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CMVP Validated Module · FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

nShield 5s Hardware Security Module

Certificate#4765StandardFIPS 140-3Level3TypeHardwareEmbodimentMulti-Chip EmbeddedStatusHistoricalVendorEntrust
Medium review priority  ·  exposes boot-chain verification, firmware-update authentication, HSM/SE firmware trust anchor  ·  last validated 15 months ago. How this is derived →

Certificate

StandardFIPS 140-3
Overall level3
Module typeHardware
EmbodimentMulti-Chip Embedded
StatusHistorical
CaveatInterim validation. When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section 11.3 of the Security Policy
VendorEntrust

Approved Algorithms (59)

AlgorithmACVP Cert
AES-CBCA3707
AES-CMACA3707
AES-CTRA3706
AES-ECBA3706
AES-ECBA3707
AES-GCMA3706
AES-GCMA3707
AES-KWA3707
AES-KWPA3707
DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)A3707
DSA PQGGen (FIPS186-4)A3707
DSA PQGVer (FIPS186-4)A3707
DSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)A3707
DSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A3707
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)A3707
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4)A3707
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)A3706
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)A3707
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A3706
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A3707
Hash DRBGA3707
HMAC-SHA-1A3707
HMAC-SHA2-224A3707
HMAC-SHA2-256A3706
HMAC-SHA2-256A3707
HMAC-SHA2-384A3707
HMAC-SHA2-512A3707
HMAC-SHA3-224A3707
HMAC-SHA3-256A3707
HMAC-SHA3-384A3707
HMAC-SHA3-512A3707
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3A3707
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3A3706
KAS-FFC Sp800-56Ar3A3707
KDF SP800-108A3707
KDF SSHA3706
KMAC-128A3707
KMAC-256A3707
KTS-IFCA3707
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)A3707
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)A3707
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A2404
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A3707
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A6385
Safe Primes Key GenerationA3707
Safe Primes Key VerificationA3707
SHA-1A3707
SHA2-224A3707
SHA2-256A2404
SHA2-256A3706
SHA2-256A3707
SHA2-256A6385
SHA2-384A3707
SHA2-512A3706
SHA2-512A3707
SHA3-224A3707
SHA3-256A3707
SHA3-384A3707
SHA3-512A3707

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>recovery<br/>upgrade</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Status output<br/>Show Status<br/>Unauthenticated</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>HTTPS</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>linux<br/>uboot<br/>bootloader</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;
Underlying clues
flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>recovery<br/>upgrade</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Status output<br/>Show Status<br/>Unauthenticated</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>HTTPS</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>linux<br/>uboot<br/>bootloader</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

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nShield 5s Hardware Security Module ``

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Version: 2.0.4 Date: 17/12/2024 not been removed or altered. Words and logos marked with ® or ™ are trademarks of nCipher Security Limited or its affiliates in the EU and other countries. Mac and OS X are trademarks of Apple Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries. Microsoft and Windows are either registered trademarks or trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries. Linux® is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries. Information in this document is subject to change without notice. nCipher Security Limited makes no warranty of any kind with regard to this information, including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. nCipher Security Limited shall not be liable for errors contained herein or for incidental or consequential damages concerned with the furnishing, performance or use of this material. Where translations have been made in this document English is the canonical language. nCipher Security Limited Registered Office: One Station Square, Cambridge, CB1 2GA, United Kingdom Registered in England No. 11673268 nCipher is an Entrust company. Entrust, Datacard, and the Hexagon Logo are trademarks, registered trademarks, and/or service marks of Entrust Corporation in the U.S. and/or other countries. All other brand or product names are the property of their respective owners. Because we are continuously improving our products and services, Entrust Corporation reserves the right to change specifications without prior notice. Entrust is an equal opportunity employer.

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Contents nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 3 of 44

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ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6. [Number Below]FIPS 140-3 Section TitleSecurity Level
1General3
2Cryptographic Module Specification3
3Cryptographic Module Interfaces3
4Roles, Services and Authentication3
5Software/Firmware security3
6Operational EnvironmentN/A
7Physical Security3
8Non-invasive SecurityN/A
9Sensitive Security Parameter Management3
10Self-Tests3
11Life-cycle Assurance3
12Mitigation of Other AttacksN/A

Security Module, i.e. the Cryptographic Module, to meet with the security requirements in FIPS 140The Cryptographic Module meets overall FIPS 140-3 Security Level 3. The following table specifies the security level in detail. Table 1 Security levels

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ModelHardware [Part Number and Version]Firmware VersionDistinguishing Features
nShield 5s F3 model number nC5536EPCB Assembly Part Number: PCA10005-01 PCB Assembly Revision: 03, 04primary: 13.4.5 recovery: 13.2.4 uboot: 1.1.0, 1.4.1PCIe form factor
nShield 5s for nShield 5c and for nShield HSMi model number nC5536NPCIe form factor identical to the nShield 5s F3 (nC5536E), embedded inside the nShield 5c or the nShield HSMi network appliances.
2 Cryptographic module specification
2.1 Scope

The following product hardware variants and firmware version(s) are in scope of this Security Policy. Table 2 Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration

2.2 Cryptographic module description

The nShield 5s Hardware Security Module (HSM) is a multi-chip embedded hardware Cryptographic Module as defined in FIPS 140-3, which comes in a PCI express board form factor protected by a tamper resistant enclosure, and performs encryption, digital signing, and key management on behalf of an extensive range of commercial and custom-built applications including public key infrastructures (PKIs), identity management systems, application-level encryption and tokenization, SSL/TLS, and code signing. attached appliances delivering cryptographic services as a shared network resource for distributed applications and virtual machines, giving organizations a highly secure solution for establishing physical and logical controls for server-based systems. The table below shows the nShield 5s HSM (left, representative of the two hardware variants Table 3 nShield 5s (left) and nShield 5c (right) The cryptographic boundary is delimited in red in the images in the table below. It is delimited by the heat sink and the outer edge of the potting material on the top and bottom of the PCB. nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 5 of 44

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CAVP CertAlgorithm and StandardMode/MethodDescription / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function
A3707AES [FIPS 197] [SP 800-38A] [SP 800-38D]ECB CBC GCM128 bits 192 bits 256 bitsData encryption/decryption
A3707KTS (AES) [SP 800-38F] [SP 800-38D]KW KWP GCM128 bits 192 bits 256 bits (Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)Key wrapping/unwrapping
A3707KTS-IFCKTS-OAEP-basic with SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-5122048 bits 3072 bits 4096 bits (Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength)Key transport (encapsulation, un- encapsulation)
Vendor affirmedCKG [SP 800-133rev2]Section 4 “Using the Output of a Random Bit Generator “n/aKey generation
A3707RSARSASSA-PKCS-v1_51024 bits (verification only)Key generation

Table 4 Cryptographic module boundary The module enforces that only approved services are available and plaintext import/export of secret or private keys is not allowed. Refer to Approved mode of operation.

