SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (95)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Self-tests<br/>Show status</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Self-tests<br/>Show status</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C5,C6 clueLow;
  class C3 clueHigh;

Security Policy, page by page

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module version 1.1 Version 1.2 Last update: 2024-07-25 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security 2.9 4.1 4.1.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 10.1 © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module 10.2 10.2.1 10.2.2 10.2.3 10.3 11.1 11.1.1 11.1.2 11.1.3 11.1.4 11.2 11.2.1 11.2.2 11.2.3 11.2.4 11.2.5 © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version 1.1 of the SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module. It has a one-to-one mapping to the [SP 800-140B] starting with section B.2.1 named “General” that maps to section 1 in this document and ending with section B.2.12 named “Mitigation of other attacks” that maps to section 12 in this document. and including this notice. Other documentation is proprietary to their authors. In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation for consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained. The further refining of the Security Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the conformance testing, wherein the Security Policy was submitted to the vendor, who would then edit, modify, and add technical contents. The vendor would also supply additional documentation, which the laboratory formatted into the existing Security Policy, and resubmitted to the vendor for their final editing. Table 1 describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the security levels of those individual areas. N/A N/A N/A Table 1 - Security Levels © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

2.1 Module Embodiment The SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a Software multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. 2.2 Module Design, Components, Versions The software block diagram below shows the cryptographic boundary of the module, and its interfaces with the operational environment. Figure 1 - Cryptographic Boundary © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

Table 2 lists the software components of the cryptographic module, which defines its cryptographic boundary. Table 2

• Cryptographic Module Components 2.3 Modes of operation When the module starts up successfully, after passing all the pre-operational and conditional cryptographic algorithms self-tests (CASTs), the module is operating in the approved mode of operation by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 11. The module switches between approved and nonapproved mode based on the service requested. Please see section 4 for the details on service indicator provided by the module that identifies when an approved service is called. 2.4 Tested Operational Environments The module has been tested on the following platforms with the corresponding module variants and configuration options: # SYS-6019PWTR © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module # E1080 (9080HEX) Table 3 - Tested Operational Environments 2.5 Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments In addition to the platforms listed in Table 3, SUSE, LLC has also tested the module on the platforms in Table 4, and claims vendor affirmation on them. Note: the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate. # 5.3 5.3 5.3 Altra® Q8030 5.3 5.3 E1080 (9080HEX) SYS-6019PWTR SYS-6019PWTR © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Altra® Q8030 E1080 (9080HEX) # SYS-6019PWTR SYS-6019PWTR SYS-6019PWTR Table 4 - Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments 2.6 Approved Algorithms Table 5 lists all security functions of the module, including specific key strengths employed for approved services, and implemented modes of operation. The module supports RSA modulus sizes which are not tested by CAVP in compliance with FIPS 140-3 IG C.F. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module SP800133rev2 © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module SP80090Arev1 SP800Ephemeral SP80056Arev3 © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module SP800135rev1 (CVL) SP800135rev1 © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module SP80056Arev3 C.C SHA-1, SHA2N/A Table 5 - Approved Algorithms © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module 2.7 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation The module does not implement non-approved algorithms that are allowed in the approved mode of operation. 2.8 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed Table 6 lists the non-approved algorithms that are allowed in the approved mode of operation with no security claimed. These algorithms are used by the approved services listed in Table 10. Table 6 - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed 2.9 Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation Table 7 lists non-approved algorithms that are not allowed in the approved mode of operation. These algorithms are used by the non-approved services listed in Table 11.

1 These algorithms do not claim any security and are not used to meet FIPS 140-3 requirements. Therefore, SSPs do not

map to these algorithms. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 7 - Non-Approved Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. The operator can only interact with the module through the API provided by the module. Thus, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which the module runs. The following table shows the logical interfaces implemented in the module. All data output via data output interface is inhibited when the module is performing preoperational test conditional cryptographic algorithms self-tests or zeroization or when the module enters error state. Table 8 - Ports and Interfaces

2 The control output interface is omitted on purpose because the module does not implement it.

© 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

4.1 Services The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly assumed by the operator of the module when performing a service. The module does not support authentication. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module N/A N/A Table 9 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output The module provides services to the users that assume one of the available roles. All services are shown in Table 10 and Table 11. 4.1.1 Approved Services Table 10 lists the approved services. For each service, the table lists the associated cryptographic algorithm(s), the role to perform the service, the cryptographic keys or SSPs involved, and their access type(s). The following convention is used to specify access rights to an SSP:

• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP.
• N/A: the calling application does not access any SSP or key during its operation. The details of the approved cryptographic algorithms including the CAVP certificate numbers can be found in Table 5. The “Indicator” column shows the service indicator API function that must be used to verify the service indicator after executing a service. The gnutls_fips140_get_operation_state() function indicates GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED whether the API invoked corresponds to an approved algorithm. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module W, E W, E W, E W, E W, E W, E W, E W, E W, E W, E Modulegenerated G, E, R Modulegenerated G, E, R Modulegenerated RSA G, E, R Modulegenerated RSA G, E, R © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Modulegenerated G, E, R Modulegenerated G, E, R Modulegenerated EC G, E, R Modulegenerated EC G, E, R W, E W, E W, E W, E G, E E, G N/A W, E W, E W, E W, E W, E G, R © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module W, E EC DiffieHellman W, E G, R W, E W, E G, R W, E G, R W, E W, E, G G, R 1.3) W, E W, E, G, R © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module EC DiffieHellman E, G N/A N/A N/A Z Perform selftests AES, DiffieNone N/A N/A N/A Table 10 - Approved Services Table 11 lists the non-approved services. The details of the non-approved cryptographic algorithms available in non-Approved mode can be found in Table 7. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Key unencapsulation © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

5.1 Integrity Techniques The integrity of the module is verified by comparing an HMAC-SHA2-256 value calculated at run time with the HMAC value stored in the .hmac file that was computed at build time for each software component of the module listed in section 2. If the HMAC values do not match, the test fails, and the module enters the error state. 5.2 On-Demand Integrity Test The module provides the Self-Test service to perform self-tests on demand which includes the preoperational test (i.e., integrity test) and the cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs). The SelfTests service can be called on demand by invoking the gnutls_fips140_run_self_tests() function which will perform integrity tests and the cryptographic algorithms self-tests. Additionally, the SelfTest service can be invoked by powering-off and reloading the module. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are not available, and no data output is possible. 5.3 Executable Code The module consists of executable code in the form of libgnutls, libnettle, libhogweed, and libgmp shared libraries as stated in the Table 2. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

6.1 Applicability This module operates in a modifiable operational environment per the FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The SUSE Linux Enterprise Server operating system is used as the basis of other products. Compliance is maintained for SUSE products whenever the binary is found unchanged per the vendor affirmation from SUSE based on the allowance FIPS 140-3 management manual section 7.9.1 bullet 1 a i). Note: The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when supported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate. 6.2 Policy The module does not support concurrent operators. Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace utilities, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-tested operational environment. 6.3 Requirements The module shall be installed as stated in section 11. The operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

The module is comprised of software only, and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism, and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

Table 12 summarizes the SSPs that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the Modulegenerated e N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Modulegenerated RSA Module112 to Modulegenerated RSA N/A

3 see Table 5 for the certificate number of each algorithm listed in this column.

© 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module e N/A N/A N/A N/A Modulegenerated N/A Modulegenerated Modulegenerated N/A Modulegenerated N/A N/A © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module N/A e N/A Modulegenerated DiffieHellman N/A SSPs: Modulegenerated Modulegenerated DiffieHellman N/A SSPs: Modulegenerated DiffieHellman N/A Use: DiffieHellman keys: DiffieHellman DiffieHellman N/A Use: DiffieHellman © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module e key; DiffieHellman Modulegenerated EC DiffieHellman N/A [SP800Import: None Modulegenerated EC DiffieHellman N/A [SP800Import: None EC DiffieHellman N/A N/A EC DiffieHellman N/A N/A © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module e DiffieHellman N/A Use: DiffieHellman key, DiffieHellman EC DiffieHellman N/A N/A N/A Passwordzeroized N/A Passwordbased key © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module e N/A N/A N/A in SP800the N/A seed, Modulegenerated key, Modulegenerated Modulegenerated RSA Modulegenerated Modulegenerated Modulegenerated EC Modulegenerated EC N/A DiffieHellman / DiffieHellman TLS premaster © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module e SP80056Arev3. N/A N/A EC DiffieHellman N/A Table 12 - SSPs 9.1 The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90Arev1] for the creation of seeds for asymmetric keys, random numbers for security functions (e.g. ECDSA signature generation), and server and client random numbers for the TLS protocol. In addition, the module provides a Random Number Generation service to calling applications. The DRBG supports the CTR_DRBG with AES-256, without derivation function and without prediction resistance. The module uses an SP800-90B-compliant entropy source specified in Table 13. This entropy source is located within the physical perimeter, but outside of the cryptographic boundary of the module. The module obtains 384 bits to seed the DRBG, and 256 bits to reseed it, © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 13 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification 9.2 SSP Generation In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys according to section 4, 5.1 and 5.2 of [SP800-133rev2] by obtaining a random bit string directly from an approved [SP800-90Arev1] DRBG and that can support the required security strength requested by the caller (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H).

