Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 NSS Cryptographic Module

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (44)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 NSS Cryptographic Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Status Output<br/>Show status<br/>Self-test</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>IKEV<br/>HTTPS</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 NSS Cryptographic Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Status Output<br/>Show status<br/>Self-test</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>IKEV<br/>HTTPS</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 NSS Cryptographic Module version 4.34.0-a20cd33fbbe14357 document version 1.2 Last update: 2024-08-20 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

4516 Seton Center Pkwy, Suite 250

Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com © 2024 Red Hat, Inc./ atsec information security.

© 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version 4.34.0a20cd33fbbe14357 of the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 NSS Cryptographic Module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 for an overall Security Level 1 module. This NonProprietary Security Policy may be reproduced and distributed, but only whole and intact and including this notice. Other documentation is proprietary to their authors.

In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation for consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained. The further refining of the Security Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the conformance testing, wherein the Security Policy was submitted to the vendor, who would then edit, modify, and add technical contents. The vendor would also supply additional documentation, which the laboratory formatted into the existing Security Policy, and resubmitted to the vendor for their final editing.

Table 1 describes the individual security areas and levels of FIPS 140-3. Table 1 - Security Levels © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 NSS Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is defined as a software module in a multi-chip standalone embodiment. It provides a C language application program interface (API) designed to support cross-platform development of securityenabled client and server applications. Applications built with NSS can support SSLv3, TLS, IKEv2, PKCS#5, PKCS#7, PKCS#11, PKCS#12, S/MIME, X.509 v3 certificates, and other security standards supporting FIPS 140-3 validated cryptographic algorithms. It combines a vertical stack of Linux components intended to limit the external interface each separate component may provide.

The module has been tested on the following platforms with the corresponding module variants and configuration options with and without PAA/PAI: Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments In addition to the configurations tested by the atsec CST laboratory, vendor affirmed testing was performed on the following platforms for the module by Red Hat. The Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system is used as the basis of other products which include but are not limited to Table 3 - Vendor Affirmed Products Note: the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated SSPs when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

Table 4 lists all approved cryptographic algorithms of the module, including specific key lengths employed for approved services (Table 9), and implemented modes or methods of operation of the algorithms. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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© 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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Algorithm / Functions

Caveat

Use / Function

Operation with no Security Claimed Table 5 lists the non-approved algorithms that are allowed in the approved mode of operation with no security claimed. These algorithms are used by the approved services listed in Table 9. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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MD5

Only allowed as the PRF in TLSv1.0 and v1.1 per IG 2.4.A. No security claimed.

Message digest used in TLS v1.0/1.1 KDF only

Table 5 - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed

Operation The module does not offer any non-approved cryptographic algorithms that are allowed in Table 6 lists all non-approved cryptographic algorithms of the module employed by the nonapproved services in Table 10. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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Table 6 - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation

Figure 1 shows a block diagram that represents the design of the module when the module is operational and providing services to other user space applications. In this diagram, the physical perimeter of the operational environment (a general-purpose computer on which the module is installed) is indicated by a purple dashed line. The cryptographic boundary is represented by the components painted in orange blocks, which consists of two software components:

1. The Softoken library, which provides a PKCS#11 token API (libsoftokn3.so), and its associated integrity check value (libsoftokn3.chk).
2. The Freebl cryptographic library, which implements most cryptographic algorithms used by Softoken (libfreeblpriv3.so), and its associated integrity check value (libfreeblpriv3.chk). Green lines indicate the flow of data between the cryptographic module and its operator application, through the logical interfaces defined in Section
3. Components in white are only included in the diagram for informational purposes. They are not included in the cryptographic boundary (and therefore not part of the module’s validation). For example, the kernel is responsible for managing system calls issued by the module itself, as well as other applications using the module for cryptographic services. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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Figure 1 – Software Block Diagram

Upon initialization, the module immediately performs all Freebl cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs) as specified in Table

