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CMVP Validated Module · FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200, ION 1200-S, ION 3200, ION 5200, and ION 9200

Certificate#4719StandardFIPS 140-3Level2TypeHardwareEmbodimentMulti-Chip Stand AloneStatusActiveVendorPalo Alto Networks, Inc.
Medium review priority  ·  exposes firmware-update authentication  ·  last validated 24 months ago. How this is derived →

Certificate

StandardFIPS 140-3
Overall level2
Module typeHardware
EmbodimentMulti-Chip Stand Alone
StatusActive
Sunset date7/10/2029
CaveatInterim Validation. The tamper evident seals installed as indicated in the Security Policy
VendorPalo Alto Networks, Inc.

Approved Algorithms (50)

AlgorithmACVP Cert
AES-CBCA3563
AES-CBCA3564
AES-CBCA3565
AES-CTRA3563
AES-ECBA3563
AES-GCMA3563
AES-GCMA3564
Counter DRBGA3563
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)A3563
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)A3564
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)A3563
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A3563
HMAC DRBGA3564
HMAC-SHA-1A3563
HMAC-SHA2-224A3563
HMAC-SHA2-256A3563
HMAC-SHA2-256A3564
HMAC-SHA2-256A3565
HMAC-SHA2-384A3563
HMAC-SHA2-384A3564
HMAC-SHA2-384A3565
HMAC-SHA2-512A3563
HMAC-SHA2-512A3565
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3A3563
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3A3564
KDF IKEv2A3563
KDF SNMPA3563
KDF SSHA3563
KDF TLSA3563
KDF TLSA3564
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)A3563
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)A3563
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A3563
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A3564
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)C170
SHA-1A3563
SHA-1C170
SHA2-224A3563
SHA2-224A3564
SHA2-256A3563
SHA2-256A3564
SHA2-256A3565
SHA2-256C170
SHA2-384A3563
SHA2-384A3564
SHA2-384A3565
SHA2-512A3563
SHA2-512A3564
SHA2-512A3564
SHA2-512A3565

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200, ION 1200-S, ION 3200, ION 5200, and ION 9200
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Update</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>status output</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;
Underlying clues
flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200, ION 1200-S, ION 3200, ION 5200, and ION 9200
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Update</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>status output</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Page 1

Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200, ION 1200-S, ION 3200, ION 5200, and ION 9200 Firmware Version: 6.1.2 Documentation Version: 1.3 Last Update: June 17, 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. www.paloaltonetworks.com © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks. A list of our trademarks can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective companies. Revision Date: June 17, 2024 Document Version: 1.3

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Table of Contents
#SectionPage
Page 3
ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6. [Number Below]FIPS 140-3 Section TitleSecurity Level
1General2
2Cryptographic Module Specification2
3Cryptographic Module Interfaces2
4Roles, Services, and Authentication2
5Software/Firmware Security2
6Operational EnvironmentN/A
7Physical Security2
8Non-invasive SecurityN/A
9Sensitive Security Parameter Management2
10Self-tests2
11Life-Cycle Assurance2
12Mitigation of Other AttacksN/A
ModelHardware [Part Number and Version]Firmware VersionDistinguishing Features
ION 1200ION 12006.1.2See Cryptographic Module Interfaces section
ION 1200ION 1200-C-NA6.1.2
ION 1200ION 1200-C-ROW6.1.2
ION 1200ION 1200-C-5G-WW6.1.2
ION 1200-SION 1200-S6.1.2
ION 1200-SION 1200-S-C-NA6.1.2
ION 1200-SION 1200-S-C-ROW6.1.2
ION 1200-SION 1200-S-C-5G-WW6.1.2
ION 3200ION 32006.1.2
ION 5200ION 52006.1.2
ION 9200ION 92006.1.2

The table below provides the security levels of the various sections of FIPS 140-3 in relation to the Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200, ION 1200-S, ION 3200, ION 5200, and ION 9200 (hereinafter referred to as the Module or ION module). The Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices enable the integration of a diverse set of wide area network (WAN) connection types, improve application performance and visibility, enhance security and compliance, and reduce the overall cost and complexity of a WAN. Built with the intent to reduce remote infrastructure, Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN ION devices enable the cloud-delivered branch. Table 1 - Security Levels The module is designed to meet an overall security level 2. The module is a hardware multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module. FIPS 140-3 conformance testing was performed at Security Level 2 with the configurations noted in the table 2 below. Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices

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Cryptographic Boundary The module’s cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire chassis unit’s physical perimeter encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," “rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case, and shown in the figures below and in the Physical Security section. Figure 1 - ION 1200 Figure 2 - ION 1200 (Top), ION 1200-C-NA/ION 1200-C-ROW (Middle), and ION 1200-C-5G-WW (Bottom) front interfaces Figure 3 - ION 1200-S (Top), ION 1200-S-C-NA/ION 1200-S-C-ROW (Middle), and ION 1200-S-C-5G-WW (Bottom) front interfaces

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Figure 4 - ION 1200 (Top), ION 1200-C-NA/ION 1200-C-ROW (Middle), and ION 1200-C-5G-WW (Bottom) Rear Interfaces Figure 5 - ION 1200-S (Top), ION 1200-S-C-NA/ION 1200-S-C-ROW (Middle), and ION 1200-S-C-5G-WW (Bottom) Rear Interfaces Figure 6 - ION 3200 Front Interfaces Figure 7 - ION 3200 Rear Interfaces Figure 8 - ION 5200 Front Interfaces © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200, ION 1200-S, ION 3200, ION 5200, and ION 9200 5

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CAVP CertAlgorithm and StandardMode/MethodDescription/Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function
A3563AES: ● FIPS 197SP 800-38DECB128, 192, and 256 bitsData Encryption/Decryption
A3563AES: ● FIPS 197SP 800-38ACBC128, 192, and 256 bitsData Encryption/Decryption
A3563AES: ● FIPS 197SP 800-38ACTR128, 192, and 256 bitsData Encryption/Decryption
A3563AES: ● FIPS 197SP 800-38DGCM128, 192, and 256 bitsData Encryption/Decryption
A3563KDF SSH: ● SP 800-135rev1 (CVL)KDF SSHv2N/ASP800-135rev1 compliant Key Derivation
A3563KDF TLS: ● SP 800-135rev1 (CVL)KDF TLSv1.2N/ASP800-135rev1 compliant Key Derivation
A3563KDF IKEv2:KDF IKEv2N/ASP800-135rev1 compliant Key Derivation

Figure 9 - ION 5200 Rear Interfaces Figure 10 - ION 9200 Front Interfaces Figure 11 - ION 9200 Rear Interfaces Modes of Operation The module has one approved mode of operation and is always in the approved mode of operation after initial operations are performed (See Section 11). The module does not claim implementation of a degraded mode of operation. Section 4 provides details on the service indicator implemented by the module. The tables 3-6 below list all Approved or Vendor-affirmed security functions of the module, including specific key size(s) (in bits unless noted otherwise) employed for Approved services, and implemented modes of operation. There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in these tables.

