SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (503)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update<br/>recovery</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Show status</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>IPSEC<br/>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update<br/>recovery</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Show status</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>IPSEC<br/>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C5,C6 clueLow;
  class C3 clueHigh;

Security Policy, page by page

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module version 3.3 and 3.4 Version 1.3 Last update: 2024-07-03 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module

2.1 2.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.5 2.6 2.6.1 2.6.2 2.6.3 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No 2.6.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3.1 4.3.2 4.3.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 10.1 10.2 10.2.1 10.3 10.4 11.1 11.1.1 11.1.2 11.1.3 11.2 11.2.1 11.2.2 11.2.3 11.2.4 11.2.5 © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version 3.3 and 3.4 of the SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module. It has a one-to-one mapping to the [SP 800-140B] starting with section B.2.1 named “General” that maps to section 1 in this document and ending with section B.2.12 named “Mitigation of other attacks” that maps to section 12 in this document. N/A N/A N/A Table 1 - Security Levels © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module

2.1 Module Embodiment The SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a Software multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. 2.2 Module Design, Components, versions The software block diagram below shows the cryptographic boundary of the module, and its interfaces with the operational environment. Figure 1 - Cryptographic Boundary 2.2.1 Module Name and Module Version Mapping The output of “uname -r” command will return the module identifier and version number. This command returns either "5.14.21-150400.24.46-default" that maps to module version 3.3 or "5.14.21-150400.15.11-rt" that maps to module version 3.4. 2.2.2 Module Components Table 2 lists the software components of the cryptographic module, which defines its cryptographic boundary. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module Table 2

• Cryptographic Module Components 2.3 Tested Operational Environments The module has been tested on the following platforms with the corresponding module variants and configuration options: 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 E1080 (9080HEX) 3.3 # Table 3 - Tested Operational Environments 2.4 Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments In addition to the platforms listed in Table 3, SUSE has also tested the module on the platforms shown in Table 4 and Table 5, and claims vendor affirmation on them. Note: the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module 2.4.1 Version 3.3 Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments # 5.3 SYS-6019PWTR 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 SYS-6019PWTR E1080 (9080HEX) SYS-6019PWTR Table 4 - Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments for version 3.3 2.4.2 Version 3.4 Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments # © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module # SYS-6019PWTR SYS-6019PWTR Table 5 - Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments for version 3.4 2.5 Modes of Operation of the Module After following the instructions for installation and configuration provided in section 11 the module is pre-configured to be operating in the Approved mode. When the module starts up successfully, after passing all the pre-operational self-test and conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs), the module is operating in the Approved mode of operation. Please see section 4 for the details on service indicator provided by the module that identifies when an approved service is called. If any service from the non-approved services list is called, the module transitions to nonapproved mode automatically. 2.6 Security Functions 2.6.1 Approved Algorithms Table 6 below lists all security functions of the module, including specific key strengths employed for approved services. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module N/A © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module N/A KAS ECCSSC SP80056Arev3 KAS FCCSSC SP80056Arev3 © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module N/A N/A © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module Table 6 - Approved Algorithms 2.6.2 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation The module does not implement non-approved algorithms allowed in the approved mode of operation. 2.6.3 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed The module does not implement non-approved algorithms allowed in the approved mode of operation with no security claimed.. 2.6.4 Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation Table 7 lists non-approved algorithms that are not allowed in the approved mode of operation. These algorithms are used by the non-approved services listed in Table 11. Algorithm/Functions Use/Function AES-GCM with external IV Symmetric encryption AES-GMAC Message authentication code (MAC) © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module Table 7 - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module

As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. The operator can only interact with the module through the API provided by the module. Thus, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which the module runs. All data output via data output interface is inhibited when the module is performing preoperational test or zeroization or when the module enters error state. Table 8 - Ports and Interfaces