• For generating RSA and ECDSA keys, the module implements asymmetric cryptographic key generation (CKG) services compliant with [FIPS186-4].
• The public and private keys used in the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement schemes are generated internally by the module using the ECDSA key generation method compliant with [FIPS186-4] and [SP800-56Arev3].
• The public and private keys used in the Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme are also compliant with [SP800-56Arev3]. The module generates keys using safe primes defined in RFC7919 and RFC3526, as described in the next section. The module provides the following SSP generation methods with associated SSP sizes and strengths:
• RSA [FIPS186-4] B.3.2 Random Provable Primes - 2048, 3072, 4096-bit keys with 112-149 bits of key strength
• ECDH/ECDSA [FIPS186-4] B.4.2 Testing Candidates - P-256, P-384, P-521 elliptic curves with 128-256 bits of key strength
• Safe Primes Key Generation [SP800-56Arev3] - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192-bit keys with 112-200 bits of key strength. The module supports the following key derivation methods according to [SP800-135rev1]:
• KDF for the TLS protocol, used as pseudo-random functions (PRF) for TLSv1.0/1.1 and TLSv1.2 (RFC7627). The module supports the following key derivation methods according to [SP800-56Cr1]:
• HKDF for the TLS protocol TLSv1.3. The module also supports password-based key derivation (PBKDF). The implementation is compliant with option 1a of [SP800-132]. Keys derived from passwords or passphrases using this method can only be used in storage applications. 9.3 SSP establishment The module provides Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation compliant with SP800-56Arev3, in accordance with scenario 2 (1) of IG D.F and used as part of the TLS protocol key exchange in accordance with scenario 2 (2) of IG D.F; that is, the shared secret computation (KAS-FFC-SSC and KAS-ECC-SSC) followed by the derivation of the keying material using SP800-135rev1 KDF. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module For Diffie-Hellman, the module supports the use of safe primes from RFC7919 for domain parameters and key generation, which are used in the TLS key agreement implemented by the module.

• TLS (RFC7919)
• ffdhe2048 (ID = 256)
• ffdhe3072 (ID = 257)
• ffdhe4096 (ID = 258)
• ffdhe6144 (ID = 259)
• ffdhe8192 (ID = 260) The module also supports the use of safe primes from RFC3526, which are part of the Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups that can be used for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Note that the module only implements key generation and verification, and shared secret computation using safe primes, but no part of the IKE protocol.
• IKEv2 (RFC3526)
• MODP-2048 (ID=14)
• MODP-3072 (ID=15)
• MODP-4096 (ID=16)
• MODP-6144 (ID=17)
• MODP-8192 (ID=18) The module also provides the following key transport mechanisms:
• Key wrapping using AES-CCM, AES-GCM, and AES-CBC with HMAC, used in the context of the TLS protocol cipher suites (in compliance with IG D.G) with 128-bit or 256-bit keys, providing 128, 256 bits of key strength. According to Table 2: Comparable strengths in [SP 800-57rev5], the key sizes of AES, RSA, DiffieHellman and EC Diffie-Hellman provides the following security strength in approved mode of operation:
• AES key wrapping using AES-CCM, AES-GCM, and AES in CBC mode and HMAC, provides between 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength.
• Diffie-Hellman key agreement provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength.
• EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength. SP 800-56Ar3 Assurances To comply with the assurances found in Section 5.6.2 of SP 800-56Ar3, the operator must use the module together with an application that implements the TLS protocol. Additionally, the module’s approved “Key pair generation” service must be used to generate ephemeral Diffie- Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman key pairs, or the key pairs must be obtained from another FIPS-validated module. As part of this service, the module will internally perform the full public key validation of the generated public key. The module’s shared secret computation service will internally perform the full public key validation of the peer public key, complying with Sections 5.6.2.2.1 and 5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56Ar3. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module 9.4 SSP Entry and Output The module does not support manual SSP entry or intermediate SSP generation output. The SSPs are provided to the module via API input parameters in plaintext form and output via API output parameters in plaintext form within the physical perimeter of the operational environment. This is allowed by [FIPS140-3_IG] IG 9.5.A, according to the “CM Software to/from App via TOEPP Path” entry on the Key Establishment Table. 9.5 SSP Storage All SSPs not generated by the module are provided by the calling application. The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs. The SSPs are temporarily stored in the RAM in plaintext form. SSPs are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when released by the appropriate zeroization function calls. 9.6 SSP Zeroization The memory occupied by SSPs is allocated by regular memory allocation operating system calls. The application that is acting as the CO is responsible for calling the appropriate zeroization functions provided in the module's API and listed in Table 12. Calling the gnutls_global_deinit() will zeroize the SSPs stored in the TLS protocol internal state and also invoke the corresponding API functions listed in Table 12 to zeroize SSPs. The zeroization functions overwrite the memory occupied by SSPs with “zeros” and deallocate the memory with the regular memory deallocation operating system call. The completion of a zeroization routine(s) will indicate that a zeroization procedure succeeded. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Self-tests The module performs the pre-operational self-test and CASTs automatically when the module is loaded into memory. The pre-operational self-test ensure that the module is not corrupted, and the CASTs ensure that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. The module is not available for use by the calling application until the pre-operational tests and CASTs are completed successfully. After the pre-operational test and the CASTs succeed, the module becomes operational. If any of the pre-operational test or any of the CASTs fail an error message is returned, and the module transitions to the error state.

