Ultrastar DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (18)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Ultrastar DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C1["[high] Firmware / bootloader<br/>versions disclosed<br/>(identity, not provenance)<br/><i>RY07 [1], R5G4 [2], RG01 [3], VM18 [4], R7J4 [5]</i>"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>upgrade<br/>update</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Decryption<br/>Encryption<br/>OptiNAND_Descr ambler</i>"]
    C4["[high] Physical/logical<br/>interfaces (some 'blocked<br/>in firmware')<br/><i>SAS Connector SIO Serial Port Connector UART</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I1["Component identity is<br/>disclosed, but provenance<br/>and patch lineage are not."]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I4["Interface reachability may<br/>vary by boot stage and<br/>lifecycle state."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R1["Do the vendor version<br/>strings obscure the<br/>upstream baseline, fork<br/>lineage, or known-CVE<br/>exposure?"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R4["Are interfaces blocked<br/>before the bootloader<br/>runs, or only after<br/>approved mode starts?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E1["SBOM / component baselines<br/>· patch and backport<br/>manifest · CVE disposition"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E4["lifecycle reachability<br/>matrix · boot-stage<br/>interface timing ·<br/>factory/recovery/error-state<br/>access controls"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C1 --> I1 --> R1 --> E1
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C4 --> I4 --> R4 --> E4
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,C6 clue;
  class I1,I2,I3,I4,I5,I6 infer;
  class R1,R2,R3,R4,R5,R6 risk;
  class E1,E2,E3,E4,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Ultrastar DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C1["[high] Firmware / bootloader versions disclosed (identity, not provenance)<br/><i>RY07 [1], R5G4 [2], RG01 [3], VM18 [4], R7J4 [5]</i><br/>src: certificate.firmwareVersions"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>upgrade<br/>update</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Decryption<br/>Encryption<br/>OptiNAND_Descr ambler</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C4["[high] Physical/logical interfaces (some 'blocked in firmware')<br/><i>SAS Connector SIO Serial Port Connector UART</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.portsAndInterfaces"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C1,C3,C4 clueHigh;
  class C2,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Vendor name Western Digital Technologies, Inc. Module Name Ultrastar DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Document Version: 1.6 Date: October 16, 2024 Protection of Data at Rest © 2024 Western Digital Corporation or its affiliates. Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Table of Contents

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Tables

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Figures

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED 1.1 Overview This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED and Ultrastar® DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED. It contains the security rules under which each module must operate and describes how each module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 2 module. 1.2 Security Levels The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows. Table 1 Security Levels N/A N/A N/A The Western Digital Ultrastar DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, hereafter referred to as Ultrastar DC HC560, Cryptographic Module, cryptographic module, or CM, and the Western Digital Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, hereafter referred to as Ultrastar DC HC570, Cryptographic Module, cryptographic module, or CM are self-encryption drives (SED) that comply in general with the specifications listed in 13.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications and specifically with the TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification [TCG Core] with the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Storage Security Subsystem Class (SSC): Enterprise Specification [TCG Enterprise]. The TCG Storage SSC: Enterprise Specification defines a management interface for host application software to activate, provision, and manage encryption of user data. The specification includes data structures and their required content, and mechanisms for managing and configuring Authentication Credentials and access controls. The security architecture provides a locking mechanism by which an Authentication Credential (i.e., a password) can be set by an operator to enable control of access to user data. After an operator authenticates to the appropriate role and locks access to user data access user data is inaccessible. This implementation complies with the lock-based authentication model specified in IG 4.1.A.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED 2.1 Description Purpose and Use The Cryptographic Module’s intended use is by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated hardware modules. The primary function of the Cryptographic Module is to provide data encryption, access control, and cryptographic erase of the data stored on the hard drive media within the CM. The operator of the Cryptographic Module interfaces with the Cryptographic Module through application software that resides within a host system. Module Type Module Type Hardware Module Embodiment Module Embodiment Multiple-chip embedded Module Characteristics Module Characteristics Figure 1 illustrates a logical view of the CM’s firmware components. The Security Core partition is the most secure portion of the security subsystem. It forms a security boundary that provides assurances of firmware integrity and SSP integrity within the CM. The Security Protocol and Services partition contains the TCG Storage SSC: Enterprise SCC security protocol. Components in this ring communicate to the Security Core firmware through a Security Core API. The Security Application Client firmware, typically referred to as “Base Firmware” interfaces with the Security Protocol and Services firmware, provides adapters for the security subsystem support and implements a perimeter defense of the system based on security state. Specifically, the enforcement of port and command controls for manufacturing commands, firmware download control enforcement and boot up signature checks resides within the Security Application Client firmware layer. The Cryptographic Module operates within a limited operational environment. While operational, the Cryptographic Module prohibits operator or process-initiated additions, deletions, or modification of the code working set. For firmware upgrades, the Cryptographic Module uses an authenticated download service, which complies with ISO 19790 7.4.3.4, to upgrade the mutable firmware in its entirety. The immutable security firmware stored in ROM, which is essential and integral to the operation of the module is nonmodifiable. If the download operation is successful, authorized, and verified, the Cryptographic Module will begin operating with the new code working set after successfully executed all required pre-operational self-tests that comply with ISO 19790 7.10.2. Firmware loaded into the module that is not on the FIPS 140-3 certificate is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The Cryptographic Module’s security design utilizes common security protections, policies, and processes. It utilizes a hardware security Access Control Module (ACM) that incorporates a hardware Root of Trust (RoT). Security firmware leverages the RoT, hardware cryptographic algorithms and accelerators to implement a secure environment that assures firmware integrity, port access and the secure storage of plaintext secrets, user data, keys, and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSP) within the Cryptographic Module. The Cryptographic Module only supports approved security functions defined in NIST SP 800-140C and SP 800-140D. The hardware Root of Trust assures,