13. When all those self-tests pass successfully, the module automatically performs the pre-operational integrity test on the libfreeblpriv3.so file using its associated check value. Then, the module performs the RSA CAST in the Softoken library, followed by the the preoperational integrity test on the libsoftokn3.so file using its associated check value. Finally, all remaining CASTs for the algorithms implemented in Softoken are executed (see Table 13). Only if all CASTs and pre-operational integrity tests passed successfully, the module transitions to the operational state. No operator intervention is required to reach this point. In the operational state, the module accepts service requests from calling applications through its logical interfaces. At any point in the operational state, a calling application can end its process, thus causing the module to end its operation. The module supports two modes of operation:  The approved mode of operation, in which the approved or vendor affirmed services are available as specified in Table
14. By default, the module is operating in the approved mode of operation after passing all CASTs and pre-operational integrity tests. The module can be transitioned from the approved mode of operation to the non-approved mode of operation by requesting one of the non-approved services specified in Table 10.  The non-approved mode of operation, in which the non-approved services are available as specified in Table
15. The module can be transitioned from the non-approved mode of © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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operation to the approved mode of operation by requesting one of the approved services specified in Table 9.

The module supports the IKEv2 KDF, TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF, and TLS 1.2 KDF. No parts of the IKEv2 or TLS protocols, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The logical interfaces are the APIs through which the applications request services. These logical interfaces are logically separated from each other by the API design. Note that this API corresponds to the functionality described in the PKCS#11 standard (Cryptographic Token Interface Current Mechanisms Specification). All data output via data output interface is inhibited when the module is performing pre-operational test, conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests, zeroization, or when the module enters the error state. Table 7 summarizes the logical interfaces: Table 7 - Ports and Interfaces © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly and always assumed by the operator of the module. No support is provided for multiple concurrent operators or a maintenance role. Table 8 lists the roles supported by the module with corresponding services with input and output Table 8 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The module does not support authentication for roles.

The module provides services to operators that assume the available role. All services are described in detail in the API documentation (manual pages). The next tables define the services that utilize approved and non-approved security functions in this module. For the respective tables, the convention below applies when specifying the access permissions (types) that the service has for each SSP.  Generate (G): The module generates or derives the SSP.  Read (R): The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).  Write (W): The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.  Execute (E): The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.  Zeroize (Z): The module zeroizes the SSP.  N/A: The module does not access any SSP or key during its operation. To interact with the module, a calling application must use the FIPS token APIs provided by Softoken. The FIPS token API layer can be used to retrieve the approved service indicator for the module. This indicator consists of four independent service indicators:

1. The session indicator, which must be used for all cryptographic services except the key derivation service. It can be accessed by invoking the NSC_NSSGetFIPSStatus function with the CKT_NSS_SESSION_LAST_CHECK parameter. If the output parameter is set to
2. The object indicator, which must be used for the key derivation service. It can be accessed by invoking the NSC_NSSGetFIPSStatus function with the CKT_NSS_OBJECT_CHECK parameter and the output derived key. If the output parameter is set to CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1), the service was approved.
3. The DRBG service indicator, which must be used for the DRBG service. It can be accessed by invoking the C_SeedRandom or C_GenerateRandom functions. If any of these functions returns CKR_OK, the service was approved.
4. The DSA signature verification indicator, which must be used for the DSA signature verification service. It can be accessed by invoking the C_VerifyInit function with any CKM_DSA_* mechanism parameter. If this function returns CKR_OK, the service was Table 9 lists the approved services in this module, the algorithms involved, the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) involved and how they are accessed, the roles that can request the service, and the respective service indicator. In this table, CO specifies the Crypto Officer role. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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© 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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Table 10 lists the non-approved services in this module, the algorithms involved, the roles that can request the service, and the respective service indicator. In this table, CO specifies the Crypto Officer role. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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Table 10 - Non-Approved Services © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The integrity of the module is verified by performing DSA signature verification with a 2048-bit key and SHA-256. Each software component of the module has an associated integrity check value, which contains the DSA signature of the shared library.

Integrity tests are performed as part of the pre-operational self-tests, which are executed when the module is initialized. The integrity tests may be invoked on-demand by unloading and subsequently re-initializing the module, which will perform (among others) the software integrity tests. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-3 level 1 specification: the module executes on a general purpose operating system (Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9), which allows modification, loading, and execution of software that is not part of the validated module.

