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CMVP Validated Module · FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Virtual Instant-On Network (vION)

Certificate#4768StandardFIPS 140-3Level1TypeSoftwareEmbodimentMulti-Chip Stand AloneStatusHistoricalVendorPalo Alto Networks, Inc.
High review priority  ·  no TCB surface named  ·  last validated 23 months ago. How this is derived →

Certificate

StandardFIPS 140-3
Overall level1
Module typeSoftware
EmbodimentMulti-Chip Stand Alone
StatusHistorical
CaveatInterim Validation. When installed, initialized and configured as specified in section "Secure Operation" of the Security Policy and operated in approved mode
VendorPalo Alto Networks, Inc.

Approved Algorithms (40)

AlgorithmACVP Cert
AES-CBCA3564
AES-CBCA3566
AES-CTRA3563
AES-ECBA3563
AES-GCMA3563
AES-GCMA3564
Counter DRBGA3563
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)A3563
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)A3564
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)A3563
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A3563
HMAC DRBGA3564
HMAC-SHA-1A3563
HMAC-SHA2-224A3563
HMAC-SHA2-256A3564
HMAC-SHA2-256A3566
HMAC-SHA2-384A3563
HMAC-SHA2-384A3564
HMAC-SHA2-512A3563
HMAC-SHA2-512A3564
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3A3563
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3A3564
KDF IKEv2A3563
KDF SNMPA3563
KDF SSHA3563
KDF TLSA3563
KDF TLSA3564
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)A3563
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)A3563
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A3563
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A3572
SHA-1A3566
SHA2-224A3563
SHA2-224A3564
SHA2-256A3563
SHA2-256A3564
SHA2-384A3563
SHA2-384A3564
SHA2-512A3563
SHA2-512A3564

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Virtual Instant-On Network (vION)
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Update</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Status Output<br/>Self-Test<br/>Show Status</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;
Underlying clues
flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Virtual Instant-On Network (vION)
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Update</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Status Output<br/>Self-Test<br/>Show Status</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Page 1

Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Virtual Instant-On Network (vION) Software Version: 6.1.2 Documentation Version: 1.4 Last Update: June 11, 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. www.paloaltonetworks.com © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks. A list of our trademarks can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective companies. Revision Date: June 11, 2024 Document Version: 1.4

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Table of Contents
#SectionPage
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ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6. [Number Below]FIPS 140-3 Section TitleSecurity Level
1General1
2Cryptographic module specification1
3Cryptographic module interfaces1
4Roles, services, and authentication1
5Software/Firmware security1
6Operational environment1
7Physical securityN/A
8Non-invasive securityN/A
9Sensitive security parameter management1
10Self-tests1
11Life-cycle assurance1
12Mitigation of other attacksN/A
#Operating SystemHardware PlatformProcessorPAA/Acceleration
1KVM on Ubuntu 20.04Supermicro SYS-2049-TRIntel Xeon Gold 6230with PAA
2KVM on Ubuntu 20.04Supermicro SYS-2049-TRIntel Xeon Gold 6230without PAA
#Operating SystemHardware Platform
1AWSDependent on Provider
2AzureDependent on Provider
3Google CloudDependent on Provider
4OCI using KVMDependent on Provider
5VMware ESXiDependent on Provider/GPC
6ION 7108VGPC
7ION 3108VGPC

The table below provides the security levels of the various sections of FIPS 140-3 in relation to the Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Virtual Instant-On Network (vION), hereinafter referred to as the Module or vION module. The Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Virtual Instant-On Network (vION) enables the integration of a diverse set of wide area network (WAN) connection types, improves application performance and visibility, enhances security and compliance, and reduces the overall cost and complexity of a WAN. Built with the intent to reduce remote infrastructure, Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN vION enables the cloud-delivered branch. The vION module software version is 6.1.2. Table 1 - Security Levels The module is designed to meet an overall security level 1. The module is a multi-chip standalone software module running on a general-purpose computing platform. FIPS 140-3 conformance testing was performed at Security Level 1 with the configurations noted in the table 2 below. Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Virtual Instant-On Network (vION) 3

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CAVP CertAlgorithm and StandardMode/MethodDescription/Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function
A3566AES: ● FIPS 197SP 800-38DECB128, 192, and 256 bitsData Encryption/Decryption
A3566AES: ● FIPS 197SP 800-38ACBC128, 192, and 256 bitsData Encryption/Decryption
A3566AES: ● FIPS 197SP 800-38ACTR128, 192, and 256 bitsData Encryption/Decryption
A3566AES: ● FIPS 197SP 800-38DGCM128, 192, and 256 bitsData Encryption/Decryption
A3566KDF SSH: ● SP 800-135rev1 (CVL)KDF SSHN/ASP800-135rev1 compliant Key Derivation
A3566KDF TLS: ● SP 800-135rev1 (CVL)KDF TLSN/ASP800-135rev1 compliant Key Derivation
A3566KDF IKEv2: ● SP 800-135rev1 (CVL)KDF IKEv2N/ASP800-135rev1 compliant Key Derivation
A3566KDF SNMP: ● SP 800-135rev1 (CVL)KDF SNMPN/ASP800-135rev1 compliant Key Derivation
A3566DRBG: ● SP 800-90Arev1CTR_DRBG (AES-256 bits) Derivation Function Enabled: YesN/ADeterministic Random Bit Generation
A3566KAS-SSC ● SP 800-56Arev3KAS-ECC-SSC Ephemeral UnifiedCurves: P-256, P-384, P-521; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strengthKAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation

