Panorama 10.1 on Hardware Appliances

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (30)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Panorama 10.1 on Hardware Appliances
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Update<br/>Firmware Load</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>status output<br/>self-test</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Panorama 10.1 on Hardware Appliances
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Update<br/>Firmware Load</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>status output<br/>self-test</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Palo Alto Networks Panorama 10.1 on Hardware Appliances Version: 1.2 Revision Date: February 13, 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.​ www.paloaltonetworks.com​ © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks. A list of our trademarks can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective companies.​

1.​ General The Panorama 10.1 on Hardware Appliances from Palo Alto Networks Inc., hereafter referred to as “Panorama M-Series”, “modules”, or the “cryptographic modules” are multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic modules designed to fulfill FIPS 140-3 level 2 requirements. Panorama M-Series management appliances provide centralized management and visibility of Palo Alto Networks next generation firewalls. From a central location, you can gain insight into applications, users, and content traversing the firewalls. The knowledge of what is on the network, in conjunction with safe application enablement policies, maximizes protection and control while minimizing administrative effort. Your security team can centrally perform analysis, reporting, and forensics with the aggregated data over time, or on data stored on the local firewall. The Panorama M-Series management appliances’ individual management and logging components can be separated in a distributed manner to accommodate large volumes of log data. Panorama M-Series management appliances can be deployed in the following ways:

• ​ Centralized: In this scenario, all Panorama management and logging functions are combined into a single device.
• ​ Distributed: you can separate the management and logging functions across multiple devices, splitting the functions between managers and log collectors. o​ Panorama: The Panorama manager is responsible for handling the tasks associated with policy and device configuration across all managed devices. The manager analyzes the data stored in managed log collectors for centralized reporting. o​ Management-Only: Providing the ability to perform all functions of Panorama with the exception of logging. o​ Log Collector: Organizations with high logging volume and retention requirements can deploy dedicated Panorama log collector devices that will aggregate log information from multiple managed firewalls.
• ​ Panorama on the M-500 and M-600 supports an additional mode, the PAN-DB private cloud. The PAN-DB private cloud is an on-premise solution that is suitable for organizations that prohibit or restrict the use of the PAN-DB public cloud service. With this on-premise solution, you can deploy one or more M-500/M-600 appliances as PAN-DB servers within your network or data center. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 3

Table 1 - Security Levels © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 4

2.​Cryptographic Module Specification The configurations for this validation are highlighted in Table 2. Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration Approved Mode of Operation The following procedure will initialize the modules into the Approved mode of operation:

• ​ Install physical kit and tamper evidence seals according to the Physical Security Policy section. Physical kits must be correctly installed to operate in the Approved mode of operation. The tamper evidence seals and opacity shields shall be installed for the module to operate in a Approved mode of operation.
• ​ During initial boot up, break the boot sequence via the console port connection (by pressing the maint button when instructed to do so) to access the main menu.
• ​ Select “Continue.”
• ​ Select the “Set FIPS-CC Mode” option to initialize the Approved mode.
• ​ Select “Enable FIPS-CC Mode”.
• ​ When prompted, select “Reboot” and the module will re-initialize and continue into the Approved mode of operation (FIPS-CC mode).
• ​ The module will reboot.
• ​ In FIPS-CC mode, the console port is available only as a status output port.
• ​ Once the module has finished booting, the Crypto Officer can authenticate using the default credentials that come with the module o​ Once authenticated, the module will automatically require the operator to change their password; and the default credential is overwritten The module will automatically indicate the Approved mode of operation in the following manner:
• ​ Status output interface will indicate “**** FIPS-CC MODE ENABLED ****” via the CLI session.
• ​ Status output interface will indicate “FIPS-CC mode enabled successfully” via the console port.
• ​ The module will display “FIPS-CC” at all times in the status bar at the bottom of the web interface.
• ​ The module will display “fips-cc” when “show system info” is entered via the CLI Should one or more power-up self-tests fail, the Approved mode of operation will not be achieved. Feedback will consist of:
• ​ The module will output “FIPS-CC failure”
• ​ The module will reboot and enter a state in which the reason for the reboot can be determined. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 5

