CorSSL FIPS Object Module

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (38)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for CorSSL FIPS Object Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>recovery</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>library named: openssl<br/>library named: nss</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for CorSSL FIPS Object Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>recovery</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>library named: openssl<br/>library named: nss</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Corsec Security, Inc. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module Software Version: 2.0.16.001 FIPS Security Level: 1 Document Version: 0.2 Prepared by: Corsec Security, Inc.

Suite 210 Fairfax, VA 22033 United States of America Phone: +1 703 267 6050 www.corsec.com

Abstract This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module (version 2.0.16.001) from Corsec Security, Inc. (Corsec). This Security Policy describes how the CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3, which details the U.S. and Canadian government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp. This document also describes how to run the module in its Approved mode of operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-3 validation of the module. The CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module is referred to in this document as CorSSL FOM or the module. References This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-3 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:

• The Corsec website www.corsec.com contains information on the full line of services and solutions from Corsec.
• The search page on the CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/Validated-Modules/Search) can be used to locate and obtain vendor contact information for technical or sales-related questions about the module. Document Organization ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B uses the same section naming convention as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7 - Security requirements. For example, Annex B section B.2.1 is named “General” and B.2.2 is named “Cryptographic module specification,” which is the same as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7.1 and section 7.2, respectively. Therefore, the format of this Security Policy is presented in the same order as indicated in Annex B, starting with “General” and ending with “Mitigation of other attacks.” If sections are not applicable, they have been marked as such in this document. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

Corsec Security, Inc is a privately owned company dedicated to assisting organizations through the security certification and validation process. Over the past 22 years, Corsec has grown significantly, becoming a global leader in product and corporate security, offering critical guidance and expertise to meet important business challenges in product security and third-party certifications and security validations, including FIPS 140-2, FIPS 140-3, Common Criteria, and the DoDIN1 APL2. Corsec’s certification methodology helps open doors to new markets and increase revenue for clients with products ranging from mobile phones to satellites. Corsec’s broad knowledge safeguards against common pitfalls and thwarts delays, translating to a swift and seamless path to certification. Corsec has created the benchmark for providing business leaders with fast, flexible access to industry knowledge on security certifications and validations. The CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module (also called “CorSSL FOM”) version 2.0.16.001 is a software library providing a C language API 3 for use by other applications requiring cryptographic functionality. The CorSSL FOM offers symmetric encryption/decryption, digital signature generation/verification, hashing, cryptographic key generation, random number generation, message authentication, and SSP establishment functions to secure dataat-rest/data-in-flight and to support industry-standard secure communications protocols. The CorSSL FOM is built upon the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module 2.0.16 code base, providing engineering teams with a completely compatible cryptographic engine, allowing quick “drop-in” replacement into any existing OpenSSL FIPS Object Module solutions. The CorSSL FOM does not modify the OpenSSL interface, maintaining complete compatibility, and eliminating engineering development time to meet FIPS 140-3 requirements. The CorSSL FOM is validated at the FIPS 140-3 section levels shown in Table 1. Table 1

• Security Levels DoDIN
• Department of Defense Information Network

2 APL – Approved Product List

3 API – Application Programming Interface

CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

The module has an overall security level of 1. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

2. Cryptographic Module Specification The CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module is a software module with a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The module is designed to operate within a modifiable operational environment.

The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-3 requirements on the environments listed in Table 2. Table 2 – Tested Operational Environments The module is designed to utilize the AES-NI4 extended instruction set when available by the host platform’s CPU for processor algorithm acceleration (PAA) of its AES implementation. There are no vendor-affirmed operational environments claimed. The cryptographic module maintains validation compliance when operating on any general-purpose computer (GPC) provided that the GPC uses any operating system/mode specified on the validation certificate, or another compatible operating system. The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.

The module implements the Approved algorithms listed in Table 3.

