Panorama Virtual Appliance 10.1

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (30)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Panorama Virtual Appliance 10.1
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback services<br/><i>Panorama Software Update</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Zeroize<br/>Self-Test<br/>Show Status</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Trusted code is reachable<br/>through update and<br/>recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Panorama Virtual Appliance 10.1
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery / rollback services<br/><i>Panorama Software Update</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Zeroize<br/>Self-Test<br/>Show Status</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3 clueHigh;
  class C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Panorama Virtual Appliance 10.1 Version: 1.2 Revision Date: February 13, 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.​ www.paloaltonetworks.com​ © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks. A list of our trademarks can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective companies. ​

1.​ The Panorama Virtual Appliance 10.1 from Palo Alto Networks Inc., hereafter referred to as “Panorama VM” or the “cryptographic module” are multi-chip standalone cryptographic modules designed to fulfill FIPS 140-3 level 1 requirements. The Panorama VM provides a centralized monitoring and management of multiple Palo Alto Networks next-generation (NG) firewalls and Wildfire appliances. For purposes of this validation, the exact software version of the module tested was 10.1.5. The cryptographic module meets Table 1 - Security Levels 2.​ N/A N/A N/A The tested operational environments are highlighted in Table 2. Table 2

• Tested Operational Environments © 2025 # Palo Alto Networks, Inc. N/A N/A N/A Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 3

Table 3

• Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments # Operator Porting Rules The CMVP allows user porting of a validated software module to an operational environment which was not included as part of the validation testing. An operator may install and run this module on any general purpose computer (GPC) or platform using the specified hypervisor and operating system on the validation certificate or other compatible operating and/or hypervisor system and affirm the module's continued FIPS 140-3 validation compliance. The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported and executed in an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate. Approved Mode of Operation The following procedure will initialize the modules into the Approved mode of operation:
• ​ During initial boot up, break the boot sequence via the console port connection (by pressing the maint button when instructed to do so) to access the main menu.
• ​ Select “Continue.”
• ​ Select the “Set FIPS-CC Mode” option to initialize the Approved mode.
• ​ Select “Enable FIPS-CC Mode”.
• ​ When prompted, select “Reboot” and the module will re-initialize and continue into the Approved mode of operation (FIPS-CC mode).
• ​ The module will reboot.
• ​ In “FIPS-CC” mode, the console port is available only as a status output port.
• ​ Once the module has finished booting, the Crypto Officer can authenticate using the default credentials that come with the module o​ Once authenticated, the module will automatically require the operator to change their password; and the default credential is overwritten The module will automatically indicate the Approved mode of operation in the following manner:
• ​ Status output interface will indicate “**** FIPS-CC MODE ENABLED ****” via the CLI session.
• ​ Status output interface will indicate “FIPS-CC mode enabled successfully” via the console port.
• ​ The module will display “FIPS-CC” at all times in the status bar at the bottom of the web interface.
• ​ The module will display “fips-cc” when “show system info” is entered via the CLI Should one or more power-up self-tests fail, the Approved mode of operation will not be achieved. Feedback will consist of:
• ​ The module will output “FIPS-CC failure”
• ​ The module will reboot and enter a state in which the reason for the reboot can be determined.
• ​ To determine which self-test caused the system to reboot into the error state, connect the console cable and follow the on-screen instructions to view the self-test output. Note: Disabling “FIPS-CC” mode causes a complete factory reset, which is described in the Zeroization section below. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 4

Non-Compliant State Failure to follow the directions in the Approved Mode of Operation above or rules noted in Section 11 will result in the module operating in a non-compliant state, which is considered out of scope of this validation. Selecting Panorama, Management-Only, and Log Collector System Modes The Panorama VM supports multiple configurations that provide varying services. The Cryptographic Officer can initialize the module into different System Mode. The module supports the following System Modes:

• ​ Panorama
• ​ Management-Only
• ​ Log Collector The default and primary mode of operation is Panorama mode. An additional mode, Log Collector mode, focuses primarily on log gathering instead of management. The final mode supported by the module is Management-Only, which focuses primarily on management functions without logging capabilities. To convert the module from the default mode, Panorama mode, to Log Collector or Management-Only mode, follow the steps below: Convert the Panorama VM from Panorama mode to Log Collector or Management-Only mode:
• ​ Log into the CLI via SSH, CO is authenticated with username/password
• ​ Enter “request system system-mode logger” or “request system system-mode management-only”
• ​ Enter “Y” to confirm the change to the selected mode.
• ​ The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests. Convert the Panorama VM from Log Collector or Management-Only mode to Panorama mode:
• ​ Log into the CLI via SSH, CO is authenticated with username/password
• ​ Enter “request system system-mode panorama”
• ​ Enter “Y” to confirm the change to the selected mode.
• ​ The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests Note: Changing the System Mode does not change FIPS-CC Mode. Zeroization The following procedure will zeroize the module:
• ​ Access the module’s CLI via SSH, and command the module to enter maintenance mode (“debug system maintenance-mode”); the module will reboot o​ Note: Establish a serial connection to the console port
• ​ After reboot, select “Continue.”
• ​ Select “Factory Reset”
• ​ The module will perform a zeroization, and provide the following message once complete: o​ “Factory Reset Status: Success” Note: Following the completion of this procedure, the module will be placed back into an uninitialized state. Approved and Allowed Algorithms The cryptographic modules support the following Approved algorithms. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes specified in this table are used by the module. The CAVP certificate may contain more tested options than listed in this table. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 5

Table 4

• Approved Algorithms © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 6

D.G. D.G. © 2025 Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 7

5.2 ** The module is compliant to IG C.H: GCM is used in the context of TLS and SSH:

• ​ For TLS, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with SP 800-52 and in accordance with Section 4 of RFC 5288 for TLS key establishment, and ensures when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts all possible values for a given session key, that a new TLS handshake is initiated per sections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 of RFC 5246. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly. o​ From this RFC 5288, the GCM cipher suites in use are TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• ​ For SSH, the module meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H. The module conforms to RFCs 4252, 4253, and 5647. The fixed field is 32 bits in length and is derived using the SSH KDF; this ensures the fixed field is unique for any given GCM session. The invocation field is 64 bits in length and is incremented for each invocation of GCM; this prevents the IV from repeating until the entire invocation field space of 264 is exhausted, which can take hundreds of years. (in FIPS-CC Mode, SSH rekey is automatically configured at 1 GB of data or 1 hour, whichever comes first) In all the above cases, the nonce explicit is always generated deterministically. Also, AES GCM keys are zeroized when the module is power-cycled. For each new TLS or SSH session, a new AES GCM key is established. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 8

The module is compliant to IG C.F: The module utilizes approved modulus sizes 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits for RSA signatures. This functionality has been CAVP tested as noted above. The minimum number of Miller Rabin tests for each modulus size is implemented according to Table C.2 of FIPS 186-4. For modulus size 4096 the module implements the largest number of Miller-Rabin tests shown in Table C.2. RSA SigVer is CAVP tested for all three supported modulus sizes as noted above. The module does not perform FIPS 186-2 SigVer. All supported modulus sizes are CAVP testable and tested as noted above. The module does not implement RSA key transport in the approved mode. The module does not have any algorithms that fall under: -​ Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation -​ Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation The cryptographic module supports the following non-Approved algorithms that are allowed for use in the Approved mode of operation: Table 5A - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed Table 6 - Supported Protocols in the Approved Mode Supported Protocols* TLS v1.1, v1.2 SSHv2 SNMPv3 *Note: No parts of these protocols, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested or reviewed by the CAVP and CMVP. Cryptographic Boundary The Panorama Virtual Appliance is a software cryptographic module and requires an underlying general purpose computer (GPC) environment. The module consists of a GPC (multi-chip standalone embodiment) with the cryptographic boundary defined below. The cryptographic boundary (CB) includes all of the software components of the module, which is included in the file name in Section 11 (Panorama_pc-10.1.5) and also the configuration file that resides on the virtual machine’s virtual disk. The physical perimeter (PP) is defined by the enclosure around the host GPC on which it runs. Figure 1 depicts the boundary and illustrates the hardware components of a GPC. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 9

