PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (31)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Update</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>status output<br/>self-test</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Update</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>status output<br/>self-test</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Version: 1.2 Revision Date: August 13, 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. www.paloaltonetworks.com © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks. A list of our trademarks can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective companies.

The PAN-OS 10.2.8-h4 VM-Series module is available in multiple capacity options. All models can be deployed as guest virtual machines on VMware ESXi, Hyper-V, and Linux server that is running the KVM (Kernel-based Virtual Machine) using a common base image distributed in a compatible hypervisor format. The PAN-OS VM-Series is the virtualized form factor of the Palo Alto Networks next-generation firewall. The VM-Series is used to protect applications/data from cyber threats using Palo Alto Networks’ next-generation firewall and advanced threat prevention features. The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 1 security of FIPS 140-3. Table 1 - Security Levels ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6. FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level

2                                Cryptographic Module Specification                1
3                                Cryptographic Module Interfaces                   1
4                                Roles, Services, and Authentication               3
5                                Software/Firmware Security                        1
6                                Operational Environment                           1
7                                Physical Security                                 N/A
8                                Non-Invasive Security                             N/A
9                                Sensitive Security Parameter Management           1
11                               Life-Cycle Assurance                              3
12                               Mitigation of Other Attacks                       N/A
Overall Level                                      1 2.          Cryptographic Module Specification The tested operational environments are highlighted in Table 2. Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments Operating System             Hardware Platform                   Processor                     PAA/Acceleration Hyper-V 2019 on Microsoft         Dell PowerEdge R740                     Intel Xeon Gold 6248                N/A Hyper-V Server 2019 KVM 4 on Ubuntu 20.04             Dell PowerEdge R740                     Intel Xeon Gold 6248                N/A VMware ESXi v7.0                  Dell PowerEdge R740                     Intel Xeon Gold 6248                N/A © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                                         PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 3

Table 3 - Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments Operating System Hardware Platform Amazon Web Services (AWS) x86 Architecture Google Cloud Platform (GCP) (Note: Specific processor/hardware is dependent on Instance/Machine Type selected for operation system) Microsoft Azure Operator Porting Rules The CMVP allows user porting of a validated software module to an operational environment which was not included as part of the validation testing. An operator may install and run a VM-series firewall on any general purpose computer (GPC) or platform using the specified hypervisor and operating system on the validation certificate or other compatible operating and/or hypervisor system and affirm the modules continued FIPS 140-3 validation compliance. The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported and executed in an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate. Approved Mode of Operation The following procedure will put the module into the Approved mode of operation:

• During initial boot up, break the boot sequence via the console port connection (by entering “maint”) to access the main menu.
• Select “Continue.”
• Select the “Set FIPS-CC Mode” option to enter FIPS-CC mode.
• Select “Enable FIPS-CC Mode”.
• When prompted, select “Reboot” and the module will re-initialize and continue into FIPS-CC mode (Approved mode).
• The module will reboot.
• In FIPS-CC mode, the console port is available only as a status output port.
• Once the module has finished booting, the Crypto Officer can authenticate using the default credentials that come with the module
• Once authenticated, the module will automatically require the operator to change their password; and the default credential is overwritten The module will automatically indicate the Approved mode of operation in the following manner:
• Status output interface will indicate “**** FIPS-CC MODE ENABLED ****” via the CLI session.
• Status output interface will indicate “FIPS-CC mode enabled successfully” via the console port.
• The module will display “FIPS-CC” at all times in the status bar at the bottom of the web interface. Should one or more power-up self-tests fail, the Approved mode of operation will not be achieved. Feedback will consist of:
• The module will reboot and enter a state in which the reason for the reboot can be determined.
• The module will output “FIPS-CC failure.”
• To determine which self-test caused the system to reboot into the error state, connect the console cable and follow the on-screen instructions to view the self-test output. Note: Disabling FIPS-CC mode causes a complete factory reset, which is described in the Zeroization section below. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 4

Non-Compliant State Failure to follow the directions in the Approved Mode of Operation above or rules noted in Section 11 will result in the module operating in a non-compliant state, which is considered out of scope of this validation. Zeroization To perform the zeroization service, follow the procedure below:

• Access the module’s CLI via SSH, and command the module to enter maintenance mode; the module will reboot
• Note: Establish a serial connection to the console port
• After reboot, select “Continue.”
• Select “Factory Reset.”
• The module will perform a zeroization, and provide the following message once complete: o “Factory Reset Status: Success” Approved and Allowed Algorithms The cryptographic modules support the following Approved algorithms. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes specified in this table are used by the module. The CAVP certificate may contain more tested options than listed in this table. Table 4 –Approved Algorithms CAVP Cert Algorithm and Mode/Method Description / Key Size(s) / Use / Function Standard Key Strength(s) Conditioning Component Vetted conditioning component AES-CBC-MAC SP 800-90B for ESV Cert. #E69 A2907 AES-CBC [SP 800-38A] CBC 128, 192 and 256 bits Decryption A2907 AES-CTR [SP 800-38A] CTR 128, 192 and 256 bits Decryption

