WildFire 10.1 WF-500

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (30)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for WildFire 10.1 WF-500
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update<br/>firmware load</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>status output</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for WildFire 10.1 WF-500
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update<br/>firmware load</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>status output</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Version: 0.8 Revision Date: February 13, 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. www.paloaltonetworks.com © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks, Inc. is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. A list of our trademarks can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective companies.

The Wildfire 10.1 WF-500 from Palo Alto Networks Inc., hereafter referred to as “WildFire” or the “cryptographic module” is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module designed to fulfill FIPS 140-3 level 2 requirements. The WildFire

10.1 WF-500 module identifies unknown malware, zero-day exploits, and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) through

dynamic analysis, and automatically disseminates protection in near real-time to help security teams meet the challenge of advanced cyber-attacks. Unknown files are analyzed by WildFire (WF) in a scalable sandbox environment where new threats are identified, and protections are automatically developed and delivered in the form of an update. The result is a unique, closed loop approach to controlling cyber threats that begins with positive security controls to reduce the attack surface, inspection of all traffic, ports, and protocols to block all known threats, and rapid detection of unknown threats by observing their actual behavior. The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-3. Table 1 – Security Levels © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 3

The Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WF-500 is a multi-chip standalone module. The module is shown in Figure 1. The module boundary is the outer chassis enclosure. The cryptographic boundary includes all the logical components of the modules and the physical perimeter is the outer perimeter of the enclosure of the WF-500. Figure 2 through Figure 5 provide images of the module with the FIPS kit’s opacity shields in place. See the Physical Security section for details regarding the module’s physical security mechanisms. Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration Approved Mode of Operation The module supports only one mode, which is the Approved mode of operation (FIPS-CC mode). The following section details the procedure necessary to place the module into the Approved mode of operation. The following procedure will initialize the module into the Approved mode of operation:

• Install module and interface connections in addition to the physical kit.
• The tamper-evident seals and opacity shields must be installed as per Appendix A for the module to operate in the Approved mode of operation.
• Apply power to the device.
• Establish a serial connection to the console port and command the module to enter into maintenance mode.
• During initial boot up, break the boot sequence via the console port connection (by pressing the maint button when instructed to do so) to access the main menu.
• Select “Continue.”
• Select the “Set FIPS-CC” option, and press enter.
• Select “Enable FIPS-CC Mode,” and press enter.
• When prompted, select “Reboot” and the module will re-initialize and continue into the Approved mode.
• The module will reboot.
• In the Approved mode, the console port is available only as a status output port.
• Once the module has finished booting, the Crypto Officer can authenticate using the default credentials that come with the module
• Once authenticated, the module will automatically require the operator to change their password; and the default credential is overwritten The module will automatically indicate the Approved mode of operation in the following manner:
• Status output interface will indicate “**** FIPS-CC MODE ENABLED ****” via the CLI session.
• Status output interface will indicate “FIPS-CC mode enabled successfully” via the console port. Should one or more power-up self-tests fail, the module will not enter the Approved mode of operation. Feedback will consist of:
• The module will output “FIPS-CC failure.”
• The module will reboot and enter a state in which the reason for the reboot can be determined by following the on-screen instructions. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 4

Note: Disabling “FIPS-CC” mode causes a complete factory reset, which is described in the Zeroization section below. The module does not support a degraded mode of operation. Non-Compliant State Failure to follow the directions in the Approved Mode of Operation above or rules noted in Section 11 will result in the module operating in a non-compliant state, which is considered out of scope of this validation. Zeroization To initiate the zeroization service, perform the following steps:

• Access the module’s CLI via SSH, and command the module to enter maintenance mode; the module will reboot
• Note: Establish a serial connection to the console port
• After reboot, select “Continue.”
• Select “Factory Reset.”
• The module will perform a zeroization, and provide the following message once complete: o “Factory Reset Status: Success” Approved and Allowed Algorithms The cryptographic module has the following CAVP certificates: Table 3 - Approved Algorithms1 Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes specified in this table are used by the module. The CAVP certificate may contain more tested options than listed in this table. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 5

1] © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 6

D.G. (2). (2). © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 7

*The module is compliant to IG C.H: GCM is used in the context of TLS, IPsec/IKEv2, and SSH:

• For TLS, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with SP 800-52 and in accordance with Section 4 of RFC 5288 for TLS key establishment, and ensures when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts all possible values for a given session key, that a new TLS handshake is initiated per sections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 of RFC 5246. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly.
• From this RFC 5288, the GCM cipher suites in use are TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.)
• For IPsec/IKEv2, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with RFCs 4106 and 7296 (RFC 5282 is not applicable, as the module does not use GCM within IKEv2 itself), and ensures when the module exhausts all possible values for a given session key that this triggers a rekey condition. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of IPsec with IKEv2 and found to behave correctly.
• For SSH, the module meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H. The module conforms to RFCs 4252, 4253, and 5647. The fixed field is 4-byte in length and is derived using the SSH KDF; this ensures the fixed field is unique for any given GCM session. The invocation field is 8-byte in length and is incremented for each invocation of GCM; this prevents the IV from repeating until the entire invocation field space of 264 is exhausted, which can take hundreds of years. (In FIPS-CC Mode, SSH rekey is automatically configured at 1 GB of data or 1 hour, whichever comes first.) In all the above cases, the nonce_explicit is always generated deterministically. AES GCM keys are zeroized when the module is power-cycled. For each new TLS or SSH session, a new AES GCM key is established. The module is compliant to IG C.F: The module utilizes approved modulus sizes 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits for RSA signatures. This functionality has been CAVP tested as noted above. The minimum number of Miller Rabin tests for each modulus size is implemented according to Table C.2 of FIPS 186-4. For modulus size 4096 the module implements the largest number of Miller-Rabin tests shown in Table C.2. RSA SigVer is CAVP tested for all three supported modulus sizes as noted above. The module does not perform FIPS 186-2 SigVer. All supported modulus sizes are CAVP testable and tested as noted above. The module does not implement RSA key transport in the approved mode. The cryptographic module does not support Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 8

Supported Protocols*

TLS v1.1, 1.2

SSHv2

SNMPv3

IPsec and IKEv2

The cryptographic module supports the following non-Approved algorithms that are allowed for use in the Approved mode of operation: Table 4 - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed The cryptographic module supports the following non-approved algorithms not allowed for use in the approved mode of operation. Table 5 - Supported Protocols in the Approved Mode (*): These protocols have not been tested or reviewed by the CMVP or the CAVP. (**): See vendor imposed security rule in Security Rules section The module does not have any algorithms that fall under:

• Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
• Non-Approved Algorithms Module Diagrams Figures 1 - 5 depict the module and its interfaces. The cryptographic boundary includes the physical perimeter of the enclosure of the appliance with the physical kit installed and all logical components within. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 9

Figure 1 - Front view of WF-500 Figure 2 - Front view of WF-500 with opacity shield Figure 3 - Rear view of WF-500 with opacity shield Figure 4 - Right side of WF-500 with opacity shields Figure 5 - Left side of WF-500 with opacity shields © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 10

3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces The WF-500 provides the following ports and interfaces: Figure 6 - Front Ports and Interfaces Figure 7 - Rear Ports and Interfaces © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 11

Table 6 - Ports and Interfaces NOTE: Port number 8 (VGA) is omitted intentionally because it is disabled and so N/A. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 12

4. Roles, Services, and Authentication Services When initialized into the Approved mode of operation, all authenticated services are accessed via SSH or TLS sessions. Approved and allowed algorithms, relevant CSPs and public keys related to these protocols are accessed to support the following services. CSP access by services is further described in the following tables. The Crypto-Officer (CO) may access all services and has the ability to define multiple Crypto-Officer roles. The User role establishment of VPN connections between several WildFire WF-500 modules. Table 7 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 13

CO

Configuration Management

Configuring and managing cryptographic parameters and setting/modifying communication