2.3 Supported cryptographic algorithms

This section describes the cryptographic mechanisms and security functions provided and used by the cryptographic module.

2.3.1 Approved algorithms

The following tables describe the approved cryptographic algorithms supported by the Cryptographic Module.

2.3.1.1 nCore crypto

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CAVP CertAlgorithm and Standard [FIPS 186-4]Mode/Method RSASSA-PSSDescription / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) 2048 bits 3072 bits 4096 bitsUse / Function Signature generation and verification
A3707ECDSA [FIPS 186-4]n/aNIST P-224, P-256, P-384, P- 521 NIST K-233, K-283, K-409, K- 571 NIST B-233, B-283, B-409, B- 571Key generation Key verification Signature generation and verification
A3707DSA [FIPS 186-4]n/aL = 1024 bits, N = 160 bits (verification only) L = 2048 bits, N = 224 bits L = 2048 bits, N = 256 bits L = 3072 bits, N = 256 bitsKey generation Signature generation and verification Domain parameter generation and verification
A3707HMAC [FIPS 198]HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2- 256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512, HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC- SHA3-384, HMAC-SHA3-512≥ 112 bitsMAC generation and verification
A3707AES [SP 800-38B]CMAC128 bits 192 bits 256 bitsMAC generation and verification
A3707KMAC [SP 800-185]KMAC-128 KMAC-256≥ 112 bitsMAC generation and verification
A3707KAS-FFC [SP 800- 56Arev3]DHMODP-2048 MODP-3072 MODP-4096 MODP-6144 MODP-8192 FB FC (Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength)Key agreement
A3707Safe Primes Key Generation [SP 800- 56Arev3]KeyGen for KAS-FFCSafe prime groups: MODP- 2048, MODP-3072, MODP- 4096, MODP-6144, MODP- 8192 (Provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength.)KAS-FFC key generation
A3707Safe Primes Key VerificationKeyVer for KAS-FFCSafe prime groups: MODP- 2048, MODP-3072, MODP- 4096, MODP-6144, MODP- 8192KAS-FFC key verification

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CAVP CertAlgorithm and Standard [SP 800- 56Arev3]Mode/MethodDescription / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function
A3707KAS-ECC [SP 800- 56Arev3]ECDH ECMQVNIST P-224, P-256, P-384, P- 521 NIST K-233, K-283, K-409, K- 571 NIST B-233, B-283, B-409, B- 571 (Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength)Key agreement
A3707KBKDF [SP 800-108rev1]counter mode CMAC-AES256n/aKey derivation
A3707SHS [FIPS 180-4]SHA-1 SHA2-224 SHA2-256 SHA2-384 SHA2-512n/aMessage digest
A3707SHA-3 [FIPS 202]SHA3-224 SHA3-256 SHA3-384 SHA3-512n/aMessage digest
A3707DRBG [SP 800- 90Arev1]Hash_DRBG256 bits of security strengthRandom bit generation
CAVP CertAlgorithm and StandardMode/MethodDescription / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function
A2404 A6385RSA [FIPS 186-4]RSASSA-PKCS-v1_54096 bitsSignature verification
A2404 A6385SHS [FIPS 180-4]SHA2-256n/aMessage digest

Table 5 nCore - Approved Algorithms Note: For AES GCM, the 96-bit IV is internally generated using the approved DRBG as per IG C.H.

2.3.1.2 Bootloader crypto

Table 6 Bootloader - Approved Algorithms

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CAVP CertAlgorithm and StandardMode/MethodDescription / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function
A3706AES [FIPS 197] [SP 800-38A] [SP 800-38D]CTR GCM ECB128 bitsData encryption/decryption
Vendor affirmedCKG [SP 800- 133rev2]Section 4 “Using the Output of a Random Bit Generator “n/aKey generation
A3706ECDSA [FIPS 186-4]n/aNIST P-256 NIST P-521Signature generation and verification
A3706HMAC [FIPS 198]HMAC-SHA2-256≥ 112 bitsMAC generation and verification
A3706KAS-ECC-SSC [SP 800- 56Arev3]ECDHNIST P-256 (Key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits of encryption strength)Key agreement
A3706CVL - Secure Shell (SSHv2) KDF [SP 800- 135rev1]n/an/aKey derivation
A3706KAS-ECC [SP 800- 56Arev3 [SP 800-135rev1]ECDHNIST P-256 (Key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits of encryption strength)Key agreement, KAS-ECC-SSC (cert# A3707) in conjunction with SSHv2 KDF of SP 800-135rev1 (cert# A3707), which is compliant with IG D.F. Scenario 2, path 2.
A3706SHS [FIPS 180-4]SHA2-256 SHA2-512n/aMessage digest
2.3.1.3 SSH crypto

Table 7 SSH - Approved Algorithms Note: As per IG D.C., no parts of this protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Note: For AES GCM, the module is compliant with RFCs 4252, 4253 and 5647, and the IV is generated according to the SSHv2 protocol IV generation, as per IG C.H. In case the module’s power is lost and

2.3.2 Allowed algorithms

The following table describes the allowed cryptographic algorithms supported by the Cryptographic Module. nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 9 of 44

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AlgorithmCaveatUse/Function
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4]• brainpoolP224r1/P224t1 (112 bits of strength) • brainpoolP256r1/P256t1 (128 bits of strength) • brainpoolP320r1/P320t1 (160 bits of strength) • brainpoolP384r1/P384t1 (192 bits of strength) • brainpoolP512r1/P512t1 (256 bits of strength)Key generation Signature generation and verification
KAS-ECC [SP 800-56Arev3]• brainpoolP224r1/P224t1 (112 bits of strength) • brainpoolP256r1/P256t1 (128 bits of strength) • brainpoolP320r1/P320t1 (160 bits of strength) • brainpoolP384r1/P384t1 (192 bits of strength) • brainpoolP512r1/P512t1 (256 bits of strength)Key agreement
2.3.2.1 nCore crypto

Table 8 nCore - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation

2.3.3 Non-approved algorithms

Only approved and non-approved but allowed cryptographic algorithms are supported.