• ​ To determine which self-test caused the system to reboot into the error state, connect the console cable and follow the on-screen instructions to view the self-test output. Note: Disabling FIPS-CC mode causes a complete factory reset, which is described in the Zeroization section below. Selecting Panorama, Management-Only, and PAN-DB System Modes Panorama M-Series appliances support multiple configurations that provide varying services. The Cryptographic Officer can initialize the module into different system modes. The primary and default system mode is the Panorama mode. The Management-Only system mode is the same as Panorama mode except there is no log collecting service. The Log Collector system mode is a secondary mode that provides a focused log collecting and forwarding capability. Directions to convert the appliance into the Log Collector mode are discussed below. The M-500 and M-600 provide a fourth system mode, PAN-DB Private Cloud server. Convert the M-200/M-500/M-600 appliance from Panorama mode to the Management-Only mode:
• ​ Log into the CLI via SSH
• ​ Enter “request system system-mode management-only”
• ​ Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Management-Only mode.
• ​ The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests. Convert the M-200/M-500/M-600 appliance from Management-Only mode to the Panorama mode:
• ​ Log into the CLI via SSH
• ​ Enter “request system system-mode panorama”
• ​ Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Panorama mode.
• ​ The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests. Convert the M-500/M-600 appliance from Panorama Manager mode to the dedicated PAN-DB Private Cloud mode:
• ​ Log into the CLI via SSH
• ​ Enter “request system system-mode panurldb”
• ​ Enter “Y” to confirm the change to PAN-DB Private Cloud mode.
• ​ The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests. Convert the M-500/M-600 appliance from PAN-DB mode to the Panorama Manager mode:
• ​ Log into the CLI via SSH
• ​ Enter “request system system-mode panorama”
• ​ Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Panorama mode.
• ​ The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests. Selecting Panorama Log Collector System Mode Convert the M-200/M-500/M-600 appliance from Panorama mode to the dedicated Panorama Log Collector mode:
• ​ Log into the CLI via SSH
• ​ Enter “request system system-mode logger”
• ​ Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Panorama Log Collector mode.
• ​ The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 6

Convert the M-200/M-500/M-600 appliance from Panorama Log Collector mode to the Panorama mode:

• ​ Log into the CLI via SSH
• ​ Enter “request system system-mode panorama”
• ​ Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Panorama mode.
• ​ The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests. NOTE: Changing the System Mode does not change the FIPS-CC Mode. Non-Compliant State Failure to follow the directions in the Approved Mode of Operation above or rules noted in Section 11 will result in the module operating in a non-compliant state, which is considered out of scope of this validation. Zeroization The following procedure will zeroize the module and must be performed under the control of the operator:
• ​ Access the module’s CLI via SSH, and command the module to enter maintenance mode (“debug system maintenance-mode”); the module will reboot o​ Note: Establish a serial connection to the console port
• ​ After reboot, select “Continue.”
• ​ Select “Factory Reset”
• ​ The module will perform a zeroization, and provide the following message once complete: o​ “Factory Reset Status: Success” Approved and Allowed Algorithms The following table details the cryptographic algorithms and their algorithm certificates. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes specified in this table are used by the module. The CAVP certificate may contain more tested options than listed in this table. Table 3 - Approved Algorithms © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 7

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D.G. D.G. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 9

The module is compliant to IG C.H: GCM is used in the context of TLS and SSH:

• ​ For TLS, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with SP 800-52 and in accordance with Section 4 of RFC 5288 for TLS key establishment, and ensures when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts all possible values for a given session key, that a new TLS handshake is initiated per sections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 of RFC 5246. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly. o​ From this RFC 5288, the GCM cipher suites in use are TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• ​ For SSH, the module meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H. The module conforms to RFCs 4252, 4253, and 5647. The fixed field is 4-byte in length and is derived using the SSH KDF; this ensures the fixed field is unique for any given GCM session. The invocation field is 8-byte in length and is incremented for each invocation of GCM; this prevents the IV from repeating until the entire invocation field space of 264 is exhausted, which can take hundreds of years. (In FIPS-CC Mode, SSH rekey is automatically configured at 1 GB of data or 1 hour, whichever comes first.) In all the above cases, the nonce_explicit is always generated deterministically. AES GCM keys are zeroized when the module is power cycled. For each new TLS or SSH session, a new AES GCM key is established. The module is compliant to IG C.F: The module utilizes approved modulus sizes 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits for RSA signatures. This functionality has been CAVP tested as noted above. The minimum number of Miller Rabin tests for each modulus size is implemented according to Table C.2 of FIPS 186-4. For modulus size 4096 the module implements the largest number of Miller-Rabin tests shown in Table C.2. RSA SigVer is CAVP tested for all three supported modulus sizes as noted above. The module does not perform FIPS 186-2 SigVer. All supported modulus sizes are CAVP testable and tested as noted above. The module does not implement RSA key transport in the approved mode. The module does not have any algorithms that fall under: -​ Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation -​ Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 10

The following table documents the module’s algorithms that are non-approved and not allowed for use in the approved mode of operation. Table 4A - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed Table 5 - Supported Protocols in the Approved Mode Supported Protocol SSHv2 SNMPv3 Note: these protocols were not reviewed or tested by the CMVP or CAVP. Module Diagrams Figures 1 - 6 depict the modules and their interfaces. The cryptographic boundary includes the physical perimeter of the enclosure of the appliance with the physical kit installed and all logical components within. Please refer to the appendices for depictions of the modules with the physical kits installed. Figure 1 - M-200 Front Figure 2 - M-200 Rear Figure 3 - M-500 Front © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 11

Figure 4 - M-500 Rear Figure 5 - M-600 Front Figure 6 - M-600 Rear 3.​Cryptographic Module Interfaces The modules are multi-chip standalone modules with ports and interfaces as shown below. The modules do not implement a Table 6 - Ports and Interfaces © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 12

4.​Roles, Services, and Authentication Assumption of Roles The module supports distinct operator roles. The cryptographic module in Panorama mode, Management-Only mode, or PAN-DB mode enforces the separation of roles using unique authentication credentials associated with operator accounts. The Log Collector mode only supports one role, the Crypto-Officer (CO) role. The module supports concurrent operators. The module does not provide a maintenance role or bypass capability. Table 7 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 13

In FIPS-CC Mode, the module checks and enforces the minimum password length of eight (8) as specified in SP 800-63B. Passwords are securely stored hashed with salt value, with very restricted access control, and rate limiting mechanism for © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 14

Access Control Policy While in the Approved mode of operation all authenticated services and CSPs are accessed via authenticated SSH or TLS sessions. Access is restricted to authenticated operators only and no interface is provided to modify the public or private key. SNMPv3 authentication is supported but is not a method of module administration and does not allow read/write access of CSPs. Approved and allowed algorithms, relevant CSP and public keys related to these protocols are used to access the following services. CSP access by services is further described in the following tables. Additional service information and administrator guidance for Panorama can be found at https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/. The Crypto-Officer may access all services, and through the “management of administrative access” service may define multiple Crypto-Officer roles with limited services. The User role provides read-only access to the System Audit service. When configured in the default mode, Panorama Manager provides services via web-browser based interface and a command line interface (CLI). For the Panorama Log Collector mode and PAN-DB mode, only the CLI is available for The table below defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. Table 11 - Approved Services © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 15

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Note: Configuration/System Logs for Approved services above will indicate FIPS-CC mode is enabled and that the service succeeded. 5.​Software/Firmware Security The module performs the Firmware Integrity test by using HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA signature verification (HMAC and ECDSA Cert. #A2137) during the Pre-Operational Self-Test. In addition, the module also conducts the firmware load test by using RSA 2048 with SHA-256 (Cert. #A2137) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module via the Panorama Firmware Update service. The Firmware Integrity Verification key and Public key for Firmware Load Test used for the Firmware Integrity and Firmware Load test, respectively, are generated externally and delivered as part of the module firmware image. The pre-operational self-tests can be initiated by power cycling the module. When this is performed, the module automatically runs the cryptographic algorithm self-tests in addition to the pre-operational firmware integrity test. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 22

