Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS) R23.3 Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Interconnect – Modular (PSI-M) R23.3

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (52)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS) R23.3 Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Interconnect – Modular (PSI-M) R23.3
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C1["[high] Firmware / bootloader<br/>versions disclosed<br/>(identity, not provenance)<br/><i>1830PSS ECN R23.3, 1830PSI-M ECN R23.3</i>"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback services<br/><i>Upgrade Application Firmware</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Show Status</i>"]
    C4["[high] Physical/logical<br/>interfaces (some 'blocked<br/>in firmware')<br/><i>Craft (USB) (1)<br/>USB (1)<br/>USB (#3)</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IPSEC</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I1["Component identity is<br/>disclosed, but provenance<br/>and patch lineage are not."]
    I2["Trusted code is reachable<br/>through update and<br/>recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I4["Interface reachability may<br/>vary by boot stage and<br/>lifecycle state."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R1["Do the vendor version<br/>strings obscure the<br/>upstream baseline, fork<br/>lineage, or known-CVE<br/>exposure?"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R4["Are interfaces blocked<br/>before the bootloader<br/>runs, or only after<br/>approved mode starts?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E1["SBOM / component baselines<br/>· patch and backport<br/>manifest · CVE disposition"]
    E2["update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E4["lifecycle reachability<br/>matrix · boot-stage<br/>interface timing ·<br/>factory/recovery/error-state<br/>access controls"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C1 --> I1 --> R1 --> E1
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C4 --> I4 --> R4 --> E4
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,C6 clue;
  class I1,I2,I3,I4,I5,I6 infer;
  class R1,R2,R3,R4,R5,R6 risk;
  class E1,E2,E3,E4,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS) R23.3 Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Interconnect – Modular (PSI-M) R23.3
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C1["[high] Firmware / bootloader versions disclosed (identity, not provenance)<br/><i>1830PSS ECN R23.3, 1830PSI-M ECN R23.3</i><br/>src: certificate.firmwareVersions"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery / rollback services<br/><i>Upgrade Application Firmware</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Show Status</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C4["[high] Physical/logical interfaces (some 'blocked in firmware')<br/><i>Craft (USB) (1)<br/>USB (1)<br/>USB (#3)</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.portsAndInterfaces"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IPSEC</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C1,C2,C3,C4 clueHigh;
  class C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS) R23.3 Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Interconnect

• Modular (PSI-M) R23.3 FIPS Security Level: 2 Document Version: 1.5 Last saved July 31, 2024 14:21 Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Table of Contents 2.1 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.1.4 2.1.5 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5.1 2.5.2 3.1 3.1.1 3.2 3.2.1 3.3 3.3.1 3.4 3.4.1 3.5 3.5.1 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.7 16.1 16.2 Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy 16.3 16.4 16.5 List of Tables Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy List of Figures Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy This document describes the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS) R23.3 (internal release R14.2) and Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Interconnect

• Modular (PSI-M) R23.3 (internal release R6.2). These are referenced in the document as PSS and PSI-M. This security policy provides the details for configuring and running these products in a FIPS-140-3 mode of operation and describes how the module meets the level 2 requirements of FIPS 140-3. Please see the references section for a full list of FIPS 140-3 requirements. The security level of the individual areas is shown in the table below. N/A N/A Table 1 - Security Levels Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Cryptographic module specification For the purposes of FIPS 140-3, the 1830 is designated as a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module.

The following platforms were tested for running the module in a FIPS approved mode. They all share the same CPU, the Marvell MV78460, which does not contain a Processor Algorithm Accelerator (PAA). Use of circuit packs not tested under this validation will invalidate the FIPS certification.

n/a n/a n/a n/a Table 2

• PSS-32 Cryptographic Module Test Configuration n/a n/a Table 3 - PSS-16II Cryptographic Module Test Configuration Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

n/a n/a n/a Table 4 - PSS-8 Cryptographic Module Test Configuration n/a n/a n/a Table 5 - PSS-24x Cryptographic Module Test Configuration n/a n/a Table 6 - PSI-M Cryptographic Module Test Configuration Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

Nokia PSS-32/16II/8/24x PSI-M SNMP-Engine 1] SHA-1, SHA2256 SHA-1, SHA256 Table 7 - Approved Algorithms (Nokia SNMP-Engine) The use of truncated HMAC-SHA-1-96 in SNMP protocol is compliant with IG.C.D Nokia openSSL Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy KDF (SP800135rev1) and MODP8192 KDF (SP800135rev1) Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy 4096, MODPRev 1] Table 8 - Approved Algorithms (Nokia openSSL) Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Nokia Jitter Entropy (JENT) N/A N/A Table 9