1. The isolation of security firmware and sensitive security parameters from Security Application Client firmware or firmware installed on embedded components within the cryptographic boundary,
2. The verification of cryptographic module firmware and security objects before usage,
3. A Key Management tree that secured by a root key stored in HW RoT OTP bits,
4. Support for a HW based Symmetric Key Generation,
5. Cryptographic Algorithm Acceleration and
6. End-to-End Protect between ACM & Key Server.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Security Application Client Security Protocol and Services Security Core Data and Control Input Data and Status Output Host System Figure 1 - Security Subsystem Components Cryptographic Boundary Figure 2 and Figure 3 depict the physical form of each CM within the scope of this security policy document. The CM is a multi-chip embedded embodiment. The hard opaque surface of the enclosure defines the cryptographic boundary. All components within this boundary satisfy FIPS 140-3 requirements. The Cryptographic Module firmware disables the SIO port pins outlined by the red box to the right of the SAS connector in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP)

• The physical enclosure of the CM defines the TOEPP’s physical perimeter. TOEPP and Cryptographic Boundary - The cryptographic boundary consists of CM’s physical enclosure and all firmware implementations within the immutable Security Core firmware that resides within the ROM of the Western Digital SoC9B ASIC and the mutable Security Protocol and Services and Security Application Client firmware layers. The Cryptographic Module writes mutable firmware from disk media into DRAM memory on power up. Photographs Figure 2 - Ultrastar DC HC560

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification Tested Module Identification - Hardware The Ultrastar DC HC560 cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environment. # N/A N/A The Ultrastar DC HC570 cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environment. # 2.3 N/A N/A Excluded Components The Ultrastar DC HC560 components listed below and identified in Figure 4 and Figure 5 are excluded from the cryptographic boundary.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Figure 4 - Excluded Components, Ultrastar DC HC560 Figure 5 - Excluded Components, Ultrastar DC HC560 The Ultrastar DC HC570 components listed below and identified in Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8 are excluded Table 3 Ultrastar DC HC570 Exclusions

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Figure 6 - Excluded Components, Ultrastar DC HC570 Figure 7 - Excluded Components, Ultrastar DC HC570

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Figure 8 - Excluded Components, Ultrastar DC HC570 2.4 Modes of Operation Table 4 Modes of Operation Section 11.1 of this document specifies the recommended and mandatory steps necessary for the secure installation, responsible for assuring that the mandatory configuration requirements remain unchanged. When correctly configured the Cryptographic Module always powers up isFIPS mode. The cryptographic module does not support non-approved or non-allowed security functions. Mode Change Instructions and Status: Table 4 specifies the conditions that must be true for the Cryptographic Module to operate in isFIPS mode. Any action by the operator that negates the PowerCycle setting of the Firmware Download Control's LockOnReset field transitions the CM to a noncompliant state. Any action by the operator that negates the attribute setting, specified in

1 See the Level 0 Discovery’ Vendor Specific Data section of the Ultrastar DC HC560 3.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI Hard Disk Drive

Specification [Product Manual] or Ultrastar DC HC570 3.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI Hard Disk Drive Specification [Product Manual] for guidance.

3 See the Ports section of the Ultrastar DC HC560 3.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI Hard Disk Drive Specification [Product Manual] or Ultrastar

DC HC570 3.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI Hard Disk Drive Specification [Product Manual] for guidance.