The module’s executable code is in the form of the compiled firmware image loaded onto the module. 6.​Operational Environment The FIPS 140-3 Area 5 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the module contains a non-modifiable operational environment. The operational environment is limited since the module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The multi-chip standalone modules are production quality containing standard passivation. Chip components are protected by an opaque enclosure. There are tamper-evident seals that are applied on the modules by the Crypto-Officer. There are fifteen (15) for the M-200, twelve (12) for the M-500, and twenty-one (21) for the M-600. All unused seals are to be controlled by the Crypto-Officer. The seals prevent removal of the opaque enclosure without evidence. The Crypto-Officer must ensure that the module surface is clean and dry. Tamper evident seals must be pressed firmly onto the adhering surfaces during installation and once applied, the Crypto-Officer shall permit 24 hours of cure time for all tamper evident seals. The seals prevent removal of the opaque enclosure without evidence. The Crypto-Officer should inspect the seals and shields for evidence of tamper every 30 days. If the seals show evidence of tamper, the Crypto-Officer should assume that the modules have been compromised and contact support. Note: For ordering information, see Table 2 for physical kit part numbers and versions. Opacity shields are included in the physical kits. Operator Required Actions The following table provides information regarding the various physical security mechanisms, and their recommended Table 14 - Physical Security Inspection Guidelines © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 23

Refer to the following sections for instructions on installation and placement of the tamper seals and opacity shields. M-200 Tamper Seal Installation (15 Seals) 1.​ Replace the top cover with the physical top cover. a.​ Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the kit). M-200 appliance—Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left top cover screw then use a Phillips-head screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration. b.​ Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the cover toward the back of the appliance to remove it. c.​ Slide the top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release buttons click. Reinsert and slide cover into position and secure with the two (2) screws.​ ​ Figure 7 – M-200: Top Cover Replacement © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 24

2.​ On the left side of the M-200, firmly apply seven (7) tamper-evident seals as indicated in the illustration. Figure 8

• M-200: Side View Before Rail Installation Install the inner rack mount rail brackets as described in the “M-200 and M-600 Appliance Hardware Reference”. The front rack bracket that you replace in the next step is located on the front inner rails. ​ Figure 9
• M-200: Inner Rack Mount Rail Brackets 3.​ Attach the front cover brackets. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 25

Replace the front rack-mount brackets (one bracket on each side) that are part of the inner-rack rails with the rack-mount brackets by removing and then reinstalling two screws on each bracket. The handles have standoffs that are used to secure the front cover. ​ Figure 10

• M-200: Replacing Front Rack-Mount Brackets​ 4.​ Attach the physical kit front cover to the front of the appliance. Slide the M-200 physical kit front cover over the brackets and secure the cover by turning the thumb screws clockwise (one thumb screw on each side). Figure 11
• M-200: Attach Physical Kit Front Cover © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 26

5.​ Attach the physical kit back cover to the back of the appliance. Slide the back cover onto the back of the appliance, insert two M4 x 0.7 x 8mm (one (1) screw on each side), and turn the screws clockwise to secure the cover. 6.​ Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following M-200 illustrations. Ensure you apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the power supplies (see seals #14 and #15 on the rear illustration). Before you apply the tamper-evident seals, ensure that the appliance and physical kit surfaces are clean and dry. Firmly press one (1) seal on to each of the locations shown in the illustrations. Avoid touching the seals for at least 24 hours to allow time for the seals to properly adhere to the appliance and physical kit surfaces. Figure 12

• M-200: Seal locations on Top and Right Side Figure 13
• M-200: Seal Locations on Left Side and Rear © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 27