• Approved Algorithms (Nokia Jitter Entropy (JENT)) Rijndael AES256 CTR/GCM (Nokia Crypto-OTU2 Engine 11QPEN4) Table 10 - Approved Algorithms (11QPEN4) Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy CRYPOTN (Nokia 100G using Microsemi, S13X100E, 2UC400E) [SP 8002UC400E) [SP 800only [SP 800bits Table 11 - Approved Algorithms (S13X100E, 2UC400E) CRYPOTN IP (Nokia 100G using Microsemi IP, DFC12E, MEC2) [SP 80038A] [SP 800only [SP 800bits [SP 80038A] Table 12 - Approved Algorithms (DFC12E, MEC2) Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy CRYPOTN (Nokia 100G using Microsemi) uses HMAC-SHA256 (and the underlying SHA-256) for the authentication of the pack serial number, which is used to distinguish the two ends of the encryption section (certificate C1545). CRYPOTN (Nokia 100G using Microsemi) uses AES-256-CTR combined with AES-GMAC to form a proprietary authenticated encryption function (GMAC+CTR). The authentication key is derived from the encryption key in exactly the same way that AES-GCM does and also all calculations are done in a GCM like manner. The only difference is that the length of the authentication and cipher text fields are transposed. For CRYPOTN, the IV generation follows the rules of [FIPS 140-3 IG] section C.H (case 4): The probability that the proprietary GMAC+CTR authenticated encryption function ever will be invoked with the same IV and the same key on two (or more) distinct sets of input data shall be no greater than 2-32 for 1830 PSS S13X100E and 2UC400E. The following rules ensure that the construction of the IV, the keys and the Fixed Field used satisfy the above requirement. i.) By implementation, the Fixed Field for AtoZ direction is always different than the ZtoA direction. ii.) By implementation, the IV is composed of a Fixed Field and a running counter (Invocation Field) that starts at zero iii.) By implementation, authentication stops and new keys are required from the key management system if: a. The modules power is lost and then restored (which would cause the IV to be reset) b. Running counter reaches its maximum iv.) Therefore, since IV are only reused with different keys, as long as the probability of new keys being different than any previous used keys exceeds 2-32, then the concatenation of the keys with the IV will also exceed 2-32. v.) By Policy, the key management system (external to the module) always generates random 256-bit keys and the probability of the key manager ever generating the same key again shall be no greater than 2-32 during the system lifetime across all keys generated. vi.) By Policy, the key management system uses one newly generated key on one circuit per one key session time period. The key is used for both the AtoZ and the ZtoA directions of that circuit for that key session time period. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy 2.3 Module Description The 1830 PSS is a scalable, next-generation Dense Wave Division Multiplexer (DWDM) platform that supports data center aggregation for Ethernet, Fiber Channel (FC) and other protocols. Multiprotocol services can then be dynamically and flexibly transported over metro and long-haul spans, using Tunable and Reconfigurable Optical Add-Drop Multiplexers (T-ROADMs) for optical wavelengths. The 1830 PSS enables transparent L2 Ethernet or FC and L3 IP services over the optical link. The Nokia 1830 PSS-32 shelves provide increased network flexibility and operational automation through zero-touch, transparent photonic networking. Photonic networks use simplified and accelerated operations to transform wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) into true transport networking with advanced flexibility, performance, automation, and integration. Several Optical Add-Drop multiplexing (OADM) configurations are supported by components that provide optical filter routing, optical amplification, and support for interworking with optical signals originating on non-1830 PSS hardware. The Nokia 1830 PSS-32s are closely related shelves that compose the Nokia 1830 PSS-32 multi-service multi-reach solution. They are scalable optical transport platforms that implement a converged platform solution for multi-service DWDM metro-area, long-haul, and Optical Transport Network (OTN) switching, and leading-edge flexibility with next generation optical and OTN capabilities. The Nokia 1830 PSS-32 Central Office Shelf provides a 32-slot primarily DWDM platform. Figure 1 - PSS-32 Shelf The Nokia 1830 PSS-8 and PSS-16II are the new generation in the 1830 portfolio; it is future-oriented product to provide high capacity, high flexibility and high scalability. Integrated together with existing network management systems and engineering tools, both shelves provide operational automation through zero-touch, transparent photonic networking. These two new products are based on the platform that converges Lambda switching, OTN switching and packet switching in metro aggregation and core layers for service grooming and aggregation. Figure 2 - PSS-16II Shelf Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Figure 3 - PSS-8 Shelf The 1830 PSS-24x is designed to address multilayer, multiservice, optical network scale and efficiency by delivering an industry leading level of optical transport network (OTN) and Ethernet switching. Capable of supporting up to 48 Tbps of OTN/Ethernet switching capacity in a single rack, terabit capable card slots and low system power utilization, the 1830 PSS-24x takes OTN/Ethernet grooming and protection to the next level of scale required to support efficient 100G, 200G, 400G, 500G and beyond wavelength transport. Figure 4 - PSS-24x Shelf The 1830 Photonic Services Interconnect

• Modular (PSI-M) provides flexible, modular, and scalable optical networking solutions for data center interconnect (DCI) applications. The Nokia PSI-M is a high capacity, modular, optical networking platform, optimized for data center interconnect applications over metro, regional, and long haul distances. As the software industry has transitioned to data center based applications, it has created a tremendous need for optical networks and bandwidth to interconnect data centers, as well as to connect local data caching sites to their respective metro point of presence locations. The 1830 PSI-M modular architecture allow carriers to configure only the interfaces and capacities needed for each application
• the ultimate pay as you go modularity. The PSI-M provides easy to use, cost efficient, small sized optical transport for 100GE, 400GE, and OTU4 client services. With its modular architecture, additional capacity and client interfaces can be added, as needed. Figure 5 - PSI-M Shelf Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy The FIPS approved configurations of 1830 PSS and 1830 PSI-M consist of physically secured single shelf entities equipped with equipment controller cards and encryption cards. The cryptographic module is based on the encryption cards 11QPEN4, S13X100E, 2UC400E installed on a single shelf version of an 1830 PSS with an equipment controller (32EC2E, 8EC2E or CEC2) as shown in 2.1.

Figure 6 - 1830 PSS, 1830 PSI-M Block Diagram Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

FIPS Configurations of 1830 PSS must meet stringent Physical, Logical and Operational requirements that are more restrictive than typical telecom or data center deployments. While the generalized use of

1830 PSS may normally include many different multi-shelf configurations with many different circuit

pack types, the FIPS approved configurations of 1830 PSS consist of physically secured single shelf entities equipped with equipment controller cards and 11QPEN4, S13X100E, 2UC400E cards. The cryptographic module is based on the encryption card 11QPEN4 and/or S13X100E or 2UC400E installed on a single shelf version of an 1830 PSS with an Equipment Controller (32EC2E, 8EC2E or The cryptographic modules are intended to be deployed at both ends of a transmit/receive pair of external optical fibers between two data centers to provide encryption of 10GE, 8G/10GFC and ODU2 client traffic (for 11QPEN4) and 10x 10GE/ODU2, 2x 40GE or 100GE/ODU4 (for S13X100E) and 4x ODU4 (for 2UC400E) while in flight between data centers. Data Service Interface (10GE/10GFC/OTU2) (100GE/40GE/10GE Data Service Interface (10GE/10GFC/OTU2) (100GE/40GE/10GE NM-NE interfaces KM-NE interfaces External KM KM-NE interfaces NM-NE interfaces External NM Figure 7 - Network Configuration of 1830 PSS-32/16II/8/24x