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CAVP CertAlgorithm and StandardMode/MethodDescription/Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function
● SP 800-135rev1 (CVL)
A3563KDF SNMP: ● SP 800-135rev1 (CVL)KDF SNMPv3N/ASP800-135rev1 compliant Key Derivation
A3563DRBG: ● SP 800-90Arev1CTR_DRBG (AES-256 bits) Derivation Function Enabled: YesN/ADeterministic Random Bit Generation
A3563KAS-SSC ● SP 800-56Arev3KAS-ECC-SSC Ephemeral UnifiedKAS-ECC-SSC with P-256, P-384, P-521; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strengthKAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation
A3563KAS (ECC) ● SP 800-56Arev3KAS (ECC) Scheme: ephemeralUnifie d: KAS Role: initiator, responderKAS (ECC): Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521; Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strengthKey Agreement Scheme per SP800-56Arev3 with key derivation function (SP800-135rev1) Note: The module’s KAS (ECC) implementation is FIPS140-3 IG D.F Scenario 2 (path 2) compliant
A3563ECDSA ● FIPS 186-4ECDSA KeyGenCurves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521ECDSA Key Generation
A3563ECDSA ● FIPS 186-4ECDSA SigGenCurves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521ECDSA Digital Signature Generation
A3563ECDSA ● FIPS 186-4ECDSA SigVerCurves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521ECDSA Digital Signature Verification
A3563HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA-1At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3563HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2- 224At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3563HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2- 256At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3563HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2- 384At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3563HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2- 512At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3563KTS ● SP800-38FKTS (AES Cert. #A3563)128, 192, and 256 bitsKey Transport using AES- GCM; Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength
A3563KTS ● SP800-38FKTS (AES Cert. #A3563 and HMAC Cert. #A3563)128, 192, and 256 bitsKey Transport using AES and HMAC; Key establishment methodology provides

© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200, ION 1200-S, ION 3200, ION 5200, and ION 9200 7

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CAVP CertAlgorithm and StandardMode/MethodDescription/Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength
A3563RSA ● FIPS 186-4RSA KeyGen (PKCS#1 v1.5)Modulus: 2048 and 3072 bitsRSA Key Generation
A3563RSA ● FIPS 186-4RSA SigGen (PKCS#1 v1.5)Modulus: 2048 and 3072 bitsRSA Digital Signature Generation
A3563RSA ● FIPS 186-4RSA SigVer (PKCS#1 v1.5)Modulus: 2048 and 3072 bitsRSA Digital Signature Verification
A3563SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA-1N/AHashing Note: SHA-1 is not used for digital signature generation
A3563SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-256N/AHashing
A3563SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-384N/AHashing
A3563SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-512N/AHashing
Vendor AffirmedCKG (SP 800-133rev2)Section 5Cryptographic Key Generation; SP 800- 133rev2 and IG D.H.Key Generation Note: The cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per section 5 in SP800- 133rev2 (vendor affirmed). A seed (i.e., the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is a direct output from SP800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG (DRBG Cert. #A3563).
CAVP CertAlgorithm and StandardMode/MethodDescription/Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function
A3564AES: ● FIPS 197SP 800-38ACBC128 or 256 bitsData Encryption/Decryption
A3564AES: ● FIPS 197SP 800-38DGCM128 or 256 bitsData Encryption/Decryption
A3564KDF TLS: ● SP 800-135rev1 (CVL)TLS 1.2 KDFN/ASP800-135rev1 compliant Key Derivation
A3564DRBG: ● SP 800-90Arev1DRBG with HMAC- SHA2-512N/ADeterministic Random Bit Generation
A3564KAS-SSC ● SP 800-56Arev3KAS-ECC-SSC Ephemeral UnifiedKAS-ECC-SSC with P-256, P- 384, P-521; Key establishment methodology provides between 128 256 bits of encryption strengthKAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation

Table 3 - Approved Algorithms (Crypto Library - I)

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CAVP CertAlgorithm and StandardMode/MethodDescription/Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function
A3564KAS ● SP 800-56Arev3KAS (ECC) Scheme: ephemeralUnified: KAS Role: initiator, responderKAS (ECC): Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521; Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strengthKey Agreement Scheme per SP800-56Arev3 with key derivation function (SP800-135rev1) Note: The module’s KAS (ECC) implementation is FIPS140-3 IG D.F Scenario 2 (path 2) compliant
A3564ECDSA ● FIPS 186-4ECDSA KeyGenCurves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521ECDSA Key Generation
A3564ECDSA ● FIPS 186-4ECDSA KeyVerCurves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521ECDSA Key Verification
A3564HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2-256At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3564HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2-384At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3564HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2-512At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3564KTS ● SP800-38FKTS (AES Cert. #A2386)128 or 256 bitsKey Transport using AES- GCM; Key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength
A3564KTS ● SP800-38FKTS (AES Cert. #A2386 and HMAC Cert. #A2386)128 or 256 bitsKey Transport using AES and HMAC; Key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength
A3564RSA ● FIPS 186-4RSA SigVer (PKCS#1 v1.5)Modulus: 2048 bitsDigital Signature Verification
A3564SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-256N/AHashing
A3564SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-384N/AHashing
A3564SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-512N/AHashing
Vendor AffirmedCKG (SP 800-133rev2)Section 5.1, Section 5.2Cryptographic Key Generation; SP 800- 133rev2 and IG D.I.Key Generation Note: The cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per section 5 in SP800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed). A seed (i.e., the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is a direct output from SP800- 90Arev1 CTR_DRBG (DRBG Cert. #A3564).

© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200, ION 1200-S, ION 3200, ION 5200, and ION 9200 9

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CAVP CertAlgorithm and StandardMode/MethodDescription/Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function
A3565AES: ● [FIPS 197; SP 800-38A]CBC128 or 256 bitsData Encryption/Decryption
A3565HMAC ● [FIPS 198-1]HMAC-SHA2-256At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3565HMAC ● [FIPS 198-1]HMAC-SHA2-384At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3565HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2-512At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3565SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-256N/AHashing
A3565SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-384N/AHashing
A3565SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-512N/AHashing
CAVP CertAlgorithm and StandardMode/MethodDescription/Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function
C170RSA FIPS 186-4RSA SigVer (PKCS#1 v1.5)Modulus: 2048 bitsDigital Signature Verification
C170SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA-1N/AHashing Note: SHA-1 is not used for digital signature generation
C170SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-256N/AHashing
Vendor NameCertificate Number
Palo Alto NetworksE68
Palo Alto NetworksE71

Table 4 - Approved Algorithms (Crypto Library

52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme

were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. ● No parts of the SSH, TLS, SNMP and IPSec/IKE protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Table 7 - Entropy Certificates Notes:

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Physical PortION 1200 QtyION 1200-C-NA QtyION 1200-C-ROW QtyION 1200-C-5G-WW Qty
LEDs4555
USBs2 x Type-A (Functionally Disabled)2 x Type-A (Functionally Disabled)2 x Type-A (Functionally Disabled)2 x Type-A (Functionally Disabled)
Console1 x RJ-451 x RJ-451 x RJ-451 x RJ-45
Ethernet4 x RJ-454 x RJ-454 x RJ-454 x RJ-45
Uplink ConnectorNone334
Power1111
Physical PortLogical InterfaceData that passes over port/interface
Ethernet and Uplink ConnectorData InputData input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data.
Ethernet and Uplink ConnectorData OutputData output from the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data.
Ethernet and Uplink ConnectorControl InputControl Data input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data.
Console, Ethernet, Uplink Connector and LEDsStatus OutputStatus Information output from the module.
N/AControl OutputN/A
PowerN/AProvide the Power Supply to the module.
Physical PortION 1200-S QtyION 1200-S-C-NA QtyION 1200-S-C-ROW QtyION 1200-S-C-5G- WW Qty
USB2 x USB 3.0 (Functionally Disabled)2 x USB 3.0 (Functionally Disabled)2 x USB 3.0 (Functionally Disabled)
Page 12
Console111
Micro USB111
SFP/RJ-45 Combo portPorts 1 and 2 (SFP/RJ- 45 Combo)Ports 1 and 2 (SFP/RJ- 45 Combo)Ports 1 and 2 (SFP/RJ-45 Combo)
ByPass Pair (Note: This is not for FIPS 140-3 Bypass Service)Ports 3 and 4Ports 3 and 4Ports 3 and 4
Ethernet PortsPorts 5 - 10 (Access Ports) Ports 7 - 10 (PoE)Ports 1 - 10 (Access Ports) Ports 7 - 10 (PoE)Ports 1 - 10 (Access Ports) Ports 7 - 10 (PoE)
LEDs344
Power222
Uplink ConnectorN/A34
Physical PortLogical InterfaceData that passes over port/interface
Ethernet, PoE, SFP/RJ-45 Combo port, ByPass Pair, and Uplink ConnectorData InputData input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data.
Ethernet, PoE, SFP/RJ-45 Combo port, ByPass Pair, and Uplink ConnectorData OutputData output from the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data.
Ethernet, PoE, SFP/RJ-45, and Uplink ConnectorControl InputControl Data input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data.
Console, Ethernet, PoE, ByPass Pair, SFP/RJ-45 Combo port, Uplink Connector, and LEDsStatus OutputStatus Information output from the module.
N/AControl OutputN/A
PowerN/AProvide the Power Supply to the module.
Physical PortION 3200 Qty
USB2 x USB 3.0(Functionally Disabled)
Console1 x RJ-45 serial console port
Micro USB1 x USB Type B console connector
SFP / RJ-45 Combo portPorts 1 and 2 (SFP/RJ-45)
ByPass Pair (Note: This is not for FIPS 140-3 Bypass Service)Ports 3 and 4 (RJ-45)
Ethernet or PoEPorts 5 - 10 (RJ-45) Ports 7 - 10 (PoE)
LEDs3
Power2

Table 11 - Ports and Interfaces (ION 1200-S)

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Physical PortLogical InterfaceData that passes over port/interface
Ethernet, PoE, ByPass Pair, SFP/RJ-45 Combo portData InputData input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data. Status of the module via LEDs.
Ethernet, PoE, ByPass Pair, SFP/RJ-45 Combo portData OutputData output from the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data. Status of the module via LEDs.
Ethernet, PoE, SFP/RJ-45 Combo portControl InputControl Data input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data
Console, ByPass Pair, Ethernet, PoE, SFP/RJ-45 Combo port, and LEDsStatus OutputStatus Information output from the module.
N/AControl OutputN/A
PowerN/AProvides the power supply to the module.
Physical PortION 5200 Qty
ByPass Pair (Note: This is not for FIPS 140-3 Bypass Service)Ports 1 - 4
PoEPorts 9 - 12
SFP+Ports 13 - 16
EthernetPorts 5 - 8, Ports 17-19 (RJ-45)
Console1 x RJ-45 serial console port
USB1
Micro USB1
LEDs9
Power2
Physical PortLogical InterfaceData that passes over port/interface
Ethernet, PoE, ByPass Pair, SFP+/RJ-45 Combo portData InputData input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data. Status of the module via LEDs.
Ethernet, PoE, ByPass Pair, SFP+/RJ-45 Combo portData OutputData output from the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data. Status of the module via LEDs.
Ethernet, PoE, SFP+/RJ-45 Combo portControl InputControl Data input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data.
Console, ByPass Pair, Ethernet, PoE, SFP+/RJ-45 Combo port, and LEDsStatus OutputStatus Information output from the module.
N/AControl OutputN/A
PowerN/AProvides the power supply to the module.

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Physical PortION 9200 Qty
ByPass Pair (Note: This is not for FIPS 140-3 Bypass Service)Ports 1 - 8
PoEPorts 9 - 12
SFP+Ports 13 - 22
EthernetPorts 23 - 25 (RJ-45)
Console1 x RJ-45 serial console port
USB1
Micro USB1
LEDs9
Power2
Physical PortLogical InterfaceData that passes over port/interface
Ethernet, PoE, ByPass Pair, SFP+Data InputData input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data. Status of the module via LEDs.
Ethernet, PoE, ByPass Pair, SFP+Data OutputData output from the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data. Status of the module via LEDs.
Ethernet, PoE, SFP+Control InputControl Data input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 service data.
Console, ByPass Pair, Ethernet, PoE, SFP+ and LEDsStatus OutputStatus Information output from the module.
N/AControl OutputN/A
PowerN/AProvides the power supply to the module.
RoleServiceInputOutput
Crypto OfficerCrypto Officer Role AuthenticationCrypto Officer role authentication requestStatus of Crypto Officer role authentication
Crypto OfficerPerform Self-TestCommand to trigger Self-TestStatus of the self-tests results
Crypto OfficerPerform ZeroizationCommand to initiate the SSPs zeroizationStatus of the SSPs zeroization
Crypto OfficerFirmware UpdateCommand to upload a new validated firmwareStatus of the updated firmware installation
Crypto OfficerShow VersionCommand to show versionModule’s name/ID and versions
Crypto OfficerShow StatusCommand to show statusModule’s status information

Note: All USB ports on each ION 9200 module are functionally disabled. The modules all support role-based authentication, and provide the Crypto Officer role and the User role. The Crypto Officer role has the ability to perform all tasks and administrative actions while the User is read-only.

