Wildfire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (31)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Wildfire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C1["[high] Firmware / bootloader<br/>versions disclosed<br/>(identity, not provenance)<br/><i>10.2.3-h1</i>"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback services<br/><i>Firmware Update<br/>RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Zeroize<br/>Self-Tests<br/>Show Status</i>"]
    C4["[high] Physical/logical<br/>interfaces (some 'blocked<br/>in firmware')<br/><i>RJ45 Ethernet</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I1["Component identity is<br/>disclosed, but provenance<br/>and patch lineage are not."]
    I2["Trusted code is reachable<br/>through update and<br/>recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I4["Interface reachability may<br/>vary by boot stage and<br/>lifecycle state."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R1["Do the vendor version<br/>strings obscure the<br/>upstream baseline, fork<br/>lineage, or known-CVE<br/>exposure?"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R4["Are interfaces blocked<br/>before the bootloader<br/>runs, or only after<br/>approved mode starts?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E1["SBOM / component baselines<br/>· patch and backport<br/>manifest · CVE disposition"]
    E2["update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E4["lifecycle reachability<br/>matrix · boot-stage<br/>interface timing ·<br/>factory/recovery/error-state<br/>access controls"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C1 --> I1 --> R1 --> E1
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C4 --> I4 --> R4 --> E4
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,C6 clue;
  class I1,I2,I3,I4,I5,I6 infer;
  class R1,R2,R3,R4,R5,R6 risk;
  class E1,E2,E3,E4,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Wildfire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C1["[high] Firmware / bootloader versions disclosed (identity, not provenance)<br/><i>10.2.3-h1</i><br/>src: certificate.firmwareVersions"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery / rollback services<br/><i>Firmware Update<br/>RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Zeroize<br/>Self-Tests<br/>Show Status</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C4["[high] Physical/logical interfaces (some 'blocked in firmware')<br/><i>RJ45 Ethernet</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.portsAndInterfaces"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C1,C2,C3,C4 clueHigh;
  class C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B ​ Version: 1.3 Revision Date: February 13, 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.​ www.paloaltonetworks.com​ © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks, Inc. is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. A list of our trademarks can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective companies.

1.​ The Wildfire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B from Palo Alto Networks Inc., hereafter referred to as “Wildfire” or the “cryptographic module” is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module designed to fulfill FIPS 140-3 level 2 requirements. The WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B module identifies unknown malware, zero-day exploits, and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) through dynamic analysis, and automatically disseminates protection in near real-time to help security teams meet the challenge of advanced cyber-attacks. Unknown files are analyzed by WildFire (WF) in a scalable sandbox environment where new threats are identified, and protections are automatically developed and delivered in the form of an update. The result is a unique, closed loop approach to controlling cyber threats that begins with positive security controls to reduce the attack surface, inspection of all traffic, ports, and protocols to block all known threats, and rapid detection of unknown threats by observing their actual behavior. Table 1- Security Levels N/A N/A N/A © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 2

2.​ Cryptographic Module Specification The Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WF-500-B is a multi-chip standalone module. The cryptographic boundary includes all firmware components contained within the physical enclosure of the module. Figures below provide images of the module with the physical kit’s opacity shields in place. See the Physical Security section for details regarding the module’s physical security mechanisms. Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration Approved Mode of Operation The following section details the procedure necessary to place the module into the Approved mode of operation.

• ​ Install module and interface connections in addition to the physical kit.
• ​ The tamper-evident seals and opacity shields must be installed as per Appendix A for the module to operate in the Approved mode of operation.
• ​ Apply power to the device.
• ​ Establish a serial connection to the console port and command the module to enter into maintenance mode. o​ During initial boot up, break the boot sequence via the console port connection (by pressing the maint button when instructed to do so) to access the main menu.
• ​ Select “Continue.”
• ​ Select the “Set FIPS-CC Mode” option to enter the Approved mode.
• ​ Select “Enable FIPS-CC Mode,” and press enter.
• ​ When prompted, select “Reboot” and the module will re-initialize and continue into the Approved mode.
• ​ The module will reboot.
• ​ In the Approved mode, the console port is available only as a status output port.
• ​ Once the module has finished booting, the Crypto Officer can authenticate using the default credentials that come with the module o​ Once authenticated, the module will automatically require the operator to change their password; and the default credential is overwritten The module will automatically indicate the Approved mode of operation in the following manner:
• ​ Status output interface will indicate “**** FIPS-CC MODE ENABLED ****” via the CLI session.
• ​ Status output interface will indicate “FIPS-CC mode enabled successfully” via the console port. Should one or more power-up self-tests fail, the module will not enter the Approved mode of operation. Feedback will consist of:
• ​ The module will output “FIPS-CC failure.”
• ​ The module will reboot and enter a state in which the reason for the reboot can be determined by following the on-screen instructions. Note: Disabling “FIPS-CC” mode causes a complete factory reset, which is described in the Zeroization section below. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 3