The module performs the integrity test using HMAC-SHA2-256. The details of integrity test are provided in 5.1.

Table 14 specifies all the CASTs. The CASTs are performed in the form of the Known Answer Tests (KATs) and are run prior to performing the integrity test. A KAT includes the comparison of a calculated output with an expected known answer, hard coded as part of the test vectors used in the test. If the values do not match, the KAT fails. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 14 - Conditional Cryptographic Algorithms Self-Tests

The module performs the Pair-wise Consistency Tests (PCT) shown in the following table. If at least one of the tests fails, the module returns an error code and enters the Error state. When the module is in the Error state, no data is output, and cryptographic operations are not allowed. Table 15 - Pairwise Consistency Test

The module provides the Self-Test service to perform self-tests on demand which includes the preoperational test (i.e., integrity test) and the cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs). The SelfTests service can be called on demand by invoking the gnutls_fips140_run_self_tests() function which will perform integrity tests and the cryptographic algorithms self-tests. Additionally, the SelfTest service can be invoked by powering-off and reloading the module. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are not available, and no data output is possible.

When the module fails any pre-operational self-test or conditional test, the module will return an error code to indicate the error and enters error state. Any further cryptographic operations and the data output via the data output interface are inhibited. The calling application can obtain the module state by calling the gnutls_fips140_get_operation_state() API function. The function returns GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_ERROR if the module is in the Error state. The following table shows the error codes and the corresponding condition: © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 16 - Error States Self-test errors transition the module into an error state that keeps the module operational but prevents any cryptographic related operations. The module must be restarted and perform the per-operational self-test and the CASTs to recover from these errors. If failures persist, the module must be re-installed. A completed list of the error codes can be found in Appendix C “Error Codes and Descriptions” in the gnutls.pdf provided with the module's code. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

The following sections describe the Delivery and Operation and Crypto Officer Guidance of the module.

The Crypto Officer can install the RPM packages containing the module as listed in Table 18 using the zypper tool. The integrity of the RPM package is automatically verified during the installation, and the Crypto Officer shall not install the RPM package if there is any integrity error.

The operating environment needs to be configured to support FIPS, so the following steps shall be performed with the root privilege:

1. Install the dracut-fips RPM package: # zypper install dracut-fips
2. Recreate the INITRAMFS image: # dracut -f
3. After regenerating the initrd, the Crypto Officer has to append the following parameter in the /etc/default/grub configuration file in the GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT line: fips=1
4. After editing the configuration file, please run the following command to change the setting in the boot loader: # grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg If /boot or /boot/efi resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=<partition of /boot or /boot/efi> must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command "df /boot" or "df /boot/efi" respectively. For example: # df /boot Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% /dev/sda1 233191 30454 190296 14% Mounted on /boot The partition of /boot is located on /dev/sda1 in this example. Therefore, the following string needs to be appended in the aforementioned grub file: "boot=/dev/sda1"
5. Reboot to apply these settings. Now, the operating environment is configured to support FIPS operation. The Crypto Officer should check the existence of the file /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled, and verify it contains a numeric value “1”. If the file does not exist or does not contain “1”, the operating environment is not configured to support FIPS and the module will not operate as a FIPS-validated module properly.