4 AES-NI – Advanced Encryption Algorithm New Instructions

CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

5 This table includes vendor-affirmed algorithms that are approved but CAVP testing is not yet available.

6 PUB – Publication

CBC – Cipher Block Chaining

8 CFB – Cipher Feedback

ECB – Electronic Code Book

11 OFB – Output Feedback

12 CMAC – Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code

13 CCM – Counter with Cipher Block Chaining - Message Authentication Code

GCM – Galois Counter Mode

15 XOR – Exclusive OR

16 XEX – XOR Encrypt XOR

17 XTS – XEX-Based Tweaked-Codebook Mode with Ciphertext Stealing

19 DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator

20 DSA – Digital Signature Algorithm

CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

21 ECDSA – Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

22 KAS-ECC-SSC – Key Agreement Scheme - Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Shared Secret Computation

KTS – Key Transport Scheme

24 Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES-CCM is an Approved key transport technique.

25 Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES-GCM is an Approved key transport technique.

CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

The vendor affirms the following cryptographic security methods:

26 Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES with CMAC is an Approved key transport technique.

27 Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES with HMAC is an Approved key transport technique.

28 RSA – Rivest Shamir Adleman

RSA – Rivest Shamir Adleman

30 PSS – Probabilistic Signature Scheme

31 SHS – Secure Hash Standard

CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

• Cryptographic key generation
• In compliance with section 4 of NIST SP 800-133rev2, the module uses its Approved DRBG to generate random values and seeds used for asymmetric key generation. The generated seed is an unmodified output from the DRBG. The module implements the non-Approved but allowed algorithms shown in Table 4 below. Table 4
• Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation The module does not implement any non-Approved algorithms allowed in the Approved mode of operation with no security claimed. The module does not implement any non-Approved algorithms not allowed in the Approved mode of operation.

As a software cryptographic module, the module has no physical components. The physical perimeter of the cryptographic module is defined by each host platform on which the module is installed. Figure 1 below illustrates a block diagram of a typical GPC and the module’s physical perimeter.

32 Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES in any Approved mode is an Approved key transport technique (for unwrapping only).

CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

Hardware Network DVD RAM Management Interface HDD Clock SCSI/SATA Generator Controller LEDs/LCD CPU Serial I/O Hub Audio Cache PCI/PCIe Slots USB BIOS Power Graphics PCI/PCIe Interface Controller Slots External Power Supply KEY: BIOS

• Basic Input/Output System PCIe
• PCI express Plaintext Data CPU
• Central Processing Unit HDD
• Hard Disk Drive Encrypted Data SATA
• Serial Advanced Technology Attachment DVD
• Digital Video Disc Control Input SCSI
• Small Computer System Interface USB
• Universal Serial Bus Status Output PCI
• Peripheral Component Interconnect RAM
• Random Access Memory Physical Perimeter LED
• Light Emitting Diode LCD
• Liquid Crystal Display Figure 1
• GPC Block Diagram The module is a software module based on the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) 2.0.16. The module is compiled into object form and then linked to a “FIPS-capable” instance of the OpenSSL cryptographic library at build-time. The larger library can then be linked to a calling application. The module’s cryptographic boundary consists of all functionalities contained within the module’s compiled source code. This comprises a cryptographic primitives library file called fipscanister.o. The cryptographic boundary is the contiguous perimeter that surrounds all memory-mapped functionality provided by the module when loaded and stored in the host platform’s memory. The module image also includes an embedded HMAC SHA-1 MAC value for verifying the module’s integrity at runtime. The module is entirely contained within the physical perimeter. Figure 2 below shows the logical block diagram of the module executing in memory and its interactions with surrounding software components, as well as the module’s physical perimeter and cryptographic boundary. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

Calling Application                        fipscanister KEY: Cryptographic Boundary Physical Perimeter                                         Operating System Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output                         CPU           Memory            Storage           Ports System Calls Host Device Figure 2 – Module Block Diagram (with Cryptographic Boundary)

Once all pre-operational self-tests have completed successfully, the module supports only an Approved mode of operation. Table 3, Table 4, and above list the algorithms available in the Approved mode; Table 7 provides descriptions of the Approved services. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

FIPS 140-3 defines the following logical interfaces for cryptographic modules: As a software library, the cryptographic module has no direct access to any of the host platform’s physical ports, as it communicates only to the calling application via its well-defined API. A mapping of the FIPS-defined interfaces and the module’s logical interfaces can be found in Table 5. Note that the module does not output control Table 5 – Ports and Interfaces CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

4. Roles, Services, and Authentication The sections below describe the module’s authorized roles, services, and operator authentication methods.

