SUSE Linux Enterprise OpenSSL Cryptographic Module

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (539)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for SUSE Linux Enterprise OpenSSL Cryptographic Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output<br/>Show status</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for SUSE Linux Enterprise OpenSSL Cryptographic Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output<br/>Show status</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

SUSE Linux Enterprise OpenSSL Cryptographic Module version 4.4 Version 1.3 Last update: 2025-07-29 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

4516 Seton Center Parkway, Suite 250

Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

2.8 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security

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This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version 4.4 of the SUSE Linux Enterprise OpenSSL Cryptographic Module. It has a one-to-one mapping to the [SP800-140B] starting with section B.2.1 named “General” that maps to section 1 in this document and ending with section B.2.12 named “Mitigation of other attacks” that maps to section 12 in this document. Table 1 - Security Levels © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The SUSE Linux Enterprise OpenSSL Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a Software multi-chip standalone cryptographic module.

The software block diagram below shows the cryptographic boundary of the module, and its interfaces with the operational environment. Figure 1 - Cryptographic boundary Table 2 lists the software components of the cryptographic module, which defines its cryptographic boundary. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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When the module starts up successfully, after passing all the pre-operational and conditional cryptographic algorithms self-tests (CASTs), the module is operating in the approved mode of operation by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 12. Please see section 4 for the details on service indicator provided by the module that identifies when an approved service is called.

The module has been tested on the following platforms with the corresponding module variants and configuration options: Table 3 - Tested Operational Environments

In addition to the platforms listed in Table 3, SUSE has also tested the module on the platforms in Table 4 and Table 5, and claims vendor affirmation on them. Note: the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Table 4 - Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments for OpenSSL (64-bit)

Table 5 - Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments for OpenSSL (32-bit)

Table 6 lists all the approved security functions of the module, including specific key strengths employed for approved services. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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of Operation The module does not implement non-approved algorithms that are allowed in the approved mode of operation. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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of Operation with No Security Claimed Table 7 lists the non-approved algorithms that are allowed in the approved mode of operation with no security claimed. These algorithms are used by the approved services listed in Table 10. Table 7 - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed

Mode of Operation Table 8 lists non-approved algorithms that are not allowed in the approved mode of operation. These algorithms are used by the non-approved services listed in Table 12.

1 These algorithms do not claim any security and are not used to meet FIPS 140-3 requirements. Therefore, SSPs do not

map to these algorithms. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Table 8 - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. The operator can only interact with the module through the API provided by the module. Thus, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which the module runs. The following table shows the logical interfaces implemented in the module. All data output via data output interface is inhibited when the module is performing preoperational test or zeroization or when the module enters error state. Table 9 - Ports and Interfaces Note: The module does not implement a control output interface. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly assumed by the operator of the module when performing a service. The module does not support © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Role

Service Key encapsulation Shared secret computation Diffie-Hellman key generation using safe primes Public key validation TLS Key derivation SSH Key Derivation PBKDF Key Derivation HKDF Key Derivation Show status Zeroization Self-test On-demand integrity test Module installation and configuration Module initialization Show module name and version Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol

Input Key to be encapsulated, key encapsulating key Private key, public key from peer Safe prime Public key TLS pre-master secret Shared secret Password/passphrase Shared secret None Context containing SSPs Module reset None None None None Application data

Output Encapsulated key Shared secret Key pair Return codes/log messages Derived key Derived key Derived key Derived key Return codes/log messages None Self-test results Self-test results Log messages Log messages Name and version of the module Application data

Table 10 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output The module provides services to the users that assume one of the available roles. All services are shown in Table 11 and Table 12.