Non-Compliant State Failure to follow the directions in the Approved Mode of Operation above and Section 11 will result in the module operating in a non-compliant state. Zeroization To initiate the zeroization service, perform the following steps:

• ​ Access the module’s CLI via SSH, and command the module to enter maintenance mode; the module will reboot o​ Note: Establish a serial connection to the console port
• ​ After reboot, select “Continue.”
• ​ Select “Factory Reset.”
• ​ The module will perform a zeroization, and provide the following message once complete: o​ “Factory Reset Status: Success”​ Uninitialized State If the module does not successfully transition into the Approved mode of operation, or zeroization is performed, the module will be in an uninitialized state. It is required to initialize the module in order to perform cryptographic functions. Approved and Allowed Algorithms The cryptographic modules support the following Approved algorithms. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes specified in this table are used by the module. The CAVP certificate may contain more tested options than listed in this table. Table 3 - Approved Algorithms © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 4

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 5

(2). (2). (2). (2). (2). (2). ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 6

seeds). Note: The seeds used for asymmetric key pair generation are produced using the unmodified/direct output of the DRBG *The module is compliant to IG C.H: GCM is used in the context of TLS, IPsec/IKEv2, and SSH:

• ​ For TLS, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with SP 800-52 and in accordance with Section 4 of RFC 5288 for TLS key establishment, and ensures when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts all possible values for a given session key, that a new TLS handshake is initiated per sections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 of RFC 5246. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly. o​ From this RFC 5288, the GCM cipher suites in use are TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.)
• ​ For IPsec/IKEv2, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with RFCs 4106 and 7296 (RFC 5282 is not applicable, as the module does not use GCM within IKEv2 itself), and ensures when the module exhausts all possible values for a given session key that this triggers a rekey condition. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of IPsec with IKEv2 and found to behave correctly.
• ​ For SSH, the module meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H. The module conforms to RFCs 4252, 4253, and 5647. The fixed field is 4-byte in length and is derived using the SSH KDF; this ensures the fixed field is unique for any given GCM session. The invocation field is 8-byte in length and is incremented for each invocation of GCM; this prevents the IV from repeating until the entire invocation field space of 264 is exhausted, which can take hundreds of years. (In FIPS-CC Mode, SSH rekey is automatically configured at 1 GB of data or 1 hour, whichever comes first.) In all the above cases, the nonce_explicit is always generated deterministically. AES GCM keys are zeroized when the module is power-cycled. For each new TLS or SSH session, a new AES GCM key is established. The module is compliant to IG C.F: The module utilizes Approved modulus sizes 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits for RSA signatures. This functionality has been CAVP tested as noted above. The minimum number of Miller Rabin tests for each modulus size is implemented according to Table C.2 of FIPS 186-4. For modulus size 4096, the module implements the largest number of Miller-Rabin tests shown in Table C.2. RSA SigVer is CAVP tested for all three supported modulus sizes as noted above. The module does not perform FIPS 186-2 SigVer. All supported modulus sizes are CAVP testable and tested as noted above. The module does not implement RSA key transport in the approved mode. The module does not have any algorithms that fall under: -​ Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation -​ Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed -​ Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 7

Table 4 - Supported Protocols in the Approved Mode Supported Protocols* TLS 1.2 SSHv2 SNMPv3 IPsec and IKEv2 *Note: These protocols have not been tested or reviewed by the CMVP or the CAVP. Module Diagrams Figures 1 - 4 depict the modules and their interfaces. Please refer to the appendix for depictions of the module with the physical kit installed. Figure 1 - WF-500 Front Figure 2 - WF-500 Rear © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 8

Figure 3 - WF-500-B Front Figure 4 - WF-500-B Rear 3.​ Cryptographic Module Interfaces The module is a multi-chip standalone with ports and interfaces as shown below. The module does not implement a control Table 5 - Ports and Interfaces N/A Note: USB and IPMI ports are present but not used (i.e. disabled). © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 9