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Crypto OfficerConfigure NetworkCommands to configure the moduleStatus of the completion of network related configuration
Crypto OfficerConfigure SSHv2 FunctionCommands to configure SSHv2Status of the completion of SSHv2 configuration
Crypto OfficerConfigure TLSv1.2 FunctionCommands to configure TLSv1.2Status of the completion of TLSv1.2 configuration
Crypto OfficerConfigure SNMPv3 FunctionCommands to configure SNMPv3Status of the completion of SNMPv3 configuration
Crypto OfficerConfigure IPSec/IKEv2 FunctionCommands to configure IPSec/IKEv2Status of the completion of IPSec/IKEv2 configuration
RoleServiceInputOutput
UserUser Role AuthenticationUser role authentication requestStatus of User role authentication
UserShow VersionCommand to show versionModule’s name/ID and versions
UserShow StatusInitialize show status commandModule’s status information
UserRun SSHv2 FunctionInitiate SSHv2 tunnel establishment requestStatus of SSHv2 tunnel establishment
UserRun TLSv1.2 FunctionInitiate TLSv1.2 tunnel establishment requestStatus of TLSv1.2 tunnel establishment
UserRun SNMPv3 FunctionInitiate SNMPv3 tunnel establishment requestStatus of SNMPv3 tunnel establishment
UserRun IPsec/IKEv2 FunctionInitiate IPsec/IKEv2 tunnel establishment requestStatus of IPSec/IKEv2 tunnel establishment
RoleAuthentication MethodAuthentication Strength
UserPassword/Pre- shared SecretThe modules support Password based authentication mechanism using the minimum length is eight (8) characters password (94 possible characters from the keyboard). The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/(94^8) which is less than 1/1,000,000. For multiple attacks during a one-minute period, as the module supports at most 3 failed attempts to authenticate in a one-minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 3/(94^8), which is less than 1/100,000. This calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total.
Crypto Officer, UserRSAThe modules support RSA public-key based authentication mechanism using a minimum of RSA 2048 bits, which provides 112 bits of security strength. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^112) which is less than 1/1,000,000. For multiple attacks during a one-minute period, as the module at its highest can support at most 17,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^112), which is less than 1/100,000.
UserECDSAThe modules support ECDSA public-key based authentication mechanism using a minimum of curve P-256, which provides 128 bits of security strength. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^128) which is less than 1/1,000,000. For multiple attacks during a one-minute period, as the module at its highest can support at most 17,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^128), which is less than 1/100,000.

Table 19 - Roles, Services Commands, Input and Output (User) Table 20 - Roles and Authentication © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200, ION 1200-S, ION 3200, ION 5200, and ION 9200 15

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ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and / or SSPsIndicator
Crypto Officer role Authenticatio nCrypto Officer Role AuthenticationRSA SigVerCrypto Officer Authentication RSA Public Key (PSP)Crypto OfficerW/E/ZCO role successful login status
Perform Self- TestInitiate and run the pre-operational self-tests pre-operational self-testsHMAC-SHA2- 256Firmware Integrity Test Key (Non-SSP)Crypto OfficerN/ANone
Perform ZeroizationZeroize all unprotected SSPs stored in the moduleN/AAllCrypto OfficerZNone
Firmware UpdateThe module’s firmware is updated to a new versionRSA Signature VerificationFirmware Update Key (SSP)Crypto OfficerEFirmware update completion message
Show VersionProvides the module’s name/ID and versionsN/AN/ACrypto Officer/ UserN/ANone
Show StatusProvides the module’s current status and informationN/AN/ACrypto Officer/ UserN/ANone
Configure NetworkPerform the Module’s Network ConfigurationN/AN/ACrypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and Configuratio n logs
Configure SSHv2 FunctionCreate a secure SSHv2 channelAES-CTR; CKG; CTR_DRBG; ECDSA KeyGen; ECDSA KeyVer; ECDSA SigGen; ECDSA SigVer; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA2- 256; HMAC-SHA2- 512; KAS-SSC (ECC); KAS (ECC); KDF SSHDRBG Entropy Input (CSP); DRBG Seed (CSP); DRBG Internal State V Value (CSP); DRBG Key (CSP); SSH ECDHE Private Key (CSP); SSH ECDHE Public Key (PSP); Peer SSH ECDHE Public Key (PSP); SSH ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP); SSH ECDSA Private Key (CSP); SSH ECDSA Public Key (PSP); SSH Session Encryption Key (CSP); SSH Session Authentication Key (CSP)Crypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and SSH connection log message
Configure TLSv1.2 FunctionCreate a secure TLSv1.2 channelAES-CBC; AES-GCM; CKG;DRBG Entropy Input (CSP); DRBG Seed (CSP);Crypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and

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ServiceDescriptionApproved Security Functions CTR_DRBG; HMAC_DRBG; HMAC-SHA2- 256; HMAC-SHA2- 384; KAS-SSC (ECC); KAS (ECC); KTS; RSA KeyGen; RSA SigGen; RSA SigVer; KDF TLSKeys and/or SSPs DRBG Internal State V Value (CSP); DRBG Key (CSP); TLS RSA Private Key (CSP); TLS RSA Public Key (PSP); TLS ECDHE Private Key (CSP); TLS ECDHE Public Key (PSP); Peer TLS ECDHE Public Key (PSP); TLS ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP); TLS Pre-Master Secret (CSP); TLS Master Secret (CSP); TLS Session Encryption Key (CSP); TLS Session Authentication Key (CSP)RolesAccess rights to Keys and / or SSPsIndicator TLS success log message
Configure SNMPv3 FunctionCreate a secure SNMPv3 channelAES-CBC; HMAC-SHA-1; KDF SNMPSNMPv3 Authentication Secret (CSP); SNMPv3 Session Encryption Key (CSP); SNMPv3 Session Authentication Key (CSP)Crypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and SNMPv3 success log message
Configure IPsec/IKEv2 FunctionCreate IPSec/IKEv2 tunnelAES-CBC; CKG; CTR_DRBG; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA2- 256; HMAC-SHA2- 384; HMAC-SHA2- 512; KAS-SSC (ECC); KAS (ECC); RSA KeyGen; RSA SigGen; RSA SigVer; KDF IKEv2DRBG Entropy Input (CSP); DRBG Seed (CSP); DRBG Internal State V Value (CSP); DRBG Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE Pre-Shared Secret (CSP); IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key (PSP); IPSec/IKE ECDHE Private Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE ECDHE Public Key (PSP); IPSec/IKE ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP); IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE Session Authentication Key (CSP);Crypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and IPSec success log message
User role Authenticatio nUser Role AuthenticationN/AUser Password (CSP)UserW/EN/A
Run SSHv2 FunctionNegotiation and encrypted data transport via SSHAES-CTR; CKG; CTR_DRBG;DRBG Entropy Input (CSP); DRBG Seed (CSP); DRBG Internal State V Value (CSP);UserG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and SSHv2 Function