See Section 2.2. The Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system is used as the basis of other products which include but are not limited to:  Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS  Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform  Red Hat OpenStack Platform  Red Hat OpenShift  Red Hat Gluster Storage  Red Hat Satellite Compliance is maintained for these products whenever the binary is found unchanged.

The module shall be installed as stated in Section 11.2. If properly installed, the operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented. There are no concurrent operators. The module does not have the capability of loading software or firmware from an external source. Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace, userspace live patching, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-validated operational environment. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The module is comprised of software only and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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Table 10 summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module in the approved services (Table 9). Each SSP will have a parameter (isFIPS), which indicates whether this SSP was established in an approved manner or not. This ensures separation of CSPs between approved and non-approved services. C) C) © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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C) © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) implementation based on SP 800-90Ar1. This DRBG is used internally by the module (e.g. to generate symmetric keys, seeds for asymmetric key pairs, and random numbers for security functions). It can also be accessed using the specified API functions. The DRBG implemented is a SHA-256 Hash_DRBG, seeded by the entropy source described in Table 12. The DRBG is seeded with 384 bits of output from the entropy source and is reseeded with 256 bits of output from the entropy source. There are 0.87890625 bits of entropy per bit of output of the entropy source. The Hash_DRBG does not employ prediction resistance. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The public use document of this entropy source is found at: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/ entropy/E47_PublicUse.pdf Table 12 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification As the highest SSP strength required by the module is 256 bits, the following caveat is applicable: "The module generates SSPs (e.g., keys) whose strengths are modified by available entropy."

The module implements Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG, vendor affirmed), compliant with SP 800-133r2. When random values are required, they are obtained from the SP 800-90Ar1 approved DRBG, compliant with Section 4 of SP 800-133r2. The following methods are implemented:  Direct generation of symmetric keys: compliant with SP 800-133r2, Section 4, without the use of V (direct DRBG output as described in additional comment #2 of IG D.H).  Safe primes key pair generation: the method described in Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56Ar3 (“Testing Candidates”) is used. The random values used in key generation are obtained in compliance with SP 800-133r2, Section 4, without the use of V (direct DRBG output as described in additional comment #2 of IG D.H).  RSA key pair generation: the method described in Appendix B.3.3 of FIPS 186-4 (“Probable Primes”) is used. The random values used in key generation are obtained in compliance with SP 800-133r2, Section 4, without the use of V (direct DRBG output as described in additional comment #2 of IG D.H).  ECC (ECDH and ECDSA) key pair generation: the method described in Appendix B.4.1 of FIPS 186-4 (“Extra Random Bits”) is used. The random values used in key generation are obtained in compliance with SP 800-133r2, Section 4, without the use of V (direct DRBG output as described in additional comment #2 of IG D.H). Additionally, the module implements the following key derivation methods:  KBKDF: compliant with SP 800-108r1. This implementation can be used to generate secret keys from a pre-existing key-derivation-key.  HKDF: compliant with SP 800-56Cr2. This implementation shall only be used to generate secret keys in the context of an SP 800-56Ar3 key agreement scheme.  TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, IKEv2 PRF: compliant with SP 800-135r1. These implementations shall only be used to generate secret keys in the context of the TLS 1.0/1.1, TLS 1.2, and IKEv2 protocols, respectively.  PBKDF2: compliant with option 1a of SP 800-132. This implementation shall only be used to derive keys for use in storage applications. Intermediate key generation values are not output from the module and are explicitly zeroized after processing the service. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The module provides Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) shared secret computation compliant with SP800-56Ar3, in accordance with scenario 2 (1) of FIPS 140-3 IG D.F. For Diffie-Hellman, the module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 3526 (IKE) and RFC 7919 (TLS). Note that the module only implements domain parameter generation, key pair generation and verification, and shared secret computation. No other part of the IKE or TLS protocols is implemented (with the exception of the TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, and IKEv2 PRF):  IKE (RFC 3526):

