SUSE Linux Enterprise Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (178)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for SUSE Linux Enterprise Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output<br/>Show status</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for SUSE Linux Enterprise Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output<br/>Show status</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

SUSE Linux Enterprise Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module version 3.2 Version 1.1 Last update: 2024-06-19 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

4516 Seton Center Parkway, Suite 250

Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version 3.2 of the SUSE Linux Enterprise Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module. It has a one-to-one mapping to the [SP 800-140B] starting with section B.2.1 named “General” that maps to section 1 in this document and ending with section B.2.12 named “Mitigation of other attacks” that maps to section 12 in this document. Table 1 - Security Levels © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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The SUSE Linux Enterprise Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a Software multi-chip standalone cryptographic module.

The software block diagram below shows the cryptographic boundary of the module, and its interfaces with the operational environment. Figure 1

• Cryptographic Boundary Table 2 lists the software components of the cryptographic module, which defines its cryptographic boundary. Table 2
• Cryptographic Module Components © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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Only if the integrity test passed successfully, the module transitions to the operational state. No operator intervention is required to reach this point. The module operates in the approved mode of operation by default and can only transition into the non-approved mode by calling one of the nonapproved services listed in Table 10. Please see section 4 for the details on service indicator provided by the module that identifies when an approved service is called.

The module has been tested on the following platforms with the corresponding module variants and configuration options: Table 3 - Tested Operational Environments

In addition to the platforms listed in Table 3, SUSE has also tested the module on the platforms in Table 4, and claims vendor affirmation on them. Note: the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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© 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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Table 4 - Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments

Table 5 below lists all security functions of the module, including specific key strengths employed for approved services, and implemented modes of operation. The following are allowed for legacy use only: Digital signature verification using ECDSA with a SHA-1. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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© 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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© 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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of Operation The module does not implement non-approved algorithms that are allowed in the approved mode of operation.

of Operation with No Security Claimed The module does not implement non-approved algorithms that are allowed in the approved mode of operation.

Mode of Operation Table 6 lists non-approved algorithms that are not allowed in the approved mode of operation. These algorithms are used by the non-approved services listed in Table 10. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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Table 6 - Non-Approved Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. The operator can only interact with the module through the API provided by the module. Thus, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which the module runs. All data output via data output interface is inhibited when the module is performing preoperational test or zeroization or when the module enters error state. Table 7 - Ports and Interfaces

1 The control output interface is omitted on purpose because the module does not implement it.

© 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly assumed by the operator of the module when performing a service. The module does not support Table 8 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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The module provides services to the users that assume one of the available roles. All services are shown in Table 9 and Table

10. Table 9 lists the approved services. For each service, the table lists the associated cryptographic algorithm(s), the role to perform the service, the cryptographic keys or CSPs involved, and their access type(s). The following convention is used to specify access rights to a CSP: • G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. • R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). • W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. • E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. • Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. • N/A: the calling application does not access any CSP or key during its operation. The details of the approved cryptographic algorithms including the CAVP certificate numbers can be found in Table
11. The module implements dedicated functions based on the type of requested service to indicate whether it utilizes an approved security function or not. The specific functions are as listed below 4. _gcry_fips_indicator_hash - For digest functions For all approved services, the output of the function will be "0” indicating the service is approved. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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Service Digital signature generation Digital signature verification Public key verification Random number generation Message digest XOF

Description Generate a signature Verify a signature Verify a public key Generate random bitstrings Compute a message digest Compute the output of an XOF

Approved Security Functions RSA, SHS, DRBG ECDSA, DRBG, SHS RSA, SHS ECDSA, SHS ECDSA CTR_DRBG Hash_DRBG HMAC_DRBG SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA- 384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256

Keys and/or SSPs RSA private key ECDSA private key RSA public key ECDSA public key ECDSA public key Entropy input DRBG seed DRBG Internal state (V, Key) Entropy input DRBG seed DRBG Internal state (V, C) Entropy input DRBG seed DRBG Internal state (V, Key) N/A N/A

Roles

Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs W, E W, E W, E W, E W, E W, E E, G W, E, G W, E E, G W, E, G W, E E, G W, E, G N/A N/A

Indicator rsa_sign and _gcry_fips_indi cator_pk functions returns “0” _gcry_fips_indi cator_pk function returns “0” rsa_verify and _gcry_fips_indi cator_pk functions returns “0” _gcry_fips_indi cator_pk function returns “0” _gcry_fips_indi cator_pk function returns “0” drbg_generate function returns “0” _gcry_fips_indi cator_hash function returns “0” _gcry_fips_indi cator_hash function returns “0”

© 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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© 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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Table 10 lists the non-approved services. The details of the non-approved cryptographic algorithms available in non-approved mode can be found in Table 6. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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The integrity of the module is verified by comparing an HMAC-SHA-256 value calculated at run time with the HMAC value stored in the .hmac file that was computed at build time for each software component of the module. If the HMAC values do not match, the test fails and the module enters the error state.