4 See the TCG Storage SSC: Enterprise Specification [TCG Enterprise] for guidance.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Table 4 for LockOnReset, ReadLockEnabled, or WriteLockEnabled for any configured BandMaster transitions the CM to a noncompliant state. The Cryptographic Module does not support a degraded operational mode. 2.5 Algorithms The Cryptographic Module supports NIST SP 800-131A compliant approved algorithms listed in Table 5. Approved Algorithms Table 5 Approved Algorithms AES 3580 5

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Use/Function Digital signature OptiNAND device. Note: AES - XTS - The AES-XTS algorithm implementations include a check to ensure Key_1 ≠ Key_2 The Cryptographic Module implements the FIPS Vendor Affirmed cryptographic algorithms listed in Table

6. Table 6 Vendor Affirmed Algorithms N/A CKGCombined N/A Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms The Cryptographic Module does not implement non-Approved but allowed algorithms. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed The Cryptographic Module does not implement non-Approved but allowed algorithms with no security claimed. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms None. The cryptographic module does not implement algorithms that are not NIST SP 800-131A compliant. 2.6 Security Function Implementations The Cryptographic Module implements the Security Function Implementations listed in Table
7. Table 7 Security Function Implementations

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information The Cryptographic Module performs a key comparison test on each LRK.AESKey/LRK.XTS and NSK.AESKey/NSK.XTS keyset to assure compliance with FIPS 140-3 IG C.I XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements every time the CM generates an LRK.AESKey/LRK.XTS and NSK.AESKey/NSK.XTS keyset, to assure compliance for all derived MEKs. The only use of any AES-XTS key pair is the encryption and decryption of data-at-rest within the cryptographic module in a storage application. PBKDF2 The password consists of a minimum of twelve (12) hexadecimal bytes values and a maximum of thirty-two (32) hexadecimal bytes values that range from 0x00 to 0xFF. The probability that a random attempt correctly guesses a twelve (12) byte password, or a false acceptance occurs is equal to 1 in 7.92E+28. The probability that a random attempt correctly guesses a thirty-two (32) byte password, or a false acceptance occurs is equal to 1 in 1.16E+7728. The default 1024 iteration count, 256-bit Salt and HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert #HMAC 2280) algorithm conforms to SP 800-132, Option 2a. The Master key (MK) encrypts and decrypts data protection keys. The PBKDF2 derived keys, Ku, and Ka, encrypt data protection keys used in a data storage application.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED 2.8 RBG and Entropy The SP 800-90A rev1-compliant Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG), implemented as a CTR_DRBG mechanism, uses an AES-256 block cipher derivation function to generate encryption keys for use within the cryptographic boundary of the Cryptographic Module. Paragraphs titled Entropy Information and RBG Information summarize the characteristics of the entropy noise source that resides within the cryptographic boundary and seeds the CTR_DRBG. Table 8 Entropy Certificates Table 9 Entropy Sources Entropy Information The hardware-based ring oscillator noise source referenced in Table 9 consist of eight (8) identical groups of four (4) independent ring oscillator circuits. Within each group, there are four (4) distinct logic inverter gate designs that consist of 19, 23, 31, and 39 gates. The oscillators are physically isolated from other active traces within the SoC9 ASIC. No configuration steps are necessary to operate the entropy source in a compliant manner. As stated in the Public Use Documents for E13, on power up the Cryptographic Module executes an entropy source initialization sequence that collects sufficient samples of raw noise to verify the health of its entropy source prior to seeding the DRBG. If the initialization sequence returns false, the Cryptographic Module transitions to an error state that blocks the execution of all security services. RBG Information The output of the entropy source referenced in Table 9 consists of the raw data generated from thirty-two (32) free running ring oscillators. Eight identical groups of four variable length inverter chains define the implementation. Each 32-bit sample produces at least 2.69612 bits of entropy. Each time the DRBG is instantiated or reseeded, the CM concatenates one hundred sixty (160) 32-bit samples to seed the DRBG. This equates to 5120 bits of entropy data and translates to at least 431.379 bits of min-entropy. This seeds the CTR_DRBG with approximately 287 bits of security strength (~287.59 bits of entropy input and ~143.79 bits of nonce). Seeding the DRBG with at least 287 bits of security strength exceeds the requirement to seed the DRBG with 256 bits of security strength. 2.9 Key Generation The cryptographic module utilizes an SP 800-90A rev1-compliant CTR_DRBG to generate symmetric cryptographic keys, which comply with sections 6.1, 6.2.3 and 6.3 of SP 800-133r2. Each symmetric keyset consists of an encryption and a signing key. Specifically,