Confirmation of service via Configuration/System Logs

Assumption of Roles The module supports distinct operator roles. The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles using unique authentication credentials associated with operator accounts. The module supports concurrent operators with identity-based authentication. The module does not provide a maintenance role or bypass capability. Table 8 – Roles and Authentication In FIPS-CC Mode, the module checks and enforces the minimum password length of eight (8) as specified in SP 800-63B. Passwords are securely stored hashed with salt value, with very restricted access control, and rate limiting mechanism for © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 14

3072, RSA 4096, ECDSA P-256, P-384, or P- 521. The minimum equivalent strength supported is 112 bits. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2112) which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 3,600,000/(2112), which is less than 1/100,000. The module supports at most 60,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period.

The following table defines the access to CSPs and the different module services. While in the Approved mode, all authenticated services and CSPs are accessed via authenticated TLS or SSH sessions. Approved and allowed algorithms, relevant CSPs, and public keys related to these protocols are used to access the services as listed in Table 15. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. Table 9 – Approved Services © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 15

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5. Software/Firmware Security ECDSA Cert. #A2137) during the Pre-Operational Self-Test. In addition, the module also conducts the firmware load test by using the Public Verification Key (RSA 2048 with SHA-256, Cert. #A2137) for the new validated firmware to be Public key for Firmware Content Load Test used for the Firmware Integrity and Firmware Load test, respectively, are generated externally and delivered as part of the module firmware image. The pre-operational self-tests can be initiated by power cycling the module. When this is performed, the module automatically runs the cryptographic algorithm self-tests in addition to the pre-operational firmware integrity test. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 21

The module’s executable code is in the form of the compiled firmware image loaded onto the module. 6. Operational Environment The FIPS 140-3 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable. The operational environment is limited since the Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 22

The multi-chip standalone module is production quality and contains standard passivation. Chip components are protected by an opaque enclosure. There are tamper-evident seals that are applied on the module by the Crypto-Officer, and any unused seals are to be controlled by the Crypto-Officer. The Crypto-Officer must ensure that the module surface is clean and dry before applying the seals. The seals prevent removal of the opaque enclosure without evidence, which should be inspected by the Crypto-Officer every 30 days for evidence of tampering. If the seals or opacity shields show evidence of tamper, the Crypto-Officer should assume that the module has been compromised and contact Customer Support. Note: For ordering information, see Table 1 for physical kit part numbers and version. Opacity shields are included in the physical kits. must be pressed firmly onto the adhering surfaces during installation, and once applied, the Crypto-Officer shall permit 24 hours of cure time for all tamper-evident seals. The placement of the twelve (12) tamper-evident seals are shown in Operator Required Actions The following table provides information regarding the various physical security mechanisms, and their recommended Table 10 - Physical Security Inspection Guidelines © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 23

8. Non-Invasive Security There are currently no defined Approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics in SP 800-140F.
9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management The following table details all the sensitive security parameters utilized by the module. “TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted” corresponds to the following KTS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table: ● AES Cert. #A2137, HMAC Cert. #A2137 ● AES-GCM Cert. #A2137 “IPSec/IKE, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3” corresponds to the following KAS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table: ● KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF IKEv2 Cert. #A2137 ● KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF IKEv2 Cert. #A2137 “SSH, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3” corresponds to the following KAS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table: ● KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF SSH Cert. #A2137 ● KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF SSH Cert. #A2137 “TLS, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3” corresponds to the following KAS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table: ● KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF TLS Cert. #A2137 ● KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF TLS Cert. #A2137 Table 11 – SSPs © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 24

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 25

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 26

Note: SSPs are implicitly zeroized when power cycling and explicitly zeroized when using the zeroize service. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 27