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Physical portLogical interfaceData that passes over port/interface
PCIe busData inputnCoreAPI, Updater, SSHAdmin, Launcher
Data outputnCoreAPI, SSHAdmin, Launcher
Control inputnCoreAPI, SSHAdmin, Setup, Monitor, Launcher, Discovery
Status outputnCoreAPI, Updater, Setup, Monitor, Launcher, Discovery
Powern/a
Smartcard reader serial portData inputAPDU commands
Data outputAPDU commands
Status LEDStatus outputn/a
Recovery buttonControl inputn/a
BatteryPowern/a
3 Cryptographic module interfaces

The Cryptographic Module provides the following physical ports: • Battery (including external backup battery power supply) The following table maps the FIPS logical interfaces and physical ports to the module´s services Table 9 Ports and Interfaces Note: Control output is omitted because the module does not implement it. nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 11 of 44

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RoleServiceInputOutput
PCOSSHAdmin Updater Setup Monitor LauncherData ControlData Status
UCnCoreAPIData ControlData Status
NSOnCoreAPIData ControlData Status
4 Roles, services and authentication
4.1 Roles

The Cryptographic Module supports the following roles:

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RoleAuthentication MethodAuthentication Strength
PCO UCECDSA P-256, P-521 client key authentication as part of establishing an SSH based secure channel. Identity-based and required.The ciphersuites used are: ecdh-sha2-nistp256 , ecdh-sha2-nistp521, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes128- ctr@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com This results in a security strength of 128 bits. A random authentication attempt gives is a probability of success of 2-128, which is less than one in 1,000,000. The module can process around 220 commands per minute. This gives a probability of success in a one minute period of 2-108, which is less than one in 100,000.
NSOsmartcard authentication. Identity-based and required.A logical token share stored in a Smartcard or Softcard is encrypted and MAC'ed. An attacker would need to guess the encrypted share value and the associated MAC in order to be able to load a valid Logical token share into the module. This requires, as a minimum, guessing a 256-bit HMAC-SHA256 value, which gives a security strength of 256 bits. A random authentication attempt gives is a probability of success of 2-256 , which is less than one in 1,000,000. The module can process around 220 commands per minute. This gives a probability of success in a one minute period of 2-236, which is less than 10-5, which is less than one in 100,000.
ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
infoThis is a Show Module's Versioning Information service. This command prints out the contents of the board-id rom file and a number of flags that indicate which other setup subcommands have been previously executed as determined by the existence or non-existence of the relevant files in long-term storage. It also prints out the tag and value pairsData encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0
4.2 Services

The following table describes the services provided by the Cryptographic Module and the access policy. The Access column presents the access level given to the SSP G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 13 of 44

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ServiceDescription of any options set with the setopt subcommand.Approved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
factorystateThis is the Perform Zeroisation service. It zeroizes unprotected SSPs and returns the module to factory state. It then initiates a module reboot.Data encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KRESET (note: any SSP that is derived from KRESET, or protected by an SSP derived from KRESET, will also be effectively zeroised.) KSESSION - SSH KUSER_SSH, KSSH_SETUP, KSSH_SSHADMIN, KSSH_MONITOR, KSSH_UPDATER, KCONTAINER, KCONTAINERSSH, KSSH_NCOREPCOZ E G (note: SSH server authentication keys are only generated on first reboot after a setup factorystate command)return value 0
settimeThis subcommand sets the system date and time.Data encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0
gettimeThis subcommand returns the system date and time.Data encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0
ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
setLoads the client public key in the module, that will be used to authenticate the requester of a particular serviceData encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSSH_CLIENT pub KSESSION - SSHPCOW Ereturn value 0
listObtains the client public key for the service given by the 'role' parameter.Data encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSSH_CLIENT pub KSESSION - SSHPCOR Ereturn value 0
get- serverkeyObtains the server public key for the service given by the 'role' parameter.Data encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM)KSSH_NCORE pubPCOR Rreturn value 0

E Table 12 Approved Services they only use approved mechanisms. R

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Service

Description

Approved Security Functions MAC generation / verification (HMAC)

Keys and/or SSPs KSSH_UPDATER pub KSSH_SETUP pub KSSH_SSHADMIN pub KSSH_MONITOR pub KSESSION - SSH

Roles

Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs R E

Indicator

ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
infoThis is a Show Module's Versioning Information service. Obtains the version number of the HSM firmware.Data encryption/decryption (AES) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0
receiveTransmits a file (intended to be an npkg upgrade file) to the HSM.Data encryption/decryption (AES) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0
loadVerifies that a file on the HSM filesystem is a valid npkg upgrade file and, if so loads the file onto its flash partition.Digital signature verification (RSA, ECDSA) Data encryption/decryption (AES) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)NSBIK pub NPSK pub NFIK pub NLIK pub KSESSION - SSHPCOE E E E Ereturn value 0
setminvsnSets the minimum VSN that the module will use to check, when the 'load' command above is run, that the firmware specified can be validly loaded onto this module.Data encryption/decryption (AES) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0

E Table 13 Approved Services they only use approved mechanisms. Table 14 Approved Services they only use approved mechanisms. nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 15 of 44

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ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
getlogThis is the Show Status service. Obtains the log of the systemData encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0
clearlogClears the log of the systemData encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0
getenvstatsObtains the environmental stats from the systemData encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0
ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
receiveUploads a file to the launcher service for temporary storage.Data encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0
machine createCreates a SEE machine container from a received file, after successfully being validated.Digital signature verification (ECDSA) Data encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)DSK pub KSESSION - SSHPCOE Ereturn value 0
machine listLists SEE machines along with their current states.Data encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0
startStarts a SEE machine after successfully being validated.Digital signature verification (ECDSA) Data encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)DSK pub KSESSION - SSHPCOE Ereturn value 0
4.2.4 Monitor service

Table 15 Approved Services they only use approved mechanisms.

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ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
stopStops a SEE machine.Data encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0
destroyDeletes a SEE machine.Data encryption/decryption (AES CTR, GCM) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0
ids commandsManagement of the SEE machine signing certificates.Digital signature verification (ECDSA) Data encryption/decryption (AES) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)DSK pub ESK pub KSESSION - SSHPCOR, W, E E Ereturn value 0
see-log commandsManagement of the SEE machine logs.Data encryption/decryption (AES) MAC generation / verification (HMAC)KSESSION - SSHPCOEreturn value 0
ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
python- zeroconfThe (logical) network connection between host and HSM uses TCP/IP protocols over the PCIe bus; however, for ease of setup it needs to avoid requiring IP configuration by the user. Therefore the HSM uses zeroconf: each end of the virtual 'network segment' has only a link-local (IPv4 and IPv6) address. The HSM's address can be discovered by the host using multicast DNS, responding to mDNS queries.--Unauthenticated-return value 0

Table 16 Approved Services The approved service indicator is the successful completion of these services (return value 0), as they only use approved mechanisms.