FIPS Configurations of 1830 PSI-M must meet stringent Physical, Logical and Operational requirements that are more restrictive than typical telecom or data center deployments. The FIPS approved configurations of 1830 PSI-M consist of physically secured single shelf entities equipped with equipment controller cards and DFC12E cards. The cryptographic module is based on the encryption card DFC12E installed on an 1830 PSI-M with an Equipment Controller (MEC2). The cryptographic modules are intended to be deployed at both ends of a transmit/receive pair of external optical fibers between two data centers to provide encryption of 12x ODU4 (for DFC12E) while in flight between data centers. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Data Service Interface (100GE) Encrypted ODU-4 (x12 per DFC12E) Data Service Interface (100GE) Optical Fiber

MEC2 AES-256 Device AES-256 Device DFC12E DFC12E Key Repository Key Repository cryptographic boundary cryptographic boundary NM-NE interfaces

MEC2 KM-NE interfaces External KM KM-NE interfaces NM-NE interfaces External NM Figure 8 - Network Configuration of 1830 PSI-M Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Cryptographic module interfaces The logical interface Control Output is not used by the module. The module does not output any command or control data used to control another module. L (4) L (1) n.a. n.a. Table 13 - PSS-32 Ports and Interfaces 3.1.1 Figure 9 - PSS32 User Panel - front view Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Table 14 - PSS-32 User Panel - Ports and Interfaces L (4) L (1) n.a. n.a. Table 15 - PSS-16II Ports and Interfaces 3.2.1 Figure 10 - PSS-16II User Panel - Ports and Interfaces Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Table 16 - PSS-16II User Panel - Ports and Interfaces L (4) L (1) n.a. n.a. Table 17 - PSS-8 Ports and Interfaces 3.3.1 Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Table 18 - PSS-8 Shelf Panel - Ports and Interfaces

(1) C, M, m, W (4) (1) R 1, 2 (2) n.a. n.a. Table 19 - PSS-24x Ports and Interfaces Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy 3.4.1 MFC24X Figure 12 - PSS-24x MFC24X - Ports and Interfaces Table 20 - MFC24x - Ports and Interfaces n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Table 21

• PSI-M Ports and Interfaces Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy 3.5.1 PSI-M Chassis Chassis Front Chassis Back Figure 13

• PSI-M Chassis (Front and Back) - Ports and Interfaces Table 22
• PSI-M Chassis - Ports and Interfaces 3.6 Equipment Controller 32EC2 for PSS-32, PSS16II Figure 14 - 32EC2 - Ports and Interfaces Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy (#6,7) Table 23 - 32EC2 - Ports and Interfaces The physical access to the AUX, ES1, ES2 is prevented by a faceplate which is secured by tamper labels if the module is in approved mode of operation. The AUX channel is disabled in the approved mode of operation and cannot be used. For ES1/ES2, non-usage of ES1/2 is by policy. The ES1/2 are unused in FIPS configurations and instead, the ports are used in non-FIPS multi-shelf configurations. They are, however, only used if the connected shelf is accepted to be a part of the NE. This requires provisioning actions that are prohibited by policy. CSPs are not accessible through ES1/2 and code

Figure 15 - 8EC2 - Ports and Interfaces (#4,5) Table 24 - 8EC2 - Ports and Interfaces The physical access to the ES1, ES2 is prevented by a faceplate which is secured by tamper labels if the module is in approved mode of operation. For ES1/ES2, non-usage of ES1/2 is by policy. The ES1/2 are unused in FIPS configurations and instead, the ports are used in non-FIPS multi-shelf configurations. They are, however, only used if the connected shelf is accepted to be a part of the NE. This requires provisioning actions that are prohibited by policy. CSPs are not accessible through ES1/2 and code 3.8 Equipment Controller CEC2 for PSS-24x Figure 16 - CEC2 - Ports and Interfaces Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy (1) C (1) M (1) m (1) W (1) (1) R Table 25 - CEC2 - Ports and Interfaces

The 11QPEN4 has four pluggable client interfaces (C1, C2, C3, and C4), four pluggable line interfaces Figure 10. The client and line interfaces are equipped with XFP transceivers. Each transceiver provides an optical fiber interface for receive and an optical fiber interface for transmit. Each line-client pair (L1-C1, L2-C2, L3-C3, L4-C4) provides an encrypted line port and the associated unencrypted client port. In the transmit direction, unencrypted data in the form of Fibre Channel, Ethernet or OTU2 signals enter a client port and are encrypted and then transmitted out the associated line port. In the receive direction, encrypted data is received on the Line Port and then decrypted and sent out the associated client port. The VOA sockets provide a means to optically attenuate the Line port signals- (They do not access or modify the content of the line port signals). Figure 17 - 11QPEN4 - Ports and Interfaces Table 26 - 11QPEN4 - Ports and Interfaces Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

The S13X100E has

• thirteen pluggable client interfaces
• C1 … C10: SFP+ transceivers
• C31, C32: QSFP transceivers
• one fixed line interface
• a status LEDs for the card
• fourteen status LEDs (one for each interface) Each pluggable client interface transceiver and the fixed line side transceiver provides an optical fiber interface for receive and an optical fiber interface for transmit. In the transmit direction, unencrypted data in the form of Ethernet, OTU2 or OTU4 signals enters the client ports, are multiplexed into one ODU4 signal and then encrypted and transmitted out the line port. In the receive direction, encrypted data is received on the Line Port and then decrypted and de-multiplexed and sent out the client ports. Figure 18 - S13X100E - Ports and Interfaces Table 27 - S13X100E - Ports and Interfaces

The 8P20 has

• a status LEDs for the card
• eight status LEDs (one for each interface) 8P20 is a single-slot, half-height card supported in 1830 PSS-8/PSS-16II/PSS-32 shelves. It has six SFP and two SFP+ ports. It supports 8 sub-10G any-rate client ports in client/line configurations as a client tributary card in PSS-8/PSS-16II shelves, and it supports 6 sub-10G anyrate client ports with two line OTU2 SFP+ ports in the standalone muxponder configuration. Figure 19
• 8P20 - Ports and Interfaces Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy L1/C7, L1/C8 (8) Table 28