M-500 Tamper Seal Installation (15 Seals) Step 1: Remove the two pull handles and front modules on the left and right side of the appliance by removing the three (3) screws located behind each handle/module. There is no need to disconnect the LED circuit board attached to the end of the ribbon cable. Retain these screws for Step

2. Figure 14 – M-500: Remove Front Handles and Modules Step 2: Attach the left and right front cover brackets to the appliance using the six (6) screws that you removed in Step
3. First attach the brackets using the bottom screws (one on each side) as shown in Figure 15, ensuring that you feed the ribbon cable and LED circuit board through the left bracket. Replace the front modules and secure them using the middle and top screws on each side as shown in Figure 16. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 28

Figure 15

• M-500: Secure the Front Brackets Figure 16
• M-500: Attach Pull Handles and Front Modules Step 3: Secure the front opacity shield to the right and left front brackets that you installed in Step 2. Use two (2) screws (provided) on each side. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 29

Figure 17

• M-500: Install Front Opacity Shield Figure 18
• M-500: Front Opacity Shield Installed Step 4: Attach the rear opacity shield tray to the appliance. First, remove the two (2) screws (shown in Figure 19) from the appliance and use these screws to secure the rear opacity shield tray. Note: Install the back cables (power cords and network/management cables) because you will not be able to access these ports after the next step. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 30

Figure 19

• M-500: Install Rear Opacity Shield Tray Step 5: Place the rear opacity shield on top of the rear opacity shield tray ensuring that you run the cables through the opening at the bottom. Secure the opacity shields with two (2) screws (provided) on each side. Figure 20
• M-500: Install Rear Opacity Shield Step 6: © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 31

Cover the vent openings as shown in Figure 21 by applying one (1) overlay sticker over the left side vent and one (1) overlay sticker over the right side vent. Each overlay requires two (2) tamper seals as shown in Figure 46 (A). Also apply one (1) additional tamper seal as shown in Figure 22 (B) #5. Figure 21

• M-500: Apply Vent Overlays Figure 22
• M-500: Apply Tamper Seals on Vent Overlays and Side Opening Step 7: Re-attach the rail kit to the appliance as shown in Figure 23 and then add three (3) tamper seals to the bottom of the appliance as shown in Figure 24. One (1) tamper seal prevents tampering of the front opacity shield connected to the bottom of the appliance and two (2) tamper seals wrap around the upper and lower rear opacity shields to prevent tampering of the rear opacity shields. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 32

Figure 23

• M-500: Install Rail Kit Figure 24
• M-500: Apply Tamper Seals on the Bottom of the Appliance Step 8: Place four (4) tamper seals on the top of the appliance. Two (2) tamper seals (#9 and #11) prevent tampering of the top front and rear opacity shields and two (2) tamper seals (#10 and #12) prevents someone from attempting to access the vent overlays by sliding the rail kit. This completes the FIPS kit installation. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 33

Figure 25 – M-500: Apply Tamper Seals on the Top and Sides of the Appliance M-600 Tamper Seal Installation (21 Seals) 1.​ Replace the top cover with the physical top cover. a.​ Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the kit). Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left side cover screw then use a Phillips-head screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration. b.​ Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the cover toward the back of the appliance to remove it. c.​ Slide the physical kit top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release buttons click. Replace the two screws that you removed from the old cover © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 34

Figure 26

• M-600: Top Cover Replacement 2.​ Attach the physical front cover brackets. Remove the front pull handles by removing two (2) screws from each handle (one (1) handle on each side), insert the M-600 physical kit front-cover brackets under each handle, and then replace the handles and secure them using the screws that you removed. The physical kit handles have standoffs that are used to secure the front cover. Figure 27
• M-600: Front Cover Bracket 3.​ Attach the physical kit front cover to the front of the appliance. Slide the M-600 physical kit front cover over the physical kit pull handle brackets and secure the cover by turning the thumb screws clockwise (one thumb screw on each side). © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 35