4.​ Roles, Services, and Authentication Services When initialized into the Approved mode of operation, all authenticated services are accessed via SSH or TLS sessions. Approved and allowed algorithms, relevant CSPs and public keys related to these protocols are accessed to support the following services. CSP access by services is further described in the following tables. The Crypto-Officer may access all services and has the ability to define multiple Crypto-Officer roles. The User role provides establishment of VPN connections between several WF-500 and WF-500-B modules. Table 6

• Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output N/A © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security ​ Page 10

Assumption of Roles The module supports distinct operator roles. The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles using unique authentication credentials associated with operator accounts. The module supports concurrent operators with identity-based authentication. The module does not provide a maintenance role or bypass capability. Table 7

• Roles and Authentication In FIPS-CC Mode, the module checks and enforces the minimum password length of eight (8) as specified in SP 800-63B. Passwords are securely stored hashed with salt value, with very restricted access control, and rate limiting mechanism for © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 11

The minimum equivalent strength supported is

will succeed is 1/(2112) which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 6,000/(2112), which is less than 1/100,000. The module supports at most 100 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period. The table below defines the relationship between access to SSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. Table 8

• Approved Services N/A N/A N/A G/W/E G/W/E G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 12

G/E/R/W/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/W G/E G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z N/A W/E G/R/E/W G/R/E/W W/E G/R/E/W E N/A W/E G/W/E G/W/E G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 13

G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/W G/E N/A W/E W/E G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z N/A W/E G/R/E/W E G/W/E G/W/E G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 14

G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/W G/E N/A G/W/E G/W/E G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/W G/E N/A W/E W/E G/E/Z G/E/Z W/E © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 15

G/W/E G/W/E G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/W G/E N/A G/W/E G/W/E G/E G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/R/E/W G/R/E/W © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 16

N/A N/A N/A Z E N/A Note: Configuration/System Logs for Approved services above will indicate FIPS-CC mode is enabled and that the service succeeded. 5.​ Software/Firmware Security ECDSA Cert. #A2906) during the Pre-Operational Self-Test. In addition, the module also conducts the firmware load test by using RSA 2048 with SHA-256 (Cert. #A2906) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. The pre-operational self-tests can be initiated by power cycling the module. When this is performed, the module automatically runs the cryptographic algorithm self-tests in addition to the pre-operational firmware integrity test. 6.​ Operational Environment The FIPS 140-3 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the module does not contain a modifiable operational environment. The operational environment is limited since the module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into the module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 17

7.​ The multi-chip standalone module is production quality and contains standard passivation. Chip components are protected by an opaque enclosure. There are tamper-evident seals that are applied on the module by the Crypto-Officer, and any unused seals are to be controlled by the Crypto-Officer. The Crypto-Officer must ensure that the module surface is clean and dry before applying the seals. The seals prevent removal of the opaque enclosure without evidence, which should be inspected by the Crypto-Officer every 30 days for evidence of tampering. If the seals or opacity shields show evidence of tamper, the Crypto-Officer should assume that the module has been compromised and contact Customer Support. Note: For ordering information, see Table 2 for physical kit part numbers and version. Opacity shields are included in the physical kits. Operator Required Actions The following table provides information regarding the various physical security mechanisms, and their recommended Refer to the following sections for instructions on installation and placement of the tamper seals and opacity shields. Tamper-evident seals must be pressed firmly onto the adhering surfaces during installation, and once applied, the Crypto-Officer shall permit 24 hours of cure time for all tamper-evident seals. WF-500 Tamper Seal Installation (12 Seals) 1. Remove the two pull handles and front modules on the left and right side of the appliance by removing the three (3) screws located behind each handle/module. There is no need to disconnect the LED circuit board attached to the end of the ribbon cable. Retain these screws for Step 2. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 18

Figure 5 - Remove Front Handles and Modules

2. Attach the left and right front cover brackets to the appliance using the six (6) screws that were removed in Step
3. First attach the brackets using the bottom screws (one (1) on each side) as shown in Figure 6, ensuring that you feed the ribbon cable and LED circuit board through the left bracket. Replace the front modules and secure them using the middle and top screws on each side as shown in Figure 7. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 19

Figure 6 – Secure the Front Brackets Figure 7 - Attach Pull Handles and Front Modules