• the Root Keyset consists of a 256-bit Root Encryption Key and 256-bit Root Signing Key
• the Global Active Keyset (AEK) consists of a 256-bit Global Active Encryption Key and a 256-bit Global Active Signing Key

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

• the SED Active Keyset consists of a 256-bit SED Active Encryption Key and a 256-bit SED Active Signing Key
• the SED AdminSP Active Keyset consists of a 256-bit SED AdminSP Active Encryption Key and a 256-bit SED AdminSP Active Signing Key
• SED LockingSP Active Keyset consists of a 256-bit SED LockingSP Active Encryption Key and a 256-bit SED Locking SP Active Signing Key Root Keyset Global Active Keyset SED Active Keyset SED Admin SP Active Keyset SED Locking SP Active Keyset Figure 9 - Symmetric Key Tree

Key Agreement Information The cryptographic module does not support a key establishment scheme. Key Transport Information The cryptographic module does not support a key transport scheme.

The cryptographic module supports the TCG Storage SSC: Enterprise [TCG Enterprise] security protocol. 3.1 Cryptographic Module Interfaces Ports and Interfaces As a hardware module, the Cryptographic Module uses the standard 29-pin Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) connector that conforms to the mechanical requirements of SFF 8680. Table 10 identifies the Cryptographic Module’s ports and interfaces. The two-wire SIO Serial Port connector consists of signal and ground. Prior to shipment, Western Digital disables the SIO port. The Cryptographic Module does not provide a maintenance access interface. The SCSI protocol [SCSI Core] [SCSI Block] provides the primary communication channel between the Cryptographic Module and a host system. Services provided by the Cryptographic Module that require the processing of operator issued commands include TCG Storage SSC: Enterprise configuration settings, the reading and writing of user data, and retrieval of status data. The Cryptographic Module does not support a trusted channel communication link between the CM and a host system.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Table 10 Ports and Interfaces Roles, Services, and Authentication 4.1 Authentication Methods The Cryptographic Module implements the listed authentication methods. Table 11 Authentication Methods Note: E = log2(RL), where E = authentication strength, R = pool of unique characters and L = password length defines the security strength of an Authentication Credential PIN. See Calculating Password Entropy [PW]. 4.2 Roles The Module supports distinct User and Cryptographic Officer (CO) operator roles. The Cryptographic Module enforces role separation by requiring a role identifier and authentication credential in the form of a Personal Identification Number (PIN). The Cryptographic Module enforces role dependent service access rules. Table 13 maps services to Crypto Officer and User roles. The Cryptographic Module implements Access Control in layers. The top layer of the implementation consists of Access Control Lists (ACLs). ACLs are lists of Access Control Elements (ACEs). The boolean state of an ACE associated with an authority within a role determines access to a service. After authentication, an authority’s associated ACE boolean expression is set to be True. Prior to

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED authentication, an authority’s associated ACE boolean expression is set to False. Closing a TCG session or powering off the Cryptographic Module disables all previously authenticated authorities by setting the ACE Boolean expression associated with all authenticated authorities to False. After powering up the CM and opening a new TCG session, the operator must execute the Authenticate service to enable an authority within the Crypto Officer and User roles. The Cryptographic Module does not support concurrent operators. The Cryptographic Module encrypts and signs all authentication data, associated with a role, stored outside the ACM. The ACM imports the encrypted and signed authentication, verifies the signature, and decrypts the authentication data. Before validating the operator supplied authentication data, the ACM checks for try limit violations. The lock-based authentication method implemented by the Cryptographic Module remains secure because the purpose of the implementation is to protect data-at-rest and the host operating system in communication with the CM acts as the operator and is considered a trusted machine. The Cryptographic Module implements the roles listed in Table 12. Table 12 Roles The CM supports both Crypto Officer (CO) and User roles.

• Crypto Officer Roles
• Secure ID (SID)  o 
• This Crypto Officer role corresponds to the Admin SP Secure ID (SID) Authority and serves as the TPer Owner is defined in the TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification [TCG Core]. The SID can access all services enabled by the Access Control Elements (ACE) assigned to the Admin SP Secure ID (SID) Authority. This Crypto Officer role corresponds to the Locking SP EraseMaster Authority defined in the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification [TCG Enterprise]. The EraseMaster can access all services enabled by the Access Control Elements (ACE) assigned to the EraseMaster. The EraseMaster is the single authority dedicated to resetting one or more LBA bands by invoking the TCG Erase service to regenerate the LRK and MEK associated with the LBA band. The EraseMaster can disable a BandMaster.  This Crypto Officer role corresponds to the Locking SP Bandmaster Authority as defined in the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification [TCG Enterprise]. BandMasters can access all services enabled by the Access Control Elements (ACE) assigned to a BandMaster. BandMasters lock and unlock LBA bands and configure LBA bands (user data regions) to control the ability of an operator to read and write data within the Cryptographic Module. The Cryptographic Module supports a maximum of sixteen (16) active BandMaster Authorities.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