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ServiceDescriptionApproved Security Functions ECDSA KeyGen; ECDSA KeyVer; ECDSA SigGen; ECDSA SigVer; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA2- 256; HMAC-SHA2- 512; KAS-SSC (ECC); KAS (ECC); KDF SSHKeys and/or SSPs DRBG Key (CSP); SSH ECDHE Private Key (CSP); SSH ECDHE Public Key (PSP); Peer SSH ECDHE Public Key (PSP); SSH ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP); SSH ECDSA Private Key (CSP); SSH ECDSA Public Key (PSP); SSH Session Encryption Key (CSP); SSH Session Authentication Key (CSP);RolesAccess rights to Keys and / or SSPsIndicator running status message
Run TLSv1.2 FunctionNegotiation and encrypted data transport via TLSAES-CBC; AES-GCM; CKG; CTR_DRBG; HMAC_DRBG; HMAC-SHA2- 256; HMAC-SHA2- 384; KAS-SSC (ECC); KAS (ECC); KTS; RSA KeyGen; RSA SigGen; RSA SigVer; KDF TLSDRBG Entropy Input (CSP); DRBG Seed (CSP); DRBG Internal State V Value (CSP); DRBG Key (CSP); TLS RSA Private Key (CSP); TLS RSA Public Key (PSP); TLS ECDHE Private Key (CSP); TLS ECDHE Public Key (PSP); Peer TLS ECDHE Public Key (PSP); TLS ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP); TLS Pre-Master Secret (CSP); TLS Master Secret (CSP); TLS Session Encryption Key (CSP); TLS Session Authentication Key (CSP)UserG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and TLSv1.2 Function running status message
Run SNMPv3 FunctionNegotiation and encrypted data transport via SNMPv3AES-CBC; HMAC-SHA-1; KDF SNMPSNMPv3 Authentication Secret (CSP); SNMPv3 Session Encryption Key (CSP); SNMPv3 Session Authentication Key (CSP)UserG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and SNMPv3 Function running status message
Run IPSec/IKEv2 FunctionNegotiation and encrypted data transport via IPSecAES-CBC; CKG; CTR_DRBG; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA2- 256; HMAC-SHA2- 384;DRBG Entropy Input (CSP); DRBG Seed (CSP); DRBG Internal State V Value (CSP); DRBG Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE Pre-Shared Secret (CSP); IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key (CSP);UserG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and IPSec/IKEv2 Function running status message

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Service

Description

Approved Security Functions HMAC-SHA2- 512; KAS-SSC (ECC); KAS (ECC); RSA KeyGen; RSA SigGen; RSA SigVer; KDF IKEv2

Keys and/or SSPs IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key (PSP); IPSec/IKE ECDHE Private Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE ECDHE Public Key (PSP); IPSec/IKE ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP); IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE Session Authentication Key (CSP)

Roles

Access rights to Keys and / or SSPs

Indicator

Table 21 - Approved Services G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. Unauthenticated Services Unauthenticated Users can run the self-test service by power-cycling the module by removing the power and re-applying. 5. Software/Firmware Security Integrity Techniques The module performs the Firmware Integrity test by using HMAC-SHA2-256 (HMAC Cert. #A3563) during the PreOperational Self-Test. A Firmware Integrity Test Key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware integrity test only at the pre-operational self-test. At Module’s initialization, the integrity of the runtime executable is verified using an HMAC-SHA2-256 digest which is compared to a value computed at build time. If at the load time the MAC does not match the stored, known MAC value, the module would enter an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited. The module also supports the firmware load test by using RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-256 (RSA Cert. #A3563) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test Key was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to load new firmware, the Crypto Officer must authenticate into the module before loading any firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails. Integrity Test On-Demand Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the module to initiate the firmware integrity test on-demand. This automatically performs the integrity test of all firmware components included within the boundary of the module. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200, ION 1200-S, ION 3200, ION 5200, and ION 9200 19

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Physical Security MechanismRecommended Frequency of Inspection/TestInspection/Test Guidance Details
Tamper Evident Labels30 daysVerify integrity of tamper-evident seals in the locations identified in the FIPS Kit Installation Guide. Label integrity to be verified within the module’s operating temperature range. TEL Quantity Required on each Module: Qty. 3 - ION 1200; Qty 4 - ION 1200-C-NA, ION 1200-C-ROW, ION 1200-C-5G-WW; Qty. 3 - ION 1200-S, ION 1200-S-C-NA, ION 1200-S-C-ROW, ION 1200-S-C-5G-WW; Qty. 3 - ION 3200; Qty. 12 - ION 5200/9200
Opacity Shield30 daysVerify integrity of the front opacity shield such that it has not been tampered, scratched, or warped

6. Operational Environment The Operational Environment requirements are not applicable as the module does not contain modifiable operational environments. The operational environment is non-modifiable. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into these modules is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The module’s physical security includes tamper evident labels that are utilized to meet FIPS 140-3 Level 2 requirements. Details regarding the label placement are noted below: Table 22 - Physical Security Inspection Guidelines Kit Part Numbers The module requires the following for physical security requirements: If additional labels are needed, the CO will need to contact Palo Alto Networks. The following section demonstrates how to apply the tamper evident labels (TELs) to the ION 1200 modules. The enclosure of the modules is the same. mode. TELs shall be applied as depicted in the figures below. Any unused TELs must be securely stored, accounted for, and maintained by the Crypto Officer (CO) in a protected location. Should the CO have to remove, change or replace TELs for any reason, the CO must examine the location from which the TEL was removed and ensure that no residual debris is still remaining on the chassis or card. If residual debris remains, the CO must remove the debris using a damp cloth.