The module supports a Crypto Officer (CO) that authorized operators can assume. The CO role performs cryptographic initialization or management functions and general security services. The module also supports the following role(s):

• User
• The User role performs general security services, including cryptographic operations and other approved security functions. The module does not support multiple concurrent operators. The calling application that loaded the module is its only operator. Table 6 below lists the supported roles, along with the services (including input and output) available to each role. Table 6
• Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

The module does not support authentication methods; operators implicitly assume an authorized role based on the service selected.

Descriptions of the services available are provided in Table 7 below. The keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the following notation:

• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Table 7
• Approved Services CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

The module does not provide any non-Approved services. Thus, as allowed per section 2.4.C of FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance, the module provides indicators for the use of Approved services through a combination of an explicit indication (via a global Approved mode indicator) and an implicit indication (via the API return indicating the successful completion of the service). CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

5. Software/Firmware Security The module's integrity is verified via a pre-operational self-test that uses an Approved integrity technique implemented within the cryptographic module itself. The entirety of the software cryptographic module is verified using a single embedded HMAC SHA-1 digest value. The module computes an HMAC SHA-1 digest at runtime and compares it to the embedded digest value; failure of the integrity test will cause the module to enter a critical error state. The module’s integrity test is performed automatically at module instantiation (i.e., when the module is loaded into memory for execution) without action from the module operator. This integrity test can also be performed on demand by the module operator by issuing the FIPS_selftest() API command. The CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module is not a standalone application; it is a cryptographic toolkit intended for use in a with a vendor’s solution. The module will be linked to a host application, and the host application will be preinstalled onto a target platform by the vendor or installed onto target platforms by the end-user. The module itself requires no configuration steps to be performed by application developers or end-users, and no action is required from developers or end-users to initialize the module for operation. The module is designed with a default entry point (DEP) that ensures that the pre-operational tests and conditional CASTS are initiated automatically when the module is loaded. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

6. Operational Environment The CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module comprises a software cryptographic library that executes in a modifiable operational environment. The cryptographic module has control over its own SSPs. The process and memory management functionality of the host device’s OS prevents unauthorized access to plaintext private and secret keys, intermediate key generation values and other SSPs by external processes during module execution. The module only allows access to SSPs through its well-defined API. The operational environment provides the capability to separate individual application processes from each other by preventing uncontrolled access to CSPs and uncontrolled modifications of SSPs regardless of whether this data is in the process memory or stored on persistent storage within the operational environment. Processes that are spawned by the module are owned by the module and are not owned by external processes/operators. Please refer to section 2.1 of this document for a list/description of the applicable operational environments. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

7. Physical Security The cryptographic module is implemented completely in software, such that the physical security is provided solely by the host device. Therefore, per ISO/IEC 19790:2012 7.7.1, this section is not applicable. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

8. Non-Invasive Security This section is not applicable. There are currently no approved non-invasive mitigation techniques references in ISO/IEC 19790:2021 Annex F. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

The module supports the keys and other SSPs listed Table 8 below. Table 8 – SSPs CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

The module implements the following Approved DRBG(s):

• Hash-based DRBG (non-compliant)
• HMAC-based DRBG (non-compliant) These DRBGs are used to generate random values at the request of the calling application. Outputs from the DRBGs are also used in the generation of seeds for asymmetric key pair generation. The module does not implement any non-Approved DRBGs. There is no mechanism within the module’s cryptographic boundary for the persistent storage of SSPs. The module stores DRBG state values for the lifetime of the DRBG instance. The module uses SSPs passed in on the stack by the calling application and does not store these SSPs beyond the lifetime of the API call. Maintenance, including protection and zeroization, of any keys and CSPs that exist outside the module’s cryptographic boundary are the responsibility of the end-user. For temporarily stored SSPs, zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API function calls. The module will first overwrite existing values with “0”s and then free the memory. Additionally, module operators can unload the module from memory or reboot/power-cycle the host device.