Table 3 - Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments Note: The vION comes in either ION 3108V or ION 7108V, which is the same functionality just with differences such as throughput. The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment which is not listed on the validation certificate. Modes of Operation The module has one approved mode of operation and is always in approved mode of operation after initial operations are performed (See Section 11). The module does not claim implementation of a degraded mode of operation. Section 4 provides details on the service indicator implemented by the module. The tables below list all Approved or Vendor-affirmed security functions of the module, including specific key size(s) (in bits unless noted otherwise) employed for Approved services, and implemented modes of operation. There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in these tables.

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CAVP CertAlgorithm and StandardMode/MethodDescription/Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function
A3566KAS ● SP 800-56Arev3KAS (ECC) Scheme: ephemeralUnified: KAS Role: initiator, responderKAS (ECC): Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521; Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strengthKey Agreement Scheme per SP800- 56Arev3 with key derivation function (SP800-135rev1) Note: The module’s KAS (ECC) implementation is FIPS140-3 IG D.F Scenario X1 (path 2) compliant
A3566ECDSA ● FIPS 186-4ECDSA KeyGenCurves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P- 521ECDSA Key Generation
A3566ECDSA ● FIPS 186-4ECDSA SigGenCurves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P- 521ECDSA Digital Signature Generation
A3566ECDSA ● FIPS 186-4ECDSA SigVerCurves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P- 521ECDSA Digital Signature Verification
A3566HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA-1At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3566HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2-224At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3566HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2-256At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3566HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2-384At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3566HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2-512At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3566KTS ● SP800-38FKTS (AES Cert. #A3566)128, 192, and 256 bits Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strengthKey Transport using AES-GCM
A3566KTS ● SP800-38FKTS (AES Cert. #A3566 and HMAC Cert. #A3566)128, 192, and 256 bits Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strengthKey Transport using AES and HMAC
A3566RSA ● FIPS 186-4RSA KeyGen (PKCS#1 v1.5)Modulus: 2048 and 3072 bitsRSA Key Generation
A3566RSA ● FIPS 186-4RSA SigGen (PKCS#1 v1.5)Modulus: 2048 and 3072 bitsRSA Digital Signature Generation
A3566RSA ● FIPS 186-4RSA SigVer (PKCS#1 v1.5)Modulus: 2048 and 3072 bitsRSA Digital Signature Verification
A3566SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA-1N/AHashing Note: SHA-1 is not used for digital signature generation
A3566SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-224N/AHashing
A3566SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-256N/AHashing
A3566SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-384N/AHashing
A3566SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-512N/AHashing
Vendor AffirmedCKG (SP 800-133rev2)Section 5Cryptographic Key Generation; SP 800- 133rev2 and IG D.H.Key Generation Note: The cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per section 5 in SP800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed). A seed (i.e., the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is a direct output from SP800-90Arev1 DRBG (DRBG Cert. #A3566)

© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Virtual Instant-On Network (vION) 5

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CAVP CertAlgorithm and StandardMode/MethodDescription/Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)Use / Function
A3572AES: ● FIPS 197SP 800-38ACBC128 or 256 bitsData Encryption/Decryption
A3572AES: ● FIPS 197SP 800-38DGCM128 or 256 bitsData Encryption/Decryption
A3572KDF TLS: ● SP 800-135rev1 (CVL)KDF TLSN/ASP800-135rev1 compliant Key Derivation
A3572DRBG: ● SP 800-90Arev1DRBG with HMAC- SHA2-512N/ADeterministic Random Bit Generation
A3572KAS-SSC ● SP 800-56Arev3KAS-ECC-SSC Ephemeral UnifiedKAS-ECC-SSC with P-256, P-384, P-521; Key establishment methodology provides between 128 256 bits of encryption strengthKAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation
A3572KAS ● SP 800-56Arev3KAS (ECC) Scheme: ephemeralUnified: KAS Role: initiator, responderKAS (ECC): Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521; Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strengthKey Agreement Scheme per SP800- 56Arev3 with key derivation function (SP800-135rev1) Note: The module’s KAS (ECC) implementation is FIPS140-3 IG D.F Scenario X1 (path 2) compliant
A3572ECDSA ● FIPS 186-4ECDSA KeyGenCurves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P- 521ECDSA Key Generation
A3572HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2-256At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3572HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2-384At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3572HMAC ● FIPS 198-1HMAC-SHA2-512At least 160 bitsMessage Authentication
A3572KTS ● SP800-38FKTS (AES Cert. #A3572)128 or 256 bitsKey Transport using AES-GCM; Key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength
A3572KTS ● SP800-38FKTS (AES Cert. #A3572 and HMAC Cert. #A3572)128 or 256 bits Key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strengthKey Transport using AES and HMAC;
A3572RSA ● FIPS 186-4RSA SigVer (PKCS#1 v1.5)Modulus: 2048 bitsDigital Signature Verification
A3572SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-224N/AHashing
A3572SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-256N/AHashing
A3572SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-384N/AHashing
A3572SHS ● FIPS 180-4SHA2-512N/AHashing
Vendor AffirmedCKG (SP 800-133rev2)Section 5.1, Section 5.2Cryptographic Key Generation; SP 800- 133rev2 and IG D.H.Key Generation Note: The cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key