• MODP-2048 (ID = 14)
• MODP-3072 (ID = 15)
• MODP-4096 (ID = 16)
• MODP-6144 (ID = 17)
• MODP-8192 (ID = 18)  TLS (RFC 7919)
• ffdhe2048 (ID = 256)
• ffdhe3072 (ID = 257)
• ffdhe4096 (ID = 258)
• ffdhe6144 (ID = 259)
• ffdhe8192 (ID = 260) ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, and ffdhe8192 have key sizes of 2048-8192 bits and security strengths of 112-200 bits. MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, and MODP-8192 have key sizes of 2048-8192 bits and a security strength of 112-200 bits. P-256, P-384, and P-521 have have a security strength of 128-256 bits. To comply with the assurances found in Section 5.6.2 of SP 800-56Ar3, the operator must use the module together with an application that implements the TLS protocol. Additionally, the module’s approved “Key pair generation” service must be used to generate ephemeral Diffie-Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman key pairs, or the key pairs must be obtained from another FIPS-validated module. As part of this service, the module will internally perform the full public key validation of the generated public key. The module’s shared secret computation service will internally perform the full public key validation of the peer public key, complying with Sections 5.6.2.2.1 and 5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56Ar3. The module also provides the following key transport mechanisms:
• Key wrapping using AES KW and AES KWP, with a security strength of 128, 192, or 256 bits, depending on the wrapping key size. Compliant with IG D.G.
• Key wrapping using AES GCM with a security strength of 128 or 256 bits. Compliant with IG D.G.

The module only supports SSP entry and output to and from the calling application running on the same operational environment. This corresponds to manual distribution, electronic entry/output (“CM Software to/from App via TOEPP Path”) per FIPS 140-3 IG 9.5.A Table 1. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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CSPs (with the exception of passwords) can only be imported to and exported from the module when they are wrapped using an approved security function (e.g. AES KW or KWP). PSPs can be imported and exported in plaintext. Import and export is performed using API input and output parameters.

SSPs imported, generated, derived, or otherwise established by the module are stored in RAM while the module is operational. The operator application can use these SSPs to perform cryptographic operations, or export them as described in Section 9. The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs.

The memory occupied by SSPs is allocated by regular memory allocation operating system calls. The operator application is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions provided in the module's API. The destruction functions (listed in Table 11) overwrite the memory occupied by SSPs with zeroes and de-allocate the memory with the regular memory de-allocation operating system call. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The module performs pre-operational self-tests and conditional self-tests. While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and data output (via the data output interface) is inhibited until the tests are successfully completed. The module does not return control to the calling application until the tests are completed. All the self-tests are listed in Table 12, with the respective condition under which those tests are performed. Note that the pre-operational integrity test is only executed after all cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs) executed successfully. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The module performs pre-operational tests automatically when the module is powered on. The pre-operational self-tests ensure that the module is not corrupted. The module transitions to the operational state only after the pre-operational self-tests are passed successfully. The types of pre-operational self-tests are described in the next sub-sections.

The integrity of the module is verified by performing DSA signature verification with a 2048-bit key and SHA-256. Each software component of the module has an associated integrity check value, which contains the DSA signature of the shared library. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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If any of the software integrity tests fail, the module transitions to the error state (Section 10.3). As mentioned previously, the DSA and SHA-256 algorithms go through their respective CASTs before the software integrity tests are performed. The pre-operational integrity test may be invoked on-demand by unloading and subsequently reinitializing the module.

The module performs self-tests on all FIPS approved cryptographic algorithms as part of the approved services supported in the approved mode of operation, using the tests shown in Table 13. Data output through the data output interface is inhibited during the self-tests. If any of these tests fails, the module transitions to the error state (Section 10.3). The conditional self-tests may be invoked on-demand by unloading and subsequently re-initializing the module.

Upon generation of a DH, RSA or EC key pair, the module will perform a pair-wise consistency test (PCT) as shown in Table 13, which provides some assurance that the generated key pair is well formed. For DH and EC key pairs, these tests consists of the PCT described in Section 5.6.2.1.4 of SP 800-56Ar3. For RSA and EC key pairs, this test consists of a signature generation and a signature verification operation. Note that two PCTs are performed for EC key pairs. If the test fails, the module transitions to the error state (Section 10.3).