Table 11 lists the approved services. For each service, the table lists the associated cryptographic algorithm(s), the role to perform the service, the cryptographic keys or SSPs involved, and their access type(s). No support of intermediate key generation is provided. The following convention is used to specify access rights to an SSP: © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP.
• N/A: the calling application does not access any SSP or key during its operation. The details of the approved cryptographic algorithms including the CAVP certificate numbers can be found in Table 6. The “Indicator” column shows the service indicator API functions that must be used to verify the service indicator for each of the services. A value of 1 indicates that the service is approved, and 0 indicates that the service is non-approved. Additionally there is a separate indicator used for the following services.
• The API function used to determine the indicator for the “TLS network protocol” service returns the cipher suite established for the TLS session. If the returned cipher suite ID belongs to one of the cipher suites listed in Table 20 of Appendix A, then the service is approved, otherwise, it is non-approved.
• The “Show status”, “Zeroization”, “Self-tests” and “Show module name and version” services listed under the “Other FIPS-related Services” group are always approved. The For more information, see the “FIPS server level indicator” man pages. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Service Key pair validation ECDSA public key validation Random number generation Message digest Message authentication code (MAC) Key wrapping Key unwrapping Shared secret computation

Description Validate ECDSA public key Validate ECDSA public key Generate random bitstrings Compute SHA hashes Compute HMAC Compute and AES-based CMAC Perform AES- based key wrapping Perform AES- based key unwrapping Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation EC Diffie- Hellman shared secret computation

Approved Security Functions ECDSA ECDSA DRBG SHA-1, SHA2- 224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 HMAC CMAC with AES AES-KW, AES- KWP AES-KW, AES- KWP KAS-FFC-SSC KAS-ECC-SSC

Keys and/or SSPs ECDSA public key ECDSA private key ECDSA public key Entropy input DRBG seed , DRBG internal state (V, Key) None HMAC key AES key AES key AES key Diffie-Hellman public key, Diffie-Hellman private key Diffie-Hellman shared secret EC Diffie- Hellman public key, EC Diffie- Hellman private key EC Diffie- Hellman shared secret

Roles

Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs W, E W, E W, E W, E E, G N/A W, E W, E W, E W, E G, R W, E G, R

Indicator fips_sli_is_approved_EVP _PKEY_CTX returns 1 fips_sli_is_approved_EVP _PKEY_CTX returns 1 fips_sli_RAND_bytes_is_a pproved returns 1 fips_sli_RAND_priv_bytes _is_approved returns 1 fips_sli_SHA*_is_approve d returns 1 fips_sli_HMAC_is_approve d returns 1 fips_sli_is_approved_CMA C_CTX returns 1 fips_sli_is_approved_EVP _CIPHER_CTX returns 1 fips_sli_is_approved_EVP _CIPHER_CTX returns 1 fips_sli_is_approved_EVP _PKEY_CTX returns 1 fips_sli_is_approved_EVP _PKEY_CTX returns 1

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Service Self-tests Show module name and version

Description Perform self- tests Show module name and version

Approved Security Functions AES, Diffie- Hellman, EC Diffie-Hellman, ECDSA, DRBG, HMAC, RSA, SHS N/A

Keys and/or SSPs None None

Roles

Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs N/A N/A

Indicator Implicit (always approved) Implicit (always approved)

Table 12 lists the non-approved services. The details of the non-approved cryptographic algorithms available in non-approved mode can be found in Table 8. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The integrity of the module is verified by comparing an HMAC-SHA2-256 value calculated at run time with the HMAC value stored in the .hmac file that was computed at build time for each software component of the module listed in section 2. If the HMAC values do not match, the test fails, and the module enters the error state.

On-Demand integrity tests can be invoked by powering-off and reloading the module.

The module consists of executable code in the form of libcrypto and libssl shared libraries as stated in section 2. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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This module operates in a modifiable operational environment per the FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The SUSE Linux Enterprise Server operating system is used as the basis of other products. Compliance is maintained for SUSE products whenever the binary is found unchanged per the vendor affirmation from SUSE based on the allowance FIPS 140-3 management manual [FIPS140-3_MM] section 7.9.1 bullet 1 a i). Note: The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when supported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace utilities, userspace live patching, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-tested operational environment.

The module shall be installed as stated in section 11. The operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The module is comprised of software only, and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Table 13 summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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2 The security strength of RSA is based on key sizes between 2048 and up to 16384 bits allowed by IG C.F.