Integrity tests are performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. The module provides the Self-Test service to perform self-tests on demand which includes the preoperational tests (i.e., integrity test) and cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs). This service can be invoked by using the gcry_control(GCRYCTL_SELFTEST) API function call or by powering-off and reloading the module. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are not available, and neither data input nor output is possible. In order to verify whether the self-tests have succeeded and the module is in the Operational state, the calling application may invoke the gcry_control(GCRYCTL_OPERATIONAL_P). The function will return TRUE if the module is in the operational state, FALSE if the module is in the Error state.

The module consists of executable code in the form of libgcrypt file as stated in Table 2. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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This module operates in a modifiable operational environment per the FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The SUSE Linux Enterprise Server operating system is used as the basis of other products. Compliance is maintained for SUSE products whenever the binary is found unchanged per the vendor affirmation from SUSE based on the allowance FIPS 140-3 management manual section 7.9.1 bullet 1 a i). Note: The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when supported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace utilities, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-tested operational environment.

The module shall be installed as stated in section 11. The operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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The module is comprised of software only, and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism, and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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Table 11 summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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(), e(), © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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Table 11 - SSPs The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90Arev1] for the creation of RSA and ECDSA keys, RSA and ECDSA signature generation. In addition, the module provides a Random Number Generation service to calling applications. The DRBG supports the Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG and CTR_DRBG mechanisms. The DRBG is initialized during module initialization; the module loads by default the DRBG using the HMAC_DRBG mechanism with SHA-256 and without prediction resistance. A different DRBG mechanism can be chosen by invoking the gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DRBG_REINIT) function. The module uses an [SP800-90B]-compliant entropy source specified in Table 12. This entropy source is located within the cryptographic boundary. The module obtains 384 bits to seed the DRBG, and 256 bits to reseed it, sufficient to provide a DRBG with 256 bits of security strength. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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Table 12 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

The module provides an [SP800-90Arev1]-compliant Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) for the creation of key components of asymmetric keys, and random number generation. The Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) methods implemented in the module for Approved services in approved mode are compliant with section 5.1 of [SP800-133rev2] and with IG C.H. For generating RSA and ECDSA keys the module implements asymmetric key generation services compliant with [FIPS186-4]. A seed (i.e., the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is directly obtained from the [SP800-90Arev1] DRBG.

The module provides the following key transport mechanisms:

• AES key wrapping using AES-KW.
• AES key wrapping using AES-CCM. According to Table 2: Comparable strengths in [SP 800-57rev5], the key sizes of AES provide the following security strength in approved mode of operation:
• AES key wrapping in KW mode provides 128, 192, 256-bit keys with key strength between 128-256 bits in compliance with IG D.G.
• AES key wrapping using AES-CCM provides 128, 192, 256-bit keys with key strength between 128-256 bits in compliance with IG D.G.

The module supports password-based key derivation (PBKDF2). The implementation is compliant with option 1a of [SP-800-132]. Keys derived from passwords or passphrases using this method can only be used in storage applications.

The module does not support direct manual SSP entry or intermediate SSP generation output. The SSPs are provided to the module via API input parameters in plaintext form and output via API output parameters in plaintext form within the physical perimeter of the operational environment. This is allowed by [FIPS140-3_IG] 9.5.A, according to the “CM Software to/from App via TOEPP Path” entry on the Key Establishment Table.

The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs. The SSPs are temporarily stored in the RAM in plaintext form. SSPs are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when released by the appropriate zeroization function calls. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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The memory occupied by SSPs is allocated by regular memory allocation operating system calls. The application that is acting as the CO is responsible for calling the appropriate zeroization functions provided in the module's API and listed in Table 11. Calling gcry_free() will zeroize the SSPs and also invoke the corresponding API functions listed in Table 11 to zeroize SSPs. The zeroization functions overwrite the memory occupied by SSPs with “zeros” and deallocate the memory with the regular memory deallocation operating system call. The completion of a zeroization routine(s) will indicate that a zeroization procedure succeeded. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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The module performs pre-operational tests automatically when the module is loaded into memory; pre-operational tests ensure that the module is not corrupted, and the CASTs ensure that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. While the module is executing the pre-operational tests and CASTs, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. The module is not available for use by the calling application until the pre-operational tests are completed successfully. After the pre-operational test and the CASTs succeed, the module becomes operational. If any of the pre-operational test or any of the CASTs fail an error message is returned, and the module transitions to the error state.