Figure 1

• Cryptographic Boundary 3.​ Cryptographic Module Interfaces The Panorama VM is designed to operate on a general-purpose computer (GPC) platform. The module supports the following FIPS 140-3 interfaces, which have physical and logical ports consistent with a GPC operating environment. The module does not implement a control output interface. Table 7 –Ports and Interfaces © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 10

4.​ Roles, Services, and Authentication Roles and Services While in the Approved mode of operation, all CO and User services are accessed via SSH or TLS sessions. Approved and allowed algorithms, relevant CSPs and public keys related to these protocols are accessed to support the following services. CSP access by services is further described in the following tables. Table 8

• Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 11

​ Assumption of Roles The module supports distinct operator roles. The cryptographic module in Panorama or Management-Only mode enforces the separation of roles using unique authentication credentials associated with operator accounts. The Log Collector mode The module does not provide a maintenance role or bypass capability. Table 9 - Roles and Authentication In FIPS-CC Mode, the module checks and enforces the minimum password length of eight (8) as specified in SP 800-63B. Passwords are securely stored hashed with salt value, with very restricted access control, and rate limiting mechanism for authentication attempts. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 12

Single-Factor Cryptographic Software (certificate common name / public The minimum equivalent strength supported is 112 bits. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2112) which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 10/(2112), which is less than 1/100,000. The module supports at most 10 failed attempts and locks out afterwards. Definition of CSPs Modes of Access The following table defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. Note: Unless otherwise specified, all services are available in all system modes. If there is a service that is specific to a certain system mode, it is noted in the Description column. Table 10

• Approved Services N/A G/R/E/W G/R/E/W G/R/E/W N/A N/A G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E G/E/Z © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 13

G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z G/E N/A N/A N/A W/E G/W/E G/W/E G/R/E/W W/E G/E/Z G/E/Z G/R/E/W G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z Palo Alto Networks, Inc. W/E © 2025 G/R/E/W G/E/R/W/Z G/E/Z Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 14

G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z N/A W/E G/E N/A G/E/W W/E G/R/E/W G/R/E/W G/R/E/W G/R/W/E G/R/W/E G/E N/A © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. N/A N/A W/E W/E N/A N/A G/E/Z G/E/Z N/A Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 15

N/A G/E/W N/A d Z E N/A d N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A G/W/E G/W/E G/R/E/W G/R/E/W © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. KAS KDF TLS (CVL), G/E/Z Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 16

G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z G/E/Z G/E Note: Configuration/System Logs for Approved services above will indicate FIPS-CC mode is enabled and that the service succeeded. 5.​ Software/Firmware Security The module performs the Software Integrity test by using HMAC-SHA-256 (HMAC Cert. #A2244) during the Pre-Operational Self-Test. In addition, the module also conducts a software load test by using RSA 2048 with SHA-256 (Cert. #A2244) for the new validated software to be uploaded into the module via the Panorama Software Update service. The Software Integrity Verification key and Public key for Software Content Load Test used for the Software Integrity and Software Load test, respectively, are generated externally and delivered as part of the module software image. The pre-operational self-tests can be initiated by power cycling the module. When this is performed, the module automatically runs the cryptographic algorithm self-tests in addition to the pre-operational software integrity test. Any software loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate is out of scope of this validation, and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. 6.​ Operational Environment The module is a modifiable operational environment as per FIPS 140-3 Level 1 specifications. The hypervisor environment provides an isolated operating environment and is the single operator of the virtual machine. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 17