The cryptographic module’s entropy scheme follows the scenario given in FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance 9.3.A, section 2(b). The module invokes a GET command to obtain entropy for random number generation (the module requests 256 bits of entropy from the calling application per request), and then passively receives entropy from the calling CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

application while having no knowledge of the entropy source and exercising no control over the amount or the quality of the obtained entropy. The calling application and its entropy sources are located within the physical perimeter of the module’s operational environment but outside its cryptographic boundary. Thus, there is no assurance of the minimum strength of the generated SSPs. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

10. Self-Tests Both pre-operational and conditional self-tests are performed by the module. Pre-operational tests are performed between the time the cryptographic module is instantiated and before the module transitions to the operational state. Conditional self-tests are performed by the module during module operation when certain conditions exist. The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status, and the error resolutions.

The module performs the following pre-operational self-test(s): • Software integrity test (using an HMAC SHA-1 digest verification)

Conditional self-tests are performed by the module during module operation when certain conditions exist. The module performs the following conditional self-tests:

• Conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs)
• AES ECB encrypt KAT (128-bit)
• AES ECB decrypt KAT (128-bit)
• AES CCM encrypt KAT (192-bit)
• AES CCM decrypt KAT (192-bit)
• AES GCM encrypt KAT (256-bit)
• AES GCM decrypt KAT (256-bit)
• AES XTS encrypt KAT (128/256-bit)
• AES XTS decrypt KAT (128/256-bit)
• AES CMAC generate KAT (CBC mode; 128/192/256-bit)
• AES CMAC verify KAT (CBC mode; 128/192/256-bit)
• CTR_DRBG generate/instantiate/reseed KAT (256-bit AES)
• Hash_DRBG generate/instantiate/reseed KAT (SHA2-256)
• HMAC_DRBG generate/instantiate/reseed KAT (SHA2-256)
• HMAC KATs (SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512)
• DSA sign KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256)
• DSA verify KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256)
• ECDSA sign KAT (P-224 and K-233 curves; SHA2-256)
• ECDSA verify KAT (P-224 and K-233 curves; SHA2-256)
• RSA sign KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1 v1.5 scheme)
• RSA verify KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1 v1.5 scheme)
• RSA encrypt KAT
• RSA decrypt KAT
• ECC CDH shared secret computation KAT (P-224 curve) CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

To ensure all CASTs are performed prior to the first operational use of the associated algorithm, all CASTs are performed during the module’s initial power-up sequence. The SHA and HMAC KATs are performed prior to the pre-operational software integrity test; all other CASTs are executed after the successful completion of the software integrity test.

• Conditional pair-wise consistency tests (PCTs)
• DSA sign/verify PCT
• ECDSA sign/verify PCT
• RSA sign/verify PCT
• RSA encrypt/decrypt PCT
• ECDH key generation PCT
• Conditional critical function tests
• XTS AES duplicate key test

Upon failure of any of the module’s pre-operational or conditional self-tests, the module will enter a critical error state. An internal global error flag FIPS_selftest_fail will be set and subsequently tested to prevent the execution of any cryptographic services while the error state persists. For any subsequent request for cryptographic services, the module will return an error result consistent with the API’s function declaration for every invocation. To recover, the module must be re-instantiated, or the host device must be rebooted/power-cycled. If these recovery methods do not result in the successful completion of all pre-operational self-tests and conditional CASTs, then the module will not be able to resume normal operations, and the CO should contact Corsec Security, Inc. for assistance. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

11. Life-Cycle Assurance The sections below describe how to ensure the module is operating in its validated configuration, including the following:

• Procedures for secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module
• Maintenance requirements
• Administrator and non-Administrator guidance Operating the module without following the guidance herein (including the use of undocumented services) will result in non-compliant behavior and is outside the scope of this Security Policy.