4.2.6 Discovery service

Table 17 Approved Services The approved service indicator is the successful completion of these services (return value 0), as they only use approved mechanisms. nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 17 of 44

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ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
Big number operation Cmd_BignumOpPerforms an operation on a large integer.--UC-return status OK
Make Blob Cmd_MakeBlobCreates a Key blob containing the key. Note that the key ACL needs to authorize the operation.Key derivation (KBKDF) Key wrapping (AES CBC and HMAC, KTS-IFC)KA, KRE_BLOBKEY, KR, KM, KNSO, LTx BLOBKE, BLOBKMUCR Ereturn status OK
Bulk channel Cmd_ChannelOpen Cmd_ChannelUpdateProvides a bulk processing channel for crypto operationsEncryption and decryption (AES ECB, CBC, GCM) MAC generation and verification (HMAC, KMAC, AES CMAC) Digital signature generation and verification (RSA, ECDSA, DSA)KAUCEreturn status OK
Check User Action Cmd_CheckUserActionDetermines whether the ACL associated with a key allows a specific operator defined action.-KNSO, KAUCRreturn status OK
Clear Unit Cmd_ClearUnitThis is the Perform Self-tests service. Zeroises all keys, tokens and shares that are loaded in RAM. Will cause the module to reboot and perform self-tests.-KA, KR, IMPATHKE, IMPATHKM, RAKME, RAKMAUCZreturn status OK
Set Module Key Cmd_SetKMAllows a key to be stored internally as a Module key (KM) value. The ACL needs to authorize this operation.Message digest (SHA-1)KMNSOWreturn status OK
Remove Module Key Cmd_RemoveKMDeletes the KM with a given KM hash value from non- volatile memory.-KMNSOZreturn status OK
Duplicate key handle Cmd_DuplicateCreates a second instance of a Key with the same ACL and returns a handle to the new instance. Note that the source key ACL needs to authorize this operation.-KAUCRreturn status OK
Enable feature Cmd_StaticFeatureEnableEnables the service. This service requires a certificate--UC-return status OK
4.2.7 nCoreAPI service

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ServiceDescription signed by the Master Feature Enable key.Approved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
Encryption / decryption Cmd_Encrypt Cmd_DecryptEncryption and decryption using the provided key handle.Data encryption and decryption (AES ECB, CBC, GCM)KAUCEreturn status OK
Erase from smartcard /softcard Cmd_EraseFile Cmd_EraseShareRemoves a file or a share from a smartcard or softcard--UC-return status OK
Format Token Cmd_FormatTokenFormats a smartcard or a softcard.--UC-return status OK
File operations Cmd_FileCopy Cmd_FileCreate Cmd_FileErase Cmd_FileOpPerforms file operations in the module.--UC-return status OK
Force module to fail Cmd_FailCauses the module to enter a failure state.--UC-return status OK
Generate prime number Cmd_GeneratePrimeGenerates a random prime.Random bit generation (DRBG)DRBG entropy input, seed, internal state ('V' and 'C')UCEreturn status OK
Generate random number Cmd_GenerateRandomGenerates a random number from the Approved DRBG.Random bit generation (DRBG)DRBG entropy input, seed, internal state ('V' and 'C')UCEreturn status OK
Get ACL Cmd_GetACLGet the ACL of a given key.-KAUCRreturn status OK
Get key application data Cmd_GetAppDataGet the application data field from a key.-KAUCRreturn status OK
Get challenge Cmd_GetChallengeGet a random challenge that can be used in fresh certificates.Random bit generation (DRBG)DRBG entropy input, seed, internal state ('V' and 'C')UCEreturn status OK
Get KLF2 Cmd_GetKLF2Get a handle to the Module Long Term (KLF2) public key.--UC-return status OK
Get Key Information Cmd_GetKeyInfo Cmd_GetKeyInfoExGet the type, length and hash of a key.Message digest (SHA-1)KAUCRreturn status OK

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ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
Get module signing key Cmd_GetKMLGet a handle to the KML public key.-KMLUCRreturn status OK
Get list of slot in the module Cmd_GetSlotListGet the list of slots that are available from the module.--UC-return status OK
Get Logical Token Info Cmd_GetLogicalTokenInfo Cmd_GetLogicalTokenInfoExGet information about a Logical Token: hash, state and number of shares.Message digest (SHA-1)LTxUCRreturn status OK
Get list of module keys Cmd_GetKMListGet the list of the hashes of all module keys and the KNSO.Message digest (SHA-1)KM, KNSOUCRreturn status OK
Get module state Cmd_GetModuleStateReturns unsigned data about the current state of the module.--UC-return status OK
Get real time clock Cmd_GetRTCGet the current time from the module Real Time Clock.--UC-return status OK
Get share access control list Cmd_GetShareACLGet the Share's ACL.-SHAREKEYUCRreturn status OK
Get Slot Information Cmd_GetSlotInfoGet information about shares and files on a Smartcard that has been inserted in a module slot.--UC-return status OK
Get Ticket Cmd_GetTicketGet a ticket (an invariant identifier) for a key. This can be passed to another client or to a SEE World which can redeem it using Redeem Ticket to obtain a new handle to the object.--UC-return status OK
Initialize Unit Cmd_InitializeUnit Cmd_InitializeUnitExCauses the nCore API service in the pre-initialization state to enter the initialization state. When the module enters the initialization state, it erases all Module keys (KM), the module's signing key (KML), and the hash of the Security Officer's keys, HKNSO. It then generates a new KML and KM.Key generation (CKG, RSA, DSA) Message digest (SHA-1)HKNSO KA, KRE_BLOBKEY, KR, KM, KAL, KML, KNSO, HKNSO, LTxUCZ, Greturn status OK
Insert a Softcard Cmd_InsertSoftTokenAllocates memory on the module that is used to store the logical token share and other data objects.--UC-return status OK
Remove a Softcard Cmd_RemoveSoftTokenRemoves a Softcard from the module. It returns the updated--UC-return status OK

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ServiceDescription shares and deletes them from the module’s memory.Approved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
Impath secure channel Cmd_ImpathGetInfo Cmd_ImpathKXBegin Cmd_ImpathKXFinish Cmd_ImpathReceive Cmd_ImpathSendSupport for Impath secure channel. Requires Feature Enabled.Key agreement (KAS- FFC) Key derivation (KBKDF) Data encryption and decryption (AES CBC, GCM) MAC generation and verification (HMAC- SHA256)KML, IMPATHKE, IMPATHKMUCG, Ereturn status OK
Key generation Cmd_GenerateKey Cmd_GenerateKeyPairGenerates a cryptographic key of a given type with a specified ACL. It returns a handle to the key. Optionally, it returns a KML signed certificate with the hash of the key and its ACL information.Key generation (CKG, RSA, ECDSA, DSA) Digital signature generation (DSA)KML, KA, DRBG entropy input, seed, internal state ('V' and 'C')UCGreturn status OK
Key import Cmd_ImportLoads a plain text key into the module. If the module is initialized in approved mode, this service is available for public keys only.-KAUCWreturn status OK
1Derive Key Cmd_DeriveKeyPerforms key wrapping, unwrapping, transport, exchange and derivation. The ACL needs to authorize this operation.Key derivation (KBKDF) Key wrapping/unwrapping (KTS-AES) Key transport (KTS-IFC) Key agreement (KAS- FFC, KAS-ECC)KAUCR, Wreturn status OK
Load Blob Cmd_LoadBlobLoad a Key blob into the module. It returns a handle to the key suitable for use with module services.Key derivation (KBKDF) Key unwrapping (AES CBC and HMAC, KTS-IFC)KA, KRE_BLOBKEY, KR, KM, KNSO BLOBKE, BLOBKMUCW Ereturn status OK
Load Logical Token Cmd_LoadLogicalTokenInitiates loading a Logical Token from Shares, which can be loaded with the Read Share command.Key unwrapping Key derivation-UC-return status OK
Generate Logical Token Cmd_GenerateLogicalTokenCreates a new Logical Token with given properties and secret sharing parameters.Key generation (CKG)KM, LTxUCG, Wreturn status OK
Message digest Cmd_HashComputes the cryptographic hash of a given message.Message digest (SHS, SHA-3)-UC-return status OK
Modular ExponentiationPerforms a modular exponentiation (standard or--UC-return status OK