Table 4 - Approved Algorithms (Crypto Library - I)

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CAVP Cert

Algorithm and Standard

Mode/Method

Description/Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)

Use / Function Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per section 5 in SP800- 133rev2 (vendor affirmed). A seed (i.e., the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is a direct output from SP800-90Arev1 DRBG (DRBG Cert. #A3572)

Vendor NameCertificate Number
Palo Alto NetworksE69

Table 5 - Approved Algorithms (Crypto Library

52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme

were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.

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Physical PortLogical InterfaceData that passes over port/interface
N/AData Input InterfaceAPI input parameters for data
N/AData Output InterfaceAPI output parameters for data
N/AControl Input InterfaceAPI function calls
N/AControl Output InterfaceN/A
N/AStatus Output InterfaceReturn values, and or log messages
RoleServiceInputOutput
Crypto OfficerSelf-TestCommand to trigger Self-TestStatus of the self-tests results
Crypto OfficerZeroizeCommand to initiate the SSPs zeroizationStatus of the SSPs zeroization
Crypto OfficerShow VersionCommand to show versionModule’s name/ID and versions
Crypto OfficerShow StatusCommand to show statusModule’s status information
Crypto OfficerSoftware UpdateCommand to upload a new validated softwareStatus of the updated software installation
Crypto OfficerConfigure NetworkCommands to configure the moduleStatus of the completion of network related configuration

Figure 1 - Block Diagram

  1. Cryptographic Module Interfaces The module is a software only module that operates on a general purpose computing (GPC) platform. The physical ports and logical interfaces are consistent with a GPC operating environment. The module supports the following FIPS 140-3 logical interfaces. Table 7 - Ports and Interfaces
  2. Roles, Services, and Authentication The module supports role-based authentication, and provides a Crypto Officer role. The Crypto Officer role has the ability to perform all tasks and administrative actions.

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Crypto OfficerConfigure SSHv2 FunctionCommands to configure SSHv2Status of the completion of SSHv2 configuration
Crypto OfficerConfigure TLSv1.2 FunctionCommands to configure TLSv1.2Status of the completion of TLSv1.2 configuration
Crypto OfficerConfigure SNMPv3 FunctionCommands to configure SNMPv3Status of the completion of SNMPv3 configuration
Crypto OfficerConfigure IPsec/IKEv2 FunctionCommands to configure IPSec/IKEv2Status of the completion of IPSec/IKEv2 configuration
Crypto OfficerRun SSHv2 FunctionInitiate SSHv2 tunnel establishment requestStatus of SSHv2 tunnel establishment
Crypto OfficerRun TLSv1.2 FunctionInitiate TLSv1.2 tunnel establishment requestStatus of TLSv1.2 tunnel establishment
Crypto OfficerRun SNMPv3 FunctionInitiate SNMPv3 tunnel establishment requestStatus of SNMPv3 tunnel establishment
Crypto OfficerRun IPSec/IKEv2 FunctionInitiate of IPSec/IKEv2 tunnel establishmentStatus of IPSec/IKEv2 tunnel establishment
ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPsRolesAccess rights to Keys and / or SSPsIndicator
Self-TestInitiate and run the pre-operational self- testsHMAC-SHA2-256Software Integrity Test Key (Non-SSP)Crypto OfficerN/ANone
ZeroizeZeroize all unprotected SSPs stored in the moduleN/AAllCrypto OfficerZNone
Show VersionProvides the module’s name/ID and versionsN/AN/ACrypto OfficerN/ANone
Show StatusProvides the module’s current status and informationN/AN/ACrypto OfficerN/ANone
Software UpdateThe module’s software is updated to a new versionRSA Signature VerificationSoftware Load Test Key (PSP)Crypto OfficerESoftware update completion message
Configure NetworkPerform the Module’s Network ConfigurationRSA Signature VerificationTLS RSA Public KeyCrypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and Configuration logs
Configure SSHv2 FunctionCreate a secure SSHv2 channelAES-CTR; CKG; CTR_DRBG; ECDSA KeyGen; ECDSA SigGen; ECDSA SigVer; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA2-256; HMAC-SHA2-512; KAS-SSC (ECC); KAS (ECC); KDF SSH;DRBG Entropy Input (CSP); DRBG Seed (CSP); DRBG Internal State V Value (CSP); DRBG Key (CSP); SSH ECDHE Private Key (CSP); SSH ECDHE Public Key (PSP); Peer SSH ECDHE Public Key (PSP); SSH ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP); SSH ECDSA Private Key (CSP);Crypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and SSH connection log message