Table 12 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 28

10. Self-Tests The module design corresponds to the module security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of a FIPS 140-3 Level 2 module.
11. The cryptographic module shall provide distinct operator roles. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to any cryptographic services.
12. The cryptographic module shall clear previous authentications on power cycle.
13. The cryptographic module performs the following tests A. Pre-operational Self-Tests
14. Firmware Integrity Test –verified with HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256* *Note: the ECDSA and HMAC-SHA-256 KATs are performed prior to the Firmware integrity test B. Conditional self-tests
15. Cryptographic algorithm self-tests a. AES 128-bit ECB Encrypt Known Answer Test* b. AES 128-bit ECB Decrypt Known Answer Test* c. AES 128-bit CMAC Known Answer Test* d. AES 256-bit GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test e. AES 256-bit GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test f. AES 192-bit CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test* g. AES 192-bit CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test* h. RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Sign Known Answer Test i. RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Verify Known Answer Test j. RSA 2048-bit Encrypt Known Answer Test* k. RSA 2048-bit Decrypt Known Answer Test* l. ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Sign Known Answer Test m. ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Verify Known Answer Test n. HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test o. HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test p. HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test q. HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test r. SHA-1 Known Answer Test s. SHA-256 Known Answer Test t. SHA-384 Known Answer Test u. SHA-512 Known Answer Test v. DRBG Instantiate/Generate/Reseed SP800-90A Known Answer Tests w. SP 800-90A Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Section 11.3 Health Tests x. KAS-FFC-SSC 2048-bit Known Answer Test y. KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 Known Answer Test z. SP 800-135 TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF KAT aa. SP 800-135 TLS 1.2 with SHA-256 KDF KAT bb. SP 800-135 SSH KDF KAT cc. SP 800-135 IKE KDF KAT dd. Continuous Random Number Generator (RNG) test – performed on DRBG ee. SP 800-90B RCT/APT Health Tests on Entropy Source *Note: Supported by the module cryptographic implementation, but only utilized for CAST
16. Pairwise Consistency Self-Tests a. RSA Pairwise Consistency Test b. ECDSA/KAS-ECC Pairwise Consistency Test c. KAS-FFC Pairwise Consistency Test
17. Software/firmware Load test a. Firmware Load Test – Verify RSA 2048 with SHA-256 signature on firmware at time of load © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 29

4. Critical Functions Tests a. SP 800-56A Rev. 3 Assurance Tests (Based on Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3) If any self-tests or conditional tests fail, the module will output ‘FIPS-CC failure’ and the specific test that failed.
5. Power-up self-tests shall not require any operator action.
6. The operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power-up self-test by power cycling the module.
7. Data output shall be inhibited during power-up self-tests and error states.
8. Processes performing key generation and zeroization processes shall be logically isolated from the logical data output paths.
9. The module does not output intermediate key generation values.
10. Status information output from the module shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
11. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
12. The module maintains separation between concurrent operators.
13. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
14. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
15. The module does not allow the input or output of plaintext CSPs.
16. The module provides a warning, “Your device is still configured with the default admin account credentials. Please change your password prior to deployment.” to inform the operator to change their default authentication data.
17. Life-cycle Assurance The vendor provided life-cycle assurance documentation that describes configuration management, design, finite state model, development, testing, delivery + operation, end of life procedures, and guidance. For details regarding the secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module, see section “Approved Mode of Operation” in Section
18. Palo Alto Network provides an Administrator Guide for additional information noted in the “References” section of this Security Policy Vendor imposed security rules In FIPS-CC mode, the following rules shall apply:
19. If the cryptographic module remains inactive in any valid role for the administrator specified time interval, the module automatically logs out the operator. 2.
20. The module enforces a timed access protection mechanism that supports at most ten authentication attempts per minute. After the administrator-specified number of consecutive unsuccessful password validation attempts have occurred, the cryptographic module shall enforce a wait period of at least one (1) minute before any more login attempts can be attempted.
21. In FIPS-CC mode, the following rules shall apply: A. The operator should not enable TLSv1.0 or use RSA for key wrapping; it is disabled by default. ■ Checked via CLI using “show shared” command B. If using RADIUS, it must be configured using TLS. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 30

■ Checked via CLI using “show shared” command Failure to follow these Security Rules will cause the module to operate in a non-compliant state.