1 The control output interface is omitted on purpose because the module does not implement it.

© 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module

4.1 Roles The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly assumed by the operator of the module when performing a service. The module does not support authentication. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module Table 9 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output 4.2 Authentication The module does not support authentication. 4.3 Services The module provides services to the users that assume one of the available roles. All services are shown in Table 10 and Table 11. 4.3.1 Service Indicator The module provides an approved service indicator as specified in the “Indicator” column in Table 10. 4.3.2 Approved Services Table 10 lists the approved services. For each service, the table lists the associated cryptographic algorithm(s), the role to perform the service, the cryptographic keys or CSPs involved, and their access type(s). No support of intermediate key generation is provided. The following convention is used to specify access rights to a CSP:

• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP.
• N/A: the calling application does not access any CSP or key during its operation. The details of the approved cryptographic algorithms including the CAVP certificate numbers can be found in Table 6. Having the module configured properly in the approved mode as detailed in section 11, restricts the Crypto Officer to only access the approved services listed in Table 10. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module W, E N/A W, E W, E W, E W, E G, E Encryptthen-MAC CCM, AESGCM W, E W, E CCM, AESGCM W, E W, E © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module EC DiffieHellman EC DiffieHellman W, E G, R SP80056Arev3 Modulegenerated EC Modulegenerated EC E, G, R DiffiePerform DH DiffieHellman W, E G, R Modulegenerated Modulegenerated E, G, R N/A N/A DiffieHellman key SP80056Arev3 for DiffieHellman N/A

2 The module performs a pairwise consistency test for EC Diffie-Hellman as outlined in section

5.6.2.1.4 of SP 800-56Arev3. This key generation service is for exclusive use of the EC DiffieHellman shared secret computation service.

3 This algorithm does not provide any cryptographic attribute, i.e., its purpose in the module is not

security relevant © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module N/A N/A N/A N/A EC DiffieHellman, DiffieHellman, N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Z N/A N/A Table 10 - Approved Services 4.3.3 Table 11 lists the non-approved services. The details of the non-approved cryptographic algorithms available in non-approved mode can be found in Table 7. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module Table 11 - Non-Approved Services © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module

5.1 Integrity Techniques The module uses the HMAC-SHA2-256 algorithm for the integrity test of the static kernel binary and the fipscheck application. The HMAC calculation is performed by the fipscheck application itself. Additionally, the module uses RSA signature verification with a SHA2-256 message digest and a 2048-bit key for the integrity test of each of the kernel object files loaded during boot-up time. If the integrity values do not match the expected values, the test fails, and the module enters the error state. 5.2 On-Demand Integrity Test Integrity tests are performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. The module provides the Self-Test service to perform self-tests on demand. This service performs the same cryptographic algorithm tests executed during power-up. Pre-Operational Self-Tests can also be invoked by calling the kernel_restart() which effectively powers off the module and then reloads the module. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are not available, and no data output or input is possible. 5.3 Executable Code The module consists of executable code in the form of the files listed in Table 2. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module

6.1 Applicability This module operates in a modifiable operational environment per the FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The SUSE Linux Enterprise Server operating system is used as the basis of other products. Compliance is maintained for SUSE products whenever the binary is found unchanged per the vendor affirmation from SUSE based on the allowance FIPS 140-3 management manual [FIPS140-3_MM] section 7.9.1 bullet 1 a i). Note: The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when supported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate. 6.2 Policy Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace utilities, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-tested operational environment. 6.3 Requirements The module shall be installed as stated in section 11. The operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module

The module is comprised of software only, and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module

This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism, and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module