Table 8 – Roles, Services Commands, Input and Output © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Virtual Instant-On Network (vION) 9

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ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionsKeys and/or SSPs SSH ECDSA Public Key (PSP); SSH Session Encryption Key (CSP); SSH Session Authentication Key (CSP);RolesAccess rights to Keys and / or SSPsIndicator
Configure TLSv1.2 FunctionCreate a secure TLSv1.2 channelAES-CBC; AES-GCM; CKG; CTR_DRBG; HMAC_DRBG; HMAC-SHA2-256; HMAC-SHA2-384; KAS-SSC (ECC); KAS (ECC); KTS; RSA KeyGen; RSA SigGen; RSA SigVer; KDF TLS;DRBG Entropy Input (CSP); DRBG Seed (CSP); DRBG Internal State V Value (CSP); DRBG Key (CSP); TLS RSA Private Key (CSP); TLS RSA Public Key (PSP); TLS ECDHE Private Key (CSP); TLS ECDHE Public Key (PSP); Peer TLS ECDHE Public Key (PSP); TLS ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP); TLS Pre-Master Secret (CSP); TLS Master Secret (CSP); TLS Session Encryption Key (CSP); TLS Session Authentication Key (CSP);Crypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and TLS success log message
Configure SNMPv3 FunctionCreate a secure SNMPv3 channelAES-CBC; HMAC-SHA-1; KDF SNMP;SNMPv3 Authentication Secret (CSP); SNMPv3 Session Encryption Key (CSP); SNMPv3 Session Authentication Key (CSP);Crypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and SNMPv3 success log message
Configure IPsec/IKEv2 FunctionCreate IPSec/IKEv2 tunnelAES-CBC; CKG; CTR_DRBG; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA2-256; HMAC-SHA2-384; HMAC-SHA2-512; KAS-SSC (ECC); KAS (ECC); RSA KeyGen; RSA SigGen; RSA SigVer; KDF IKEV2DRBG Entropy Input (CSP); DRBG Seed (CSP); DRBG Internal State V Value (CSP); DRBG Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE Pre-Shared Secret (CSP); IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key (PSP); IPSec/IKE ECDHE Private Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE ECDHE Public Key (PSP); IPSec/IKE ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP); IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE Session Authentication Key (CSP);Crypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and IPSec success log message
Run SSHv2 FunctionNegotiation and encrypted data transport via SSHAES-CTR; CKG; CTR_DRBG; ECDSA KeyGen; ECDSA SigGen; ECDSA SigVer; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA2-256; HMAC-SHA2-512; KAS-SSC (ECC);DRBG Entropy Input (CSP); DRBG Seed (CSP); DRBG Internal State V Value (CSP); DRBG Key (CSP); SSH ECDHE Private Key (CSP); SSH ECDHE Public Key (PSP); Peer SSH ECDHE Public Key (PSP);Crypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and SSH connection log message

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ServiceDescriptionApproved Security Functions KAS (ECC); KDF SSHKeys and/or SSPs SSH ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP); SSH ECDSA Private Key (CSP); SSH ECDSA Public Key (PSP); SSH Session Encryption Key (CSP); SSH Session Authentication Key (CSP);RolesAccess rights to Keys and / or SSPsIndicator
Run TLSv1.2 FunctionNegotiation and encrypted data transport via TLSAES-CBC; AES-GCM; CKG; CTR_DRBG; HMAC_DRBG; HMAC-SHA2-256; HMAC-SHA2-384; KAS-SSC (ECC); KAS (ECC); KTS; RSA KeyGen; RSA SigGen; RSA SigVer; KDF TLS;DRBG Entropy Input (CSP); DRBG Seed (CSP); DRBG Internal State V Value (CSP); DRBG Key (CSP); TLS RSA Private Key (CSP); TLS RSA Public Key (PSP); TLS ECDHE Private Key (CSP); TLS ECDHE Public Key (PSP); Peer TLS ECDHE Public Key (PSP); TLS ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP); TLS Pre-Master Secret (CSP); TLS Master Secret (CSP); TLS Session Encryption Key (CSP); TLS Session Authentication Key (CSP);Crypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and TLS success log message
Run SNMPv3 FunctionNegotiation and encrypted data transport via SNMPv3AES-CBC; HMAC-SHA-1; KDF SNMP;SNMPv3 Authentication Secret (CSP); SNMPv3 Session Encryption Key (CSP); SNMPv3 Session Authentication Key (CSP);Crypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and SNMPv3 success log message
Run IPSec/IKEv2 FunctionNegotiation and encrypted data transport via IPSecAES-CBC; CKG; CTR_DRBG; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA2-256; HMAC-SHA2-384; HMAC-SHA2-512; KAS-SSC (ECC); KAS (ECC); RSA KeyGen; RSA SigGen; RSA SigVer; KDF IKEV2DRBG Entropy Input (CSP); DRBG Seed (CSP); DRBG Internal State V Value (CSP); DRBG Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE Pre-Shared Secret (CSP); IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key (PSP); IPSec/IKE ECDHE Private Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE ECDHE Public Key (PSP); IPSec/IKE ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP); IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key (CSP); IPSec/IKE Session Authentication Key (CSP);Crypto OfficerG/R/W/EGlobal indicator and IPSec/IKEv2 success log message

