Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (63)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Update<br/>firmware load</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>status output<br/>Self-Test</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>linux<br/>kernel<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Update<br/>firmware load</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>status output<br/>Self-Test</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>linux<br/>kernel<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000 Firmware Version: 5.6.3 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. www.paloaltonetworks.com © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks. A list of our trademarks can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective companies. Revision Date: May 31, 2024 Document Version: 1.3

The table below provides the security levels of the various sections of FIPS 140-3 in relation to the Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000 with firmware version 5.6.3 (hereinafter referred to as the Module or ION module). The Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000 enable the integration of a diverse set of wide area network (WAN) connection types, improve application performance and visibility, enhance security and compliance, and reduce the overall cost and complexity of a WAN. Built with the intent to reduce remote infrastructure, Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN ION devices enable the cloud-delivered branch. Table 1 - Security Levels The module is designed to meet an overall security level 2. FIPS 140-3 conformance testing was performed at Security Level 2 with the following configurations noted in the table 2 Cryptographic Boundary The module is a hardware multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module. The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire modules’ chassis unit encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," “rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case, and shown in the Physical Security section. These modules are described in more detail in the Cryptographic Module Figure 1 - ION 1200 Figure 2 - ION 9000 © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000 3

Figure 3 - ION 1200 (Top), ION 1200-C-NA/ION 1200-C-ROW (Middle), and ION 1200-C-5G-WW (Bottom) Front Interfaces Figure 4 - ION 1200 (Top), ION 1200-C-NA/ION 1200-C-ROW (Middle), and ION 1200-C-5G-WW (Bottom) Rear Interfaces Figure 5 - ION 9000 Front Interfaces

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Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration Note: The part number for Tamper Evidence Label (TEL) can be found in section Physical security of this document. Modes of operation By default, the module is delivered with a non-Approved mode of operation but supports an Approved mode of operation. Once the module is configured to operate in the Approved mode of operation by following the steps in section "Secure Operation" of this document by the Crypto Officer, the module can only operate in the Approved mode. The module does not claim implementation of a degraded mode of operation. The tables below list all Approved or Vendor-affirmed security functions of the module, including specific key size(s) (in bits unless noted otherwise) employed for Approved services, and implemented modes of operation. There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in these tables. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION)

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Table 3 - Approved Algorithms (Crypto Library I) © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000 7

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Table 4 - Approved Algorithms (Crypto Library II) © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000 9

A2387

SHS ● FIPS 180-4

SHA2-512

N/A

Hashing

Table 5 - Approved Algorithms (Crypto Library III) Table 6 - Approved Algorithms (Crypto Library IV) Table 7 - Approved Algorithms (Crypto Library V) Notes:

• There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in these tables.
• The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG C.H scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section

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3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.

• No parts of the SSH, TLS, SNMP and IKE protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. As the module can only be operated in the Approved mode of operation, and any algorithms not listed in the tables 3-8 above will be rejected by the module while in the approved mode, the tables defined in SP800-140B for the following categories are missing from this document.
• Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in Approved Mode of Operation
• Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed
• Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in Approved Mode of Operation Cryptographic Module Interfaces The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical interfaces provided by the output (N/A), status output, and power. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following table. Table 8 - Ports and Interfaces (ION 1200 Interface Descriptions) Note: USB ports on each ION 1200 module are functionally disabled. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000 11

Power

Table 9 - ION 1200 Interface Quantity Table 11 - ION 9000 Interface Quantity The modules all support role-based authentication, and provide a Crypto Officer and User role. The Crypto Officer role has the ability to perform all tasks and administrative actions while the User is read-only.

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Table 15 – Approved Services G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroizes the SSP. Unauthenticated Services Unauthenticated Users can run the self-test service by power-cycling the module by removing the power and re-applying. Software/Firmware Security Integrity Techniques The module performs the Firmware Integrity test by using HMAC-SHA2-256 (HMAC Cert. #A2385) during the PreOperational Self-Test. A Firmware Integrity Test Key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware integrity test only at the pre-operational self-test. At Module’s initialization, the integrity of the runtime executable is verified using an HMAC-SHA2-256 digest which is compared to a value computed at build time. If at the load time the MAC does not match the stored, known MAC value, the module would enter to an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited. The module also supports the firmware load test by using RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-256 (RSA Cert. #A2385) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test Key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to load new firmware, the Crypto Officer must authenticate into the module before loading any firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails. Integrity Test On-Demand Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the module to initiate the software integrity test on-demand. This automatically performs the integrity test of all firmware components included within the boundary of the module. Operational Environment The FIPS 140-3 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable as the module is not operated in a modifiable operational environment. The operational environment is limited as the modules include a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into these modules is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.

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The module’s physical security includes tamper evident labels that are utilized to meet FIPS 140-3 Level 2 requirements. Details regarding the label placement are noted below: Table 16 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines Kit Part Numbers The module requires the following for physical security requirements: If additional labels are needed, the CO will need to contact Palo Alto Networks. The following section demonstrates how to apply the tamper evident labels (TELs) to the ION 1200 module. The enclosure of the modules is the same. Approved mode. TELs shall be applied as depicted in the figures below. Any unused TELs must be securely stored, accounted for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location. Should the CO have to remove, change or replace TELs (tamper-evidence labels) for any reason, the CO must examine the location from which the TEL was removed and ensure that no residual debris is still remaining on the chassis or card. If residual debris remains, the CO must remove the debris using a damp cloth. Any deviation of the TELs placement by unauthorized operators such as tearing, misconfiguration, removal, change, replacement or any other change in the TELs from its original configuration as depicted below shall mean the module is no longer in the Approved mode of operation. Returning the system back to the Approved mode of operation requires the replacement of the TELs as depicted below and any additional requirement per the site security policy which are out of scope of this Security Policy. require 4 tamper evident labels. The figures below detail the location of the labels. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION)