Table 17 includes the information on module installation process for the vendor affirmed platforms that are listed in Table 4. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 17 - Installation for Vendor Affirmed Platforms Note: Per section 7.9 in the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual [FIPS140-3_MM], the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when this module is ported and executed in an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.

For secure sanitization of the cryptographic module, the module needs first to be powered off, which will zeroize all keys and CSPs in volatile memory. Then, for actual deprecation, the module shall be upgraded to a newer version that is FIPS 140-3 validated. The module does not possess persistent storage of SSPs, so further sanitization steps are not needed.

The binaries of the module are contained in the RPM packages for delivery. The Crypto Officer shall follow section 11.1.1 and 11.1.2 to configure the operational environment and install the module to be operated as a FIPS 140-3 validated module. Table 16 lists the RPM packages that contain the FIPS validated module. The "Show module name and version" service returns the value “GnuTLS version 3.7.3-150400.4.35.1”, which matches the version included in the RPM package filenames, and map to version 1.1 of the cryptogtaphic module. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 18 - RPM packages

The TLS protocol implementation provides both server and client sides. In order to operate in the approved mode, digital certificates used for server and client authentication shall comply with the restrictions of key size and message digest algorithms imposed by [SP800-131Arev2]. In addition, as required also by [SP800-131Arev2], Diffie-Hellman with keys smaller than 2048 bits must not be used. The TLS protocol lacks the support to negotiate the used Diffie-Hellman key sizes. To ensure full support for all TLS protocol versions, the TLS client implementation of the module accepts DiffieHellman key sizes smaller than 2048 bits offered by the TLS server. For complying with the requirement to not allow Diffie-Hellman key sizes smaller than 2048 bits, the Crypto Officer must ensure that:

• in case the module is used as a TLS server, the Diffie-Hellman parameters must be 2048 bits or larger;
• in case the module is used as a TLS client, the TLS server must be configured to only offer Diffie-Hellman keys of 2048 bits or larger.

The AES algorithm in XTS mode can be only used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices, as specified in [SP800-38E]. The length of a single data unit encrypted with the XTS-AES shall not exceed 2²⁰ AES blocks, that is 16MB of data. The module implements a check that ensures, before performing any cryptographic operation, that the two AES keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical (in compliance with IG C.I). Note: AES-XTS shall be used with 128 and 256-bit keys only. AES-XTS with 192-bit keys is not an Approved service. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

The module implements AES GCM for being used in the TLS v1.2 and v1.3 protocols. AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with [FIPS140-3_IG] IG C.H for both protocols as follows:

• For TLS v1.2, IV generation is in compliance with scenario 1.a of IG C.H and [RFC5288]. The module supports acceptable AES-GCM ciphersuites from section 3.3.1 of [SP800-52rev2].
• For TLS v1.3, IV generation is in compliance with scenario 5 of IG C.H and [RFC8446]. The module supports acceptable AES-GCM ciphersuites from section 3.3.1 of [SP800-52rev2]. The IV generated in both scenarios is only used within the context of the TLS protocol implementation. The nonce_explicit part of the IV does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key. The design of the TLS protocol in this module implicitly ensures that the nonce_explicit, or counter portion of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values. In case the module's power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or decryption shall be redistributed.

The module cannot use the following environment variables:

• GNUTLS_NO_EXPLICIT_INIT
• GNUTLS_SKIP_FIPS_INTEGRITY_CHECKS The module can only be used with the cryptographic algorithms provided. Therefore, the following API functions are forbidden in the approved mode of operation:
• gnutls_crypto_register_cipher
• gnutls_crypto_register_aead_cipher
• gnutls_crypto_register_mac
• gnutls_crypto_register_digest
• gnutls_privkey_import_ext4

The module provides password-based key derivation (PBKDF), compliant with SP800-132 and IG D.N. The module supports option 1a from section 5.4 of [SP800-132], in which the Master Key (MK) or a segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK). In accordance with [SP800-132], the following requirements shall be met.