If the module fails any of the self-tests, the module enters the error state. In the error state, the module immediately stops functioning and ends the application process. Consequently, the data output interface is inhibited, and the module accepts no more inputs or requests (as the module is no longer running). Table 14 lists the error states and the status indicator values that explain the error that has occurred. Table 14 - Error States © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The module is distributed through the nss-softokn-3.79.0-18.el9_0 and nss-softokn-freebl-3.79.018.el9_0 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 RPM packages. The Netscape Portable Runtime (NSPR) package nspr-4.34.0-18.el9_0 is a prerequisite for the module. The NSPR package must be installed in the operating environment. The “Show module name and version” service returns the value Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 nss 4.34.0-a20cd33fbbe14357.

As the module does not persistently store SSPs, secure sanitization of the module consists of unloading the module. This will zeroize all SSPs in volatile memory. Then, if desired, the nsssoftokn-3.79.0-18.el9_0 and nss-softokn-freebl-3.79.0-18.el9_0 RPM packages can be uninstalled from the RHEL 9 system.

The version of the RPMs containing the FIPS validated Module is stated in section 11.1. The RPM packages forming the Module can be installed by standard tools recommended for the installation of RPM packages on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (for example, yum, rpm, and the RHN remote management tool). All RPM packages are signed with the Red Hat build key, which is an RSA 2048-bit key using SHA-256 signatures. The signature is automatically verified upon installation of the RPM package. If the signature cannot be validated, the RPM tool rejects the installation of the package. In such a case, the Crypto Officer is requested to obtain a new copy of the module's RPMs from Red Hat.

Before the nss-softokn-3.79.0-18.el9_0 and nss-softokn-freebl-3.79.0-18.el9_0 RPM packages are installed, the RHEL 9 system must operate in the approved mode. This can be achieved by:  Adding the fips=1 option to the kernel command line during the system installation. During the software selection stage, do not install any third-party software. More information can be found at the vendor documentation.  Switching the system into the approved mode after the installation. Execute the fipsmode-setup --enable command. Restart the system. More information can be found at the vendor documentation. In both cases, the Crypto Officer must verify the RHEL 9 system operates in the approved mode by executing the fips-mode-setup --check command. After installation of the nss-softokn-3.79.0-18.el9_0 and nss-softokn-freebl-3.79.0-18.el9_0 RPM packages, the Crypto Officer must execute the “Show module name and version” service by accessing the CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_MODULE_ID attribute of the CKO_NSS_VALIDATION object in the default slot. The object attribute must contain the value Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 nss 4.34.0-a20cd33fbbe14357 Alternatively, the /usr/lib64/nss/unsupported-tools/validation tool is provided as a convenience by the nss-tools-3.79.0-18.el9_0 RPM package. This tool performs the same steps, and also outputs the FIPS module identifier as below. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The cryptographic boundary consists only of the Softoken and Freebl libraries along with their associated integrity check values as listed in Section 2.6. If any other NSS API outside of these two libraries is invoked, the user is not interacting with the module specified in this Security Policy.

The Crypto Officer shall consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module. For TLS 1.2, the module offers the AES GCM implementation and uses the context of Scenario 1 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. NSS is compliant with SP 800-52r2 Section 3.3.1 and the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288 and 8446. The module does not implement the TLS protocol. The module’s implementation of AES GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module’s cryptographic boundary. The design of the TLS protocol implicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV) does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key. In the event the module’s power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that a new key for use with the AES GCM key encryption or decryption under this scenario shall be established. Alternatively, the Crypto Officer can use the module’s API to perform AES GCM encryption using internal IV generation. These IVs are always 96 bits and generated using the approved DRBG internal to the module’s boundary. Finally, for TLS 1.3, the AES GCM implementation uses the context of Scenario 5 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The protocol that provides this compliance is TLS 1.3, defined in RFC8446 of August 2018, using the cipher-suites that explicitly select AES GCM as the encryption/decryption cipher (Appendix B.4 of RFC8446). The module supports acceptable AES GCM cipher suites from Section