[SP 800-38D]                                                                       Decryption Counter DRBG                                     AES 256 bits with Derivation A2907                                         CTR DRBG                                               Random Bit Generator [SP 800-90Arev1]                                 Function Enabled ECDSA KeyGen                                                                       Key Generation (FIPS 186-4) Public Key Validation A2907             ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS 186-4)   ECDSA KeyVer         P-256, P-384, P-521 Signature Generation A2907             ECDSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)   ECDSA SigGen         SHA2-224, SHA2-256, A2907             ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)   ECDSA SigVer         SHA2-224, SHA2-256,               Signature Verification A2907             HMAC-SHA-1 [FIPS 198-1]     HMAC                 HMAC-SHA-1 with λ=96, 160         Authentication for protocols A2907             HMAC-SHA2-224               HMAC                 HMAC-SHA2-224 with λ=224          Authentication for protocols © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                                    PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 5

[FIPS 198-1] HMAC           HMAC-SHA2-256 with λ=256         Authentication for protocols [FIPS 198-1] HMAC           HMAC-SHA2-384 with λ=384         Authentication for protocols [FIPS 198-1] HMAC           HMAC-SHA2-512 with λ=512         Authentication for protocols [FIPS 198-1] A2907            KAS-ECC-SSC SP 800-56Ar3                                                     Key Exchange Engine ID: KDF SNMP [SP 800-135rev1] KDF SSH [SP 800-135rev1] A2907                                                        TLS v1.2 Hash Algorithm:         TLS [SP 800-135rev1] (CVL) (FIPS 186-4)                 (FIPS 186-4) (FIPS 186-4)                 (FIPS 186-4)   hashes SHA2-256/384/512 C.F) with hashes (FIPS 186-4)                 (FIPS 186-4) +++ This Hash algorithm is not supported for ANSI X9.31 Digital Signature A2907            SHA-1 [FIPS 180-4]           SHA Non-Digital Signature Applications (e.g. component of Digital Signature Non-Digital Signature Applications (e.g. component of Digital Signature Non-Digital Signature Applications (e.g. component of Digital Signature Non-Digital Signature Applications (e.g. component of Digital Signature © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                              PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 6

Non-Digital Signature Applications (e.g. component of 198-1, and SP [SP 800-38F]                   wrapping and A2907                                                                        of encryption strength unwrapping) per IG D.G. SP 800-38D and SP wrapping and            128 or 256 bits of encryption     Key Wrapping unwrapping) per IG      strength D.G. Palo Alto Networks DRNG Entropy Source SP 800-56Arev3.         P-256 and P-384 curves Cert. #A2907, KDF                                                                                              Key Exchange with protocol KAS [SP 800-56Arev3]           KAS-ECC per IG D.F      providing 128 or 192 bits of Scenario 2 path (2).    encryption strength Key Exchange with protocol SSH Cert. #A2907                                     Scenario 2 path (2).    of encryption strength Key Exchange with protocol TLS Cert. #A2907                                     Scenario 2 path (2).    of encryption strength SP 800-56Arev3.         2048, 3072, and 4096-bit keys Cert. #A2907, KDF                                                                                              Key Exchange with protocol KAS [SP 800-56Arev3]           KAS-FFC per IG D.F      providing 112, 128, or 150 bits Scenario 2 path (2).    of encryption strength Key Exchange with protocol SSH Cert. #A2907                                     Scenario 2 path (2). Key Exchange with protocol TLS Cert. #A2907                                     Scenario 2 path (2). Note: Symmetric keys and the Cryptographic Key Vendor                CKG                            Section 5.1, Section                                      seeds used for asymmetric key Affirmed              (SP 800-133rev2)               5.2, Section 6.1                                          pair generation are produced

using the unmodified/direct output of the DRBG

• For TLS, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with SP 800-52 and in accordance with Section 4 of RFC 5288 for TLS key establishment, and ensures when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts all possible values for a given session key, that a new TLS handshake is initiated per sections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 of RFC 5246. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly.
• From this RFC 5288, the GCM cipher suites in use are TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 7

● For IPsec/IKEv2, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with RFCs 4106 and