• User Roles
• SCSI User 
• The SCSI User utilizes the SCSI interface protocol [SCSI Core] [SCSI Block], which is designed to provide an efficient peer-to-peer communication link, to communicate with a host system. The host system sends commands to the Cryptographic Module and waits for the Cryptographic Module to respond. The SCSI User may execute services that were previously enabled by another authenticated role in compliance with the lock-based authentication model specified in IG 4.1.A. Anybody  This user role corresponds to the Locking SP Anybody Authority as defined in the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification [TCG Enterprise]. As specified in the TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification [TCG Core], the Anybody authority possess implicit authentication within a session. The Anybody authority executes services that do not require explicit authentication. The Anybody user role may execute services that were previously enabled by another authenticated role in compliance with the lock-based authentication model specified in IG 4.1.A.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED 4.3 Approved Services Table 13 lists approved services implemented by the Cryptographic Module. The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The CM uses the SSP to perform a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The CM zeroises the SSP. Table 13 Approved Services

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A N/A N/A N/A

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A Ka, Ku, LRK, NSK,

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED DRBG.V, Ka, Ku, LRK, PIN Digests, Ka, Ku, Ka, Ku, LRK, NSK,

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED DRBG.V, Ka, Ku, LRK, PIN Digests, Ka, Ku, Ka, Ku, LRK, NSK, DRBG.V, Ka, Ku, LRK,

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED PIN Digests, Ka, Ku, Ka, Ku, LRK, NSK, DRBG.V, Ka, Ku, LRK,

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A N/A PIN Digests, Ka, Ku,

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Keyset, Ka Keyset, Ku N/A

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED UAKa

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED 4.4 Non-Approved Services The Cryptographic Module does not support non-approved services. 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The Cryptographic Module utilizes RSA public key cryptography to verify that firmware downloaded to the CM is authentic. The Cryptographic Module uses RSA 3072 PKCSPSS with SHA2-256 to verify the digital signature of a downloaded firmware binary image. A Hardware Security Module (HSM), which resides in a secure Western Digital facility, generates, and stores the RSA Public/Private key pairs used in the firmware signing process. The Cryptographic Module rejects a downloaded firmware binary image if the digital signature verification process fails. Software/Firmware Security 5.1 Integrity Techniques The Cryptographic Module utilizes RSA public key cryptography to verify the integrity of all firmware binary images within the CM prior to execution. An operator may initiate the integrity test on demand by power cycling the CM. The firmware integrity tests ensure that prior to executing any firmware image the storage device verifies the firmware is from an authenticated Western Digital source. Current storage devices typically implement a multi-stage loader system to boot the drive. Each loader stage is responsible for loading and verifying the next image before transferring control to the next image. This process establishes a chain of trust during the boot process. The Cryptographic Module’s Boot ROM code loads the secure loader image. The SD_CA Key signed secure loader, enables the boot process to use other keys besides the SD_CA Key for boot time signature checking (i.e., SD_BFW Key). For example, the secure loader loads the SD_BFW public key certificate and verifies the SD_CA Key signature of the certificate. The secure loader then loads the next image(s) from boot flash, verifies the signature of the next image(s) using the SD_BFW public key, and transfers control to the next image. SD_CA Key SD_BFW Key SD_SM Key SC_FW Key SP_FW Key PROD_Group Key OEM_FW Key OEM_Release Key OEM_OFS Key Figure 10 - Asymmetric Key Tree 5.2 Initiate on Demand The operator initiates the integrity test on demand by power cycling the Cryptographic Module.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED 5.3 Open-Source Parameters The Western Digital firmware development process does not utilize open-source firmware to build executable code installed within the Cryptographic Module. 6.1 Operational environment Operational Environment Type and Requirements Type of Operating Environment: Limited While operational, the Cryptographic Module prohibits additions, deletions, or modification of the code working set. For firmware upgrades, the Cryptographic Module uses an authenticated download service to upgrade its mutable firmware in its entirety. The immutable security firmware stored in ROM, which is essential and integral to the operation of the module is non-modifiable. If the download operation is successful, authorized, and verified, the Cryptographic Module will begin operating with the new code working set after successfully executing all preoperational self-tests. Firmware loaded into the cryptographic module that is not on the FIPS 140-3 certificate is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. 6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions The Cryptographic Module blocks the installation of firmware images that contain a Code ID that is inconsistent with the Cryptographic Module’s SoC, hardware interface type (e.g., SAS or SATA) and security type (e.g., TCG Enabled, FIPS Enabled, etc.). The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the LockOnReset parameter of the logical firmware download port is set to PowerCycle. The Cryptographic Module is in a noncompliant state when the LockOnReset parameter is not set to PowerCycle. The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring the logical firmware download port remains locked unless the CO intends to execute the Firmware Download service. The CO shall lock the firmware download port after the Firmware Download service completes. Consult the Ports section of the Ultrastar DC HC560 3.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI Hard Disk Drive Specification [Product Manual] or Ultrastar DC HC570 3.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI Hard Disk Drive Specification [Product Manual] for guidance. The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the BandMaster Authentication PIN Credential for all configured BandMasters does not equal the MSID value. LBA bands associated with BandMasters with default authentication PIN values are considered plaintext. The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the LockOnReset attribute for any configured BandMaster is set to PowerCycle. The Cryptographic Module is in a noncompliant state when the state of the LockOnReset attribute of any configured BandMaster is not set to PowerCycle. The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled attribute for any configured BandMaster is set to True. The Cryptographic Module is in a noncompliant state when the state of the ReadLockEnabled or WriteLockEnabled attribute of any configured BandMaster is set to False. Consult the TCG Storage SSC: Enterprise Specification [TCG Enterprise] for guidance. Physical Security The Cryptographic Module is a multi-chip embedded module that complies with FIPS 140-3 Level 2 security. An ambient temperature from 5° to 60°C defines the Cryptographic Module’s environmental operating range [Datasheet] 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required The Cryptographic Module does not make claims in the Physical Security area beyond FIPS 140-3 Level 2 security. Therefore, the CM does not employ any fault induction mitigation techniques or EFP feature to immediately zeroise all unprotected SSPs if the temperature or voltage falls outside of the cryptographic module's normal operating range.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED The CM initiates a thermal safety shutdown if the temperature drops below -40°C or exceeds 70°C but does not zeroize SSPs if either trip point is exceeded.

