Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (193)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback services<br/><i>Error State</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Show Status<br/>Self-Test<br/>Error State</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>IKEV<br/>IPSEC<br/>HTTPS</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Trusted code is reachable<br/>through update and<br/>recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery / rollback services<br/><i>Error State</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Show Status<br/>Self-Test<br/>Error State</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>IKEV<br/>IPSEC<br/>HTTPS</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3 clueHigh;
  class C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Versions: Kernel 6.1.41-64.118.amzn2023, 6.1.41-64.118.fips.amzn2023 Libkcapi 1.4.0-105.amzn2023 Document Version: 1.2 Document Date: 2024-09-20 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Table of Contents © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API List of Tables List of Figures © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Amazon is a registered trademark of Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API 1.1 Overview This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API versions:

• Kernel: 6.1.41-64.118.amzn2023 (Amazon Linux 2023) and 6.1.41-64.118.fips.amzn2023 (SnowOS 1.0) Libkcapi: 1.4.0-105.amzn2023 It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards including this notice. Other documentation is proprietary to their authors. 1.2 Security Levels Table 1 describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the security levels of those individual areas. Table 1 - Security Levels 1.2.1 Additional Information This Security Policy describes the features and design of the module named Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API using the terminology contained in the FIPS 140-3 specification. The FIPS 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Module specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive but unclassified information. The NIST/CCCS Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) validates cryptographic module to FIPS 140-3. Validated products are accepted by the Federal agencies of both the USA and Canada for the protection of sensitive or designated information. intact and including this notice. Other documentation is proprietary to their authors. In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation for consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained. The further refining of the Security Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the conformance testing, wherein the Security Policy was submitted to the vendor, who would then edit, modify, and add technical contents. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API The vendor would also supply additional documentation, which the laboratory formatted into the existing Security Policy, and resubmitted to the vendor for their final editing. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Cryptographic Module Specification 2.1 Description Purpose and Use: The Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API (hereafter referred to as “the module”) provides a C language application program interface (API) for use by other (kernel space and user space) processes that require cryptographic functionality. The module operates on a generalpurpose computer as part of the Linux kernel. Its cryptographic functionality can be accessed using the Linux Kernel Crypto API. Module Type: Software Module Embodiment: Multi-chip standalone Module Characteristics: N/A Cryptographic Boundary: The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined as the kernel binary and the kernel crypto object files, the libkcapi library, and the sha512hmac binary, which is used to verify the integrity of the software components. In addition, the cryptographic boundary contains the .hmac files which store the expected integrity values for each of the software components. Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): The TOEPP of the module is defined as the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed. Figure 1

• Block Diagram 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Version and Identification Tested Module Identification
• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Table 2 - Tested Module Identification Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: The module has been tested on the following platforms with the corresponding module variants and configuration options with and without PAA: Table 3 - Tested Operational Environments Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: The vendor affirms the following platforms with the corresponding module variants and configuration options with and without PAA: Table 4 - Software, Hardware, Hybrid Vendor Affirmed Operational Environment 2.3 Excluded Components There are no components excluded from the requirements of the FIPS 140-3 standard. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API 2.4 Modes of Operation Modes List and Description: Table 5 - Modes List and Description After passing all pre-operational self-tests and cryptographic algorithm self-tests executed on start-up, the module automatically transitions to the approved mode. No operator intervention is required to reach this point. Mode change instructions and status indicators: The module automatically switches between the approved and non-approved modes depending on the services requested by the operator. The status Degraded Mode Description: The module does not implement a degraded mode of operation. 2.5 Algorithms Approved Algorithms: Table 6 lists all approved cryptographic algorithms of the module, including specific key lengths employed for approved services (Table 14), and implemented modes or methods of operation of the algorithms. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API N/A © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Table 6 - Approved Algorithms Vendor Affirmed Algorithms: Table 7 - Vendor Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: The module does not implement non-approved algorithms allowed in the approved mode of operation. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: The module does not implement non-approved algorithms allowed in the approved mode of operation with no security claimed. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: Table 8 lists all non-approved cryptographic algorithms of the module employed by the non-approved services in Table 15. Table 8 - Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms 2.6 © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Table 9 - Security Function Implementations 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information The Crypto Officer shall consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module. For IPsec, the module offers the AES GCM implementation and uses the context of Scenario 1 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 4106. IVs generated using this mechanism may only be used in the context of AES GCM encryption within the IPsec protocol. The module does not implement IPsec. The module’s implementation of AES GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module’s cryptographic boundary. This application must use RFC

7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption

keys are derived. The design of the IPsec protocol implicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV) does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key. In the event the module’s power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that a new key for use with the AES GCM key encryption or decryption under this scenario shall be established. The module also provides a non-approved AES GCM encryption service which accepts arbitrary external IVs from the operator. This service can be requested by invoking the crypto_aead_encrypt API function with an AES GCM handle. When this is the case, the API will not set an approved service indicator, as described in Table 14.