7296 (RFC 5282 is not applicable, as the module does not use GCM within IKEv2 itself), and ensures when the module

exhausts all possible values for a given session key that this triggers a rekey condition. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of IPsec with IKEv2 and found to behave correctly. ● For SSH, the module meets Scenario 4 of IG C.H. The fixed field is 32 bits in length and is derived using the SSH KDF; this ensures the fixed field is unique for any given GCM session. The invocation field is 64 bits in length and is incremented for each invocation of GCM; this prevents the IV from repeating until the entire invocation field space of 264 is exhausted, which can take hundreds of years. (In FIPS-CC Mode, SSH rekey is automatically configured at 1 GB of data or 1 hour, whichever comes first.) In all the above cases, the nonce_explicit is always generated deterministically. AES GCM keys are zeroized when the module is power-cycled. For each new TLS or SSH session, a new AES GCM key is established. The module is compliant to IG C.F: The module utilizes Approved modulus sizes 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits for RSA signatures. This functionality has been CAVP tested as noted above. The minimum number of Miller Rabin tests for each modulus size is implemented according to Table C.2 of FIPS 186-4. For modulus size 4096, the module implements the largest number of Miller-Rabin tests shown in Table C.2. RSA SigVer is CAVP tested for all three supported modulus sizes as noted above. The module does not perform FIPS 186-2 SigVer. All supported modulus sizes are CAVP testable and tested as noted above. The module does not implement RSA key transport in the approved mode. The module does not have any algorithms that fall under: - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation Table 5 - Supported Protocols in the Approved Mode Supported Protocols* TLSv1.2 SSHv2 SNMPv3 IPsec and IKEv2 *Note: These protocols have not been tested or reviewed by the CMVP or the CAVP. Cryptographic Boundary The PAN-OS 10.2.8-h4 VM-Series is a software cryptographic module and requires an underlying general purpose computer (GPC) environment. The module consists of a GPC (multi-chip standalone embodiment) with the cryptographic boundary defined below. The cryptographic boundary (CB) includes all of the software components of the module, which is included in the file noted in Section 11 (PanOS_vm-10.2.8-h4) and also the configuration file that resides on the virtual machine’s virtual disk. The physical perimeter (PP) is defined by the enclosure around the host GPC on which it runs. Figure 1 depicts the boundary and illustrates the hardware components of a GPC. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 8

Figure 1 - Cryptographic Boundary 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces The module is a software only module that operates on a general purpose computing (GPC) platform. The physical ports and logical interfaces are consistent with a GPC operating environment. The module supports the following FIPS 140-3 logical interfaces: Table 6 - Ports and Interfaces Physical Port Logical Interface Data that passes over port/interface Power Power In Power supplies Console, GPC I/O Status Output Self-test status output Ethernet Data input, control input, HTTPS, TLS, SNMP, IPsec, and SSH data output, status output traffic data. The module’s physical and electrical characteristics, manual controls, and physical indicators are provided by the host GPC; the hypervisors provide virtualized ports and interfaces which map to the GPCs’ physical ports and interfaces (i.e., network interfaces and GPC inputs/outputs). © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 9

4.        Roles, Services, and Authentication Roles and Services While in the Approved mode of operation, all CO and User services are accessed via SSH or TLS sessions. Approved and allowed algorithms, relevant CSPs and public keys related to these protocols are accessed to support the following services. CSP access by services is further described in the following tables. Table 7 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output Crypto Officer          Show Version                    Query module for version                     Module provides version Crypto Officer,         Security Configuration          Configuring and managing                     Confirmation of service User                    Management                      cryptographic parameters and                 via Configuration Logs setting/modifying security policy, including creating User accounts and additional CO accounts via CLI or WebUI Crypto Officer          Other Configuration             Networking parameter                         Confirmation of service configuration, logging configuration,        via Configuration Logs and other non-security relevant configuration via CLI or WebUI Crypto Officer,         View Other                      Query module for current                     Confirmation of service User                    Configuration                   non-security relevant configuration          via Configuration Logs via WebUI or CLI Crypto Officer,         Show Status                     Query status of the module via               Module status User, RA VPN,                                           WebUI or CLI                                 information via CLI or S-S VPN                                                                                              System Logs RA VPN, S-S VPN         VPN                             Initialize VPN connection                    Confirmation of service via System Logs Crypto Officer          Software Update                 Loading new image                            Message output noting version updated Unauthenticated         Zeroize                         Initiate zeroization command                 The device will overwrite all CSPs and provide status of completion Unauthenticated                                         Power cycling the module                     Self-test status output via system logs Unauthenticated         Show Status                     View status of the module via                Module status via the The zeroization procedure is invoked when the operator initiates the service. The operator must be in control of the module during the entire procedure to ensure that it has successfully completed. During the zeroization procedure, no other services are available. Note: Additional information on the configuration options the module provides can be found at https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/ © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                                              PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 10