The tested operating environments isolate virtual systems into separate isolated process spaces. Each process space is logically separated from all other processes by the operating environments software and hardware. The module functions entirely within the process space of the isolated system as managed by the single operational environment. This implicitly meets the FIPS 140-3 requirement that only one (1) entity at a time can use the cryptographic module. 7.​ Physical Security 8.​ Non-Invasive Security The module is a software only module; FIPS 140-3 physical security requirements are not applicable. There are currently no defined Approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics in SP 800-140F. 9.​ Sensitive Security Parameters Management The following table details all the sensitive security parameters utilized by the module. “TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted” corresponds to the following KTS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table:

• ​ AES Cert. #A2244, HMAC Cert. #A2244
• ​ AES-GCM Cert. #A2244 “SSH, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3” corresponds to the following KAS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table:
• ​ KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A2244, KDF SSH Cert. #A2244
• ​ KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A2244, KDF SSH Cert. #A2244 “TLS, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3” corresponds to the following KAS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table:
• ​ KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A2244, KDF TLS Cert. #A2244
• ​ KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A2244, KDF TLS Cert. #A2244 Table 11
• SSPs N/A © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. N/A Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 18

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 19

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A © 2025 N/A Palo Alto Networks, Inc. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 20

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Note: SSPs are implicitly zeroized when power is lost, or explicitly zeroized by the zeroize service. In the case of implicit zeroization, the SSPs are implicitly overwritten with random values due to their ephemeral memory being reset upon power loss. For the zeroization service and zeroization at session termination, the SSP's memory location is overwritten with random values. The module utilizes the following entropy source, which is internal to the physical perimeter of the host GPC. Table 12 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification 10.​ Self-Tests The cryptographic module performs the following tests below. The operator can command the module to perform the pre-operational and cryptographic algorithm self-tests by cycling power of the module. The pre-operational and conditional self-tests are performed automatically and do not require any additional operator action. Pre-operational Self-Tests Pre-operational Software Integrity Test

• ​ Verified with HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256 Note: the ECDSA and HMAC-SHA-256 KATs are performed prior to the Software integrity test Conditional self-tests Cryptographic algorithm self-tests
• ​ AES 128-bit ECB Encrypt Known Answer Test* © 2025 Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 21

• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​
• ​ AES 128-bit ECB Decrypt Known Answer Test* AES 128-bit CMAC Known Answer Test* AES 256-bit GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test AES 256-bit GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test AES 192-bit CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test* AES 192-bit CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test * RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Sign Known Answer Test RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Verify Known Answer Test RSA 2048-bit Encrypt Known Answer Test* RSA 2048-bit Decrypt Known Answer Test* ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Sign Known Answer Test ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Verify Known Answer Test HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test SHA-1 Known Answer Test SHA-256 Known Answer Test SHA-384 Known Answer Test SHA-512 Known Answer Test DRBG SP800-90Arev1 Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Known Answer Tests SP 800-90Arev1 Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Section 11.3 Health Tests SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-FFC-SSC 2048-bit Known Answer Test SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 Known Answer Test SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF Known Answer Test SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.2 KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Test SP 800-135rev1 SSH KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Test SP 800-135rev1 IKEv2 KDF Known Answer Test* SP 800-90B RCT/APT Health Tests on Entropy Source Note: The SP 800-90B Health Tests are implemented by the entropy source. *Note: Supported by the module cryptographic implementation, but only utilized for CAST Conditional Pairwise Consistency Self-Tests
• ​ RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
• ​ ECDSA/KAS-ECC Pairwise Consistency Test
• ​ KAS-FFC Pairwise Consistency Test Conditional Software Load test
• ​ Software Load Test
• Verify RSA 2048 with SHA-256 signature on software at time of load Conditional Critical Functions Tests
• ​ SP 800-56A Rev. 3 Assurance Tests (Based on Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3) Error Handling In the event of a conditional test failure, the module will output a description of the error. These are summarized below. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 22