The module performs the integrity test using HMAC-SHA-256. The details of integrity test are provided in section 5.1.

Table 13 specifies the CASTs performed by the module. All CASTs performed are in the form of the Known Answer Tests (KATs) and are run prior to performing the integrity test. A KAT includes the comparison of a calculated output with an expected known answer, hard coded as part of the test vectors used in the test. If the values do not match, the KAT fails. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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Table 13 – Conditional Cryptographic Algorithms Self-Tests

The module performs the Pair-wise Consistency Tests (PCT) shown in Table 14. If at least one of the tests fails, the module returns an error code and enters the Error state. When the module is in the Error state, no data is output, and cryptographic operations are not allowed. Table 14 - Pairwise Consistency Test

On-Demand self-tests can be invoked by using gcry_control(GCRYCTL_SELFTEST) API function call or by powering-off and reloading the module which cause the module to run both the pre-operational services are not available, and neither data input nor output is possible. In order to verify whether the self-tests have succeeded and the module is in the Operational state, the calling application may invoke the gcry_control(GCRYCTL_OPERATIONAL_P). The function will return TRUE if the module is in the operational state, FALSE if the module is in the Error state.

When the module fails any pre-operational self-test or conditional test, the module will return an Additionally, when random numbers are requested in the error state or cipher operations are requested on a deallocated handle, the module is aborted, enters the Error state (i.e., Abort error state) and is not available for use. Any further cryptographic operation is inhibited. When the module is in Self-test Error state, the calling application can obtain the module state by calling the gcry_control(GCRYCTL_OPERATIONAL_P) API function. The function returns FALSE to indicate that the module is in the Error state. Otherwise, the function returns TRUE to indicate that the module is in the Operational state. In the Abort Error state the module is aborted and is not available for use, therefore, the module state cannot be obtained. In both Error states, all data output is inhibited, and no cryptographic operation is allowed. The Error states can be recovered by a restart (i.e., powering off and powering on) of the module. The following table shows the error © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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Table 15 - Error States © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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The Crypto Officer can install the RPM packages containing the module as listed in Table 17 using the zypper tool as follows. # zypper install libgcrypt20 # zypper install libgcrypt20-hmac The integrity of the RPM package is automatically verified during the installation, and the Crypto Officer shall not install the RPM package if there is any integrity error.

The operating environment needs to be configured to support FIPS, so the following steps shall be performed with the root privilege:

1. Install the dracut-fips RPM package: # zypper install dracut-fips
2. Recreate the INITRAMFS image: # dracut -f
3. After regenerating the initrd, the Crypto Officer has to append the following parameter in the /etc/default/grub configuration file in the GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT line: fips=1
4. After editing the configuration file, please run the following command to change the setting in the boot loader: # grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg If /boot or /boot/efi resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=<partition of /boot or /boot/efi> must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command "df /boot" or "df /boot/efi" respectively. For example: # df /boot Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on /dev/sda1 233191 30454 190296 14% /boot The partition of /boot is located on /dev/sda1 in this example. Therefore, the following string needs to be appended in the aforementioned grub file: "boot=/dev/sda1"
5. Reboot to apply these settings. Now, the operating environment is configured to support FIPS operation. The Crypto Officer should check the existence of the file /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled, and verify it contains a numeric value “1”. If the file does not exist or does not contain “1”, the operating environment is not configured to support FIPS and the module will not operate as a FIPS validated module properly.

Table 16 includes the information on module installation process for the vendor affirmed platforms that are listed in Table 4. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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Table 16 - Installation for Vendor Affirmed Platforms Note: Per section 7.9 in the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual [FIPS140-3_MM], the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when this module is ported and executed in an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.

For secure sanitization of the cryptographic module, the module must first to be powered off, which will zeroize all keys and CSPs in volatile memory. Then, for actual deprecation, the module shall be upgraded to a newer version that is FIPS 140-3 validated. The module does not possess persistent storage of SSPs, so further sanitization steps are not required.

The binaries of the module are contained in the RPM packages for delivery. The Crypto Officer shall follow sections 11.1.1 and 11.1.2 to configure the operational environment and install the module to be operated as a FIPS 140-3 validated module. Table 17 lists the RPM packages that contain the FIPS validated module and the OE directory where the components are installed. The "Show version" service returns the value “Libgcrypt version 1.9.4-150400.6.8.1”, which matches the service output and the version information provided in the RPM packages where the module is distributed, and map to version 3.2 of the cryptographic module. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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The user shall only use the memory management functions provided by the libgcrypt API. Critical security parameters (e.g., keys) which are used as input or output parameters shall be managed using the gcry_malloc_secure(), gcry_calloc_secure() and gcry_free() functions. The function gcry_set_allocation_handler() shall not be used; the user shall not change the libgcrypt memory handlers. The use of this API function implies that the cryptographic module is being executed in an invalid configuration.