Table 12 summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic e N/A t N/A N/A © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module e t N/A Modulegenerated EC DiffieHellman DiffieHellman Modulegenerated EC DiffieHellman © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module e Modulegenerated EC DiffieHellman N/A t DiffieHellman EC DiffieHellman n Modulegenerated EC DiffieHellman EC DiffieHellman N/A N/A DiffieHellman EC DiffieHellman N/A N/A N/A DiffieHellman n DiffieHellman Modulegenerated DiffieHellman DiffieHellman n Modulegenerated DiffieHellman © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module e Modulegenerated DiffieHellman DiffieHellman DiffieHellman EC DiffieHellman t N/A N/A N/A N/A Use: DiffieHellman n Modulegenerated DiffieHellman DiffieHellman Use: DiffieHellman n DiffieHellman DiffieHellman n DiffieHellman © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module e t DiffieHellman N/A Use: DiffieHellman n DiffieHellman DiffieHellman Table 12 - SSPs 9.1 The module employs the Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90Arev1] for the random number generation. The DRBG supports the Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG and CTR_DRBG mechanisms. The module performs the DRBG health tests as defined in section 11.3 of The entropy source is tested with RCT and APT Health tests as required by section 4 of [SP 80090B]. The DRBG is seeded with (DRBG_security_strength * 1.5) bits of random data from the CPU initialization (seed) and reseeding, the entropy source provides the required amount of entropy to meet the security strength of the respective DRBG methods. The module uses the entropy source specified in Table 13. Table 13 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification 9.2 generated internally by the module using the ECDSA key generation method compliant with [FIPS186-4], [SP800-56Arev3] and section 4 and 5.1 of [SP800-133rev2]. The random value used in asymmetric key generation is directly obtained from the [SP800-90Arev1] DRBG. This key generation method is used exclusively by the EC Diffie-Hellman algorithm and provides support for compliant with [SP 800-56Arev3] and generates keys using safe primes defined in RFC7919 and RFC3526. In accordance with FIPS140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys per SP800-133rev2 section 4 and 5 (vendor affirmed). © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module 9.3 Key Agreement The module provides Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation compliant with [SP800- 56Arev3] in accordance with scenario 2 (1) of IG D.F, CAVP-tested compliance with the derivation of a shared secret Z for Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman (section 6 of SP 80056Arev3).

• Diffie-Hellman: Shared secret computation provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength.
• EC Diffie-Hellman: Shared secret computation provides 128 or 192 bits of encryption strength. 9.4 Key Transport The module provides approved key transport methods as permitted by IG D.G. These key transport methods are provided either by using an approved key wrapping algorithm, an approved authenticated encryption mode, or a combination method of approved symmetric encryption (AES) and HMAC-SHA-1/SHA-2. Table 6 specifies the key sizes allowed in the approved mode of operation. According to “Table 2: Comparable strengths” in [SP800-57rev5], the key sizes of AES key wrapping provide the following security strengths:
• AES-KW key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
• AES-GCM and AES-CCM authenticated encryption key wrapping: key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
• Combination method of approved AES-CBC block mode and message authentication code (HMAC-SHA-1/SHA-2) key wrapping: key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength. 9.5 SSP Entry and Output The module does not support manual SSP entry or intermediate SSP generation output. The SSPs are provided to the module via API input parameters in plaintext form and output via API output parameters in plaintext form. This is allowed by [FIPS140-3_IG] 9.5.A, according to the “CM Software to/from App via TOEPP Path” entry on the Key Establishment Table. 9.6 SSP Storage The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs. The SSPs are temporarily stored in the RAM in plaintext form. SSPs are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when released by the appropriate zeroization function calls. 9.7 SSP Zeroization The application is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions from the Kernel Crypto API. When a calling application calls the appropriate API function, that function overwrites the memory with zeros and deallocates the memory when the cipher handler is freed. The completion of a zeroization and freeing the cipher handler routines will indicate that a zeroization procedure succeeded. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module

The module performs the pre-operational and conditional cryptographic algorithms self-tests automatically when the module is loaded into memory. These self-tests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. While the module is executing the pre-operational and the conditional cryptographic algorithms self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. The module is not available for use by the calling application until the self-tests are completed successfully. If any of the self-tests fails, an error message is returned and the module transitions to error state.

The module performs a pre-operational software integrity test automatically when the module is powered on before the module transitions into the operational state. The details on the integrity

Table 14 lists the cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs). The CASTs include the KATs for the integrity mechanism that is run prior to performing the integrity test. The details of the integrity Each KAT includes comparison of the calculated output with the expected known answer, hard coded as part of the test vectors used in the test. If the values do not match, the KAT fails. After the pre-operational and conditional cryptographic algorithms self-tests succeed, a success message is recorded in the dmesg log, and the module becomes operational. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module EC DiffieHellman DiffieHellman Table 14

• Cryptographic Algorithms Self-Tests

Conditional pair-wise consistency tests are performed during operational state of the module when the respective cryptographic functions are used. If any of the conditional Pair-Wise Consistency (PCT) tests fails, the module transitions to the error state. The module performs PCT tests for

On-demand self-tests can be invoked by powering-off and reloading the module which cause the module to run the pre-operational and conditional cryptographic algorithms self-tests. On-demand self-tests can also be invoked by calling kernel_restart() function which effectively powers off the module and then reloads the module. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are not available, and no data output or input is possible.