The module is distributed third-party vendors as a package containing the binary and HMAC digest file that the Crypto Officer is to install onto a target platform specified in section 2.1 above or one where portability is maintained.

This module is designed to support third-party vendor applications, and these applications are the sole consumers of the cryptographic services provided by the module. No end-user action is required to initialize the module for operation; the calling application performs any actions required to initialize the module. The pre-operational integrity test and cryptographic algorithm self-tests are performed automatically via a DEP when the module is loaded for execution by the calling application, without any specific action from the calling application or the end-user. The DEP invokes self-test code by calling the FIPS_mode_set() API command with a non-zero parameter. If successful, this action sets an internal Approved mode flag to ‘TRUE’, placing the module in its Approved mode. End-users have no means to short-circuit or bypass these actions. Failure of any of the initialization actions will result in a failure of the module to load for execution.

No startup steps are required to be performed by end-users.

There are no specific management activities required of the CO role to ensure that the module runs securely. If any irregular activity is observed, or if the module is consistently reporting errors, then Corsec Customer Support should be contacted. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

The following list provides additional guidance for the CO:

• The CO can initiate the pre-operational self-tests and conditional CASTs on demand for periodic testing of the module by re-instantiating the module, rebooting/power-cycling the host device, or issuing the FIPS_selftest() API command.
• The FIPS_mode() API command can be used to determine the module’s current mode of operation. This command will return a non-zero value when the module has properly initialized in its Approved mode of operation.
• The FIPS_module_version_text() API command can be used to obtain the module’s versioning information. This information will include the module name and version, which can be correlated with the module’s validation record.

The following list provides additional policies for module operators acting in a non-administrative role:

• The cryptographic module’s services are designed to be provided to a calling application. Excluding the use of the NIST-defined elliptic curves as trusted third-party domain parameters, all other assurances from FIPS PUB 186-4 (including those required of the intended signatory and the signature verifier) are outside the scope of the module and are the responsibility of the calling application.
• The module performs assurances for its key agreement schemes as specified in the following sections of NIST SP 800-56Arev3:
• Section 5.5.2 (for assurances of domain parameter validity)
• Section 5.6.2.1 (for assurances required by the key pair owner) The module includes the capability to provide the required recipient assurance of ephemeral public key validity specified in section 5.6.2.2.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3. However, since public keys from other modules are not received directly by this module (those keys are received by the calling application), the module has no knowledge of when a public key is received. Invocation of the proper module services to validate another module’s public key is the responsibility of the calling application.
• The module performs assurances for its RSA-based key transport scheme as specified in the following sections of NIST SP 800-56Brev2:
• Section 6.4.1 (for assurances required by the key pair owner) The module includes the capability to provide the required recipient assurance of ephemeral public key validity specified in section 6.4.2 of NIST SP 800-56Brev2. However, since public keys from other modules are not received directly by this module (those keys are received by the calling application), the module has no knowledge of when a public key is received. Invocation of the proper module services to validate another module’s public key is the responsibility of the calling application. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

• To meet the AES GCM (key/IV) pair uniqueness requirements from NIST SP 800-38D, the module complies with FIPS 140-3 IG C.H as follows:
• Per scenario 3 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H, the module employs deterministic IV construction as specified in section 8.2.1 of NIST SP 800-38D. The IV is constructed at its entirety internally deterministically, with a length of 96 bits. In the event that power to the module is lost and subsequently restored, the calling application must ensure that any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
• The calling application is responsible for using entropy sources that meet the minimum security strength of 112 bits required for the Approved DRBGs as shown in NIST SP 800-90Arev1, Table 2 and Table 3.
• In the event that the module encounters a DRBG self-test failure, the calling application must uninstantiate and reinstantiate the DRBG per the requirements found in NIST SP 800-90Arev1. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

12. Mitigation of Other Attacks This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 requirements for this validation. CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations Table 9 provides definitions for the acronyms and abbreviations used in this document. Table 9 – Acronyms and Abbreviations CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

CorSSL™ FIPS Object Module 2.0.16.001 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

Prepared by: Corsec Security, Inc.

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