• All components are production-grade materials with standard passivation techniques. The enclosure is opaque. Engineering design supports opacity requirements. An attacker cannot penetrate or remove and reapply a tamper-evident security seal without evidence of Table 14 Mechanisms and Actions Required

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED 8.1 Non-invasive Security Mitigation Techniques The Cryptographic Module lacks features to mitigate any non-invasive security attacks beyond the scope of the requirements within FIPS 140-3 Security Level 2. Sensitive Security Parameters Management The Cryptographic Module manages the SSPs listed in Section 9.4 of this document. The Cryptographic Module does not support the output of SSPs beyond the cryptographic boundary. The Cryptographic Module does not support non-approved algorithms or key lengths. 9.1 Storage Areas Calling processes implemented in firmware control Cryptographic Module access to SSPs. Zeroization services destroy or cryptographically erase SSPs. Table 15 Storage Area 9.2 SSP Input and Output Methods The CM limits the input of SSPs to plaintext Authentication Credential PINs and RSA-3072 public keys. RSA-3072 public key input only occurs during the manufacturing process. Instead of storing PIN values as plaintext, the CM stores an HMAC SHA-256 Digest of the PIN. A Hardware Security Module (HSM), which resides within a secure Western Digital facility, generates, and stores the RSA Public/Private key pairs input during the manufacturing process. The CM does not support the output of intermediate values generated during key generation. The module does not support the output of SSPs beyond the cryptographic boundary of the module. Table 16 SSP Input-Output Methods

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods Zeroization of persistent SSPs complies with the cryptographic erasure requirements for SCSI Hard Disk drives within [SP 800 88], Guidelines for Media Sanitization. The Cryptographic Module zeroizes ephemeral SSPs by overwriting the SSP memory location with all zeros within the scope of the function call. Table 17 SSP Zeroization Methods 9.4 SSPs Table 18 SSPs Part 1 N/A (UAKa) N/A

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A N/A N/A except UAKa. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

8 E = log2(RL), where E = authentication strength, R = pool of unique characters and L = password length, https://www.pleacher.com/mp/mlessons/algebra/entropy.html

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A N/A Table 19 SSPs Part 2 (Ka) N/A Key (UAKa) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A N/A N/A N/A Ku keys N/A N/A N/A N/A

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Key (Ku)

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A N/A N/A N/A HMAC-SHA2Authentication N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED N/A N/A

The Cryptographic Module performs pre-operational self-tests automatically at powered up and after installing a new firmware image. Pre-operational self-tests tests ensure that the Cryptographic Module is not corrupted, and all cryptographic algorithms work as expected. The Cryptographic Module inhibits all data output via the “data output” interface and the execution of loaded or modified approved security functions while executing the preoperational self-tests.