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Any deviation of the TELs placement by unauthorized operators such as tearing, misconfiguration, removal, change, replacement or any other change in the TELs from its original configuration as depicted below shall mean the module is no longer in Approved mode of operation. Returning the system back to Approved mode of operation requires the replacement of the TELs as depicted below and any additional requirement per the site security policy which are out of scope of this Security Policy. The ION 1200 requires 3 tamper evident labels while the ION 1200-C-NA/ION 1200-C-ROW/ION 1200-C-5G-WW require 4 tamper evident labels. The figures below detail the location of the labels. Figure 12 - ION 1200 Front View Figure 13 - ION 1200-C-5G-WW Front View Figure 14 - ION 1200-C-NA and ION 1200-C-ROW Front View Figure 15 - ION 1200 Left View (same for all models) Figure 16 - ION 1200 Right View (same for all models) © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200, ION 1200-S, ION 3200, ION 5200, and ION 9200 21

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Figure 17 - ION 1200 Top View Figure 18 - ION 1200-C-5G-WW/ION 1200-C-NA/ION 1200-C-ROW Top View Figure 19 - ION 1200 Rear View Figure 20 - ION 1200 Bottom View

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Figure 21 - ION 1200-C-5G-WW/ION 1200-C-NA/ION 1200-C-ROW Bottom View Figure 21A - ION 1200-S Rear View Figure 21B - ION 1200-S-C-NA, ION 1200-S-C-ROW, ION 1200-S-C-5G-WW Rear View Figure 21C - ION 1200-S, ION 1200-S-C-NA, ION 1200-S-C-ROW, ION 1200-S-C-5G-WW Bottom View ION 3200 The ION 3200 requires 3 tamper labels, which are placed at the following locations. Figure 22 - ION 3200 Rear View © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200, ION 1200-S, ION 3200, ION 5200, and ION 9200 23

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Figure 23 - ION 3200 Bottom View Figure 24 - ION 3200 Left Side View Figure 25 - ION 3200 Right Side View ION 5200 / 9200 The ION 5200 and ION 9200 use the same FIPS kit and have the same installation. The figure below demonstrates the tamper label placement along with the front opacity shield. Figure 26 - ION 5200/9200 FIPS Kit Installation 8. Non-Invasive Security No approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics are defined at this time.

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Key/SSP Name/TypeStrengthSecurity Function and Cert. NumberGenerationImport/ExportEstablish- mentStorageZeroizationUse & Related Keys
DRBG Entropy Input (CSP)256 bitsN/AObtained from the Entropy Source located within module’s cryptographic boundaryImport to the module via Module’s API Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to seed the DRBG
DRBG Seed (CSP)256 bitsCTR_DRBG; Cert. #A3563; HMAC_DRBG; Cert. #A3564Internally Derived from entropy input string as defined by SP800- 90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandRandom number generation
DRBG Internal State V Value256 bitsCTR_DRBG; Cert. #A3563; HMAC_DRBG; Cert. #A3564Internally Derived from entropy input string as defined by SP800- 90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandRandom number generation
DRBG Key (CSP)256 bitsCTR_DRBG; Cert. #A3563; HMAC_DRBG; Cert. #A3564Internally Derived from entropy input string as defined by SP800- 90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandRandom number generation
Crypto Officer Authentication RSA Public Key (PSP)2048 bitsSHA-1; SHA2-256; RSA SigVer Cert. #C170Pre-loaded at the factoryImport: No Export: NoN/AEmbedded in the module’s executable binary in HDD (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed for CO role authentication
User Password (CSP)8 characters minimumN/AN/AImport to the Module encrypted by TLS/SSH session key Export: NoMD/EEHDD (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed for User role authentication
Firmware Load Test Key (CSP)112 bits (Modulus: 2048 bits)RSA SigVer Cert. #A3563Pre-loaded at the build time (in the module’s binary)Import: No Export: NoN/AEmbedded in the module’s executable binary in HDD (plaintext)N/A (Note: This key is only used for Firmware Load Test and not subject to the zeroization requirement)Used for Firmware Load Test
TLS RSA Private Key (CSP)112 - 128 bits (Modulus: 2048, 3072 bits)CKG; DRBG; RSA KeyGen; RSA SigGen; Certs. #A3563 and #A3564Internally generated conformant to SP800- 133r2 (CKG) using FIPS 186-4 RSA key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/AHDD (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed for TLS peer authentication
TLS RSA Public Key (PSP)112 - 128 bits (Modulus: 2048, 3072 bits)RSA SigVer; Certs. #A3563 and #A3564Internally derived per the FIPS 186-4 RSA key generation methodImport: No Export to the TLS peer via the Module’s data output interfaceN/AHDD (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed for TLS peer authentication
TLS ECDHE Private Key (CSP)128 – 256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, P-521)CKG; DRBG; KAS-ECC-SSC; Certs. #A3563 and #A3564Internally generated conformant to SP800- 133r2 (CKG) using SP800-56Arev3 EC Diffie-Hellman key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800- 90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to derive TLS ECDHE Shared Secret
TLS ECDHE Public Key (PSP)128 – 256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, P-521)KAS-ECC-SSC Certs. #A3563 and #A3564Internally derived internally per the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement (SP800-56Arev3)Import: No Export to the TLS peer via the Module’s data output interfaceN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to derive TLS ECDHE Shared Secret
Peer TLS ECDHE Public Key (PSP)128 – 256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, P-521)N/AN/AImport to the Module via Module’s data input interface Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to derive TLS ECDHE Shared Secret