Table 9 – Approved Services G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Virtual Instant-On Network (vION) 11

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W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroizes the SSP. Unauthenticated Services Unauthenticated Users can run the self-test service by power-cycling the module by removing the power and re-applying.

  1. Software/Firmware Security Integrity Techniques The module performs the Software Integrity test by using HMAC-SHA2-256 (HMAC Cert. #A3566) during the PreOperational Self-Test. A Software Integrity Test Key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for software integrity test only at the pre-operational self-test. At Module’s initialization, the integrity of the runtime executable is verified using an HMAC-SHA2-256 digest which is compared to a value computed at build time. If at the load time the MAC does not match the stored, known MAC value, the module would enter an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited. The module also supports the software load test by using RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-256 (RSA Cert. #A3566) for the new validated software to be uploaded into the module. A Software Load Test Key was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for software load test. In order to load new software, the Crypto Officer must authenticate into the module before loading any software. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails Integrity Test On-Demand Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the module to initiate the software integrity test on-demand. This automatically performs the integrity test of all software components included within the boundary of the module.
  2. Operational Environment The module is a modifiable operational environment as per FIPS 140-3 Level 1 specifications. The operating system is restricted to a single operator mode of operation. The application that makes calls to the module is the single user of the modules even when the application is serving multiple clients. See Table 2 for details regarding what platforms the module was tested on. The software module provides a Software Update service. The module’s validation to FIPS 140-3 is no longer valid once a non-validated software is loaded.
  3. Physical Security As the module is a software only module, the physical security requirements are not applicable.