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Service Cmd_ModExp Cmd_ModExpCrt Cmd_RSAImmedVerifyEncrypt Cmd_RSAImmedSignDecryptDescription CRT) on values supplied with the command.Approved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
Module hardware information Cmd_ModuleInfoReports detailed hardware information.--UC-return status OK
No Operation Cmd_NoOpNo operation.--UC-return status OK
Change Share Passphrase Cmd_ChangeSharePIN Cmd_ChangeShareGroupPINUpdates the passphrase of a Share.Key derivation (KBKDF) Key wrapping/unwrapping (AES CBC and HMAC, KTS-IFC)SHAREKEY, LTx, KMUCG, E, R, Wreturn status OK
NVRAM Allocate Cmd_NVMemAllocateAllocation in NVRAM.--NSO-return status OK
NVRAM Free Cmd_NVMemFreeDeallocation from NVRAM.--UC-return status OK
Operation on NVM list Cmd_NVMemListReturns a list of files in NVRAM.--UC-return status OK
Operation on NVM files Cmd_NVMemOpOperation on an NVRAM file.--UCreturn status OK
Key export Cmd_ExportExports a key in plain text. Note: in approved mode, only public keys can be exported.-KAUCRreturn status OK
Read file Cmd_ReadFileReads data from a file on a Smartcard or Softcard. The ACL needs to authorize this operation.--UC-return status OK
Read share Cmd_ReadShareReads a share from a Smartcard or Softcard. Once a quorum of shares have been loaded, the module re- assembles the Logical Token.Key derivation (KBKDF) Key unwrapping (AES CBC and HMAC)SHAREKEY, LTx, KMUCG, E, Rreturn status OK
Send share to remote slot Cmd_SendShareReads a Share and encrypts it with the Impath session keys for transmission to the peer module.Data encryption(AES CBC, GCM) MAC generation (HMAC-SHA256)IMPATHKE, IMPATHKM, SHAREKEYUCR, Ereturn status OK
Receive share from remote slot Cmd_ReceiveShareReceives a Share encrypted with the Impath session keys by a remote module.Data decryption (AES CBC, GCM)IMPATHKE, IMPATHKM, SHAREKEYUCR, Ereturn status OK

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ServiceDescriptionApproved Security Functions MAC verification (HMAC-SHA256)Keys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
Redeem Ticket Cmd_RedeemTicketGets a handle in the current name space for the object referred to by a ticket created by Get Ticket.--UC-return status OK
Remote Administration Cmd_DynamicSlotCreateAssociation Cmd_DynamicSlotExchangeAPDUs Cmd_DynamicSlotsConfigure Cmd_DynamicSlotsConfigureQuery Cmd_VerifyCertificateProvides remote presentation of Smartcards using a secure channel between the module and the Smartcard.Key agreement (KAS- ECC ECDH) Key derivation (KBKDF) Data encryption and decryption (AES CBC) MAC generation and verification (AES CMAC) Digital signature verification (ECDSA)RAKME, RAKMA, KWARN_pubUCG, E Ereturn status OK
Destroy Cmd_DestroyRemove handle to an object in RAM. If the current handle is the only one remaining, the object is zeroised from RAM.-KA, KNSO, LTxUCZreturn status OK
Report statistics Cmd StatGetValues Cmd_StatEnumTreeReports the values of the statistics tree.--UC-return status OK
Show Status Cmd_NewEnquiryThis is a Show Status and Show Module's Versioning Information service. Report status information.--UC-return status OK
Set ACL Cmd_SetACLReplaces the ACL of a given key with a new ACL. The ACL needs to authorize this operation.-KAUCWreturn status OK
Set key application data Cmd_SetAppDataWrites the application information field of a key.-KAUCWreturn status OK
Set NSO Permissions Cmd_SetNSOPermsSets the NSO key hash and which permissions require a Delegation Certificate.--NSO-return status OK
Signature generation Cmd_SignGenerate a digital signature or MAC value.MAC generation (HMAC, KMAC, AES CMAC) Digital signature generation (RSA, ECDSA, DSA)KA, KNSOUCEreturn status OK
Sign Module State Cmd_SignModuleStateReturns a signed certificate that contains data about theDigital signature generation (DSA)KMLUCEreturn status OK

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ServiceDescription current configuration of the module.Approved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and/or SSPsIndicator
Signature verification Cmd_VerifyVerifies a digital signature or MAC value.MAC verification (HMAC, KMAC, AES CMAC) Digital signature verification (RSA, ECDSA, DSA)KAUCEreturn status OK
Write file Cmd_WriteFileWrites a file to a Smartcard or Softcard.--NSO-return status OK
Write share Cmd_WriteShareWrites a Share to a Smartcard or Softcard.Key derivation (KBKDF) Key wrapping (AES CBC and HMAC)SHAREKEY, LTx, KMUCG, E, Wreturn status OK
SEE connection Cmd_CreateSEEConnectionOpens a connection from the nCoreAPI service to the SEE machine--UC-return status OK

Table 18 Approved Services Non-approved services will fail with a return an error code indicator "StrictFIPS140". All nCore API services are sent through the SSH channel, performing security functions Data encryption/decryption, MAC generation / verification and access E (execute) of the session keys KSESSION - SSH.

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5 Software/Firmware security

The nShield 5s cryptographic module's executable code is delivered by Entrust as a single signed firmware package (.npkg file). The firmware integrity is verified at start up using RSA with 4096 bit key and SHA2-256. The Library Partition is an internal storage area that contains a number of auxiliary files required for operation of the module. The integrity of the Library Partition is verified using ECDSA with curve P-521 and SHA2-512. Operators can initiate the integrity tests on demand by restarting the module. nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 25 of 44

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6 Operational environment

Not applicable. The module has a limited operational environment, it is designed to accept only controlled firmware changes that successfully pass the software/firmware load test.