3. Secure the front opacity shield to the right and left front brackets that you installed in Step
4. Use two (2) screws (provided) on each side. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 20

Figure 8

• Install Front Opacity Shield Figure 9
• Front Opacity Shield Installed 4. Attach the rear opacity shield tray to the appliance. First, remove the two (2) screws (shown in Figure 10) from the appliance and use these screws to secure the rear opacity shield tray. Note: Install the back cables (power cords and network/management cables) because you will not be able to access these ports after the next step. Figure 10
• Install Rear Opacity Shield Tray © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 21

5. Place the rear opacity shield on top of the rear opacity shield tray ensuring that you run the cables through the opening at the bottom. Secure the opacity shields with two (2) screws (provided) on each side. Figure 11 – Install Rear Opacity Shield
6. Cover the vent openings as shown in Figure 12 by applying one (1) overlay tamper-evident seal over the left side vent and one overlay tamper-evident seal over the right side vent. Each overlay requires two (2) tamper-evident seals as shown in Figure
7. Also apply one (1) additional tamper-evident seal as shown in Figure 13, #5. Figure 12 – Apply Tamper-Evident Seals on Vent Overlays © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 22

Figure 13 – Apply Tamper-Evident Seals on Vent Overlays and Side Opening

7. Attach the rail kit to the appliance as shown in Figure 14 and then add three (3) tamper-evident seals to the bottom of the appliance as shown in Figure
8. One (1) tamper-evident seal prevents tampering of the front opacity shield connected to the bottom of the appliance and two (2) tamper-evident seals wrap around the upper and lower rear opacity shields to prevent tampering of the rear opacity shields. Figure 14 – Install Rail Kit © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 23

Figure 15

• Apply Tamper-Evident Seals on the Bottom of the Appliance 8. Place four (4) tamper seals on the top of the appliance. Two (2) tamper seals (#9 and #11) prevent tampering of the top front and rear opacity shields and two (2) tamper seals (#10 and #12) prevents someone from attempting to access the vent overlays by sliding the rail kit. This completes the physical kit installation. Figure 16
• Apply Tamper Seals on the Top and Sides of the Appliance WF-500-B Tamper Seal Installation (21 Seals) 1.​ Replace the top cover with the physical kit top cover. a.​ Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the kit). © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 24

Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left side cover screw then use a Phillips-head screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration. b.​ Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the cover toward the back of the appliance to remove it. c.​ Slide the physical kit top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release buttons click. Replace the two screws that you removed from the old cover Figure 17

• WF-500-B: Top Cover Replacement © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 25

2.​ Attach the physical kit front cover brackets. Remove the front pull handles by removing two (2) screws from each handle (one (1) handle on each side), insert the WF-500-B physical kit front-cover brackets under each handle, and then replace the handles and secure them using the screws that you removed. The physical kit handles have standoffs that are used to secure the front cover. Figure 18

• WF-500-B: Front Cover Bracket 3.​ Attach the physical kit front cover to the front of the appliance. Slide the WF-500-B physical kit front cover over the physical kit pull handle brackets and secure the cover by turning the thumb screws clockwise (one thumb screw on each side). © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 26

Figure 19

• WF-500-B: FIPS Front Cover 4.​ Install a tamper-evident seal on the back of the appliance. This is seal #13 in the WF-500-B Figure 19. You need to install this seal before you install the WF-500-B physical kit back cover. 5.​ Attach the physical kit back cover to the back of the appliance. a.​ Slide the back cover onto the back of the appliance and turn the two (2) thumb screws clockwise until tight (one (1) screw on each side) to secure the cover. 6.​ Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following WF-500-B illustrations below.​ Also install the overlay stickers to cover vent openings (two (2) stickers on each side). You then install tamper-evident seals over the overlay stickers. Apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the back side of the right rack handle (see seals #18 and #19 on the left side in Figure 19). Apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the power supplies (see seals #11 and #12 with rear inset of Figure 19). Before you apply the tamper-evident seals, ensure that the appliance and physical kit surfaces are clean and dry. Firmly press one (1) seal on each of the locations shown in the illustrations. Avoid touching the seals for at least 24 hours to allow time for the seals to properly adhere to the appliance and physical kit surfaces. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 27

Figure 20

• WF-500-B: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Rear) Figure 21
• WF-500-B: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Front) © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 28