• Derived keys shall only be used in storage applications. The Master Key (MK) shall not be used for other purposes. The length of the MK or DPK shall be of 112 bits or more (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved).
• A portion of the salt, with a length of at least 128 bits (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved), shall be generated randomly using the SP800-90Arev1 DRBG,
• The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. The minimum value shall be 1000 (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved).
• Passwords or passphrases, used as an input for the PBKDF, shall not be used as cryptographic keys. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

• The length of the password or passphrase shall be of at least 20 characters (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved), and shall consist of lower-case, uppercase and numeric characters. The probability of guessing the value is estimated to be 10-20 (assuming all digits). The calling application shall also observe the rest of the requirements and recommendations specified in [SP800-132]. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

The module does not offer mitigation of other attacks. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Appendix A. The module supports the following cipher suites for the TLS protocol version 1.0, 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, compliant with section 3.3.1 of [SP800-52rev2]. Each cipher suite defines the key exchange algorithm, the bulk encryption algorithm (including the symmetric key size) and the MAC algorithm. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 19 - TLS Cipher Suites © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Appendix B. Glossary and Abbreviations AES Advanced Encryption Standard AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CBC Cipher Block Chaining CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code CFB Cipher Feedback CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CPACF Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Function CSP Critical Security Parameter CTR Counter Mode DES Data Encryption Standard DF Derivation Function DSA Digital Signature Algorithm DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB Electronic Code Book ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography FFC Finite Field Cryptography FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FSM Finite State Model GCM Galois Counter Mode HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code KAS Key Agreement Schema KAT Known Answer Test MAC Message Authentication Code NIST National Institute of Science and Technology OFB Output Feedback O/S Operating System PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration PAI Processor Algorithm Implementation PR Prediction Resistance PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman SHA Secure Hash Algorithm © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module SHS Secure Hash Standard SSH Secure Shell SSP Sensitive Security Parameter TDES Triple-DES XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Appendix C. References FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program March 2024 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf FIPS140-3_MM FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Validation Program Management Manual April 2024 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS-140-3CMVP%20Management%20Manual.pdf FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) August 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) July 2013 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard November 2001 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 2008 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf FIPS202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions August 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 February 2003 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm September 2002 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques December 2001 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038a.pdf SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication May 2005 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38b.pdf SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality May 2004 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038c.pdf SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC November 2007 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038d.pdf SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices January 2010 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038e.pdfhttps://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-80038E.pdf SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping December 2012 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf SP800-38G NIST Special Publication 800-38G - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Format - Preserving Encryption March 2016 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38G.pdf SP800-52rev2 NIST Special Publication 800-52 Revision 2 - Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations August 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-52r2.pdf © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module SP800-56Arev3 NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3 - Recommendation for Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography April 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf SP800-56Crev2 NIST Special Publication 800-56C Revision 2 - Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion August 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf SP800-57rev5 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5 Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General May 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.80057pt1r5.pdf SP800-90Arev1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators June 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf SP800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation January 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf SP800-108rev1 NIST Special Publication 800-108 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised) August 2022 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf SP800-131Arev2 NIST Special Publication 800-131 Revision 2 - Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800131Ar2.pdf SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132 - Recommendation for PasswordBased Key Derivation - Part 1: Storage Applications December 2010 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800132.pdf SP800-133rev2 NIST Special Publication 800-133 Revision 2 - Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation June 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

SUSE Linux Enterprise GnuTLS Cryptographic Module SP800-135rev1 NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions December 2011 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800135r1.pdf SP800-140B NIST Special Publication 800-140B - CMVP Security Policy Requirements March 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140B.pdf RFC7627 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension September 2015 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7627.txt RFC5288 AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS August 2008 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5288.txt RFC8446 The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 August 2018 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.txt © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

Referenced URLs

• www.atsec.com
• https://documentation.suse.com/sle-micro/5.3/single-html/SLE-Micro-
• https://documentation.suse.com/sles/15-SP4/html/SLES-all/book-
• https://documentation.suse.com/smart/linux/html/concept-
• https://documentation.suse.com/sled/15-SP4/html/SLED-all/book-
• https://documentation.suse.com/sle-rt/15-SP4/
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf
• https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
• https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38b.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38G.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-52r2.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140B.pdf
• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7627.txt
• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5288.txt
• https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.txt