Cryptographic Module The Cryptographic Module performs the pre-operational self-test listed in Table 20 at power up, in response to a self-initiated reset and prior to booting to a new firmware image. The execution of the ESV Critical Function and RSA SigVer SW/FW Integrity self-tests satisfy AS10.23. Upon failure the Cryptographic Module transitions to a Device Unavailable error state. Table 20 CM Pre-Operational Self-Tests

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED OptiNAND Device The OptiNAND device performs the pre-operational self-test listed below at power up, in response to a self-initiated reset and prior to booting to a new firmware image. Upon failure, the device returns a UEC error code, aborts booting to the firmware image and transitions to a Device Unavailable error state. The execution of the SW/FW Integrity self-test satisfies AS10.23. Table 21 OptiNAND Pre-Operational Self-Tests

Cryptographic Module Conditional Self-Tests The Cryptographic Module performs the listed conditional self-tests. Upon failure the Cryptographic Module, with exception of the ESV self-tests, transitions to a Device Degraded error state. Conditional ESV self-test failures cause the CM to transition to a Device Unavailable error state. Table 22 CM Conditional Self-Tests

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Nonequivalence HMACSHA2-256 Message, 256bit key, 256KAT

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Message, 256KAT OptiNAND Conditional Self-Tests The OptiNAND device performs the conditional self-test listed below. If any conditional self-test fails, the OptiNAND device executes a self-initiated reset or enters a Device Degraded error state. If the OptiNAND device enters a Device Degraded error state, the Cryptographic Module reports the error condition by transmitting an UEC error code to the host system. After entering the Device Degraded error state, the OptiNAND device does not process functional commands unless a power cycle occurs and clears the error state. Table 23 OptiNAND Conditional Self-Tests

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED The Cryptographic Module does not enforce a policy that would result in the interruption of the module’s operations due to a periodic self-test. Table 24 Error States The operator may initiate an on-demand periodic self-test by power cycling the CM.

After initialization, the CM operates and powers up in isFIPS mode. Prior to configuring the CM to comply with isFIPS mode configuration requirements, it operates in a noncompliant state. Regardless, the CM functions as a Secure Erase Drive (SED) that is compliant with the TCG Storage SSC: Enterprise Specification [TCG Enterprise]. Installation and Initialisation: The Crypto Officer is responsible for executing a Take-Ownership scenario to configure the Cryptographic Module to operationally comply with operator site requirements and assure that the Cryptographic Module is compliant with FIPS 140-3 at SL2.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED Informative Having the MSID Authentication Credential PIN electronically available to the operator constitutes a risk to the overall security of the Cryptographic Module. Therefore, the Crypto Officer should execute a Take-Ownership scenario the first time the Cryptographic Module is inserted into a system that replaces any Authentication Credential PIN that is set to the default MSID value with a value that is different from the MSID value and between 12 and 32 bytes in length. This assures compliance with ISO/IEC19790, Section 7.4.4 Authentication which states that, “…If default authentication data is used to control access to the module, then default authentication data shall [04.46] be replaced upon first-time authentication. This default authentication data does not need to meet the zeroisation requirements (7.9.7).” Take-Ownership Scenario Example

1. Authenticate to the SID. a. If the CM authenticated to the SID with the default MSID value, change the SID PIN to a random value between 12 and 32 bytes in length.
2. Use the Get service to determine if the logical firmware download port is set to lock on PowerCycle. a. If the logical firmware download port’s LockOnReset attribute is not set to PowerCycle utilize the Set service to set the LockOnReset attribute to PowerCycle.
3. Authenticate to each BandMaster that is within the scope of the operator site requirements. a. If the CM authenticated to a BandMaster with the default MSID value, change the BandMaster PIN to a random value between 12 and 32 bytes in length. b. Utilize the Get Band Attributes service to determine the state of a BandMaster’s LockOnReset attribute. If the LockOnReset attribute is not set to PowerCycle, use the Set Band Attribute service to set the LockOnReset attribute to PowerCycle. c. Utilize the Get Band Attributes service to determine the state of a BandMaster’s ReadLockEnabled attribute. If the ReadLockEnabled attribute is not set to True, use the Set Band Attribute service to set the ReadLockEnabled attribute to True. d. Utilize the Get Band Attributes service to determine the state of a BandMaster’s WriteLockEnabled attribute. If the WriteLockEnabled attribute is not set to True, use the Set Band Attribute service to set the WriteLockEnabled attribute to True.
4. Authenticate to the EraseMaster. a. If the CM authenticated to the EraseMaster with the default MSID value, change the EraseMaster PIN to a random value between 12 and

Delivery: The Cryptographic Officer shall inspect the tamper evident seal that covers the Cryptographic Module’s PCBA for evidence of tampering. See Figure

13 for an example of tamper evidence. If tamper evidence is apparent, the CO should return the module to Western Digital.