Assumption of Roles The modules support four distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO), Remote Access VPN, and Site-to-site VPN. The cryptographic modules enforce the separation of roles using unique authentication credentials associated with operator accounts. The modules do not provide a maintenance role or bypass capability. The modules all support the use of a password (i.e. Memorized Secret as per SP 800-140E). Upon first boot, the module requires that the Cryptographic Officer change the password from the default one to a custom one. The module automatically enforces a minimum password length of at least 8 characters. In FIPS-CC mode, the module automatically enforces a maximum of 10 failed attempts. Passwords stored in the module are hashed using SHA-256, and any passwords that are transported into/out of the module are protected via TLS 1.2. Table 8 – Roles and Authentication Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength Cryptographic Officer Memorized Secret Memorized Secret (Password-based) (Username/password) and/or The minimum length is eight (8) Single-Factor Cryptographic Software characters1 (95 possible characters). (certificate/public key-based The probability that a random attempt authentication) will succeed or a false acceptance will User Memorized Secret occur is 1/(958) which is less than Single-Factor Cryptographic Software successfully authenticating to the (certificate/public key-based module within one minute is 10/(958), authentication) which is less than 1/100,000. The firewall’s configuration supports at Remote Access VPN (RA VPN) Memorized Secret most ten failed attempts to (Username/password) and/or authenticate in a one-minute period. Single-Factor Cryptographic Software authentication) The security modules support authentication using RSA 2048, RSA The minimum equivalent strength supported is 112 bits. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2112) which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 3,600,000/(2112), which is less than 1/100,000. The firewall supports at most 60,000 new In FIPS-CC Mode, the module checks and enforces the minimum password length of eight (8) as specified in SP 800-63B. Passwords are securely stored hashed with salt value, with very restricted access control, and rate limiting mechanism for authentication attempts. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 11

sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period. Site-to-Site VPN (S-S VPN) IKE/IPSec Pre-shared keys - The pre-shared key authentication Identification with the IP Address and method has a minimum security authentication with the Pre-Shared strength of 2112. The probability of Key (Memorized Secret) or successfully authenticating to the Single-Factor Cryptographic Software module is 1/(2112), which is less than (certificate based authentication) 1/1,000,000. The number of authentication attempts is limited by the number of new connections per second supported (120,000) on the fastest platform of the Palo Alto Networks firewalls. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 7,200,000/(2112), which is less than The security modules support RSA 2048 and certificate-based authentication using RSA 2048, RSA The minimum equivalent strength supported is 112 bits. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2112) which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 3,600,000/(2112), which is less than 1/100,000. The firewall supports at most 60,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 12

Definition of CSPs Modes of Access The following table defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. Table 9 - Approved Services Service                 Description         Approved Security            Keys and/or SSPs      Roles     Access rights to              Indicator Functions                                                 Keys and/or SSPs Show Version       Query the module to    N/A                         N/A                      CO        N/A                Version displayed via System display the version                                                                                      Logs / CLI / UI Security           Configuring and        CKG                         RSA Private Keys         CO        G/W/E              Configuration/System Logs RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4) parameters and including creating ECDSA SigGen additional CO KAS         KDF TLS         TLS Pre-Master Secret    CO        G/E/Z              Configuration/System Logs KDF TLS         TLS Master Secret        CO        G/E/Z              Configuration/System Logs CKG,            TLS DHE/ECDHE                      G/E/Z TLS DHE/ECDHE Public               G/E/R/W/Z , , Safe Primes Safe Primes AES-CBC,        SSH Session Encryption   CO        G/E/Z              Configuration/System Logs © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                                                       PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 13

KAS       KDF SSH         SSH DHE/ECDHE             CO        G/E/Z         Configuration/System Logs Private Components KAS-FFC-SSC     SSH DHE/ECDHE Public                G/E/R/W/Z Safe Primes     Components Safe Primes N/A                       CO, User, RA VPN          CO        G/E/W         Configuration/System Logs Counter DRBG, ESV         Entropy Input String      CO        G/E           Configuration/System Logs DRBG Seed DRBG V DRBG Key KDF SNMP (CVL)            SNMPv3 Authentication     CO        W/E           Configuration/System Logs KDF SNMP (CVL)            SNMPv3 Privacy Secret     CO        W/E           Configuration/System Logs N/A                       Protocol Secrets          CO        W/E           Configuration/System Logs RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)   CA Certificates           CO        G/R/E/W       Configuration/System Logs ECDSA SigVer ECDSA SigVer              ECDSA Public Keys         CO        G/R/E/W       Configuration/System Logs RSA SigVer                RSA Public Keys           CO        G/R/E/W       Configuration/System Logs RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)   SSH Host Public Key       CO        G/R/E/W       Configuration/System Logs ECDSA SigVer RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)   SSH Client Public Key     CO        W/E           Configuration/System Logs RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)   Public key for software   CO        W/E           Configuration/System Logs load test Other           Networking               RSA SigGen                RSA Private Keys          CO        G/W/E         Configuration/System Logs configuration, logging   ECDSA SigGen              ECDSA Private Keys        CO        G/W/E         Configuration/System Logs other non-security       KAS       KDF TLS         TLS Pre-Master Secret     CO        G/E/Z         Configuration/System Logs KDF TLS         TLS Master Secret         CO        G/E/Z         Configuration/System Logs CKG,            TLS DHE/ECDHE             CO        G/E/Z         Configuration/System Logs TLS DHE/ECDHE Public                G/E/R/W/Z , , Safe Primes Safe Primes HMAC-SHA2-256             TLS HMAC Keys             CO        G/E/Z         Configuration/System Logs © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                                                     PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 14