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Key/SSP Name/TypeStrengthSecurity Function and Cert. NumberGenerationImport/ExportEstablish- mentStorageZeroizationUse & Related Keys
TLS ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP)128 – 256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, P-521)KAS-ECC-SSC; KAS-ECC; Certs. #A3563 and #A3564Internally derived Using SP800-56Ar3 ECDH shared secret computation GeneratedImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to derive TLS Session Encryption Keys, TLS Session Authentication Keys
TLS Pre- Master Secret (CSP)384 bitsKeying MaterialInternally derived per SP800-135 rev1 KDF (TLSv1.2)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to derive TLS Master Secret
TLS Master Secret (CSP)384 bitsKeying MaterialInternally derived per SP800-135 rev1 KDF (TLSv1.2)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to derive TLS Encryption Keys, TLS Authentication Keys
TLS Session Encryption Key (CSP)128 or 256 bitsAES-CBC; AES-GCM; KDF TLS; KTS; Certs. #A3563 and #A3564Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP 800- 135rev1 KDF (TLSv1.2)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to secure TLS session confidentiality
TLS Session Authentication Key (CSP)At least 112 bitsKDF TLS; KTS; HMAC-SHA2-256; HMAC-SHA2-384; Certs. #A3563 and #A3564Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 rev1 KDF TLSv1.2Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to secure the TLS session integrity
IPSec/IKE Pre- Shared Secret (CSP)2048 bitsN/AN/AImport: Encrypted by using TLS/SSH session key Export: NoMD/EEHDD (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed for IPSec/IKE peer authentication
IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key (CSP)112 or 128 bits (Modulus: 2048 or 3072 bits)CKG; DRBG; RSA KeyGen; RSA SigGen; Cert. #A3563Internally generated conformant to SP800- 133r2 (CKG) using FIPS 186-4 RSA key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/AHDD (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed for IPSec/IKE peer authentication
IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key (PSP)112 or 128 bits (Modulus: 2048 or 3072 bits)RSA SigVer Cert. #A3563Internally derived per the FIPS 186-4 RSA key generation methodImport: No Export to the IPSec/IKE peer via the Module’s data output interfaceN/AHDD (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed for IPSec/IKE peer authentication
IPSec/IKE ECDHE Private Key (CSP)128 or 192 bits (Curves: P- 256 or P-384)CKG; DRBG; KAS-ECC-SSC; Cert. #A3563Internally generated conformant to SP800- 133r2 (CKG) using SP800-56Arev3 EC Diffie-Hellman key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800- 90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to derive IPSec/IKE ECDHE Shared Secret
IPSec/IKE ECDHE Public Key (PSP)128 or 192 bits (Curves: P- 256 or P-384)KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A3563Internally derived per the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement (SP800-56A rev3)Import: No Export to the IPSec/IKE peerN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to derive IPSec/IKE ECDHE Shared Secret
IPSec/IKE ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP)128 or 192 bits (Curves: P- 256 or P-384)KAS-ECC-SSC; KAS (ECC); Cert. #A3563Internally derived using SP800-56A rev3 ECDH shared secret computationImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to derive IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Keys, IPSec/IKE Authentication Keys
IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key (CSP)128-256 bitsAES-CBC; KDF IKEv2;Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP800- 135rev1 KDF (IKEv2)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to secure IPSec/IKEv2 session confidentiality

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Key/SSP Name/TypeStrengthSecurity Function and Cert. NumberGenerationImport/ExportEstablish- mentStorageZeroizationUse & Related Keys
Certs. #A3563 and #A3565
IPSec/IKE Session Authentication Key (CSP)At least 112 bitsHMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA2-256; HMAC-SHA2-384; HMAC-SHA2-512; KDF IKEv2; Certs. #A3563 and #A3565Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP800- 135rev1 KDF (IKEv2)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to secure IPSec/IKEv2 session integrity
SNMPv3 Authentication Secret (CSP)8 characters minimumN/AN/AImport: Encrypted by using TLS/SSH session key Export: NoMD/EEHDD (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed for SNMPv3 User authentication
SNMPv3 Session Encryption Key (CSP)128 bitsAES-CFB; KDF SNMPv3; Cert. #A3563Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP800- 135rev1 KDF (SNMPv3)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to secure SNMPv3 session confidentiality
SNMPv3 Session Authentication Key (CSP)160 bitsHMAC-SHA-1; KDF SNMPv3; Cert. #A3563Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP800- 135rev1 KDF (SNMPv3)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to secure SNMPv3 session integrity
SSH ECDHE Private Key (CSP)128-256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, or P-521)CKG; DRBG; KAS-ECC-SSC; Cert. #A3563Internally generated conformant to SP800- 133r2 (CKG) using SP800-56Arev3 EC Diffie-Hellman key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800- 90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to derive the SSH ECDHE Shared Secret
SSH ECDHE Public Key (PSP)P-256, P-384, or P-521KAS-ECC-SSC; Cert. #A3563Internally derived internally per the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement (SP800-56Arev3)Import: No Export to the SSH peer via the Module’s data output interfaceN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to derive the SSH ECDHE Shared Secret
SSH ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP)128-256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, or P-521)KAS-ECC-SSC; KAS-ECC; Cert. #A3566Internally derived using SP800-56A rev3 EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computationImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed to derive SSH Session Encryption Keys, SSH Session Authentication Keys
SSH ECDSA Private Key (CSP)128-256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, or P-521)CKG; DRBG; ECDSA KeyGen; ECDSA SigGen; Cert. #A3563Internally generated conformant to SP800- 133r2 (CKG) using FIPS 186-4 ECDSA key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800- 90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/AHDD (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed for SSH session authentication
SSH ECDSA Public Key (PSP)128-256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, or P-521)ECDSA SigVer; Cert. #A3563Internally derived per the FIPS 186-4 RSA key generation methodImport: No Export to the SSH peer via the Module’s data output interfaceN/AHDD (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed for SSH session authentication
SSH Session Encryption Key (CSP)128, 192, or 256 bitsAES-CTR; KDF SSH; KTS; Cert. #A3563Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP 800- 135rev1 KDF (SSHv2)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed for SSH session confidentiality protection
SSH Session Authentication Key (CSP)At least 160 bitsKDF SSH; KTS; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA2-256; HMAC-SHA2-512; Cert. #A3563Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (SSH)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext)Zeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed for SSH session integrity protection

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Entropy Source(s)Minimum Number of Bits of EntropyDetails
Palo Alto Networks DRNG Entropy Source0.6 bits entropy per sample with sample bit: 1 bitPlease refer to ESV Cert. #E68
Palo Alto Networks DRNG Entropy Source0.6 bits entropy per sample with sample bit: 1 bitPlease refer to ESV Cert. #E71
AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
SHSKAT using SHA2-256
HMACKAT using HMAC- SHA2-256
Firmware integrityUsing HMAC-SHA2-256
AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
AESAES-ECB 256 bits Encryption KAT
AESAES-ECB 256 bits Decryption KAT
AESAES-CBC 256 bits Encryption KAT
AESAES-CBC 256 bits Decryption KAT
AES-GCMAES-GCM 256 bits Encryption KAT
AES-GCMAES-GCM 256 bits Decryption KAT
DRBGCTR_DRBG (AES-256) KAT: Instantiate; KAT: Generate; KAT: Reseed Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90Arev1 Section 11.3 are performed)
ECDSA SigGenKAT using P-224 with SHA2-256 (ECDSA Signature Generation)
ECDSA SigVerKAT using P-224 with SHA2-256 (ECDSA Signature Verification)

Table 23 – SSPs Notes:

  1. To initiate zeroization, see Section End of Life / Sanitization in this document for more details.
  2. The zeroization operations shall be performed under the control of the CO role.
  3. The zeroized SSPs cannot be retrieved or reused. Once the command is initiated, the SSPs are overwritten with 0s. Table 24 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification The modules perform the following self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and Conditional self-tests. Pre-Operational Self-Tests Table 25 - Crypto Library I Pre-Operational Self-Tests The modules also perform the following Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CASTs), which can be initiated by rebooting the module. All self-tests run without operator intervention.