When the module fails any pre-operational self-test or conditional test, the module will indicate an error has occurred and will enter the Error state. Any further cryptographic operation is inhibited. In the Error state, all data output is inhibited, and no cryptographic operations are allowed. The error can be recovered by a restart (i.e., powering off and powering on) of the module. The following table shows the error codes and the corresponding condition: Table 15 - Error States © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module

The Crypto Officer can install the RPM packages containing the module as listed in Table 17 using the zypper tool. The integrity of the RPM package is automatically verified during the installation, and the Crypto Officer shall not install the RPM package if there is any integrity error.

The operating environment needs to be configured to support FIPS, so the following steps shall be performed with the root privilege:

1. Install the dracut-fips RPM package: # zypper install dracut-fips
2. Recreate the INITRAMFS image: # dracut -f
3. After regenerating the initrd, the Crypto Officer must append the following parameter in the /etc/default/grub configuration file in the GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT line: fips=1
4. After editing the configuration file, please run the following command to change the setting in the boot loader depending on if the system being used uses UEFI boot or legacy boot: # grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/efi/EFI/sles/grub.cfg # grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg If /boot or /boot/efi resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=<partition of /boot or /boot/efi> must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command "df /boot" or "df /boot/efi" respectively. For example: # df /boot Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on /dev/sda1 233191 30454 190296 14% /boot The partition of /boot is located on /dev/sda1 in this example. Therefore, the following string needs to be appended in the aforementioned grub file: "boot=/dev/sda1"
5. Reboot to apply these settings. Now, the operating environment is configured to support FIPS operation. The Crypto Officer should check the existence of the file /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled, and verify it contains a numeric value “1”. If the file does not exist or does not contain “1”, the operating environment is not configured to support FIPS and the module will not operate as a FIPS validated module properly.

Environments Table 16 below includes the installation process for the Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments found in section 2.4.1 and section 2.4.2 above. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module 5.3 Table 16 - Installation Process for Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments Note: Per section 7.9 in the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual [FIPS140-3_MM], the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when this module is ported and executed in an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.

The binaries of the module are contained in the RPM packages for delivery. The Crypto Officer shall follow sections 11.1.1 and 11.1.2 to configure the operational environment and install the module to be operated as a FIPS 140-3 validated module. The following RPM packages contain the FIPS validated module: Table 17

• RPM packages

The AES algorithm in XTS mode can be only used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices, as specified in [SP800-38E]. The length of a single data unit encrypted with the XTS-AES shall not exceed 2²⁰ AES blocks, that is 16MB of data. To meet the requirement stated in IG C.I, the module implements a check that ensures, before performing any cryptographic operation, that the two AES keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical. Note: AES-XTS shall be used with 128 and 256-bit keys only. AES-XTS with 192-bit keys is not an Approved service.

In case the module's power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or decryption shall be redistributed. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module The GCM with internal IV generation in the approved mode is in compliance with RFC4106 and shall only be used in conjunction with the IPsec stack of the kernel to be compliant with IG C.H scenario 1. Any other usage of GCM encryption is considered as non-Approved. The nonce_explicit part of the IV does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key. The design of the IPsec protocol ensures that the nonce_explicit, or counter portion, of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values. When a GCM IV is used for decryption, the responsibility for the IV generation lies with the party that performs the AES-GCM encryption. The module merely receives the GCM IV and performs the operation. It is not responsible for generating the IV.