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Key/SSP Name/Typ eStrengthSecurity Function and Cert. NumberGenerationImport/ExportEstablish- mentStorageZeroizationUse & Related Keys
DRBG Entropy Input (CSP)256 bitsN/AObtained from the Entropy Source within TOEPP (GPS INT Pathways)Import to the module via Module’s API Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to seed the DRBG
DRBG Seed (CSP)256 bitsN/AInternally Derived from entropy input string as defined by SP800-90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downRandom number generation
DRBG Internal State V value (CSP)256 bitsN/AInternally Derived from entropy input string as defined by SP800-90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downRandom number generation
DRBG Key (CSP)256 bitsN/AInternally Derived from entropy input string as defined by SP800-90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downRandom number generation
Software Load Test Key (PSP)112 bits (Modulus: 2048 bits)RSA Sig Ver Cert. #A3566Pre-loaded at the build time (in the module’s binary)Import: No Export: NoN/AHDD (plaintext) Embedded in the module’s executable binary. Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageN/A (Note: This key is only used for Software Load Test and not subject to the zeroization requirement)Used for Software Load Test
TLS RSA Private Key (CSP)112-128 bits (Modulus: 2048, 3072 bits)CKG; DRBG; RSA KeyGen; RSA SigGen; Certs. #A3566 and #A3572Internally generated conformant to SP800- 133r2 (CKG) using FIPS 186-4 RSA key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/AHDD (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized by SSP/CSP/PSP Zeroization CommandUsed for TLS peer authentication
TLS RSA Public Key (PSP)112-128 bits (Modulus: 2048, 3072 bits)RSA KeyGen; RSA SigVer; Certs. #A3566 and #A3572Internally derived per the FIPS 186-4 RSA key generation methodImport: No Export: Yes, to the TLS peerN/AHDD (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized by SSP/CSP/PSP Zeroization CommandUsed for TLS peer authentication
TLS ECDHE Private Key (CSP)128 – 256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, P-521)CKG; DRBG; KAS-ECC-SSC; Certs. #A3566 and #A3572Internally generated conformant to SP800- 133r2 (CKG) using SP800- 56Arev3 EC Diffie-Hellman key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to derive TLS ECDHE Shared Secret
TLS ECDHE Public Key (PSP)128 – 256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, P-521)KAS-ECC-SSC; Certs. #A3566 and #A3572Internally derived internally per the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement (SP800-56Arev3)Import: No Export: Yes, to the TLS peerN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to derive TLS ECDHE Shared Secret
Peer TLS ECDHE Public Key (PSP)Curves: P- 256, P-384, P-521N/AN/AImport: Enter into the Module via Module’s API Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to derive TLS ECDHE Shared Secret
  1. Non-Invasive Security No approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics are defined at this time.
  2. Sensitive Security Parameters © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Virtual Instant-On Network (vION) 13
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Key/SSP Name/Typ eStrengthSecurity Function and Cert. NumberGenerationImport/ExportEstablish- mentStorageZeroizationUse & Related Keys
TLS ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP)128 – 256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, P-521)KAS-ECC-SSC; KAS (ECC); Certs. #A3566 and #A3572Internally derived using SP800-56A rev3 EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computationImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to derive TLS Session Encryption Keys, TLS Session Authentication Keys
TLS Pre- Master Secret (CSP)384 bitsN/AInternally derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135rev1 KDF (TLSv1.2)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to derive TLS Master Secret
TLS Master Secret (CSP)384 bitsN/AInternally derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135rev1 KDF (TLSv1.2)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to derive TLS Encryption Keys, TLS Authentication Keys.
TLS Session Encryption Key (CSP)128 or 256 bitsAES-CBC; AES-GCM; KDF TLS KTS; Certs. #A3566 and #A3572Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP 800-135rev1 KDF (TLSv1.2)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to secure TLS session confidentiality
TLS Session Authenticatio n Key (CSP)At least 112 bitsHMAC-SHA2- 256; HMAC-SHA2- 384; KDF TLS KTS; Certs. #A3566 and #A3572Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 rev1 KDF TLSImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to secure the TLS session integrity
IPSec/IKE Pre-Shared Secret (CSP)2048 bits charactersN/AN/AImport: Encrypted by using TLS/SSH session key Export: NoMD/EEHDD (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized by SSP/CSP/PSP Zeroization CommandUsed for IPSec/IKE peer authentication
IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key (CSP)112 or 128 bits (Modulus: 2048, 3072 bits)CKG; DRBG; RSA SigGen; Cert# A3566Internally generated conformant to SP800- 133r2 (CKG) using FIPS 186-4 RSA key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/AHDD (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized by SSP/CSP/PSP Zeroization CommandUsed for IPSec/IKE peer authentication
IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key (PSP)112 or 128 bits (Modulus: 2048, 3072 bits)RSA SigVer; Cert. #A3566Internally derived per the FIPS 186-4 RSA key generation methodImport: No Export: to the IKE Peer applicationN/AHDD (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized by SSP/CSP/PSP Zeroization CommandUsed for IPSec/IKE peer authentication
IPSec/IKE ECDHE Private Key (CSP)128 or 192 bits (Curves: P- 256 or P-384)CKG; DRBG; KAS-ECC-SSC; Cert. #A3566Internally generated conformant to SP800- 133r2 (CKG) using SP800- 56Arev3 EC Diffie-Hellman key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to derive IPSec/IKE ECDHE Shared Secret
IPSec/IKE ECDHE Public Key (PSP)128 or 192 bits (Curves: P- 256 or P-384)KAS-ECC-SSC; Cert. #A3566Internally derived internally per the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement (SP800-56Arev3)Import: No Export: to the IKE Peer applicationN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to derive IPSec/IKE ECDHE Shared Secret
IPSec/IKE ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP)128 or 192 bits (Curves: P- 256 or P-384)KAS-ECC-SSC; Cert. #A3566Internally derived using SP800-56A rev3 EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computationImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to derive IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Keys, IPSec/IKE Authentication Keys