• 8P20 - Ports and Interfaces

The 2UC400E has

• two fixed line interfaces (1, 2)
• a status LEDs for the card
• two status LEDs (one for each interface) The fixed line side transceivers provide an optical fiber interface for receive and an optical fiber interface for transmit. This card is used in a switching system, where the client-side signals are received from a backplane interface by the card. In the backplane-to-line direction, unencrypted data in the form of 100GE signals enters the client ports, is multiplexed into one ODU4 signal and then encrypted and transmitted out the line port. In the line-to-backplane direction, encrypted data is received on the Line Port and then decrypted and de-multiplexed and sent out the client ports. Figure 20
• 2UC400E - Ports and Interfaces 1, 2 (2) Table 29
• 2UC400E - Ports and Interfaces

The MEC2 has no interfaces. All needed interfaces (e.g. for OAMP) are accessible at the PSI-M Chassis. n.a. n.a. Table 30

• MEC2 - Ports and Interfaces

The DFC12E has

• twelve pluggable client interfaces
• C01 … C12: QSFP transceivers (QSFP28 100GBase-SR4/LR4,CWDM4)
• two fixed line interfaces (L1, L2)
• a status LEDs for the card
• thirteen status LEDs (one for each interface) Each pluggable client interface transceiver and the fixed line side transceivers provide an optical fiber interface for receive and an optical fiber interface for transmit. In the client-to-line direction, unencrypted data in the form of 100GE signals enters the client ports, is multiplexed into one ODU4 signal and then encrypted and transmitted out the line port. In the line-to-client direction, encrypted data is received on the Line Port and then decrypted and de-multiplexed and sent out the client ports. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Figure 21

• DFC12E - Ports and Interfaces Table 31 - DFC12E - Ports and Interfaces

The Filler Card has no transmission functionality. Its main purpose is to guarantee the proper airflow for the cooling of the NE. Figure 22

• PSS32-16II/8 Filler Card - Ports and Interfaces n.a. n.a. Table 32 - Filler Card - Ports and Interfaces Note: there are different physical filler cards for PSS-32/16II/8, for PSS-24x and for PSI-M, but the properties of those cards are the same and are reflected in the table above. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy The module supports identity-based authentication and the module supports two roles:

• Crypto Officer Role which is referred to as ‘Admin’
• User Role which is referred to as ‘Crypto’ WebUI. This role provides all services that are necessary for initial installation of the module and provides all services that are necessary for the provisioning and supervision of the transmission encryption function of the module for S13X100E, 11QPEN4 and 2UC400E. Those transmission encryption functions cannot be provisioned by other roles. These services are all Approved services. Table 33 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output 4.2 N/A W N/A W E, W G, E, R, W N/A N/A July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Perform Selftests s–Z N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Z E N/A Z N/A N/A N/A Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy G, R, W, E G, R, W, E W, E Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy E Perform Selftests N/A W N/A s–Z N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A W W N/A N/A N/A W W N/A N/A W W N/A N/A N/A Z N/A Table 34 - Approved Services Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Access rights: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Table 35 - Roles and Authentication The cryptographic module only provides access to a user that assumes a role (Administrator or Crypto) and has a specific identity (username and a password). Users are required to follow password Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy ! (exclamation mark) @ (at sign) $ (dollar sign) ” (double quotation mark) & (ampersand) ' (apostrophe) ( (left parenthesis) ) (right parenthesis) (asterisk) . (period) The first character of the password can be any alphabetic, numeric, or a valid special character. The New Password cannot be the same as or the reverse of the associated username and the password must not have three consecutive identical characters. Table 36 - Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Software/Firmware security A Nokia-Generic is the means to store software and firmware for a PSS-8/16II/32/24x or PSI-M system. The Nokia-Generic consists of a number of RPMs and each RPM contains a number of files.

Each RPM is protected in integrity and authentication (proof of origin) using a digital signature based on:

• SHA-512 [FIPS 180-4] for the hash function
• RSA-PSS [FIPS 186-4] with 4096-bits asymmetrical key for the signature calculation using a 512-bit salt (random value) An RPM is checked when it is brought onto the module.

Each file is protected in integrity using an integrity check based on

• SHA-256 for the hash function All files are checked a start-up of the module. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Operational environment The operational environment is non-modifiable.

For the used Operating Systems and Hardware Platforms, please refer to chapter 2 “Cryptographic module specification”.

The module shall be provisioned as described in chapter 16.1 and physically secured as described in chapter 15. The Admin can unambiguously determine that the module is in approved mode if the tamper-evident labels remain intact. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Physical security

To operate in FIPS Approved mode the tamper-evident labels shall be installed as shown in chapter 15 “Guidance

• Physical Installation
• Installing Tamper-evident labels”.

The cryptographic boundary of the 1830 PSS shelves is

• PSS-8: Shelf and Shelf Cover and Shelf Panel
• PSS-16II, PSS-32: Shelf and Shelf Cover and User Panel
• PSS-24x (ETSI version): Rack (shelf is inside the rack)
• PSS-24x (ANSI variant): Shelf and Shelf Cover
• PSI-M: Shelf

After the tamper seals have been applied to the module, the shelf cannot be accessed without indicating signs of tampering. The multi-chip standalone cryptographic module includes the following physical security mechanisms:

• Production-grade components and production-grade opaque enclosure with tamper-evident labels.
• Tamper-evident labels: refer to chapter 15 “Guidance
• Physical Installation
• Installing Tamper-evident labels” for detailed instructions on tamper-evident label placement.
• Provision the cryptographic module to operate in a FIPS compliant mode: refer to chapter 6.1 “Operating System and Hardware Platforms
• For the used Operating Systems and Hardware Platforms, please refer to chapter 2 “Cryptographic module specification”.
• ” for detailed instructions.
• all unpopulated slots are equipped with filler cards

Tamper-evident labels shall be installed (by the Crypto Officer (CO)) for the module to operate in a FIPS-approved mode of operation. The following graphics illustrate a tamper-evident label. Figure 23 - Tamper-evident label: intact, illustrates a tamper-evident label with no evidence of tampering. Figure 23 - Tamper-evident label: intact Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Figure 24 - Tamper-evident label: broken, illustrates a tamper-evident label that shows signs of tampering. Note the VOID markings on the solid red label. If any portion of the VOID marking is visible, the equipment is showing signs of potential tampering. Figure 24 - Tamper-evident label: broken Scan labels The tamper-evident labels each have a unique serial number and a linear barcode. The linear barcodes can be scanned while still on the sheet. Broken tamper-evident labels If a tamper-evident label is broken, then the respective module must be considered compromised and must not be used anymore. Non-invasive security The module claims no non-invasive security techniques. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Sensitive security parameter management List of SSPs: N/A N/A powercycle 256bits N/A