G/Z HMAC-SHA-1                SSH Session                CO                      Configuration/System Logs AES-CBC, AES-CTR, or      SSH Session Encryption     CO        G/E/Z         Configuration/System Logs KAS       KDF SSH         SSH DHE/ECDHE              CO        G/E/Z         Configuration/System Logs KeyGen (FIPS    SSH DHE/ECDHE Public , , Safe Primes Safe Primes N/A                       CO, User, RA VPN           CO        G/E/W         Configuration/System Logs RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)   CA Certificates            CO        G/R/E/W       Configuration/System Logs ECDSA SigVer ECDSA SigVer              ECDSA Public Keys          CO        G/R/E/W       Configuration/System Logs RSA SigVer                RSA Public Keys            CO        G/R/E/W       Configuration/System Logs RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)   SSH Host Public Key        CO        G/R/E/W       Configuration/System Logs ECDSA SigVer RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)   SSH Client Public Key      CO        W/E           Configuration/System Logs View Other      Read-only of            N/A                       CO, User, RA VPN           CO,       W/E           Configuration/System Logs Note: includes all items Show Status     Provides status         RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)   RSA Private Keys           CO,       E             Configuration/System Logs information of the                                                           User ECDSA SigGen              ECDSA Private Keys         CO,       E             Configuration/System Logs KAS       KDF TLS         TLS Pre-Master Secret      CO,       G/E/Z         Configuration/System Logs KDF TLS         TLS Master Secret          CO,       G/E/Z         Configuration/System Logs CKG,            TLS DHE/ECDHE              CO,       G/E/Z         Configuration/System Logs TLS DHE/ECDHE Public                 G/E/R/W/Z , , Safe Primes Safe Primes © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                                                     PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 15

HMAC-SHA-1                SSH Session              CO,       G/E/Z       Configuration/System Logs AES-CBC, AES-CTR, or      SSH Session Encryption   CO,       G/E/Z       Configuration/System Logs ECDSA           SSH ECDHE                          G/E/R/W/Z , , Safe Primes Safe Primes VPN           Provide network                   HMAC-SHA-1      S-S VPN IPSec/IKE        S-S VPN   G/E/Z       Configuration/System Logs access for remote       KTS       HMAC-SHA2-      Authentication Keys Session Keys KAS       KDF IKEv2       S-S VPN IPSec/IKE        S-S VPN   G/E/Z       Configuration/System Logs , , Safe Primes Safe Primes N/A                       S-S VPN IPSec            S-S VPN   W/E         Configuration/System Logs RSA SigVer                RSA Public Keys          S-S VPN   W/E         Configuration/System Logs RSA SigGen                RSA Private Keys         RA VPN    E           Configuration/System Logs ECDSA SigGen              ECDSA Private Keys       RA VPN    E           Configuration/System Logs KAS       KDF TLS         TLS Pre-Master Secret    RA VPN    G/E/Z       Configuration/System Logs © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                                               PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 16