3 RSA public key with less than 2048 bits and security strength of 80-111 bits is allowed for legacy use.

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Table 13 - SSPs The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90Arev1] for the creation of seeds for asymmetric keys, random numbers for security functions (e.g. ECDSA module provides a Random Number Generation service to calling applications. The DRBG supports the CTR_DRBG mechanisms. The DRBG is initialized during module initialization; the module loads by default the DRBG using the CTR_DRBG mechanism with AES256, with derivation function, and without prediction resistance. A different DRBG mechanism can be chosen through an API function call. The module uses an SP800-90B-compliant entropy source specified in Table 14. This entropy source is located within the physical perimeter, but outside of the cryptographic boundary of the provide a DRBG with 256 bits of security strength. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Table 14 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

The SSP generation methods implemented in the module are compliant with [SP800-133rev2]. For generating RSA, ECDSA keys, the module implements asymmetric key generation services compliant with [FIPS186-4]. A seed (i.e., the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is directly obtained from the [SP800-90Arev1] DRBG. The public and private keys used in the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement schemes are generated internally by the module using the ECDSA key generation method compliant with [FIPS186-4] and [SP800-56Arev3]. The Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme is also compliant with [SP80056Arev3] and generates keys using safe primes defined in RFC7919 and RFC3526, as described in the next section. In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per section 5.1 of SP800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) by obtaining a random bit string directly from an approved DRBG and that can support the required security strength requested by the caller (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H). The module supports the following key derivation methods according to [SP800-135rev1]:

• KDF for the TLS protocol, used as pseudo-random functions (PRF) for TLSv1.0/1.1, TLSv1.2;
• HKDF for the TLS protocol, used as pseudo-random functions (PRF) for TLSv1.3; and
• KDF for the SSHv2 protocol. The module also supports password-based key derivation (PBKDF). The implementation is compliant with option 1a of [SP800-132]. Keys derived from passwords or passphrases using this method can only be used in storage applications.

The module provides Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation compliant with SP800-56Arev3, in accordance with scenario 2 (1) of IG D.F. The module also provides Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement schemes compliant with SP800-56rev3 and used as part of the TLS protocol key exchange in accordance with scenario

2 (2) of IG D.F; that is, the shared secret computation (KAS-FFC-SSC and KAS-ECC-SSC) followed by

the derivation of the keying material using SP800-135rev1 KDF. For Diffie-Hellman, the module supports the use of safe primes from RFC7919 for domain parameters and key generation, which are used in the TLS key agreement implemented by the

• TLS (RFC7919)
• ffdhe2048 (ID = 256)
• ffdhe3072 (ID = 257) © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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• ffdhe4096 (ID = 258)
• ffdhe6144 (ID = 259)
• ffdhe8192 (ID = 260) The module also supports the use of safe primes from RFC3526, which are part of the Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups that can be used for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Note that the module only implements key generation and verification, and shared secret computation using safe primes, but no part of the IKE protocol.
• IKEv2 (RFC3526)
• MODP-2048 (ID=14)
• MODP-3072 (ID=15)
• MODP-4096 (ID=16)
• MODP-6144 (ID=17)
• MODP-8192 (ID=18) The module also provides the following key transport mechanisms:
• Key wrapping using AES-KW and AES-KWP modes.
• Key wrapping using AES-CCM, AES-GCM, and AES-CBC with HMAC, used in the context of the TLS protocol cipher suites with 128-bit or 256-bit keys. According to Table 2: Comparable strengths in [SP800-57rev5], the key sizes of AES, RSA, DiffieHellman and EC Diffie-Hellman provides the following security strength in the approved mode of operation:
• AES key wrapping using AES in KW, KWP provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
• AES key wrapping using AES-CCM, AES-GCM, and AES in CBC mode and HMAC, provides between 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength.
• Diffie-Hellman key agreement provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength.
• EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength.