N/A 256bits 256bits 256bits al-AlphaNumericString) N/A Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy al-AlphaNumericString) al-AlphaNumericString) N/A N/A 256bits HMAC-SHA2256 N/A 256bits HMAC-SHA2256 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ReturntoFactory d powercycle powercycle; n HMACSHA256) HMACSHA256)

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

A) N/A ReturntoFactory ReturntoFactory Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

A) N/A ReturntoFactory Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

N/A KAS-FFCSSC KAS-ECCSSC n

powercycle; n powercycle; n ReturntoFactory ReturntoFactory ReturntoFactory TLS PreMaster

N/A powercycle; Security Policy July 31, 2024 n 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

N/A powercycle; n powercycle; n powercycle TLS PreMaster N/A [SP80090Ar1]. N/A powercycle [SP80090Ar1]. N/A powercycle Security Policy July 31, 2024 in [SP80090Ar1]. 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy N/A powercycle N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ReturntoFactory ReturntoFactory d

Table 37 - SSPs Note: The AES-GCM IV is used in the TLS and SSH protocol. For TLS, the AES-GCM IV is internally generated deterministically in compliance with TLSv1.2 GCM cipher suites as specified in RFC 5288 and Section 8.2.1 of NIST SP 800-38D. Per RFC 5246, when the nonce explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the module will trigger a handshake to ciphersuites from Section 3.3.1 of SP 800- 52 Rev 2. For SSH, the AES GCM IV is constructed in compliance with the SSHv2 specification (RFCs 4252, 4253 and 5647) and only for use within the SSHv2 protocol. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Table 38 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

The 1830 PSS-32/PSS-16II/PSS-8/24x and PSI-M perform known answer tests and critical functions tests at power up. Table 39 - Self-tests Pre-Operational Self-Tests

• OpenSSL Integrity Test
• using HMAC-SHA2-256
• Application Firmware Integrity Test
• using error detection code (SHA2-256) Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (performed at power-up)
• OpenSSL library
• CTR-based DRBG KAT
• HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
• ECDSA signature generation KAT OR ECDSA signature verification KAT
• RSA signature generation KAT
• RSA signature verification KAT
• SNMPv3 KDF KAT
• SSHv2 KDF KAT
• TLS 1.2 KDF KAT
• FFC DH shared secret KAT (2048)
• ECDH shared secret KAT (P-256)
• o SHA3-256 (entropy conditioning component) HMAC KATs with SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, and SHA2-512 utilize (and thus test) the full functionality of the SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, and SHA2-512 algorithms; therefore, no independent KATs for SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, and SHA2-512 implementations are required. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Conditional Self-Tests

• Firmware Load Test using RSA 4096 digital signature verification with SHA2-512
• Entropy RCT/APT
• ECDSA PCT
• RSA PCT
• DH/ECDH Key Assurances Critical Functions Tests
• DRBG Health Checks (performed at power-up) Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

Nokia delivers the module both physically and electronically. The hardware is delivered physically via a trusted carrier. The box is sealed by PVC adhesive tape with identification labels. A tamper free tape is also applied. The box is then belted if required. The software and guidance documentation are retrieved electronically from a web site. Hardware and software items associated with the module are itemized by a unique Nokia Part Number (APN). In addition, each 1830 PSS or 1830 PSI-M shelf can be ordered as a kit with the minimum required equipment for approved operation. The kit is also specified by a unique APN. Final versions of 1830 PSS customer documentation are posted on the Nokia Support portal, a Nokia Extranet site for internal users and external customers with entitlement. If a customer document is reissued, the re-issue is then posted on Nokia Support portal and the previous issue of the document removed.

The approved mode of operation has to be prepared by the Crypto Officer (Admin) by following the instructions in chapter 15 and chapter 16. If the module starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests (described in chapter 10) and is operating in the approved mode of operation.

The Crypto Officer is responsible for inspecting the tamper-evident labels on the shelves at least every 3 months.

When a zeroization of all SSPs is needed, because the module shall be decommissioned or taken out of the secured mode of operation, then the Return-to-Factory procedure can be used. Please note, that this erases also all Firmware and thus leads to a need to send the equipment back to the factory before the next use. For details, refer to chapter 16.4.

The module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3 requirements.

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Table 40 - Acronyms

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

Purpose Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSS-8/16-II/32. The tamper seals are provided in the Security Label Kit (8DG-6509-AAAA), which is a component of Shelf FIPS Kit: (3KC-13453-AAAA) Steps

1. When applying tamper-evident labels, ensure that the surface temperature to be sealed is be a minimum of +10°F and a maximum of +167°F.
2. Ensure that the surface to be sealed is dry. Moisture of any kind can cause a problem. Wipe the area with a clean paper towel.
3. Ensure that the surface to be sealed is clean. Wipe the area with a clean cloth or paper towel to remove any dust or other loose particles.
4. If there are possible chemical contaminants (oil, lubricants, release agents, etc), clean the surface with 100% iso-propyl alcohol. Wipe the alcohol dry with clean dry cloth or paper towel. • Note: Avoid using rubbing alcohol; it can leave an oily coating that will interfere with adhesion of the label.
5. Installed tamper-evident labels shall be cured for 24 hours.
6. Proceed to the appropriate procedure to install the tamper-evident labels: • PSS-8 • PSS-16II • PSS-32 • PSS-24x • PSI-M Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

Purpose Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSS-8. Steps

1. Place labels 1-4 horizontally over the 4 mounting screws that affix the rear cover to the shelf. Figure 25 - PSS-8 shelf – rear
2. Place labels 5 and 6 over the over the top cover to wrap the faceplate latches. Figure 26 - PSS-8 shelf – top Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

3. Place label 7 and 8 vertically over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover adaptor to the shelf. Left Right Figure 27 - PSS-8 shelf – left / right
4. Place labels 9 and 10 over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover to the shelf. Figure 28 - PSS-8 shelf – front
5. The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSS-8 shelf is now sealed.
6. Log the installation of the tamper evident labels used to be referenced at the time of label inspection. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