The AES algorithm in XTS mode can be only used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices, as specified in [SP800-38E]. The length of a single data unit encrypted with the XTS-AES shall not exceed 2²⁰ AES blocks, that is 16MB of data. To meet the requirement stated in IG C.I, the module implements a check that ensures, before performing any cryptographic operation, that the two AES keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical.

The module provides password-based key derivation (PBKDF2), compliant with SP800-132 and IG D.N. The module supports option 1a from section 5.4 of [SP800-132], in which the Master Key (MK) or a segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK). In accordance with [SP800-132], the following requirements shall be met.

• Derived keys shall only be used in storage applications. The Master Key (MK) shall not be used for other purposes. The length of the MK or DPK shall be of 112 bits or more (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved).
• A portion of the salt, with a length of at least 128 bits (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved), shall be generated randomly using the [SP80090Arev1] DRBG.
• The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. The minimum value shall be 1000 (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved).
• Passwords or passphrases, used as an input for the PBKDF2, shall not be used as cryptographic keys.
• The length of the password or passphrase shall be of at least 20 characters (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved). The probability of guessing the password, assuming the worst case scenario of all digits, is estimated to be at most 10-20. Combined with the minimum iteration count as described above, this provides an acceptable trade-off between user experience and security against brute-force attacks. The calling application shall also observe the rest of the requirements and recommendations specified in [SP800-132]. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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In compliance with IG C.F, the module implements only the approved modulus sizes of 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits for signature generation and verification. Each algorithm was tested, and corresponding certificates can be found detailed in Section 2.6 Approved Algorithms. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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The module implements blinding Against RSA Timing Attacks. RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can measure the time of RSA decryption or signature operations, blinding must be used to protect the RSA operation from that attack. By default, the module uses the following blinding technique: instead of using the RSA decryption directly, a blinded value y = x re mod n is decrypted and the unblinded value x' = y' r−1 mod n returned. The blinding value r is a random value with the size of the modulus n. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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Appendix A.                      Glossary and Abbreviations AES                Advanced Encryption Standard AES-NI             Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions API                Application Programming Interface CAST               Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test CAVP               Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CBC                Cipher Block Chaining CCM                Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code CFB                Cipher Feedback CKG                Cryptographic Key Generation CMAC               Cipher-based Message Authentication Code CMVP               Cryptographic Module Validation Program CPACF              Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Function CSP                Critical Security Parameter CTR                Counter Mode DF                 Derivation Function DRBG               Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB                Electronic Code Book ECC                Elliptic Curve Cryptography ECDSA              Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS               Federal Information Processing Standards Publication GCM                Galois Counter Mode HMAC               Hash Message Authentication Code ISA                Instruction Set Architecture KAT                Known Answer Test KW                 AES Key Wrap MAC                Message Authentication Code NIST               National Institute of Science and Technology OAEP               Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding OFB                Output Feedback PAA                Processor Algorithm Acceleration PAI                Processor Algorithm Implementation PBKDF2             Password-based Key Derivation Function v2 PCT                Pair-wise Consistency Test PKCS               Public-Key Cryptography Standards PR                 Prediction Resistance © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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PSS                Probabilistic Signature Scheme RNG                Random Number Generator RSA                Rivest, Shamir, Addleman SHA                Secure Hash Algorithm SHS                Secure Hash Standard SSP                Sensitive Security Parameter XOF                Extendable Output Function XTS                XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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Appendix B. References FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules March 2019 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3 FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program March 2024 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf FIPS140-3_MM FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Validation Program - Management Manual (Draft) December 2022 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/Draft%20FIPS-140-3CMVP%20Management%20Manual%20v1.2%20%5BDec%2023%202022%5 D.pdf FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) August 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) July 2013 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard November 2001 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 2008 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf FIPS202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions August 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 February 2003 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques December 2001 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038a.pdf © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication May 2005 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38b.pdf SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality May 2004 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038c.pdf SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices January 2010 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038e.pdf SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping December 2012 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf SP800-90Arev1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators June 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf SP800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation January 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132 - Recommendation for PasswordBased Key Derivation - Part 1: Storage Applications December 2010 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800132.pdf SP800-133rev2 NIST Special Publication 800-133 - Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation June 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf SP800-140B NIST Special Publication 800-140B - CMVP Security Policy Requirements March 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140B.pdf © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security corporation.

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