Figure 22

• WF-500-B: Tamper Seals Location for Side Rails 8.​ Non-Invasive Security There are currently no defined Approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics in SP 800-140F. 9.​ Sensitive Security Parameters The module contains the following SSPs: Table 12
• SSPs N/A © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ N/A Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 29

C C N/A C C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C N/A N/A C C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 30

-1 C C C C N/A N/A N/A N/A -1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 31

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -1 N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 13 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 32

The module generates SSPs (e.g., keys) whose strengths are modified by available entropy 10.​ Self-Tests The cryptographic module automatically performs the following tests below. The operator can command the module to perform the pre-operational and cryptographic algorithm self-tests by cycling power of the module; these tests do not require any additional operator action. Pre-operational Self-Tests Pre-operational Firmware Integrity Test

• ​ Verified with HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256 Note: the ECDSA and HMAC-SHA-256 KATs are performed prior to the Firmware integrity test Conditional self-tests Cryptographic algorithm self-tests
• ​ AES 128-bit ECB Encrypt Known Answer Test*
• ​ AES 128-bit ECB Decrypt Known Answer Test *
• ​ AES 128-bit CMAC Known Answer Test*
• ​ AES 256-bit GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• ​ AES 256-bit GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• ​ AES 192-bit CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test*
• ​ AES 192-bit CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test*
• ​ RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Sign Known Answer Test
• ​ RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Verify Known Answer Test
• ​ RSA 2048-bit Encrypt Known Answer Test*
• ​ RSA 2048-bit Decrypt Known Answer Test*
• ​ ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Sign Known Answer Test
• ​ ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Verify Known Answer Test
• ​ HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• ​ HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• ​ HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• ​ SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• ​ SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• ​ SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• ​ DRBG SP 800-90Arev1 Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Known Answer Tests
• ​ SP 800-90Arev1 Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Section 11.3 Health Tests
• ​ SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-FFC-SSC 2048-bit Known Answer Test
• ​ SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.2 with SHA-256 KDF Known Answer Test
• ​ SP 800-135rev1 SSH KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ SP 800-135rev1 IKEv2 KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ SP 800-90B RCT/APT Health Tests on Entropy Source Note: The SP 800-90B Health Tests are implemented by the entropy source. *Note: Supported by the module cryptographic implementation, but only utilized for CAST © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 33

●​ ECDSA/KAS-ECC Pairwise Consistency Test ●​ Firmware Load Test – Verify RSA 2048 with SHA-256 signature on firmware at time of load ●​ SP 800-56A Rev. 3 Assurance Tests (Based on Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3) Error Handling In the event of a conditional test failure, the module will output a description of the error. These are summarized below. Table 14 - Errors and Indicators

11. Life Cycle Assurance The vendor provided life-cycle assurance documentation that describes configuration management, design, finite state model, development, testing, delivery + operation, end of life procedures, and guidance. For details regarding the secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module, see section “Approved Mode of Operation” in Section
12. Palo Alto Network provides an Administrator Guide for additional information noted in the “References” section of this Security Policy Vendor imposed security rules In FIPS-CC mode, the following rules shall apply: 1.​ The operator shall not enable TLSv1.0 or use RSA for key wrapping; it is disabled by default A.​ Checked via CLI using “show shared” command 2.​ If using RADIUS, it must be configured using TLS 1.2. A.​ Checked via CLI using “show shared” command
13. Mitigation of Other Attacks The module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-3. These requirements are not applicable. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 34

13. Definitions and Acronyms AES

• Advanced Encryption Standard CA
• Certificate Authority CLI
• Command Line Interface CO
• Crypto-Officer CSP
• Critical Security Parameter CVL
• Component Validation List DB9
• D-sub series, E size, 9 pins DES
• Data Encryption Standard DH
• Diffie-Hellman DRBG
• Deterministic Random Bit Generator EDC
• Error Detection Code ECDH
• Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA
• Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS
• Federal Information Processing Standard HMAC
• (Keyed) Hashed Message Authentication Code KDF
• Key Derivation Function LED
• Light Emitting Diode RJ45
• Networking Connector RNG –Random number generator RSA
• Algorithm developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman SHA
• Secure Hash Algorithm SNMP
• Simple Network Management Protocol SSH
• Secure Shell TLS
• Transport Layer Security USB
• Universal Serial Bus VGA
• Video Graphics Array WF
• WildFire © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. ​ ​ Palo Alto Networks WildFire 10.2 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy ​ Page 35

Referenced URLs

• www.paloaltonetworks.com​
• https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html