KDF TLS           TLS Master Secret                       G/E/Z CKG,              TLS DHE/ECDHE Public        RA VPN      G/E/R/W/Z              Configuration/System Logs TLS DHE/ECDHE               RA VPN      G/E/Z                  Configuration/System Logs Private Components , , Safe Primes Safe Primes KTS       HMAC-SHA2-        TLS HMAC Keys               RA VPN      G/E/Z                  Configuration/System Logs AES-CBC           TLS Encryption Keys         RA VPN      G/E/Z                  Configuration/System Logs CKG,                        RA VPN IPSec Session        RA VPN      G/E/Z                  Configuration/System Logs CKG,                        RA VPN IPSec                RA VPN      G/E/Z                  Configuration/System Logs Counter DRBG, ESV           Entropy Input String        RA VPN      G/E                    Configuration/System Logs DRBG Seed DRBG V DRBG Key RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4))    CA Certificates             RA VPN      W/E                    Configuration/System Logs ECDSA SigVer ECDSA SigVer                ECDSA Public Keys           RA VPN      W/E                    Configuration/System Logs RSA SigVer                  RSA Public Keys             RA VPN      W/E                    Configuration/System Logs RSA SigVer                  Public key for software     CO          E                      Configuration/System Logs from Other Zeroize             Destroys all keys in       N/A                         All keys and SSPs           CO          Z                      Zeroization indicator the module Self-Test           Initiates self-tests and   HMAC-SHA2-256,              Software integrity          CO          E                      System Logs Show Status         Provides status of the     N/A                         N/A                         All         R                      Hypervisor VM status Note: Configuration/System Logs for Approved services above will indicate FIPS-CC mode is enabled, configuration requirements from Section 11 are followed, and that the service succeeded. 5.            Software/Firmware SecurityS The module performs the Software Integrity test by using HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256 Signature Verification (HMAC/ECDSA Cert. #A2907) with the Software integrity verification key during the Pre-Operational Self-Test. In addition, © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                                                                PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 17

the module also conducts the software load test by using RSA 2048 with SHA-256 (Cert. #A2907) for the new validated software to be uploaded into the module. Any software loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate is out of scope of this validation, and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.

6. Operational Environment The module is a modifiable operational environment as per FIPS 140-3 Level 1 specifications. The hypervisor environment provides an isolated operating environment and is the single operator of the virtual machine. The tested operating environments isolate virtual systems into separate isolated process spaces. Each process space is logically separated from all other processes by the operating environments software and hardware. The module functions entirely within the process space of the isolated system as managed by the single operational environment. This implicitly meets the FIPS 140-3 requirement that only one (1) entity at a time can use the cryptographic module.
7. Physical Security There are no applicable FIPS 140-3 physical security requirements.
8. Non-Invasive Security No approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics are defined at this time.
9. Sensitive Security Parameters The following table details all the sensitive security parameters utilized by the module. Table 10 - SSPs ECDSA/RSA Public key - Used to trust a RSA SigVer (FIPS HDD – Zeroize root CA intermediate CA Certificates Session Key N/A RAM - Zeroize at entity certificates RSA public keys managed as certificates for the verification of RSA SigVer signatures, authentication and peer authentication. (RSA 2048, 3072, or RSA SigGen TLS or SSH RSA Private keys for RSA Private 112 bits DRBG, FIPS HDD/RAM HDD – Zeroize © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 18

managed as certificates for the verification of authentication and peer authentication. for generation of Public            minimum                                 handshake                                                          used in key agreement Secret value used to Rev. 3                                                       termination        client and server random nonces Zeroize at         Secret value used to N/A                        KDF TLS      N/A               N/A                           session            derive the TLS session TLS Encryption    128 bits                                                                  RAM -                            keys used in TLS HMAC keys used in RSA SigVer (RSA 2048, RSA 3072, SSH Client        112 bits   RSA SigVer                   Encrypted via                     HDD/RAM                          Public RSA key used © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                                              PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 19

Used in all SSH connections to the security module’s SSH, KAS SP                   Zeroize at        command line used in all SSH connections to the HMAC-SHA-1                                                                                  security module’s S-S VPN                                                                                                                  private component S-S VPN component used in
112 bits                                                               RAM -                           key agreement
Used to encrypt S-S VPN                      AES-CBC,                                                                  Zeroize at        are AES (128, 192, or HMAC-SHA2-256                                                             Zeroize at        SHA-512) Used to HMAC-SHA2-384   KDF IKEv2   N/A                                           session           authenticate the peer PSK used in conjunction with HMAC listed above S-S VPN IPSec                                            Encrypted via                   HDD/RAM                         for authentication. N/A        N/A             N/A                         N/A                           Zeroize Service Pre-Shared Keys                                          SSH or TLS                      – plaintext                     Entered into the module by the Crypto Officer once Used to encrypt AES-CBC or                                                                Zeroize at        remote access Zeroize at RA VPN IPSec                 HMAC-SHA-1      CKG,                                        RAM -                           Used in remote access IPSec © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                                           PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 20