The module does not support manual SSP entry or intermediate SSP generation output. The SSPs are provided to the module via API input parameters in plaintext form and output via API output parameters in plaintext form within the physical perimeter of the operational environment. This is allowed by [FIPS140-3_IG] IG 9.5.A, according to the “CM Software to/from App via TOEPP Path” entry in the Key Establishment Table.

The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs. The SSPs are temporarily stored in the RAM in plaintext form. SSPs are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when released by the appropriate zeroization function calls.

The memory occupied by SSPs is allocated by regular memory allocation operating system calls. The application that is acting as the CO is responsible for calling the appropriate zeroization © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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functions provided in the module's API and listed in Table 13. Calling the SSL_free() and SSL_clear() will zeroize the SSPs stored in the TLS protocol internal state and also invoke the corresponding API functions listed in Table 13 to zeroize SSPs. The zeroization functions overwrite the memory occupied by SSPs with “zeros” and deallocate the memory with the regular memory deallocation operating system call. The completion of a zeroization routine(s) will indicate that a zeroization procedure succeeded. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The module performs the pre-operational self-test and CASTs automatically when the module is loaded into memory. Pre-operational self-test ensure that the module is not corrupted, and the CASTs ensure that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. While the module is executing the pre-operational test and the CASTs, the module services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. The module is not available for use by the calling application until the preoperational self-test and the CASTs are completed successfully. After the pre-operational test and the CASTs succeed, the module becomes operational. If any of the pre-operational test or any of the CASTs fail an error message is returned, and the module transitions to the error state. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Table 15 – Cryptographic Algorithms Self-Tests

The module performs the integrity test of the shared libraries that comprise the module. The details of integrity test are provided in section 5.1.

Table 15 specifies all the CASTs. All the CASTs are performed in the form of the Known Answer Tests (KATs) and are run prior to performing the integrity test. A KAT includes the comparison of a calculated output with an expected known answer, hard coded as part of the test vectors used in the test. If the values do not match, the KAT fails.

The module performs the Pair-wise Consistency Tests (PCT) shown in the following table. If at least one of the tests fails, the module returns an error code and enters the Error state. When the module is in the Error state, no data is output, and cryptographic operations are not allowed. Table 16 - Pairwise Consistency Test

On-Demand self-tests can be invoked by powering-off and reloading the module which cause the module to run the power-up tests again.

When the module fails the pre-operational self-test or any conditional test, the module returns an error code to indicate the error and enter the “Abort” error state, showing the following message to © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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functioning. The only way to recover from this error is to restart the application. If the failure persists, the module must be reinstalled. When a PCT fails during conditional tests, the module returns an error code to indicate the error and enter the “Error” error state. Any further cryptographic operation is inhibited. The calling application can obtain the module state by requesting the “Show status” service by calling the Some cryptographic services cannot handle the return value of the “Error” state, and when the module is in that state and receives a service request, shows an error message and transitions to failed: FATAL FIPS SELFTEST FAILURE” and stopping functioning. The only way to recover from this error is to restart the application. Table 17 shows the error codes and the corresponding condition: Table 17 - Error States © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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In the “Error” state, errors are reported through the regular ERR interface of the modules and can be queried by functions such as ERR_get_error(). See the OpenSSL man pages for the function description. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The Crypto Officer can install the RPM packages containing the module as listed in Table 19 using the zypper tool as follows: # zypper install libopenssl1_1 # zypper install libopenssl1_1-hmac If the use of certified 32-bit Openssl libraries on Intel x86 is required, then use the following to install the 32bit libraries and hmac packages: # zypper install libopenssl1_1-32bit # zypper install libopenssl1_1-hmac-32bit The integrity of the RPM package is automatically verified during the installation, and the Crypto Officer shall not install the RPM package if there is any integrity error.