Figure 28 – M-600: Physical Kit Front Cover 4.​ Install a tamper-evident seal on the back of the appliance. This is seal #13 in the M-600 Figure 29. You need to install this seal before you install the M-600 physical kit back cover. 5.​ Attach the physical kit back cover to the back of the appliance. a.​ Slide the back cover onto the back of the appliance and turn the two (2) thumb screws clockwise until tight (one (1) screw on each side) to secure the cover. 6.​ Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following M-600 illustrations below.​ Also install the overlay stickers to cover vent openings (two (2) stickers on each side). You then install tamper-evident seals over the overlay stickers. Apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the back side of the right rack handle (see seals #18 and #19 on the left side in Figure 29). Apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the power supplies (see seals #11 and #12 with rear inset of Figure 29). Note: Before you apply the tamper-evident seals, ensure that the appliance and physical kit surfaces are clean and dry. Firmly press one (1) seal on to each of the locations shown in the illustrations. Avoid touching the seals for at least 24 hours to allow time for the seals to properly adhere to the appliance and physical kit surfaces. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 36

Figure 29

• M-600: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Rear) Figure 30
• M-600: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Front) © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 37

Figure 31

• M-600: Tamper Seals Location for Side Rails 8.​Non-Invasive Security There are currently no defined Approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics in SP 800-140F. 9.​Sensitive Security Parameters Management The following table details all the sensitive security parameters utilized by the module. “TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted” corresponds to the following KTS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table:
• ​ AES Cert. #A2137, HMAC Cert. #A2137
• ​ AES-GCM Cert. #A2137 “SSH, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3” corresponds to the following KAS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table:
• ​ KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF SSH Cert. #A2137
• ​ KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF SSH Cert. #A2137 “TLS, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3” corresponds to the following KAS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table:
• ​ KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF TLS Cert. #A2137
• ​ KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF TLS Cert. #A2137 © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 38

Table 15 - SSPs © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 39

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 40

Note: SSPs are implicitly zeroized when power is lost, or explicitly zeroized by the zeroize service. In the case of implicit zeroization, the SSPs are implicitly overwritten with random values due to their ephemeral memory being reset upon power loss. For the zeroization service and zeroization at session termination, the SSP's memory location is overwritten with random values. Table 16 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 41

The entropy source provides at least 0.506 bits of entropy per bit of output. The DRBG is seeded with 384-bits of output from the entropy source. Therefore the DRBG is seeded with at least 194 bits of entropy before generating keys. The module generates SSPs (e.g., keys) whose strengths are modified by available entropy

10.​ Self-Tests The cryptographic module performs the following tests below. The operator can command the module to perform the pre-operational and cryptographic algorithm self-tests by cycling power of the module; these tests do not require any additional operator action. Pre-operational Self-Tests Pre-operational Firmware Integrity Test

• ​ Verified with HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256 Note: the ECDSA and HMAC-SHA-256 KATs are performed prior to the Firmware Integrity Test Conditional self-tests Cryptographic algorithm self-tests
• ​ AES 128-bit ECB Encrypt Known Answer Test
• ​ AES 128-bit ECB Decrypt Known Answer Test
• ​ AES 128-bit CMAC Known Answer Test*
• ​ AES 256-bit GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• ​ AES 256-bit GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• ​ AES 192-bit CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test*
• ​ AES 192-bit CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test*
• ​ RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Sign Known Answer Test
• ​ RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Verify Known Answer Test
• ​ RSA 2048-bit Encrypt Known Answer Test*
• ​ RSA 2048-bit Decrypt Known Answer Test*
• ​ ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Sign Known Answer Test
• ​ ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Verify Known Answer Test
• ​ HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• ​ HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• ​ HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• ​ SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• ​ SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• ​ SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• ​ DRBG SP 800-90Arev1 Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Known Answer Tests
• ​ SP 800-90Arev1 Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Section 11.3 Health Tests
• ​ SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-FFC-SSC 2048-bit Known Answer Test © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 42