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Physical Security MechanismRecommended Frequency of Inspection/TestInspection/Test Guidance Details
Hard and opaque epoxyMonthlyThe module should be inspected periodically for evidence of tamper attempts, including the entire enclosure including the epoxy resin security coating for obvious signs of damage.
Temperature or voltage measurementSpecify EFP or EFTSpecify if this condition results in a shutdown or zeroisation
Low Temperature2ºCEFPShutdown
High Temperature95ºCEFPShutdown
Low Voltage8VEFPShutdown
High Voltage14.08VEFPShutdown
Hardness tested temperature measurement
Low Temperature0ºC
High Temperature95ºC

The product is a multi-chip embedded Cryptographic Module, as defined in FIPS 140-3. It is enclosed 3. The cryptographic module implements Environmental Failure Protections (EFP) which detect out of Table 19 Physical Security Inspection Guidelines Table 20 EFP/EFT Table 21 Hardness testing temperature ranges nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 27 of 44

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8 Non-invasive security
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Key/SSP/Name/TypeStrengthSecurity Function and Cert. NumberGenerationImport/ExportEstablishmentStorageZeroisationUse & related keys
KRESET (CSP)256 bitsRe-settable key A3707DRBGNevern/aMSP430 FRAM, in plaintextfactorystateKey derivation
KUSER_SSH (CSP)256 bitsGlobal SSH key encryption key AES-256 A3707Derived at start-up using KBKDF from KRESET and other fixed parametersNevern/aRAM, in plaintextPower cycleEncryption of all the service's server authentication SSH keys
KSSH_SETUP (CSP)128 bitsServer authentication SSH key for the Setup service ECDSA P-256 A3707 A3706DRBGPrivate key: never Public key: output via SSHAdmin servicen/aIn Flash, encrypted with KUSER_SSHn/a protectedSSH channel session
KSSH_UPDATER (CSP)128 bitsServer authentication SSH key for the Updater service ECDSA P-256 A3707 A3706DRBGPrivate key: never Public key: output via SSHAdmin servicen/aIn Flash, encrypted with KUSER_SSHn/a protectedSSH channel session
KSSH_SSHADMIN (CSP)128 bitsServer authentication SSH key for the SSH Admin service ECDSA P-256 A3707 A3706DRBGPrivate key: never Public key: output via SSHAdmin servicen/aIn Flash, encrypted with KUSER_SSHn/a protectedSSH channel session
KSSH_MONITOR (CSP)128 bitsServer authentication SSH key for the Monitor service ECDSA P-256DRBGPrivate key: never Public key: output vian/aIn Flash, encrypted with KUSER_SSHn/a protectedSSH channel session
9 Sensitive security parameters management

This section defines the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) managed by the cryptographic module.

9.1.1 Platform SSPs

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Key/SSP/Name/TypeStrengthSecurity Function and Cert. Number A3707 A3706GenerationImport/Export SSHAdmin serviceEstablishmentStorageZeroisationUse & related keys
KSSH_LAUNCHER (CSP)128 bitsServer authentication SSH key for the Launcher service ECDSA P-256 A3707 A3706DRBGPrivate key: never Public key: output via SSHAdmin servicen/aIn Flash, encrypted with KUSER_SSHn/a protectedSSH channel session
KSESSION - SSH (CSP)128 bitsSSH channel session keys AES GCM or AES CTR, HMAC A3707n/aNeverECDHRAM, in plaintextPower cycle or channel closureSSH channel data encryption and integrity
NSBIK pub (not an SSP)128 bitsBootloader public integrity key RSA 4096 bit A2404 A6385EntrustImport: Firmware update Export: Nevern/aFlash, in plaintextn/aFirmware integrity test
NFIK pub (not an SSP)128 bitsFirmware public signature verification key RSA 4096 bit A2404 A6385EntrustImport: Firmware update Export: Nevern/aFlash, in plaintextn/aFirmware integrity test
NLIK pub (not an SSP)256 bitsLibrary public integrity key ECDSA P-521 A3707EntrustImport: Firmware update Export: Nevern/aFlash, in plaintextn/aFirmware integrity test
NPSK pub (PSP)256 bitsPackage public signature verification key ECDSA P-521 A3707EntrustImport: Firmware update Export: Nevern/aFlash, in plaintextn/aFirmware loading test
ESK pub (PSP)256 bitsRoot Entrust SEE public signing key ECDSA P-521 A3707EntrustImport: Firmware update Export: Nevern/aFlashn/aSignature verification

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Key/SSP/Name/TypeStrengthSecurity Function and Cert. NumberGenerationImport/ExportEstablishmentStorageZeroisationUse & related keys
DSK pub (PSP)256 bitsDeveloper public signing key ECDSA P-521 A3707n/aLauncher service ids commandsn/aFlashn/aSignature verification
KSSH_CLIENT pub (PSP)128 bitsClient authentication SSH key for each of the services (Updater, Setup, SSHAdmin, Launcher, nCoreAPI) ECDSA P-256, P- 521 A3707Client sideThrough SSHAdmin servicen/aFlash, in plaintextfactorystateSSH authentication credentials
DRBG entropy input (CSP)> 256 bitsPlatform DRBG A3707520 bits from the approved Entropy Source.Nevern/aRAM, in plaintextPower cycleRandom number generation
DRBG seed (CSP)256 bitsPlatform DRBG A3707Generated as per SP 800-90Arev1 with 696 bits from the approved Entropy Source: 520 bits entropy input 176 bits random nonceNevern/aRAM, in plaintextPower cycleRandom number generation
DRBG internal state ('V' and 'C' values) (CSP)256 bitsPlatform DRBG A3707Generated as per SP 800- 90Arev1.Nevern/aRAM, in plaintextPower cycleRandom number generation

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Key/SSP/Name/TypeStrengthSecurity Function and Cert. NumberGenerationImport/ExportEstablishmentStorageZeroisationUse & related keys
KCONTAINER (CSP)256 bitsMaster key for container A3707Derived at start-up using KBKDF from KRESET, container-id and other fixed value.Nevern/aRAM, in plaintextPower cycleKey derivation
KCONTAINERSSH (CSP)256 bitsEncryption key for KSSH_NCORE AES-256 A3707Derived at start-up using KBKDF from KCONTAINER, and other fixed value.Nevern/aRAM, in plaintextPower cycleEncryption
KSSH_NCORE (CSP)128 bitsServer authentication ssh key for the nCore API service ECDSA P-256 A3707 A3706DRBGPrivate key: Never Public key output via SSH Admin servicen/aIn Flash, encrypted with KCONTAINERSSHn/a protectedSSH channel session
Key/SSP/Name/Typ eStrengt hSecurity Function and Cert. NumberGeneratio nImport/Expor tEstablishmen tStorageZeroisationUse & related keys
KRE_BLOBKEY (CSP)128 bitsRecovery confidentialit y key RSA 3072 bit A3707DRBGImport: From key blob, decrypted with LTRE Export: in key blob, encrypted with LTREn/aRAM, in plaintextPower cycle or Cmd_Destro yKey used to protect recovery keys (KR).
KR (CSP)256 bitsRecovery key AES 256 A3707DRBGImport: From key blob, decrypted with KRE_BLOBKEYn/aRAM, in plaintextPower cycle or Cmd_Destro yKey used to derive (using SP 800- 108 KDF in counter mode) the keys Ke (AES 256-bit) and Km (HMAC-SHA256) that protect an archive
9.1.1.1 Service SSPs

Table 23 nCoreAPI SSP table

9.1.1.2 Security World SSPs

The following SSPs are related to the Security World in which the cryptographic module is enrolled into.