Purpose Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSS-16II. Overview Figure 29

• PSS-16II shelf
• overview front Figure 30 - PSS-16II shelf
• overview rear Steps Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

1. Place labels 1-5 vertically over the 5 mounting screws that affix the rear cover to the shelf. Figure 31 – PSS-16II shelf - rear
2. Place labels 6 to 7 vertically over the 2 mounting screws that affix the left bracket to the shelf. Figure 32 - PSS-16II shelf - left Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

3. Place labels 8 and 9 horizontally over the 2 mounting screws that affix the right bracket to the shelf. Figure 33 - PSS-16II shelf - right
4. Place labels 10 and 11 vertically over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover to the shelf. Place labels 12 and 13 vertically over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover to the fan tray. Figure 34 - PSS-16II shelf - front
5. The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf is now sealed. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

Purpose Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSS-32. Steps 1. Place labels 1–4 horizontally over the 4 mounting screws that affix the rear cover to the shelf. Figure 35 - PSS-32 shelf

• rear Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

2. Wrap labels 5 around one of the 2 mounting screws that affix the bottom shelf cover mounting bracket to the shelf. Figure 36 – PSS-32 shelf – bottom (1)
3. Wrap label 6 around one of the 2 mounting screws that affix the bottom shelf cover mounting bracket to the shelf. Figure 37 - PSS-32 shelf – bottom (2) Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

4. Place label 7 over one of the two screws that affix the top air exhaust to the shelf. Place labels 8 and 9 over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover to the shelf. Figure 38 - PSS-32 shelf – front
5. The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSS-32 shelf is now sealed.
6. Log the installation of the tamper evident labels used to be referenced at the time of label inspection. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

15.5 Procedure 1.4: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ETSI variant

Purpose Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ETSI variant. Steps

1. Place label 1 over the front door opener and label 2 over the rear door opener.
2. Place label 3 and 4 over the screws on the left side and place labels 5 and 6 over the screws on the right side. Figure 39 - PSS-24x ETSI rack
3. The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ETSI rack is now sealed. Note: Top and bottom of the PSS-24x rack does not need to be secured as this is implicitly achieved by the steps in this procedure. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

15.6 Procedure 1.4: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ANSI variant

Purpose Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ANSI variant. Steps

1. Place label 1 and 2 over the screws on the front cover of the PSS-24x ANSI shelf.
2. Place label 3 and 4 on the left side of the PSS-24x ANSI shelf. Attach the tamper-evident labels over the cover brackets and the central rack-post.
3. Place label 5 and 6 on the right side of the PSS-24x ANSI shelf. Attach the tamper-evident labels over the cover brackets and the central rack-post. Figure 40 - PSS-24x ANSI shelf – front, left and right Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. Place label 7 over the border of the TPSC96, as shown in figure below. Place label 8 over the screw on the back wall of the shelf, as shown in figure below. Place label 9, 10 over the thumb screw that secures the TIC. Place label 11 over the thumb screw that secures the MFC24X. Place label 12, 13, 14 over the border between FAN housing and shelf. Place label 15, 16, 17, 18 over the thumb screw that secures the PSF96. FAN TIC 15..18 PSF PSS-24x Rear View MFC TPSC Figure 41 - PSS24x ANSI shelf – rear
10. The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ANSI shelf is now sealed. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

Purpose Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSI-M. Steps

1. Place labels 1-4 horizontally over the 4 blades and onto the top cover making sure to not cover any air holes or labels. Figure 42 - PSI-M shelf – front
2. Place label 5 and 6 vertically over the mounting thumb screw for the chassis to mount into the rack. Figure 43 - PSI-M shelf – front left
3. Place label 7 over the top cover horizontally to cover the chassis and the top cover. Making sure to cover the screw head on the chassis. Figure 44 - PSI-M shelf – top Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

4. Place Label 8 on the chassis and over the fan grill as shown. Place Labels 9 and 10 over the fan handle. Make sure the fan handle is in the down position and put the make sure it is on the bottom surface of the chassis once on the handles as shown. Figure 45 - PSI-M shelf – rear Label coming onto the bottom surface of the shelf Figure 46 - PSI-M shelf – rear, bottom
5. The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSI-M shelf is now sealed.
6. Log the installation of the tamper evident labels used to be referenced at the time of label inspection. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

This procedure describes how to put the module into the FIPS-Approved mode.

Important! Until the NE is secured by performing the steps described up to and including chapter 16.1.1.15, it must not be connected to a LAN in order to avoid vulnerabilities. For a FIPS compliant configuration, the NE must run an ECN software load. When the NE is operational, the NE, along with the whole communication network, must be under restricted access. Internet access must be disabled, and access within the customer DCN must be restricted to selected systems, for example the NMS and computers of administrators. The Gateway NE (GNE) does have a rudimentary firewall, but the PSS network should also be protected from network attacks, such as Denial of Service attacks or rogue packets. This protection is typically implemented at the DCN router that connects to the GNE. Additionally, IPSec tunneling between the DCN router and the management system(s) is recommended.

The NE is properly installed and running: The NE is physically assembled, and the software is installed. The NE has booted and can be accessed via CIT.

Any equipment used to access the NE must be secured through the current state of the art security measures. This applies to computers that the 1830 PSS WebUI user interface or WS-NOC run on, but also, to the use of input devices for such computers. Note: A cordless mouse or keyboard cannot be considered secure. The OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) community, among others, can provide the best practices in regard to this topic.

All communication from/to the Management System(s) can be secured using an IPSec tunnel. This is an additional security measure that is not required for most communication channels. The communication channels where this is mandatory, are explicitly shown in the respective chapters. Irrespective of the use of IPSec tunnel, secure protocols (SSH, SNMPv3, HTTPS, etc.) should be used to connect to the NE. The IPSec tunnel is set up between the management system(s) and a DCN router placed next to the NE. From the DCN router to the NE, there is no IPSec tunnel possible, so this physical connection must be physically secured. Note: A FIPS compliant configuration allows secure communication protocols at the OAMP interface only.