Table 13 - Errors and Indicators 11.​ Life-cycle Assurance The vendor provided life-cycle assurance documentation describes configuration management, design, finite state model, development, testing, delivery & operation, end of life procedures, and guidance. For details regarding the approved mode of operation, see “Approved Mode of Operation''. For details regarding secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module, see below. Installation Instructions The module can be retrieved by downloading Panorama_pc-10.1.5 from the support site: https://support.paloaltonetworks.com/Support/Index, and a checksum (SHA-256) is available to ensure the module is correct: Panorama_pc-10.1.5: 018fd6b322d1d65023751496ac3f9a7c4890fdd523f9d5a9145c752447b492cb Alternatively, the module version can be obtained by running the following commands via CLI (as an authorized administrator): 1.​ request system software check 2.​ request system software download version 10.1.5 3.​ request system software install version 10.1.5 4.​ request restart system Palo Alto Network provides an Administrator Guide for additional information noted in the “References” section of this Security Policy. The module design corresponds to the module security rules. Module Enforced Security Rules When FIPS-CC mode is enabled, the module runs all the required items noted in Section 10 Self-Tests. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-3 Level 1 module. 1.​ The cryptographic module shall provide distinct operator roles. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to any cryptographic services. 2.​ The cryptographic module shall clear previous authentications on power cycle. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 23

3.​ The module shall support the generation of key material with the approved DRBG. The entropy provided must be greater than or equal to the strength of the key being generated. 4.​ Data output shall be inhibited during power-up self-tests and error states. 5.​ Processes performing key generation and zeroization processes shall be logically isolated from the logical data output paths. 6.​ The module does not output intermediate key generation values. 7.​ Status information output from the module shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module. 8.​ There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service. 9.​ The module maintains separation between concurrent operators. 10.​ The module does not support a maintenance interface or role. 11.​ The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data. 12.​ The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs. Vendor Imposed Security Rules In FIPS-CC mode, the following rules shall apply: 1.​ The operator should not enable TLSv1.0 or use RSA for key wrapping; it is disabled by default. a.​ Checked via CLI using “show shared” command 2.​ When FIPS-CC mode is enabled, the operator shall not install plugins. a.​ Checked via CLI using “show plugins installed” 3.​ When FIPS-CC mode is enabled, the operator shall not use TACACS+. RADIUS may be used but must be protected by TLS protocol. a.​ Checked via CLI using “show deviceconfig” command Failure to follow these Security Rules will cause the module to operate in a non-compliant state. Key to Entity The cryptographic module associates all keys (secret, private, or public) stored within, entered into or output from the module with authenticated operators of the module. Keys stored within the module are only made available to authenticated operators via TLS or SSH. Keys are only input or output from the module by the authenticated operator via a SSH or TLS protected communication. Any attempt to intervene in the key to entity relationship would require defeating the module TLS or SSH encryption and authentication/integrity mechanism. 12.​ Mitigation of Other Attacks This module is not designed to mitigate other attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-3. 13.​ References [FIPS 140-3] FIPS Publication 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules [AGD] Panorama Administrator’s Guide Version 10.1: https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/techdocs/en_US/pdf/panorama/10-1/panorama-admin/panorama-admin.p df © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 24

14.​ Definitions and Acronyms AES

• Advanced Encryption Standard CA
• Certificate Authority CLI
• Command Line Interface CO
• Crypto-Officer CSP
• Critical Security Parameter CVL
• Component Validation List DB9
• D-sub series, E size, 9 pins DES
• Data Encryption Standard DH
• Diffie-Hellman DRBG
• Deterministic Random Bit Generator EDC
• Error Detection Code ECDH
• Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA
• Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS
• Federal Information Processing Standard HMAC
• (Keyed) Hashed Message Authentication Code KDF
• Key Derivation Function LED
• Light Emitting Diode RJ45
• Networking Connector RNG –Random number generator RSA
• Algorithm developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman SHA
• Secure Hash Algorithm SNMP
• Simple Network Management Protocol SSH
• Secure Shell TLS
• Transport Layer Security USB
• Universal Serial Bus VGA
• Video Graphics Array © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama VM 10.1 Security Policy 25

Referenced URLs

• www.paloaltonetworks.com​
• https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html
• https://support.paloaltonetworks.com/Support/Index
• https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/techdocs/en_US/pdf/panorama/10-1/panorama-admin/panorama-admin.p