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Key/SSP Name/Typ eStrengthSecurity Function and Cert. NumberGenerationImport/ExportEstablish- mentStorageZeroizationUse & Related Keys
IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key (CSP)128-256 bitsAES-CBC; KDF IKEv2; Cert. #A3566Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135rev1 KDF (IKEv2)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to secure IPSec/IKEv2 session confidentiality
IPSec/IKE Session Authenticatio n Key (CSP)At least 112 bitsHMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA2- 256; HMAC-SHA2- 384; HMAC-SHA2- 512; KDF IKEv2; Cert. #A3566Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135rev1 KDF (IKEv2)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to secure IPSec/IKEv2 session integrity
SNMPv3 Authenticatio n Secret (CSP)8 characters minimumN/AN/AImport: Encrypted by using TLS/SSH session key Export: NoMD/EEHDD (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized by SSP/CSP/PSP Zeroization CommandUsed for SNMPv3 User authentication
SNMPv3 Session Encryption Key (CSP)128 bitsAES-CFB; KDF SNMP; Cert. #A3566Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135rev1 KDF (SNMPv3)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to secure SNMPv3 session confidentiality
SNMPv3 Session Authenticatio n Key (CSP)At least 112 bitsHMAC-SHA-1; KDF SNMP; Cert. #A3566Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135rev1 KDF (SNMPv3)Import: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to secure SNMPv3 session integrity
SSH ECDHE Private Key (CSP)128-256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, or P- 521)CKG; DRBG; KAS-ECC-SSC; Cert. #A3566Internally generated conformant to SP800- 133r2 (CKG) using SP800- 56Arev3 EC Diffie-Hellman key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to derive the SSH ECDHE Shared Secret
SSH ECDHE Public Key (PSP)128-256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, or P- 521)KAS-ECC-SSC; Cert. #A3566Internally derived internally per the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement (SP800-56Arev3)Import: No Export: Yes, to the SSH peerN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to derive the SSH ECDHE Shared Secret
Peer SSH ECDHE Public Key (PSP)128-256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, or P- 521)KAS-ECC-SSC; KAS-ECC; Cert.#A3566N/AImport: Enter into the Module via the Module’s API Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to derive SSH ECDHE Shared Secret
SSH ECDHE Shared Secret (CSP)128-256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, or P- 521)KAS-ECC-SSC; KAS-ECC; Cert. #A3566Internally derived using SP800-56A rev3 EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computationImport: No Export: NoN/ADRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed to derive SSH Session Encryption Keys, SSH Session Authentication Keys
SSH ECDSA Private Key (CSP)128-256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, or P- 521)CKG; DRBG; ECDSA KeyGen; ECDSA SigGen; Cert. #A3566Internally generated conformant to SP800- 133r2 (CKG) using FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Key Generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBGImport: No Export: NoSSP generationHDD (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized by SSP (CSP/PSP) Zeroization CommandUsed for SSH session authentication
SSH ECDSA Public Key (PSP)128-256 bits (Curves: P- 256, P-384, or P- 521)ECDSA KeyGen; ECDSA SigVer; Cert. #A3566Internally derived per the FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Keypair generation methodImport: No Export: Yes, to the SSH peerN/AHDD (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized by SSP/CSP/PSP Zeroization CommandUsed for SSH session authentication
SSH Session Encryption Key (CSP)128 - 256 bitsAES-CTR; KDF SSH; KTS; Cert. #A3566Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP 800-135rev1 KDF (SSHv2)Import: No Export: NoKey derivationDRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed for SSH session confidentiality protection

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eKey/SSP Name/TypStrengthSecurity Function and Cert. NumberGenerationImport/ExportEstablish- mentStorageZeroizationUse & Related Keys
SSH Session Authenticatio n Key (CSP)At least 112 bitsKDF SSH; KTS; HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA2- 256; HMAC-SHA2- 512; Cert. #A3566Internally derived via key derivation function defined in SP 800-135rev1 KDF (SSHv2)Import: No Export: NoKey derivationDRAM (plaintext) Note: The module does not provide persistent keys/ SSPs storageZeroized when the tested platform is powered downUsed for SSH session integrity protection
Entropy Source(s)Minimum Number of Bits of EntropyDetails
Palo Alto Networks DRNG Entropy Source0.6 bits entropy per sample with sample bit: 1 bitPlease refer to ESV Cert. #E69
AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
SHSKAT using SHA2-256
HMACKAT using HMAC- SHA2-256
Software integrityUsing HMAC-SHA2-256
AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
AESAES-ECB 256 bits Encryption KAT
AESAES-ECB 256 bits Decryption KAT
AESAES-CBC 256 bits Encryption KAT
AESAES-CBC 256 bits Decryption KAT
AESAES-GCM 256 bits Encryption KAT
AESAES-GCM 256 bits Decryption KAT
DRBGCTR_DRBG KAT: Instantiate KAT: Generate KAT: Reseed Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90Arev1 DRBG Section 11.3 are performed)
ECDSAKAT using P-224 with SHA2-256 (ECDSA Signature Generation)
ECDSAKAT using P-224 with SHA2-256 (ECDSA Signature Verification)
HMACKAT using HMAC-SHA-1

Table 10 - SSPs Table 11 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification The module performs the following self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and Conditional self-tests. Pre-Operational Self-Tests Table 12 - Pre-Operational Self-Tests The module performs the following Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CASTs). These CASTs can be initiated by rebooting the module. All CASTs run without operator intervention automatically on reboot.