Refer to the 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS) Release 22.12 Command Line Interface Guide [PSS-CLIG] for more detailed information regarding the CLI commands used in this chapter. 16.1.1.10 Preparation When the NE is connected to a DCN while the default user account passwords were not yet changed or ZTP enabled, and keys not set, the NE might be compromised. Required steps:

1. Disconnect the NE from DCN, if the NE was connected to the DCN before. If the security was already compromised (e.g., illegitimate user accounts were created), the system shall be reset to an initial status wiping out all configuration data. After this, restart the system turn-up procedure. The following command resets the system: config admin factory-reset
2. From the serial console of the active EC cryptographic module, access CLI as the default administrator 'admin’. Set the NE TID.”
3. From the serial console of the active EC, login to CLI as default administrator ‘admin’. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Execute the following CLI command to set the OAMP IP address. config interface usrpnl oamp ip <ipaddress/mask> 16.1.1.11 Configuration access: CIT Required steps must be executed using a locally connected Craft Interface Terminal (CIT) in order to avoid interference from DCN before the NE is secured. 16.1.1.12 NE keys NE keys and certificates must be generated. Required steps:

1. Generate an SSH key. crypto key generate all
2. Generate an SSL key (note: SSL means really TLS). crypto sslkey generate keytype rsa keylen 2048
3. Get and install a signed TLS X.509v3 certificate. Refer to chapter 16.1.1.13 for more detailed information. Note: When the NE is security hardened it can be connected to the LAN. Note: Please refer to the User Provisioning Guide for more information. 16.1.1.13 Signed SSL/TLS X.509v3 certificate In section 16.1.1.12, an SSL/TLS key was generated. Create a signed X.509v3 certificate for the NE based on this SSL/TLS key. Required steps: Create a signed X.509v3 certificate and load it onto the NE. Use the following commands:
4. Generate a CSR (Certificate Signing Request): config sslcsr generate
5. Provision Subject Alternative Names (SAN) if SAN authentication/server authentication is required on the peer. config sslcsr san {add | delete} {<ip-address> |<domain>}
6. Upload the CSR to a file server: config software server transfer < ip address of server: example 135.104.252.100> config software server transfer protocol sftp config software server transfer userid < user-id-forserver> config software server transfer root <example path: /home/sw1/ SAN8CSR.csr> config software server transfer detail config software server transfer load sslnecsr
7. Create the certificate by signing the CSR by an external CA (Certificate Authority).
8. Download the signed certificate to the NE: config software server transfer protocol sftp config software server transfer userid < user-id-forserver> config software server transfer root <example path: /home/sw1/ SAN8certificate.pem> config software server transfer load sslomscsr
9. Install downloaded certificate: config sslcert yes Be sure to install the NE root certificate on any clients connecting to the WebUI Note: Please refer to the User Provisioning Guide for more information. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy 16.1.1.14 Secure mode In order to enforce secure (encrypted) protocols, the NE must be set to secure mode. Required step:

1. Set NE to secure mode via CLI: config admin ui mode encrypted 16.1.1.15 16.1.1.16 User and account administration for NE management TL1, CLI, WebUI, NETCONF/gRPC System security settings The following settings are required to help enforce better security. config admin session maxfailedlogins 5 config admin authentication local password minlength 12 config admin session timeout 15 config admin maxsession 1 config admin minwaitlogin 15 Default local accounts At the time of NE deployment, there are two default accounts: admin and service. admin: The admin account is used to initially configure the NE. This includes creation of additional accounts to manage the NE. service: The service account is used by Nokia service personnel to install the NE and perform maintenance activities. Required steps:
2. Change the default admin password. config admin users edit admin passwd
3. Create a non-default account with administrative privileges to be used instead of the default admin account. For example, to create a user named “adminjoe” with administrative privileges, use the following command: config admin users add adminjoe administrator Note: Should you lose the new password, or disable the users, no maintenance access to the system will be available in case of emergency. It is recommended to always create new users with Administrative privilege for periodic work, and to disable the default user permanently. Recommended steps:
4. Disable the default admin account. config admin users edit admin status disabled
5. Disable the default service account. config admin users edit service status disabled 16.1.1.17 SNMP The following steps must be executed regardless if the NE is to be managed using SNMP or not. Accounts for SNMP are maintained by the NE. Internal accounts Important! The SNMP user accounts v3IntComDefUser is used for internal purposes. It must not be changed or removed. Default accounts At the time of NE deployment, there are two default accounts: v3DefaultUser and v3DftAdvUser. Required steps:
6. Disable default accounts: config admin snmpusers edit v3DftAdvUser status disabled config admin snmpusers edit v3DefaultUser status disabled Other predefined accounts If the NE was connected to a DCN before it was secured, other accounts might have been created. If other accounts than the default accounts are present, then those accounts must be deleted unless there is a clear and acceptable reason for them to be there. Required step: Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