Figure 7

• ION 1200 Front View Figure 8
• ION 1200-C-5G-WW Front View Figure 9
• ION 1200-C-NA and ION 1200-C-ROW Front View Figure 10
• ION 1200 Left View (same for all models) Figure 11
• ION 1200 Right View (same for all models)

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Figure 12

• ION 1200 Top View Figure 13
• ION 1200 Rear View Figure 14
• ION 1200-C-5G-WW/ION 1200-C-NA/ION 1200-C-ROW Top View © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000 19

Figure 15

• ION 1200 Bottom View Figure 16
• ION 1200-C-5G-WW/ION 1200-C-NA/ION 1200-C-ROW Bottom View ION 9000 Physical Security The following section demonstrates how to apply the tamper evident labels to the ION 9000 module. The module requires a total of six tamper evident labels. The figures below detail the location of the labels. Figure 17
• Rear view of ION 9000

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Figure 18

• Left side view of ION 9000 Figure 19
• Right side view of ION 9000 Figure 20
• Front side view of ION 9000 Figure 21
• Top side view of ION 9000 © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000 21

Figure 22 – Bottom side view of ION 9000 No approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics are defined at this time. Sensitive Security Parameters

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Table 17 - SSPs Notes: 1. To initiate zeroization, see Section End of Life / Sanitization in this document for more details.

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2. The zeroization operations shall be performed under the control of the CO role.
3. The zeroized SSPs cannot be retrieved or reused. Once the command is initiated, the SSPs are overwritten with 0s. Table 18 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification The modules perform the following self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and Conditional self-tests. Pre-Operational Self-Tests Table 19 - Crypto Library I Pre-Operational Self-Tests The modules also perform the following Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CASTs), which can be initiated by rebooting the module. All self-tests run without operator intervention. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000 25

Table 20 –Crypto Library I CASTs Table 21 –Crypto Library II CASTs

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Table 22 –Crypto Library III and IV CASTs Table 23 – Crypto Library V CASTs Table 24 - Crypto Library I Conditional Pair-Wise Consistency Tests Table 25 - Crypto Library II Conditional Pair-Wise Consistency Tests Error Handling If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the cause of the error and enters an error state (there is only one error state). In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only software integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The table below shows the different causes that lead to the Error State and the status indicators reported. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000 27

Table 28 - Error State Indicators Life-Cycle Assurance All ION devices are designed to handle the various stages of a module’s life-cycle. The sections below highlight the details for each stage. Secure Delivery Procedures The security of the module is maintained during the transfer of these products from production sites to the customer through the following mechanisms: ● Email from Palo Alto Networks, Inc. confirming the order and includes tracking number(s). When the package arrives at the customer site, the customer checks the tracking number on the package with the tracking number supplied by Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ● The customer also checks the integrity of the package by inspecting the integrity of the security tape and the seals of the package for tampering ● The hardware and applicable documentation are delivered in the same package Secure Operation The module meets all the Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-3, and only includes an Approved mode of operation. Once the module has been received, the Crypto Officer shall follow the secure operations provided below to place the module in the Approved mode. The module runs firmware version 5.6.3. This is the only allowable firmware image for this current Approved mode of operation. The module is initiated into the Approved mode of operation via the following procedure:

1. The Crypto Officer must apply tamper evidence labels as described in Section “Physical Security” of this document
2. Power on the ION device
3. Using the Controller, navigate to the device that is to be initiated a. Note: The module authenticates the Crypto Officer using default authentication (Root CA), and then replaces the default information with a specific one from the Controller
4. Click the three bullets next to the device
5. Select “FIPS” a. Click “proceed” to begin initialization procedure
6. The module will begin initialization that includes the following: a. Zeroization of any sensitive information or data b. Power cycle of the device followed by running all self-tests
7. Once initialization is complete, the module displays the following status output: a. Device Mode: “fips” b. Self-tests: “Power-up self-test successful” Once the module has completed initialization into the Approved mode of operation, the module automatically enforces a password change for the Crypto Officer. Any non-approved configurations/algorithms are rejected automatically by the module and an error message is output. The Crypto Officer shall load the FIPS 140-3 validated firmware only to maintain validation. End of Life / Sanitization End of life dates for software and hardware modules are announced publicly via Palo Alto Networks’ services website. Crypto Officers should follow the procedure below for the secure destruction of their module:

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Note: This process will cause the module to no longer function after it has wiped all configurations and keys.

1. Access the module via SSH with Crypto Officer
2. Authenticate using proper credentials
3. Execute command: “disable system” a. Confirm command
4. Module will begin zeroization process and wipe all security parameters and configurations within the module’s boundary Administrator/User Guidance Palo Alto Networks provides documentation for all products, which can be accessed here: https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/techdocs/en_US/pdf/prisma/prisma-sd-wan/prisma-sd-wanadmin/prisma-sd-wan-admin.pdf The ION devices include the following Administrator's Guide that shall be used by the Crypto Officer: Prisma SD-WAN Administrator’s Guide (Revision Date: September 14, 2021) Mitigation of Other Attacks This module is not designed to mitigate against any other attacks outside of the FIPS 140-3 scope. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200 and ION 9000 29