12. Mitigation of Other Attacks The module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-3. These requirements are not applicable.
13. References [FIPS 140-3] FIPS Publication 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules [AGD] WildFire Administrator’s Guide https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/techdocs/en_US/pdf/wildfire/101/wildfire-admin/wildfire-admin.pdf
14. Definitions and Acronyms AES – Advanced Encryption Standard CA – Certificate Authority CLI – Command Line Interface CO – Crypto-Officer CSP – Critical Security Parameter CVL – Component Validation List DB9 – D-sub series, E size, 9 pins DES – Data Encryption Standard DH – Diffie-Hellman DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator EDC – Error Detection Code ECDH – Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA – Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standard HMAC – (Keyed) Hashed Message Authentication Code KDF – Key Derivation Function LED – Light Emitting Diode RJ45 – Networking Connector RNG –Random number generator RSA – Algorithm developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm SNMP – Simple Network Management Protocol SSH – Secure Shell TLS – Transport Layer Security USB – Universal Serial Bus VGA – Video Graphics Array WF – WildFire © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 31

Appendix A – WF-500 Physical Kit Installation Guide (12 Tamper-Evident Seals) This section provides steps on how to install the Physical Kit on the WF-500 module. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 32

Step 1: Remove the two pull handles and front modules on the left and right side of the appliance by removing the three (3) screws located behind each handle/module. There is no need to disconnect the LED circuit board attached to the end of the ribbon cable. Retain these screws for Step

2. Figure 8 – Remove Front Handles and Modules Step 2: Attach the left and right front cover brackets to the appliance using the six (6) screws that were removed in Step
3. First attach the brackets using the bottom screws (one (1) on each side) as shown in Figure 9, ensuring that you feed the ribbon cable and LED circuit board through the left bracket. Replace the front modules and secure them using the middle and top screws on each side as shown in Figure
4. Figure 9 – Secure the Front Brackets © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 33

Figure 10 - Attach Pull Handles and Front Modules Step 3: Secure the front opacity shield to the right and left front brackets that you installed in Step 2. Use two (2) screws (provided) on each side. Figure 11 – Install Front Opacity Shield © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 34

Figure 12

• Front Opacity Shield Installed Step 4: Attach the rear opacity shield tray to the appliance. First, remove the two (2) screws (shown in Figure 13) from the appliance and use these screws to secure the rear opacity shield tray. Note: Install the back cables (power cords and network/management cables) because you will not be able to access these ports after the next step. Figure 13
• Install Rear Opacity Shield Tray Step 5: Place the rear opacity shield on top of the rear opacity shield tray ensuring that you run the cables through the opening at the bottom. Secure the opacity shields with two (2) screws (provided) on each side. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 35

Figure 14

• Install Rear Opacity Shield Step 6: Cover the vent openings as shown in Figure 15 by applying one (1) overlay tamper-evident seal over the left side vent and one overlay tamper-evident seal over the right side vent. Each overlay requires two (2) tamper-evident seals as shown in Figure 16. Also apply one (1) additional tamper-evident seal as shown in Figure 16, #5. Figure 15
• Apply Tamper-Evident Seals on Vent Overlays © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 36

Figure 16

• Apply Tamper-Evident Seals on Vent Overlays and Side Opening Step 7: Attach the rail kit to the appliance as shown in Figure 17 and then add three (3) tamper-evident seals to the bottom of the appliance as shown in Figure 18. One (1) tamper-evident seal prevents tampering of the front opacity shield connected to the bottom of the appliance and two (2) tamper-evident seals wrap around the upper and lower rear opacity shields to prevent tampering of the rear opacity shields. Figure 17
• Install Rail Kit © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 37

Figure 18 – Apply Tamper-Evident Seals on the Bottom of the Appliance Step 8: Place four (4) tamper seals on the top of the appliance. Two (2) tamper seals (#9 and #11) prevent tampering of the top front and rear opacity shields and two (2) tamper seals (#10 and #12) prevents someone from attempting to access the vent overlays by sliding the rail kit. This completes the physical kit installation. © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 38

Figure 19 – Apply Tamper-Evident Seals on the Top of the Appliance © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 10.1 WF-500 Security Policy 39