1. Check for additional accounts and delete all non-default accounts (unless they are legitimate). User-defined accounts Required steps:
2. Create SNMP accounts as needed for accessing management systems.
3. Configure security options and passwords in alignment with accessing management systems. WS-NOC related accounts WS-NOC connection is not required. If WS-NOC is used, one SNMP user account is needed for the WS-NOC to manage the NE. The WS-NOC account is an SNMPv3 user. Required steps:
4. Create an SNMPv3 user with the following commands: config admin snmpusers add newnfmuser120 admin aes256sha256 config admin snmpusers edit newnfmuser120 privpasswd 16.1.1.18 Open Agent The Open Agent provides the NETCONF/gRPC interface and is disabled by default. If the Open Agent is enabled, disable it. Required step:
5. If it was enabled, use the following command to disable Open Agent: config general openagent disabled 16.1.1.19 ZTP (Zero Touch Provisioning) By default, ZTP is enabled. Disable ZTP mode. Required step:
6. Disable ZTP via an Admin CLI account: config admin ztp disable 16.1.1.20 FIPS squelching Enable fips-squelching mode. Required step:
7. In CLI, enter: config general fips-squelching enable 16.1.1.21 Maintenance accounts Accounts for maintenance are maintained by the NE. Those accounts are to be distinguished from TL1/CLI/WebUI, SNMP, or GMPLS CP accounts. Default accounts At the time of NE deployment, there are two default accounts: maint1 and maint2. The default status is that they are disabled. Required steps:
8. Disable remote access to maint1 if it is enabled. config admin system maint1 disable
9. Change the default passwords. Use an Admin CLI account to change the passwords of maint1 and maint2: config admin system maint1 <password> config admin system maint2 <password> Note: Passwords must available when required for action by service personnel and kept in a safe area. Recommended step:
10. Disable remote access to maint2 if it is enabled. maint2 has less access rights than maint1 and could be used for remote access while remote access for maint1is disabled. Still, the disabling of remote access to maint2 is recommended. To disable the remote access to maint2, use an Admin CLI account to execute: config admin system maint2 disable 16.1.1.22 Disable local serial console The local serial console can be used for local maintenance actions. For the login the maint1 user will be used. It is required that it is either managed by the autostate feature [see 16.1.1.28] or permanently disabled. To disable it, execute the following command: config admin system maint1 localdisable Note: If all management protocols at the OAMP interface and remote maintenance logins Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy have failed or are disabled, then no maintenance access is possible anymore - neither remote nor local. If the local serial console is enabled, it will be notified by the standing condition MAINT-ALLOWEDLOCAL. The default severity is NR (not reported). It appears in the condition list and logs only. If the severity shall be increased to MJ (major), CR (critical) or WR (warning), then it is automatically present in the alarm list because the FIPS status of the NE is violated in case it is open. 16.1.1.23 16.1.1.24 Remote access is now safe Precondition The required steps described in the preceding sections of the security hardening guidelines were executed. This means that the NE is now hardened to a degree that it is safe to connect to a general network. 16.1.1.25 Allow remote access to the NE The next steps can be done using any management access type that has a secure connection. Configuration access via remote access is now safe, and you may connect to a LAN now. Note: The DCN is secured, using IP ACL throughout the DCN (see DCN Guide for concepts and instructions). 16.1.1.26 16.1.1.27 Physical security Introduction The NE must be in a secure network; see chapter 16.1.1.4. In addition, the communication channel in and out of the NE must be restricted. 16.1.1.28 Customer LAN ports, Embedded Communication Channel (ECC) Recommended steps:

1. Assign IP Address to OAMP port of TOE: config interface mfc shelf/slot/oamp <ip address for the TOE> config cn routes default add <ip address for DHCP server> 16.1.1.29 16.1.1.30 Services Introduction The following services should only be enabled if they are used. If they are not used, they should be disabled. The following services are covered by this document: NTP, SNMP Traps. 16.1.1.31 NTP with authentication To authenticate the NTP server(s), a key must be provisioned per NTP server used. Required steps:
2. Establish an authentication key on each NTP server.
3. Provision each NE receiving time from that server with the authentication key. Note: The length of the NTP Key must be at least 12 characters and the NTP Key hash type must be SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1), not MD5 (Message-digest algorithm). 16.1.1.32 SWNE For a FIPS compliant configuration, SWNE functionality must be disabled. NEs can be in a server or in a client role. Required step: Disable the SWNE functionality:
4. Execute the following command: config general ftpserver disable Note: In case of a software update, SWNE functionality must be enabled temporarily. 16.1.1.33 Installation from USB stick For a FIPS-compliant configuration, use of USB ports is prohibited. The USB ports are therefore sealed and shall not be used. 16.1.1.34 Bluetooth access The NE can be accessed via bluetooth using a bluetooth dongle. For a FIPS-compliant Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy configuration, access via bluetooth must be disabled. Required step:

1. Execute the following command to disable it: config interface BT state down 16.1.1.35 SFTP client
2. Provision key-based authentication which supports mutual authentication for SFTP file transfers. The following file transfers support this: • SW download config software server <ip address of server> • Software dynamic download config software dynamic refreshserver • Data backup & restore config database server ip <ip address of server: example 135.104.252.100> config database server protocol sftp config database server userid <user-id-for-server> config database path <example path: /home/sw1/ajayoka/DB> • Log file transfer config transferlog server ip <ip address of server: example

config transferlog server protocol SFTP config transferlog server userid crypto prompted for <password> config transferlog server port 22 config transferlog path /home/crypto • Syslog file transfer config admin transfersyslog server • System Trust anchor installation file transfer config keystore system trustanchor Note: The parameters are always the same, but the commands differ. The configuration must be done for all used services.

2. Provision the server and the user credentials on the server.[use server documentation]
3. Once the provisioning is complete, mutual authentication is available for SFTP. Required steps:
4. Enable SFTP only if needed.
5. The recommended password length for the password used for the SFTP server login as a client is 12 characters. Alternatively, use key based authentication. 16.1.1.36 SNMP traps Required step:
6. Set the SNMP trap destination(s) for 1830 SMS. config snmpserver trapdest add <snmp-server-name> <ip address of server> 1500 3 v3 0 smsuser256 16.1.1.37 TLS
7. Use TLS 1.2: config admin security tls tls-system version max 1.2 config admin security tls tls-system version min 1.2 config admin security commit Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

The NE stores information in various log files. This log files should be periodically checked. Recommended step: 1. Check log files periodically for anomalies. Show logs all

A FIPS self-test can be initiated by power cycling the system. (This action will impact service until system fully boots up.) After starting, verify the status of the self-test. FIPSSFMISMATCH or AESFIPSFAILURE conditions must not appear. show condition Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

This procedure describes how to zeroize all SSPs to comply with the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3 (Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules), detailing the U.S and Canadian governments' requirements for cryptographic modules.

All SSPs are zeroized when the module executes the command to return it to factory. Administrator privilege is needed to execute this command. Required steps: 1. initiate Return-to-Factory: config admin return-to-factory

Zeroizing all SSPs in the module takes some time, so the operator must wait for the internal steps to complete. The Zeroization process is considered completed once all controllers show their LED in Solid Red. Required steps: 1. Wait for all controller card LEDs to show solid red. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5

Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

In additional to direct guidance provided in this security policy, additional detailed guidance is available to registered customers from Nokia documentation web site at documentation.nokia.com. Note: the ITUG and CLIG documents of Release 22.12 are valid for Release 23.3 as well. Security Policy July 31, 2024 1.5