• ​ SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF Known Answer Test
• ​ SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.2 KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ SP 800-135rev1 SSH KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Tests
• ​ SP 800-135rev1 IKEv2 KDF Known Answer Tests* Note: Supported by the module cryptographic implementation, but only utilized for CAST
• ​ SP 800-90B RCT/APT Health Tests on Entropy Source Note: The SP 800-90B Health Tests are implemented by the entropy source. *Note: Supported by the module cryptographic implementation, but only utilized for CAST
• ​ ECDSA/KAS-ECC Pairwise Consistency Test
• ​ Firmware Load Test
• Verify RSA 2048 with SHA-256 signature on firmware at time of load
• ​ SP 800-56A Rev. 3 Assurance Tests (Based on Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3) Error Handling In the event of a conditional test failure, the module will output a description of the error. These are summarized below. Table 17 - Errors and Indicators 11. Life-cycle Assurance When FIPS-CC mode is enabled, the module runs all the required items noted in Section 10 Self-Tests. The vendor provided life-cycle assurance documentation that describes configuration management, design, finite state model, development, testing, delivery + operation, end of life procedures, and guidance. For details regarding the secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module, see section “Modes of Operation”. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 43

Palo Alto Network provides an Administrator Guide for additional information noted in the “References” section of this Security Policy. Module Enforced Security Rules The module design corresponds to the module security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-3 Level 2 module. 1.​ The cryptographic module shall provide distinct operator roles. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to any cryptographic services. 2.​ The cryptographic module provides identity-based authentication 3.​ The cryptographic module shall clear previous authentications on power cycle. 4.​ The module shall support the generation of key material with the approved DRBG. The entropy provided must be greater than or equal to the strength of the key being generated. 1.​ Data output shall be inhibited during power-up self-tests and error states. 2.​ Processes performing key generation and zeroization processes shall be logically isolated from the logical data output paths. 3.​ The module does not output intermediate key generation values. 4.​ Status information output from the module shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module. 5.​ There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service. 6.​ The module maintains separation between concurrent operators. 7.​ The module does not support a maintenance interface or role. 8.​ The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data. 9.​ The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs. Vendor imposed security rules In FIPS-CC mode, the following rules shall apply: 1.​ The operator shall not enable TLSv1.0 or use RSA for key wrapping; it is disabled by default. a.​ Checked via CLI using “show shared” command 2.​ When FIPS-CC mode is enabled, the operator shall not install plugins. a.​ Checked via CLI using “show plugins installed” 3.​ When FIPS-CC mode is enabled, the operator shall not use TACACS+. RADIUS may be used but must be protected by TLS protocol. a.​ Checked via CLI using “show deviceconfig” command Failure to follow these Security Rules will cause the module to operate in a non-compliant state. Key to Entity The cryptographic module associates all keys (secret, private, or public) stored within, entered into or output from the module with authenticated operators of the module. Keys stored within the module are only made available to authenticated operators via TLS or SSH. Keys are only input or output from the module by the authenticated operator via a SSH or TLS protected communication. Any attempt to intervene in the key to entity relationship would require defeating the module TLS or SSH encryption and authentication/integrity mechanism. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 44

12. Mitigation of Other Attacks The module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-3. These requirements are not applicable.
13. References [FIPS 140-3] FIPS Publication 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules [AGD] Panorama Administrator’s Guide Version 10.1
14. Definitions and Acronyms AES – Advanced Encryption Standard CA – Certificate Authority CLI – Command Line Interface CO – Crypto-Officer CSP – Critical Security Parameter CVL – Component Validation List DB9 – D-sub series, E size, 9 pins DES – Data Encryption Standard DH – Diffie-Hellman DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator EDC – Error Detection Code ECDH – Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA – Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standard HMAC – (Keyed) Hashed Message Authentication Code KDF – Key Derivation Function LED – Light Emitting Diode RJ45 – Networking Connector RNG –Random number generator RSA – Algorithm developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm SNMP – Simple Network Management Protocol SSH – Secure Shell TLS – Transport Layer Security USB – Universal Serial Bus VGA – Video Graphics Array © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.1 Security Policy 45