3.3.1 of SP800-52r2. The module’s implementation of AES GCM is used together with an

application that runs outside the module’s cryptographic boundary. The design of the TLS protocol implicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV) does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key

The module provides password-based key derivation (PBKDF2), compliant with SP 800-132. The module supports option 1a from Section 5.4 of SP 800-132, in which the Master Key (MK) or a segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK). In accordance to SP 800-132 and FIPS 140-3 IG D.N, the following requirements shall be met:  Derived keys shall only be used in storage applications. The MK shall not be used for other purposes. The length of the MK or DPK shall be of 112 bits or more.  Passwords or passphrases, used as an input for the PBKDF2, shall not be used as cryptographic keys.  The length of the password or passphrase shall be at least 8 characters, and shall consist of lowercase, uppercase, and numeric characters. The probability of guessing the value is estimated to be at most 10^(-8), when all characters are digits. Combined with the minimum iteration count as described below, this provides an acceptable trade-off between user experience and security against brute-force attacks.  A portion of the salt, with a length of at least 128 bits, shall be generated randomly using the SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG provided by the module.  The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. The minimum value is 1000. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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In accordance with IG C.I, the module performs a check to ensure that the two AES-XTS keys, Key_1 and Key_2 are not the same. To comply with SP800-38E, the length of the data unit for any instance of AES-XTS shall not exceed 2^20 AES blocks.

The module is compliant with IG C.F. The module supports RSA signature generation with modulus lengths of 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits. All three modulus lengths have been CAVP tested by atsec. The minimum number of the Miller-Rabin tests used in primality testing are consistent with Appendix B of FIPS 186-4. The module supports FIPS 186-4 signature verification with modulus lengths of 2048, 3072, and

The module supports FIPS 186-2 signature verification with modulus lengths of 1024, 1280, 1536 bits. The 1024-bit and 1536-bit modulus lengths have been CAVP tested by atsec. CAVP testing is not available for the 1280-bit modulus length, so it was not CAVP tested. © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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The module is designed to mitigate the attacks listed in Table 14. Table 15 - Mitigation of other attacks © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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Appendix A. Glossary and Abbreviations AES          Advanced Encryption Standard AES-NI       Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions API          Application Programming Interface CAST         Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test CAVP         Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CBC          Cipher Block Chaining CKG          Cryptographic Key Generation CMAC         Cipher-based Message Authentication Code CMVP         Cryptographic Module Validation Program CPACF        CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions CSP          Critical Security Parameter CTR          Counter CTS          Ciphertext Stealing DES          Data Encryption Standard DH           Diffie-Hellman DRBG         Deterministic Random Bit Generator DSA          Digital Signature Algorithm ECB          Electronic Code Book ECC          Elliptic Curve Cryptography ECDH         Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA        Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ENT (NP)     Non-physical Entropy Source FFC          Finite Field Cryptography FIPS         Federal Information Processing Standards GCM          Galois Counter Mode HKDF         HMAC-based Key Derivation Function HMAC         Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code IKE          Internet Key Exchange J-PAKE       Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling KAS          Key Agreement Scheme KAT          Known Answer Test KBKDF        Key-based Key Derivation Function KW           Key Wrap KWP          Key Wrap with Padding MAC          Message Authentication Code MD2          Message Digest 2 MD5          Message Digest 5 NIST         National Institute of Science and Technology PAA          Processor Algorithm Acceleration PCT          Pair-wise Consistency Test © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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PBKDF2       Password-based Key Derivation Function v2 PKCS         Public-Key Cryptography Standards PSS          Probabilistic Signature Scheme RC2          Rivest Cipher 2 RC4          Rivest Cipher 4 RSA          Rivest, Shamir, Addleman SHA          Secure Hash Algorithm S/MIME       Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions SSC          Shared Secret Computation SSP          Sensitive Security Parameter SSL          Secure Socket Layer TLS          Transport Layer Security XCBC         XOR Cipher Block Chaining © 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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© 2024 Red Hat, Inc. / atsec information security.

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