The operating environment needs to be configured to support the approved mode of operation, so the following steps shall be performed with the root privilege:

1. Install the dracut-fips RPM package: # zypper install dracut-fips
2. Recreate the INITRAMFS image: # dracut -f
3. After regenerating the initrd, the Crypto Officer has to append the following parameter in the /etc/default/grub configuration file in the GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT line: fips=1
4. After editing the configuration file, please run the following command to change the setting in the boot loader: # grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg If /boot or /boot/efi resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=<partition of /boot or /boot/efi> must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command "df /boot" or "df /boot/efi" respectively. For example: # df /boot Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on /dev/sda1 233191 30454 190296 14% /boot The partition of /boot is located on /dev/sda1 in this example. Therefore, the following string needs to be appended in the aforementioned grub file: "boot=/dev/sda1"
5. Reboot to apply these settings. Now, the operating environment is configured to support the approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer should check the existence of the file /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled, and verify it © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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contains a numeric value “1”. If the file does not exist or does not contain “1”, the operating environment is not configured to support the approved mode of operation and the module will not operate as a FIPS validated module properly.

Table 18 includes the information on module installation process for the vendor affirmed platforms that are listed in Table 4 and Table 5. Table 18 - Installation for Vendor Affirmed Platforms Note: Per section 7.9 in the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual [FIPS140-3_MM], the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when this module is ported and executed in an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.

For secure sanitization of the cryptographic module, the module needs first to be powered off, which will zeroize all keys and CSPs in volatile memory. Then, for actual deprecation, the module shall be upgraded to a newer version that is FIPS 140-3 validated. The module does not possess persistent storage of SSPs, so further sanitization steps are not needed.

The binaries of the module are contained in the RPM packages for delivery. The Crypto Officer shall follow section 11.1.1 and 11.1.2 to configure the operational environment and install the module to be operated as a FIPS 140-3 validated module. Table 19 lists the RPM packages that contain the FIPS validated module and the OE directory where the components are installed. The "Show module name and version" service returns the value "OpenSSL 1.1.1l-fips 24 Aug 2021 SUSE release 150400.7.81.1”, which matches the version included in the RPM package filenames. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The AES algorithm in XTS mode can be only used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices, as specified in [SP800-38E]. The length of a single data unit encrypted with the XTS-AES shall not exceed 2²⁰ AES blocks, that is 16MB of data. To meet the requirement stated in IG C.I, the module implements a check that ensures, before performing any cryptographic operation, that the two AES keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical. Note: AES-XTS shall be used with 128 and 256-bit keys only. AES-XTS with 192-bit keys is not an Approved service.

The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with the [RFC5288] and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with [FIPS140-3_IG] IG C.H, provision 1 (“TLS protocol IV generation”); in addition, the module is compliant with section 3.3.1 of [SP800-52rev2]. The nonce_explicit part of the IV does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key. The design of the TLS protocol in this module implicitly ensures that the nonce_explicit, or counter portion of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values. In case the module's power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or decryption shall be redistributed. When a GCM IV is used for decryption, the responsibility for the IV generation lies with the party that performs the AES GCM encryption.

OPENSSL_ENFORCE_MODULUS_BITS © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Setting the environment variable OPENSSL_ENFORCE_MODULUS_BITS can restrict the module to only generate the acceptable key sizes of RSA. If the environment variable is set, the module enforces the generation of keys of 2048 bits or more. Notice that even if this environment variable is not set, the module will provide the corresponding value of the service indicator depending on the size of the key generated.

The module provides password-based key derivation (PBKDF), compliant with SP800-132 and IG D.N. The module supports option 1a from section 5.4 of [SP800-132], in which the Master Key (MK) or a segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK). In accordance with [SP800-132], the following requirements shall be met.