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AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
HMACKAT using HMAC-SHA2-224
HMACKAT using HMAC-SHA2-256
HMACKAT using HMAC-SHA2-384
HMACKAT using HMAC-SHA2-512
KAS-ECC-SSCKAT for KAS-ECC-SSC (Shared Secret Computation) primitive Z value
KDF IKEv2KAT for IKEv2 KDF
KDF SNMPKAT for SNMPv3 KDF
KDF SSHKAT for SSHv2 KDF
KDF TLSKAT for TLSv1.2 KDF
RSAKAT using 2048 bits modulus with SHA2-256 (RSA Signature Generation)
RSAKAT using 2048 bits modulus with SHA2-256 (RSA Signature Verification)
SHSKAT using SHA-1
AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
AESAES-CBC 256 bits Encryption KAT
AESAES-CBC 256 bits Decryption KAT
AESAES-GCM 256 bits Encryption KAT
AESAES-GCM 256 bits Encryption KAT
ECDSAKAT using P-224 with SHA2-256 (ECDSA Signature Generation)
ECDSAKAT using P-224 with SHA2-256 (ECDSA Signature Verification)
DRBGHMAC_DRBG KAT: Instantiate KAT: Generate KAT: Reseed Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90Arev1 DRBG Section 11.3 are performed)
HMACKAT using SHA2-256
HMACKAT using SHA2-384
HMACKAT using SHA2-512
KAS-ECC-SSCKAT for KAS-ECC-SSC (Shared Secret Computation) primitive Z value
KDF TLSKAT for TLSv1.2 KDF
RSAKAT using 2048 bits modulus with SHA2-256 (RSA Signature Generation)
RSAKAT using 2048 bits modulus with SHA2-256 (RSA Signature Verification)
AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
SP 800-90B Health TestsThe module’s entropy source implements Start-up and Continuous health tests defined in SP800-90B, section 4.2. The entropy source utilizes Developer-Defined Alternatives to the Continuous Health Tests which is defined in SP 800-90B section 4.5.
Conditional Self-Tests AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
RSARSA Pairwise consistency test (PCT)
ECDSAECDSA PCT
KAS-ECC-SSCSP800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC PCT

Table 13 – CASTs (Crypto Library I) Table 14 –CASTs (Crypto Library II) © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Virtual Instant-On Network (vION) 17

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AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
RSARSA Pairwise consistency test (PCT)
ECDSAECDSA PCT
SP800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSCSP800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC PCT
Conditional Self-Tests AlgorithmSelf-Test Details
Software Load TestRSA 2048 with SHA2-256 Signature Verification
Cause of ErrorError State Indicator
Failed Pre-Operational Software Integrity TestIntegrity check failed at <location>
Failed Conditional CAST<Crypto Library>: FIPS Self-test failed for <algorithm> Entering error state
Failed Conditional PCTKey verification failed
Failed Software Load TestVerification Failure
SP 800-90B Entropy Source Start-up/Continuous health testsNo random numbers are generated and key generation is halted

Table 16 - Conditional Pair-Wise Consistency Tests (Crypto Library I) Table 17 - Conditional Pair-Wise Consistency Tests (Crypto Library II) Periodic/On-Demand Self-Test The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by power cycling or rebooting the tested platform. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic It is recommended that the Crypto Officer perform periodic testing of the module’s on-demand self-tests every 60 days to ensure all components are functioning correctly. Error Handling If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the cause of the error and enters an error state (there is only one error state). In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and perform the self-tests, including the pre-operational software integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational software integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The table below shows the different causes that lead to the Error State and the status indicators reported. Table 19 - Error State Indicators 11. Life-Cycle Assurance The module is designed to handle the various stages of a module’s life-cycle. The sections below highlight the details for each stage. Secure Delivery Procedures Software is available on Palo Alto Networks’ support site, which uses TLS 1.2 during the download process. The support site also provides a SHA2-256 checksum that Crypto Officers can use to verify the integrity of the module once it has been transferred/downloaded.

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Secure Operation The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-3. Follow the secure operations provided below to place the module in the Approved mode. The software version is 6.1.2, which is the only allowable software image for this current approved mode of operation. The module is initiated into the Approved mode of operation via the following procedure:

  1. Install the vION on the platform
  2. Using the Controller, navigate to the device that is to be initiated
  3. Select “FIPS” a. Click “proceed” to begin initialization procedure
  4. The module will begin initialization that includes the following: a. Zeroization of any sensitive information or data b. Power cycle of the device followed by running all self-tests
  5. Once initialization is complete, the module provides the following status output: a. Device Mode: “fips” b. Self-tests: “Power-up self test successful” Once the module has completed initialization into the Approved mode of operation, any non-Approved configurations/algorithms are rejected automatically by the module and an error message is output. End of Life / Sanitization End of life dates for software and hardware modules are announced publicly via Palo Alto Networks’ services website. Crypto Officers should follow the procedure below for the secure destruction of their module: Note: This process will cause the module to no longer function after it has wiped all configurations and keys.
  6. Access the module as Crypto Officer
  7. Execute command: “disable system” a. Confirm command
  8. Module will begin zeroization process and wipe all security parameters and configurations
  9. Mitigation of Other Attacks This module is not designed to mitigate against any other attacks outside of the FIPS 140-3 scope. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks SD-WAN Virtual Instant-On Network (vION) 19