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Key/SSP/Name/Typ eStrengt hSecurity Function and Cert. NumberGeneratio nImport/Expor t Export: in key blob, encrypted with KRE_BLOBKEYEstablishmen tStorageZeroisationUse & related keys copy of an application key.
IMPATHKE IMPATHKM (CSP)256 bitsSession keys for impath channel A3707n/aNeverDHRAM, in plaintextPower cycle or channel closureEncryption and decryption MAC generation and verification
KA (CSP)≥ 112 bitsApplication keys A3707DRBGImport: From key blob, decrypted with LTA or KR Export: in key blob, encrypted with LTA or KRn/aRAM, in plaintextPower cycle or Cmd_Destro yApplication keys used for general purpose cryptographic services: • Encryption and decryption • Digital signature generation and verification • MAC generation and verification • Key derivation, key agreement .
KM (CSP)256 bitsSecurity World module key AES 256 A3707DRBGImport: From key blob, decrypted with LTM Export: in key blob, encrypted with LTMn/aFlash, in plaintextfactorystate or Initialize UnitKey used for key derivation to protect logical tokens and associated module Key Blobs.
KML (CSP)128 bitsModule Signing key DSA 3072 bit A3707DRBGNevern/aFlash, in plaintextfactorystate or Initialize UnitDigital signature generation for key generation certificates and module state certificates.
KNSO (CSP)128 bitsNSO key DSA 3072 bit A3707DRBGImport: From key blob, decrypted with LTNSO Export: in key blob,n/aRAM, in plaintextPower cycle or Cmd_Destro ynShield Security Officer key used for NSO authorisation and Security World integrity

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Key/SSP/Name/Typ eStrengt hSecurity Function and Cert. NumberGeneratio nImport/Expor t encrypted with LTNSOEstablishmen tStorageZeroisationUse & related keys
HKNSO (PSP)160 bitsHash of public KNSO A3707n/aNeverSecurity World creationFlash, in plaintextfactorystate or Initialize UnitnShield Security Officer key used for NSO authorisation and Security World integrity
BLOBKE BLOBKM (CSP)256 bitsKey blob encryption and MAC key AES 256 HMAC- SHA256 A3707n/aNeverDerived from LTxRAM, in plaintextPower cycleKey wrapping
LTx (CSP)256 bitsLogical token for key x AES 256 A3707DRBGImport: From quorum of encrypted Shares using Shamir Secret Scheme Export: To encrypted Shares using Shamir Secret SchemeFrom Shares using Shamir Secret ScheeRAM, in plaintextPower cycle or Cmd_Destro yKey derivation
SHAREKEY (CSP)256 bitsShare encryption and MAC keys AES 256 HMAC- SHA256 A3707n/aNeverDerived from KM and other additional dataRAM, in plaintextPower cycleProtects a share when written to a smartcard or softcard. This key is used to derive using KBKDF the keys Ke and Km used to wrap the share.
RAKME RAKMA (CSP)256 bitsSession keys for remote admin channel AES 256 A3707n/aNeverECDHRAM, in plaintextPower cycle or channel closureEncryption and decryption MAC generation and verification
KAL (CSP)128 bitsAudit logging key DSA 3072-bit A3707DRBGNevern/aFlash, in plaintextfactorystate or Initialize UnitDigital signature generation of the audit trail.
KWARN pub (PSP)256 bitsEntrust root warranting public key for Administrator Cards and Operator CardsEntrustImport: fw update Export: nevern/aFlash, in plaintext , as part of the firmware imagen/a protectedDigital signature verification to authenticate remote cards.

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Key/SSP/Name/Typ eStrengt hSecurity Function and Cert. Number ECDSA P-521 A3707Generatio nImport/Expor tEstablishmen tStorageZeroisationUse & related keys
DRBG entropy input (CSP)256 bitsnCoreAPI DRBG A3707520 bits from Platform DRBGNevern/aRAM, in plaintextPower cycleRandom number generation
DRBG seed (CSP)256 bitsnCoreAPI DRBG A3707Generated as per SP 800- 90Arev1 with 696 bits from Platform DRBG: 520 bits entropy input 176 bits random nonceNevern/aRAM, in plaintextPower cycleRandom number generation
DRBG internal state ('V' and 'C' values) (CSP)256 bitsnCoreAPI DRBG A3707Generated as per SP 800- 90Arev1.Nevern/aRAM, in plaintextPower cycleRandom number generation
Entropy sourcesMinimum number of bits of entropyDetails
nShield 5s Physical True Random Number Generator ESV cert#380.89 bits per output bit Minimum of 256 bits of entropy for DRBG seed (total seed size of 512 bits)Hardware entropy source compliant with SP 800-90B. As per the Public Use Document, no configuration of the entropy source is required.

Table 24 Security World SSP table As per IG 9.7.B, the zeroisation of SSPs is explicitly indicated by the successful return code of the setup factorystate command. Temporary SSPs are zeroised implicitly.

9.2 SSP zeroization methods

Zeroization of all unprotected SSPs keys occurs immediately when the module is reset to the factory state with the setup factorystate command. The cryptographic module has a hardware based true random number generator used to seed the DRBGs. Table 25 Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

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Algorithm Bootloader cryptoDescription
SHA2-256Known Answer Test
RSA nCore cryptoKnown Answer Test (verification only) with 4096 bit key
AES ECB encryptAES ECB Known Answer Test encryption with 128, 192 and 256-bit keys
AES ECB decryptAES ECB Known Answer Test decryption with 128, 192 and 256-bit keys
AES CMACKnown Answer Test: 128-bit key
SHA-1SHA-1 Known Answer Test, other size are tested along with KAT HMAC
SHA-3SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 Known Answer Test
HMAC with SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512Known Answer Test
RSAKnown Answer Test: sign/verify, encrypt/decrypt with 2048-bit key Pair-Wise consistency test: sign/verify
DSAKnown Answer Test: sign/verify with 2048-bit key Pair-Wise consistency test: sign/verify
10 Self tests

The Cryptographic Module performs pre-operational, conditional and periodic self-tests. It also supports pre-operational self-tests on demand by resetting the module. In the event of a self-test failure, the module enters the error state. While in this state, the module does not process any commands, and will indicate the error on the status LED and the error log, which can be retrieved with the command monitor getlog.