• Derived keys shall only be used in storage applications. The Master Key (MK) shall not be used for other purposes. The length of the MK or DPK shall be of 112 bits or more (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved).
• A portion of the salt, with a length of at least 128 bits (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved), shall be generated randomly using the SP800-90Arev1 DRBG.
• The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. The minimum value shall be 1000 (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved).
• Passwords or passphrases, used as an input for the PBKDF, shall not be used as cryptographic keys.
• The length of the password or passphrase shall be of at least 20 characters (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved), and shall consist of lower-case, uppercase and numeric characters. The probability of guessing the value is estimated to be 1/6220 = 10-36, which is less than 2-112. The calling application shall also observe the rest of the requirements and recommendations specified in [SP800-132]. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The module implements blinding against RSA timing attacks. RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can measure the time of RSA decryption or signature operations, blinding must be used to protect the RSA operation from that attack. The module provides the API functions RSA_blinding_on() and RSA_blinding_off() to turn the blinding on and off for RSA. When the blinding is on, the module generates a random value to form a blinding factor in the RSA key before the RSA key is used in the RSA cryptographic operations. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Appendix A. TLS Cipher Suites The module supports the following cipher suites for the TLS protocol versions 1.0, 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 compliant with section 3.3.1 of [SP800-52rev2]. Each cipher suite defines the key exchange algorithm, the bulk encryption algorithm (including the symmetric key size) and the MAC algorithm. © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Table 20 - TLS Cipher Suites © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Appendix B.                      Glossary and Abbreviations AES                 Advanced Encryption Standard AES-NI              Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions CAST                Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests CAVP                Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CBC                 Cipher Block Chaining CCM                 Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code CFB                 Cipher Feedback CMAC                Cipher-based Message Authentication Code CMVP                Cryptographic Module Validation Program CPACF               Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Function CSP                 Critical Security Parameter CTR                 Counter Mode DES                 Data Encryption Standard DF                  Derivation Function DSA                 Digital Signature Algorithm DRBG                Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB                 Electronic Code Book ECC                 Elliptic Curve Cryptography FFC                 Finite Field Cryptography FIPS                Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FSM                 Finite State Model GCM                 Galois Counter Mode HMAC                Hash Message Authentication Code ISA                 Instruction Set Architecture KAS                 Key Agreement Schema KAT                 Known Answer Test KW                  AES Key Wrap KWP                 AES Key Wrap with Padding MAC                 Message Authentication Code NDF                 No Derivation Function NIST                National Institute of Science and Technology OFB                 Output Feedback PAA                 Processor Algorithm Acceleration PAI                 Processor Algorithm Implementation PR                  Prediction Resistance © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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PSS                 Probabilistic Signature Scheme RNG                 Random Number Generator RSA                 Rivest, Shamir, Addleman SDK                 Software Development Kit SHA                 Secure Hash Algorithm SHS                 Secure Hash Standard SSH                 Secure Shell SSP                 Sensitive Security Parameter TDES                Triple-DES XTS                 XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Appendix C. References FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules March 2019 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program October 2022 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf FIPS140-3_MM FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Validation Program Management Manual April 2024 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS-140-3CMVP%20Management%20Manual.pdf FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) March 2012 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) July 2013 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard November 2001 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 2008 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf FIPS202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions August 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 February 2003 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm September 2002 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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RFC5649 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm September 2009 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques December 2001 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038a.pdf SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication May 2005 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38B.pdf SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality May 2004 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038c.pdf SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC November 2007 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038d.pdf SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices January 2010 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038e.pdf SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping December 2012 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf SP800-38G NIST Special Publication 800-38G - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Format - Preserving Encryption March 2016 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38G.pdf SP800-52rev2 NIST Special Publication 800-52 Revision 2 - Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations August 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-52r2.pdf © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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SP800-56Arev3 NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3 - Recommendation for Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography April 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf SP800-56Crev2 Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-thenExpansion August 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf SP800-57rev5 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5 Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General May 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.80057pt1r5.pdf SP800-90Arev1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators June 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf SP800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation January 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf SP800-131Arev2 NIST Special Publication 800-131A Revision 2 - Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800131Ar2.pdf SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132 - Recommendation for PasswordBased Key Derivation - Part 1: Storage Applications December 2010 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800132.pdf SP800-133rev2 NIST Special Publication 800-133 Revision 2 - Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation June 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf SP800-135rev1 NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions December 2011 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800135r1.pdf © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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SP800-140B NIST Special Publication 800-140B - CMVP Security Policy Requirements March 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140B.pdf © 2025 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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