Used to check the integrity of all Software                                                                                                                software code ECDSA SigVer                                             HDD (FIPS 186-4)                                             plaintext verification key                                                                                                        ECDSA P-256) (Note: This is not considered an SSP) Used to authenticate Public key for                 RSA SigVer                                                                               software and content software            112 bits   (FIPS 186-4)         N/A          N/A             N/A                  N/A               to be installed on the content load test              Cert. #A2907                                                                             firewall (RSA 2048 N/A                             External                     N/A                  Zeroize Service VPN Password                   Cert. #A2907                      SSH or TLS             hash                            length of eight (8) Secrets used by Encrypted via HDD/RAM                         RADIUS or TACACS+ Protocol Secrets    N/A        N/A                  N/A          IPsec, SSH or   N/A                  Zeroize Service affirmed), Counter                                                                       coming from the Entropy as SP 800-90B DRBG seed coming Entropy as                                                          from the entropy SP 800-90B Seed length = 384 bits Entropy as DRBG                                                     RAM -                           state Key used in the plaintext                       generation of a SP 800-90B Cert. #A2907                                                                             random values Entropy as DRBG                                                     RAM -                           state V used in the DRBG V              128 bits                        per          N/A             N/A                  Power cycle plaintext                       generation of a SP 800-90B Cert. #A2907                                                                             random values SNMPv3                                                                                                                  Used to support Authentication                 KDF SNMP                          Encrypted via          HDD/RAM                         SNMPv3 services N/A                             N/A                          N/A                  Zeroize Service Used to support SNMPv3 Privacy                 KDF SNMP                          Encrypted via          HDD/RAM                         SNMPv3 services N/A                             N/A                          N/A                  Zeroize Service KDF SNMP     N/A             N/A                  Zeroize Service   Authentication Privacy protocol Session Key                                         KDF SNMP     N/A             N/A                  Zeroize Service   encryption key (AES 128 CFB) Note: SSPs are implicitly zeroized when power is lost, or explicitly zeroized by the zeroize service. In the case of implicit zeroization, the SSPs are implicitly overwritten with random values due to their ephemeral memory being reset upon power loss. For the zeroization service and zeroization at session termination, the SSP's memory location is overwritten with random values. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                                          PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 21

Table 11 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification Entropy Source Minimum number of bits of entropy Details ESV Cert. #E69 Palo Alto Networks DRNG Entropy 256 bits Source Entropy source provides full entropy, which is provided in the 384 bit seed. 10. Self-Tests The cryptographic module performs the following tests below. The operator can command the module to perform the pre-operational and cryptographic algorithm self-tests by cycling power of the module; these tests do not require any additional operator action. Pre-operational Self-Tests Pre-operational Software Integrity Test

• Verified with HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 Note: the ECDSA and HMAC-SHA-256 KATs are performed prior to the Software integrity test Conditional self-tests Cryptographic algorithm self-tests
• AES 128-bit ECB Encrypt Known Answer Test*
• AES 128-bit ECB Decrypt Known Answer Test* *Note: Supported by the module cryptographic implementation, but only utilized for CAST
• AES 128-bit CMAC Known Answer Test* *Note: Supported by the module cryptographic implementation, but only utilized for CAST
• AES 256-bit GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES 256-bit GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• AES 192-bit CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test*
• AES 192-bit CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test* *Note: Supported by the module cryptographic implementation, but only utilized for CAST
• RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Sign Known Answer Test
• RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Verify Known Answer Test
• RSA 2048-bit Encrypt Known Answer Test
• RSA 2048-bit Decrypt Known Answer Test Note: Encrypt/Decrypt are only used for self-tests
• ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Sign Known Answer Test
• ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Verify Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• SP 800-90Arev1 CTR DRBG Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Known Answer Tests
• SP 800-90Arev1 CTR DRBG Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Section 11.3 Health Tests
• SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-FFC-SSC 2048-bit Known Answer Test
• SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 Known Answer Test © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 22

• SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.2 KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• SP 800-135rev1 SSH KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• SP 800-135rev1 IKEv2 KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• Continuous Random Number Generator (RNG) test
• performed on DRBG
• SP 800-90B RCT/APT Health Tests on Entropy Source Conditional Pairwise Consistency Self-Tests
• RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
• ECDSA/KAS-ECC Pairwise Consistency Test
• KAS-FFC Pairwise Consistency Test Conditional Software Load test
• Software Load Test
• Verify RSA 2048 with SHA-256 signature on software at time of load Conditional Critical Functions Tests
• SP 800-56A Rev. 3 Assurance Tests (Based on Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3) Error Handling In the event of a conditional test failure, the module will output a description of the error. These are summarized below. Table 12 - Errors and Indicators Cause of Error Error State Indicator Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test or FIPS-CC mode failure. <Algorithm test> failed. Software Integrity Test Failure Conditional Pairwise Consistency or Critical Functions System log prints an error message. Test Failure Conditional Software Load Test Failure System prints Invalid image message. 11. Life-Cycle Assurance The vendor provided life-cycle assurance documentation describes configuration management, design, finite state model, development, testing, delivery & operation, end of life procedures, and guidance. For details regarding the approved mode of operation, see “Approved Mode of Operation''. For details regarding secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module, see below. Installation Instructions The module can be retrieved by downloading PanOS_vm-10.2.8-h4 from the support site (https://support.paloaltonetworks.com/Support/Index), and a checksum (SHA-256) is available to ensure the module is correct:
• 10.2.8-h4: 49224f982fc5e8c5680b1abe6116d870c2df94629c033762b07dc5c19fb7ac94 © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 23