Self test failure within the kernel crypto API module will panic the kernel and the operating system will not load and/or halt immediately. Error recovery and return to operational state can be accomplished by rebooting the system. If the failure continues, the Crypto Officer must re-install the software package and make sure to follow all instructions. If the software was downloaded, the package hash value must be verified to confirm a proper download. Please contact SUSE if these steps do not resolve the problem. The kernel dumps self-test success and failure messages into the kernel message ring buffer. Post boot, the messages are moved to /var/log/messages. Use dmesg to read the contents of the kernel ring buffer. The format of the ringbuffer (dmesg) output is: alg: self-tests for %s (%s) passed Typical messages are similar to "alg: self-tests for xts(aes) (xts(aes)) passed" for each algorithm/sub-algorithm type.

To comply with the assurances found in Section 5.6.2 of SP 800-56Ar3, the operator must use the Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation algorithms in the context of IETF protocols. Additionally, the module’s approved key pair generation service must be used to generate ephemeral Diffie-Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman key pairs, or the key pairs must be obtained from another FIPS-validated module. As part of this service, the module will internally perform the full public key validation of the generated public key. The module’s shared secret computation service will internally perform the full public key validation of the peer DH public key, and the partial public key validation of the peer EC public key, complying with Section 5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56Ar3.

As a first step for the secure sanitization, the module needs to be powered off which will erase the SSPs in the volatile memory. Then, the files listed in Table 2 must be deleted using the command “shred -zu <file_name>”. Then, for the actual deprecation, the module will be upgraded to a newer version that is approved. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module

The module does not offer mitigation of other attacks. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module Appendix A. Glossary and Abbreviations AES Advanced Encryption Standard AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CBC Cipher Block Chaining CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code CFB Cipher Feedback CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CPACF Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Function CSP Critical Security Parameter CTR Counter Mode DF Derivation Function DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB Electronic Code Book ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography FFC Finite Field Cryptography FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FSM Finite State Model GCM Galois Counter Mode HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code ISA Instruction Set Architecture KAS Key Agreement Schema KAT Known Answer Test KW AES Key Wrap KWP AES Key Wrap with Padding MAC Message Authentication Code NIST National Institute of Science and Technology OFB Output Feedback PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration PR Prediction Resistance RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman SSC Shared Secret Computation SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SHS Secure Hash Standard © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module SSP Sensitive Security Parameter XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module Appendix B. References FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules March 2019 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program October 2022 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf FIPS140-3_MM FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Validation Program - Management Manual April 2024 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS-140-3CMVP%20Management%20Manual.pdf FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) March 2012 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) July 2013 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard November 2001 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 2008 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf FIPS202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions August 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 February 2003 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm September 2002 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module RFC5649 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm September 2009 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques December 2001 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038a.pdf SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication May 2005 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38B.pdf SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality May 2004 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038c.pdf SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC November 2007 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038d.pdf SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices January 2010 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038e.pdf SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping December 2012 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf SP800-38G NIST Special Publication 800-38G - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Format - Preserving Encryption March 2016 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38G.pdf SP800-56Arev3 NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3 - Recommendation for Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography April 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module SP800-56B Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography March 2019 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56b/rev-2/final SP800-56Crev2 Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-thenExpansion August 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf SP800-57rev5 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5 Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General May 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.80057pt1r5.pdf SP800-90Arev1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators June 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf SP800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation January 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf SP800-108 NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised) October 2009 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf SP800-131Arev2 NIST Special Publication 800-131A Revision 1- Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132 - Recommendation for PasswordBased Key Derivation - Part 1: Storage Applications December 2010 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800132.pdf SP800-133rev2 NIST Special Publication 800-133 - Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation June 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel Crypto API Cryptographic Module SP800-135rev1 NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions December 2011 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800135r1.pdf SP800-140B NIST Special Publication 800-140B - CMVP Security Policy Requirements March 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140B.pdf © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

Referenced URLs

• www.atsec.com
• https://documentation.suse.com/sle-micro/5.3/single-html/SLE-
• https://documentation.suse.com/sles/15-SP4/html/SLES-all/book-
• https://documentation.suse.com/sled/15-SP4/html/SLED-all/book-
• https://documentation.suse.com/sle-rt/15-SP4/
• https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf
• https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
• https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt
• https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38B.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38G.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56b/rev-2/final
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140B.pdf