Hard disk drives are fragile. Do not drop or jar the drive. Hold the drive only by the enclosure.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED HDD electronics are sensitive to static electricity. Do not remove the CM from its antistatic container until ready to install. The operator engaged in the installation process should wear an antistatic wrist strap to ground to assure the discharge static electricity from any item or surface that my touch the CM. Hold the drive only by the metal case surrounding the drive. Avoid contacting with the SAS connector. To assure proper installation and operation, verify all cooling requirements are met prior to initiating the installation instructions within the Ultrastar DC HC560 3.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI Hard Disk Drive Specification [Product Manual] and Ultrastar DC HC570 3.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI Hard Disk Drive Specification [Product Manual]. The Ultrastar DC HC560 3.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI Hard Disk Drive Specification [Product Manual] and Ultrastar DC HC570 3.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI Hard Disk Drive Specification [Product Manual] provides additional administrator guidance.

Inspect the CM for damage to the case or SAS connector. If the CM exhibits damage, return the CM for warranty replacement service. The Ultrastar DC HC560 3.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI Hard Disk Drive Specification [Product Manual] and Ultrastar DC HC570 3.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI Hard Disk Drive Specification [Product Manual] provide non-administrator guidance.

On power-up, if previously configured to comply with isFIPS mode, the Cryptographic Module automatically initializes to isFIPS mode without operator intervention. After successfully completing pre-operational and conditional self-tests, the CM transitions to an Approved mode operational state. In this state, the module awaits service requests from the operator. The implemented security features protect against remote and physical attacks across the complete product cycle from manufacturing build time to returns and failure analysis. The secure firmware boot and firmware download process assure firmware image integrity and prevents compromised firmware attacks. These features prevent the counterfeiting of the CM, hacking and unauthorized access to CM ports. The authentication scheme enforces port restrictions for processes that are only allowed within a secure manufacturing environment. These security features utilize cryptographically secure messages to block unauthorized access to CM ports and imposes manufacturing command set restrictions. The CM utilizes a cryptographic encryption and HMAC signing scheme to assure the protection of all SSPs stored outside the ACM RoT. Rules of Operation

1. The Module provides two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The Module provides role-based authentication.
3. On power cycle the Module clears previous authentications.
4. The Module complies with the lock-based authentication model. On power cycle, the Module locks unlocked services that require authentication to unlock (IG 4.1.A).
5. Accept as allowed under the lock-based authentication model, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
6. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting the Module.
7. All self-tests do not require any operator action.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

8. The Cryptographic Module inhibits data output during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
9. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the Module.
10. The Module implements multiple zeroisation service that vary in scope. Table 17 SSP Zeroization Methods defines scope of each zeroisation service.
11. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
12. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
13. The Module does not support manual SSP establishment method.
14. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
15. The Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
16. The Module does not store any plaintext CSPs.
17. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
18. The Module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces.

The CM does not require periodic maintenance actions to maintain functional or secure operation.

All CSPs stored within the volatile memory of the CM’s ACM RoT are inaccessible from outside the ACM RoT. The CM encrypts and signs all CSPs before storing them in volatile or non-volatile memory outside ACM RoT. Removing power instantaneously erases all CSPs stored within the CM’s volatile memory. Prior to the environmentally disposal of the CM owner should cryptographically erase the CM. For this purpose, the CM supports the TCG Opal Revert method [TCG Opal]. Revert enables the CM’s owner to cryptographically erase all CSPs and overwrite existing TCG settings to the default values that were set during manufacturing. If environmental disposal requirements require the zeroization of the Root Keyset, which consists of the Root Encryption Key and Root Signing Key, the CM owner must return the CM to Western Digital. Western Digital’s proprietary Secure Manufacturing Reconfiguration Process supports Root Keyset zeroization.

The Cryptographic Module lacks features to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of the requirements within FIPS 140-3 SL2.

The Security Policy refers to the following specifications, references, and definitions.

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

Ultrastar® DC HC560 TCG Enterprise HDD SED, Ultrastar DC HC570 TCG Enterprise HDD SED

Referenced URLs

• https://www.pleacher.com/mp/mlessons/algebra/entropy.html
• https://www.westerndigital.com/support