Alternatively, the VM-Series version can be obtained by running the following commands via CLI (as an authorized administrator): 1. request system software check 2. request system software download version 10.2.8-h4 3. request system software install version 10.2.8-h4 4. request restart system Palo Alto Network provides an Administrator Guide for additional information noted in the “Reference Documents” section of this Security Policy. The module design corresponds to the module security rules noted in the section below. Module Enforced Security Rules When FIPS-CC mode is enabled, the module runs all the required items noted in Section 10 Self-tests. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-3 Level 1 module.

1. The cryptographic module provides four distinct operator roles. These are the User role, Remote Access VPN role, Site-to-site VPN role, and the Cryptographic Officer role.
2. The cryptographic module provides identity-based authentication.
3. The cryptographic module clears previous authentications when a power cycle is performed.
4. If the cryptographic module remains inactive in any valid role for the administrator specified time interval, the module will automatically log out the operator. The CO will configure the period of inactivity.
5. When configured, the module enforces a timed access protection mechanism that supports at most ten authentication attempts per minute. After the administrator specified number of consecutive unsuccessful password validation attempts have occurred, the cryptographic module shall enforce a wait period of at least one (1) minute before any more login attempts can be attempted. This wait period shall be enforced even if the module power is momentarily removed.
6. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic services.
7. The module supports the generation of key material with the approved DRBG. The entropy provided must be equal to or greater than the security strength of the key being generated. The approved DRBG requests a minimum of 256 bits of entropy per every 384 bits of seed input.
8. The operator can command the module to perform the power-up self-test by cycling power of the module.
9. Power-up self-tests do not require any operator action.
10. Data output is inhibited during power-up self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
11. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
12. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
13. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
14. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
15. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
16. The module does not output intermediate key generation values.
17. Pre-shared keys used for IKE/IPsec must be at least 6 bytes in length, but no more than 255 bytes. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 24

Vendor Imposed Security Rules In FIPS-CC mode, the following rules shall apply:

1. The operator should not enable TLSv1.0 or use RSA for key wrapping; it is disabled by default. a. Checked via CLI using “show shared” command
2. The operator should not enable TLSv1.3, it is disabled by default. a. Checked via CLI using “show profiles” command
3. If using RADIUS, it must be configured using TLS. a. Checked via CLI using “show shared” command
4. If using TACACS+, configure the service route via an IPSec tunnel, and ensure the TACACS+ server is configured for a minimum password length of eight (8) characters or greater. a. Checked via CLI using “show deviceconfig” command Failure to follow these Security Rules will cause the module to operate in a non-compliant state. Key to Entity The cryptographic module associates all keys (secret, private, or public) stored within, entered into or output from the module with authenticated operators of the module. Keys stored within the module are only made available to authenticated operators via TLS or SSH. Keys are only input or output from the module by the authenticated operator via a SSH/TLS/IPsec protected communication. Any attempt to intervene in the key to entity relationship would require defeating the module TLS/SSH/IPsec encryption and authentication/integrity mechanism.
5. Mitigation of Other Attacks The module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-3. These requirements are not applicable.
6. References [FIPS 140-3] FIPS Publication 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules Palo Alto Networks Administrator’s Guide: https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/techdocs/en_US/pdf/pan-os/10-2/pan-os-admin/pan-os-admin.pdf
7. Definitions and Acronyms AES – Advanced Encryption Standard CA – Certificate Authority CLI – Command Line Interface CO – Crypto-Officer CSP – Critical Security Parameter © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 25

CVL

• Component Validation List DB9
• D-sub series, E size, 9 pins DES
• Data Encryption Standard DH
• Diffie-Hellman DRBG
• Deterministic Random Bit Generator EDC
• Error Detection Code ECDH
• Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA
• Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS
• Federal Information Processing Standard HMAC
• (Keyed) Hashed Message Authentication Code KDF
• Key Derivation Function LED
• Light Emitting Diode RJ45
• Networking Connector RNG –Random number generator RSA
• Algorithm developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman SHA
• Secure Hash Algorithm SNMP
• Simple Network Management Protocol SSH
• Secure Shell TLS
• Transport Layer Security USB
• Universal Serial Bus VGA
• Video Graphics Array © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 10.2 VM-Series Security Policy 26