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AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
HMACKAT using HMAC-SHA-1
HMACKAT using HMAC-SHA2-224
HMACKAT using HMAC-SHA2-256
HMACKAT using HMAC-SHA2-384
HMACKAT using HMAC-SHA2-512
KAS-ECC-SSCKAT for KAS-ECC-SSC (Shared Secret Computation) primitive Z value
KDF IKEv2KAT for IKEv2 KDF
KDF SNMPKAT for SNMPv3 KDF
KDF SSHKAT for SSHv2 KDF
KDF TLSKAT for TLSv1.2 KDF
RSA SigGenKAT using 2048 bits modulus with SHA2-256 (RSA Signature Generation)
RSA SigVerKAT using 2048 bits modulus with SHA2-256 (RSA Signature Verification)
SHSKAT using SHA-1
AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
AESAES-CBC 256 bits Encryption KAT
AESAES-CBC 256 bits Decryption KAT
AES-GCMAES-GCM 256 bits Encryption KAT
AES-GCMAES-GCM 256 bits Encryption KAT
DRBGHMAC_DRBG (SHA2-512) KAT: Instantiate; KAT: Generate KAT: Reseed Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90Arev1 Section 11.3 are performed)
ECDSA SigGenKAT using P-224 with SHA2-256 (ECDSA Signature Generation)
ECDSA SigVerKAT using P-224 with SHA2-256 (ECDSA Signature Verification)
HMACKAT using SHA2-256
HMACKAT using SHA2-384
HMACKAT using SHA2-512
KAS-ECC-SSCKAT for KAS-ECC-SSC (Shared Secret Computation) primitive Z value
KDF TLSKAT for TLSv1.2 KDF
RSA SigGenKAT using 2048 bits modulus with SHA2-256 (RSA Signature Generation)
RSA SigVerKAT using 2048 bits modulus with SHA2-256 (RSA Signature Verification)
SHSKAT using SHA-1
AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
AESAES-CBC 128 bits Encryption KAT
AESAES-CBC 128 bits Decryption KAT
HMACKAT using SHA2-256
HMACKAT using SHA2-384
HMACKAT using SHA2-512
AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
RSAKAT using 2048 bit key, SHA2-256 (RSA Signature Verification)

Table 26

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SHS

KAT using SHA2-256

AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
SP 800-90B Health TestsThe module’s entropy source implements Start-up and Continuous health tests defined in SP800-90B, section 4.2. The entropy source utilizes Developer-Defined Alternatives to the Continuous Health Tests which is defined in SP 800-90B section 4.5.
Conditional Self-Tests AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
RSARSA Pairwise consistency test (PCT)
ECDSAECDSA PCT
KAS-ECC-SSCSP800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC PCT
AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
RSARSA Pairwise consistency test (PCT)
ECDSAECDSA PCT
KAS-ECC-SSCSP800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC PCT
Conditional Self-Tests AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
Firmware Load TestRSA 2048 with SHA2-256 Signature Verification

Table 29 –CASTs (Crypto Library V) 4.5. Table 31 - Conditional Pair-Wise Consistency Tests (Crypto Library I) Table 32 - Conditional Pair-Wise Consistency Tests (Crypto Library II) Table 33 - Conditional Firmware Load Test (Crypto Library I) Periodic/On-Demand Self-Test The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by power cycling the module. The full suite of selftests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests. It is recommended that the Crypto Officer perform periodic testing of the module’s on-demand self-tests every 60 days to ensure all components are functioning correctly. Error Handling If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the cause of the error and enters an error state (there is only one error state). In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and perform the self-tests, including the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The table below shows the different causes that lead to the Error State and the status indicators reported.

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Cause of ErrorError State Indicator
Failed Pre-Operational Firmware Integrity TestIntegrity check failed at <location>
Failed Conditional CAST<Crypto Library>: FIPS Self-test failed for <algorithm> Entering error state
Failed Conditional PCTKey verification failed
Failed Firmware Load TestVerification Failure
SP 800-90B Entropy Source Start-up/Continuous health testsNo random numbers are generated and key generation is halted

Table 35 - Error State Indicators

  1. Life-Cycle Assurance All ION devices are designed to handle the various stages of a module’s life-cycle. The sections below highlight the details for each stage. Secure Delivery Procedures The security of the module is maintained during the transfer of these products from production sites to the customer through the following mechanisms: ● Email from Palo Alto Networks, Inc. confirming the order and includes tracking number(s). When the package arrives at the customer site, the customer checks the tracking number on the package with the tracking number supplied by Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ● The customer also checks the integrity of the package by inspecting the integrity of the security tape and the seals of the package for tampering. Any damages to the security tape and the seals of the package would require the customer to contact Palo Alto. ● The hardware and applicable documentation are delivered in the same package. Secure Operation The module meets all the Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-3. Follow the secure operations provided below to place the module in approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the approved mode of operation. The module runs firmware version 6.1.2. This is the only allowable firmware image for this current approved mode of operation. The module is initiated into the Approved mode of operation via the following procedure:
  2. The Crypto Officer must apply tamper evidence labels as described in Section “Physical Security” of this document
  3. Power on the ION Module
  4. Using the Controller, navigate to the device that is to be initiated a. Note: The module authenticates the Crypto Officer using default authentication (Root CA), and then replaces the default information with a specific one from the Controller (CO role)
  5. Click the three bullets next to the device
  6. Select “FIPS” a. Click “proceed” to begin initialization procedure
  7. The module will begin initialization that includes the following: a. Zeroization of any sensitive information or data b. Power cycle of the device followed by running all self-tests
  8. Once initialization is complete, the module provides the following status output: © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Instant-On Network (ION) Devices ION 1200, ION 1200-S, ION 3200, ION 5200, and ION 9200 31
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a. Device Mode: “fips” b. Self-tests: “Power-up self test successful” Once the module has completed initialization into the Approved mode of operation, the module automatically enforces a login certificate change for the Crypto Officer. Any non-Approved configurations/algorithms are rejected automatically by the module and an error message is output. End of Life / Sanitization End of life dates for the modules are announced publicly via Palo Alto Networks’ services website. Crypto Officers should follow the procedure below for the secure destruction of their module: Note: This process will cause the module to no longer function after it has wiped all configurations and keys.

  1. Access the module via SSH with Crypto Officer
  2. Authenticate using proper credentials
  3. Execute command: “disable system” a. Confirm command
  4. Module will begin zeroization process and wipe all security parameters and configurations within the module’s boundary
  5. Mitigation of Other Attacks This module is not designed to mitigate against any other attacks outside of the FIPS 140-3 scope.

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