10.1 Pre-operational self tests
10.1.1 Integrity tests

At start up, the following integrity tests are performed: • Library partition integrity, is verified using ECDSA with curve P-521 and SHA2-512.

10.2 Conditional self tests
10.2.1 Crypto self tests

The following cryptographic algorithm self tests (CASTs) are run before the first use of any cryptographic mechanism.

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AlgorithmDescription
ECDSAKAT test: sign/verify with curves P-224 and B-233 Pair-Wise consistency test: sign/verify
KAS-FFCShared Secret Computation Known Answer Test DH
KAS-ECCShared Secret Computation Known Answer Test for ECDH with curves P-384 and B-233
One-step KDFKnown Answer Test with SHA2-256 auxiliary function
Two-step KDFKnown Answer Test with HMAC-SHA256 auxiliary function
KBKDFKnown Answer Test
DRBG SSH cryptoHealth Tests according to SP 800-90Arev1 section 11.3
AES GCM encryptKnown Answer Test encryption with 128 bit key
AES GCM decryptKnown Answer Test decryption with 128 bit key
AES CTR encryptKnown Answer Test encryption with 128 bit key
AES CTR decryptKnown Answer Test decryption with 128 bit key
HMAC with SHA2-256 and SHA2-512Known Answer Test
KAS-ECCShared Secret Computation Known Answer Test for ECDH with curve P-256
ECDSAKAT test: sign/verify with curves P-256 and P-521
SSH KDFSSH KDF Known Answer Test

At start up, the SP 800-90B Adaptive Proportion Test and Repetition Count Test are run on the output bits of the entropy source. These tests are also run continuously during operation of the entropy source. The module performs a pair-wise consistency test when RSA, DSA, ECDSA, DH and ECDH keys are generated.

10.2.4 Firmware load test

Prior to updating the firmware, the cryptographic module validates the integrity and authenticity of the image update package. The module performs the following actions before replacing the current image:

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Note: A firmware image version loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.

10.3 Periodic self tests

The following self tests are run periodically every 24 hours:

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11 Life-cycle assurance

This section provides specific FIPS-related guidance to Administrators and Operators. This guidance is aimed to complement the product user and installation guides which are delivered with the cryptographic module.

11.1 Delivery

The nShield cryptographic module is sent to the customers using a standard carrier service. After accepting the delivery of the module, a physical inspection of the module shall be performed (refer to Physical Security section). This inspection is done to ensure that the module has not been tampered with during transit. If the inspection results indicate that the module has not been tampered with, the Administrator can then proceed with installation and configuration of the module. The cryptographic module supports firmware upgrades in the field, which are provided by Entrust as a single signed firmware package (.npkg file).

11.2 Cryptographic module identification

This section provides instructions to inspect the cryptographic module´s fw and hw version information and ensure they correspond with the FIPS 140-3 validated versions.

11.2.1 FW identification

The cryptographic module provides the service updater info which provides firmware version information in JSON format. Entrust provides the hsmadmin status command-line utility which calls the service updater info internally. hsmadmin status --json { "D5DE-E1F8-D6E7": { "succeeded": true, "data": { "mode": "primary", "primary-version": "13.4.5-751-56c6f1db", "recovery-version": "13.2.4-280-7f4f0c24", "uboot-version": "1.1.0-1245-b9bedfa" } } } The following fields in the output must be checked: nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 39 of 44

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FieldExpected value
primary-version13.4.5-751-56c6f1db
recovery-version13.2.4-280-7f4f0c24
uboot-version1.1.0-1245-b9bedfa or 1.4.1-0-edb84d6e
FieldExpected value
product namenC5536E or nC5536N
hardware part noPCA10005-01 revision 03 or revision 04
11.2.2 HW identification

The cryptographic module provides the command Cmd_NewEnquiry which reports hardware version information. Entrust provides the enquiry command-line utility which calls Cmd_NewEnquiry internally. The following fields in the output must be checked: Alternatively, the cryptographic module also provides the service setup info which provides hardware version information in JSON format. Entrust provides the hsmadmin info command-line utility which calls the service setup info internally. hsmadmin info --json { "15C8-4387-C748": { "eeprom": { ... , "buildpart": , "buildrev": { "value": "03", "crc": xxxxx } ... } } The following fields in the output must be checked:

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FieldExpected value
buildpart"value": "PCA10005-01"
buildrev"value": "03" or "value": "04"
11.3 Approved mode of operation

When the cryptographic module is in factory state, it first needs to be initialized with the command line utility hsmadmin enroll. To configure the cryptographic module in approved mode, create a FIPS 140-3 level 3 compliant Security World using Entrust supplied utility new-world and setting the mode to fips-140-level-3. An operator can verify that the module is configured in approved mode with the command line utility enquiry, which reports the following active modes: active modes UseFIPSApprovedInternalMechanisms AlwaysUseStrongPrimes FIPSLevel3Enforcedv2 StrictSP80056Ar3 active modes UseFIPSApprovedInternalMechanisms FIPSLevel3Enforcedv2 StrictSP80056Ar3 Once a FIPS 140-3 level 3 Security World is created, it is not possible to switch into a non-compliant mode without first zeroising the unprotected SSPs.

11.4 End of life

Per FIPS 140-3 section 7.11.8, in the event that the module is no longer deployed or intended for further use, the Crypto Officer shall zeroize and destroy the module. The module shall be taken to an electronics recycling facility that offers (and assures) the physical destruction of e-waste. nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 41 of 44

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12 Mitigation of other attacks
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Contact Us Web site                                  https://www.entrust.com Support                                   https://nshieldsupport.entrust.com Email Support                             nShield.support@entrust.com Online documentation:                     Available from the Support site listed above. You can also contact our Support teams by telephone, using the following numbers: Europe, Middle East, and Africa United Kingdom:                           +44 1223 622 444 One Station Square Cambridge CB1 2GA UK Americas Toll Free:                                +1 833 425 1990 Fort Lauderdale:                          +1 954 953 5229 Sawgrass Commerce Center – A Suite 130,
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Sunrise FL 33323 USA Asia Pacific Australia: +61 9126 9070 World Trade Centre Northbank Wharf Siddeley St Melbourne VIC 3005 Australia Japan: +81 50 3196 4994 Hong Kong: +852 3008 4994 31/F, Hysan Place

500 Hennessy Road

Causeway Bay Hong Kong nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 43 of 44

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To get help with Entrust nShield HSMs nShield.support@entrust.com nshieldsupport.entrust.com ABOUT ENTRUST CORPORATION Entrust keeps the world moving safely by enabling trusted identities, payments and data protection. Today more than ever, people demand seamless, secure experiences, whether they’re crossing borders, making a purchase, accessing egovernment services or logging into corporate networks. Entrust offers an unmatched breadth of digital security and credential issuance solutions at the very heart of all these interactions. With more than 2,500 colleagues, a network of global partners, and customers in over 150 countries, it’s no wonder the world’s most entrusted organizations trust us.