In accordance with IG C.I, the module implements a check to ensure that the two AES keys used in the AES-XTS algorithm are not identical. The length of a single data unit encrypted or decrypted with AES XTS shall not exceed 2 20 AES blocks, that is 16MB, of data per XTS instance. An XTS instance is defined in Section 4 of SP 800-38E. The XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices. It shall not be used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in transit.

For RSA signature verification, all supported, approved modulus sizes have been CAVP tested

To comply with the assurances found in Section 5.6.2 of SP 800-56Ar3, the operator must use the DiffieHellman and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation algorithms with the NVMe and Bluetooth related protocols. Additionally, the module’s approved key pair generation service (see Table 14) must be used to generate ephemeral Diffie-Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman key pairs, or the key pairs must be obtained from another FIPS-validated module. As part of this service, the module will internally perform the full public key validation of the generated public key. The module’s shared secret computation service will internally perform the full public key validation of the peer DH public key, and the partial public key validation of the peer EC public key, complying with Section 5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56Ar3. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API

Digital signature verification using SHA-1 is allowed for legacy use only. 2.8 RBG and Entropy Table 10 - Entropy Certificates Nonphysical The module implements three different Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) implementations based on SP 800-90Ar1: CTR_DRBG, Hash_DRBG, and HMAC_DRBG. Each of these DRBG implementations can be instantiated by the operator of the module, using the parameters listed in Table 6. When instantiated, these DRBGs can be used to generate random numbers for external usage. Additionally, the module employs a specific HMAC-SHA-512 DRBG implementation for internal purposes (e.g. to generate asymmetric key pairs). This DRBG is initially seeded with 384 output bits from the entropy source (corresponding to 384 bits of entropy) and reseeded with 256 output bits from the entropy source (corresponding to 256 bits of entropy). The module complies with the Public Use Document for ESV certificate E105 seeding the aforementioned DRBG using the jent_kcapi_random function, which corresponds to the GetEntropy() function. The operational environment of the module is identical to the one listed on the ESV certificate. There are no maintenance requirements for the entropy source. The following is the link to the Public Use Document of Amazon Kernel CPU Time Jitter RNG Entropy https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/entropy/E105_PublicUse.pdf 2.9 Key Generation The module implements Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG, vendor affirmed), compliant with SP 800133r2. When random values are required, they are directly obtained as output from the SP 800-90Ar1 approved DRBG, compliant with Section 4 of SP 800-133r2 (without XOR). The following methods are implemented:

• Safe Primes key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133r2, Section 5.2, which maps to SP 800-56Ar3. The method described in Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56Ar3 (“Testing Candidates”) is used.
• EC key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133r2, Section 5.1, which maps to FIPS 186-4. The method described in Appendix B.4.2 of FIPS 186-4 (“Testing Candidates”) is used. Note that this generation method is also used to generated ECDH key pairs. Intermediate key generation values are not output from the module and are explicitly zeroized after processing the service. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API

The module implements SSP agreement and SSP transport methods as listed in Table 9. The module implements the P-256 and P-384 curves. For P-256, N is 256 bits and s is 128 bits. For P-384, N is 384 bits and s is 192 bits. The module implements the ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, and ffdhe8192 safe prime groups. For ffdhe2048, N is 2048 bits and s is 112 bits For ffdhe3072, N is 3072 bits and s is 128 bits For ffdhe4096, N is 4096 bits and s is 152 bits For ffdhe6144, N is 6144 bits and s is 176 bits For ffdhe8192, N is 8192 bits and s is 200 bits (N is the bit length of the private key and s is the maximum security strength supported)

AES-GCM with internal IV generation in the approved mode is compliant with RFC 4106 and shall only be used in conjunction with the IPsec protocol. Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman shall only be used with the NVMe and Bluetooth related protocols. No other parts of the NVMe, Bluetooth, or IPSec protocols, other than those mentioned above, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Cryptographic Module Interfaces 3.1 Ports and Interfaces Table 12 - Ports and Interfaces The logical interfaces are the APIs through which the applications request services. These logical interfaces are logically separated from each other by the API design. The module does not implement a © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API 4.1 The module does not implement authentication. 4.2 N/A Table 13 - Roles The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly and always assumed by the operator of the module. No support is provided for multiple concurrent operators. 4.3 Approved Services N/A HMAC-SHA-1, HMACSHA-256, HMAC-SHA384, or HMAC-SHA512 HMAC-SHA-1, HMACSHA-256, HMAC-SHA384, or HMAC-SHA512 © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API E, Z E, Z N/A N/A N/A N/A various noncryptographic N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 14 - Approved Services The following convention is used to specify access rights to SSPs:

• Write (W): The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• Execute (E): The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• N/A: The module does not access any SSP or key during its operation. 4.4 Non-Approved Services © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Table 15 - Non-Approved Services 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The module does not load external software or firmware. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Software/Firmware Security 5.1 Integrity Techniques The Linux kernel binary is integrity tested using an HMAC-SHA-512 calculation performed by the sha512hmac utility (which utilizes the module’s HMAC and SHA-512 implementations) which compares the computed HMAC value with a precomputed HMAC value. An HMAC-SHA-512 calculation is also performed on the sha512hmac utility and the libkcapi library to verify their integrity by comparing the computed HMAC value with a precomputed HMAC value. The kernel crypto object files listed in Table 3. are loaded on start-up by the module and verified using RSA signature verification with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, SHA-512, and a 4096-bit key. 5.2 Initiate On-Demand Integrity Test Integrity tests are performed as part of the pre-operational self-tests, which are executed when the module is initialized. The integrity tests can be invoked on demand by unloading and subsequently reinitializing the module, which will perform (among others) the software integrity tests. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Operational Environment 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements Type of Operating Environment: The module operates in a modifiable operational environment. The module runs on commercially available general-purpose operating systems (Amazon Linux 2023 and SnowOS 1.0), which allows modification, loading, and execution of software that is not part of the validated module. How Requirements are Satisfied: The operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented. 6.2 Configurable Settings and Restrictions The module shall be installed as stated in Section 11. Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace, user space live patching, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-validated operational environment. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Physical Security The module is comprised of software only and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Non-Invasive Security This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Sensitive Security Parameters Management 9.1 Storage Areas Table 16 - Storage Areas The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs. The SSPs are temporarily stored in the RAM in released by the appropriate zeroization function calls. 9.2 Table 17 - SSP Input-Output Methods 9.3 N/A Table 18 - SSP Zeroization Methods All data output is inhibited during zeroization. 9.4 N/A © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API N/A D.L) D.L) (V, C) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 19 - SSP Information First © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API (V, C) Table 20 - SSP Information Second 9.5 Transitions The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes, starting January 1, 2030. The RSA algorithm as implemented by the module conforms to FIPS 186-4, which has been superseded by FIPS 186-5. FIPS 186-4 will be withdrawn on February 3, 2024. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API

C Table 21 - Pre-Operational Self-Tests The pre-operational software integrity tests are performed automatically when the module is powered on, before the module transitions into the operational state. While the module is executing the selftests, services are not available, and data output (via the data output interface) is inhibited until the tests are successfully completed. The module transitions to the operational state only after the preoperational self-tests are passed successfully.

C C C © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API C C C C N/A C N/A C 5.6.2.1.4 Table 22 - Conditional Self-Tests The module performs self-tests on all approved cryptographic algorithms as part of the approved services supported in the approved mode of operation, using the tests shown in Table 22. Upon generation of a DH or EC key pair, the module will perform a pair-wise consistency test (PCT) as shown in Table 22, which provides some assurance that the generated key pair is well formed. This test consists of the PCT described in Section 5.6.2.1.4 of SP 800-56Ar3. Data output through the data output interface is inhibited during the conditional self-tests. The module does not return control to the calling application until the tests are completed. If any of these tests fails, the module transitions to the error state (Section 10.4).

The module does not implement periodic self-tests. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API

Table 23 - Error States If the module fails any of the self-tests, the module enters the error state. In the error state, the output interface is inhibited, and the module accepts no more inputs or requests (as the module is no longer running).

The software integrity tests, CASTs and entropy source start-up tests can be invoked on demand by unloading and subsequently re-initializing the module. The PCTs can be invoked on demand by requesting the Key Pair Generation service. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API

The module is distributed as a part of the Amazon Linux 2023 and SnowOS 1.0 package in the form of the kernel-6.1.41-64.118.amzn2023.rpm, kernel-6.1.41-64.118.fips.amzn2023.rpm, and libkcapihmaccalc-1.4.0-105.amzn2023.0.1.rpm packages.

Before the RPM packages are installed, the Amazon Linux 2023 or SnowOS 1.0 system must operate in the approved mode. This can be achieved by switching the system into the approved mode after the installation. Execute the fips-mode-setup --enable command. Restart the system. More information can be found at the vendor documentation. The Crypto Officer must verify the Amazon Linux 2023 or SnowOS 1.0 system operates in the approved mode by executing the fips-mode-setup --check command, which should output “FIPS mode is enabled.” After installation of the RPM packages, the Crypto Officer must execute the “cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_name” command. The Crypto Officer must ensure that the proper name is listed in the output as follows: Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Then, the Crypto Officer must execute the “cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_version” and “rpm -q libkcapihmaccalc” commands. These commands must output the following (one line per output): EC2 c7g.metal: 6.1.41-64.118.amzn2023.aarch64 libkcapi-hmaccalc-1.4.0-105.amzn2023.0.1.aarch64 EC2 c6i.metal: 6.1.41-64.118.amzn2023.x86_64 libkcapi-hmaccalc-1.4.0-105.amzn2023.0.1.x86_64 AWS Snowball, AWS Snowblade, AWS Snowcone: 6.1.41-64.118.fips.amzn2023.x86_64 libkcapi-hmaccalc-1.4.0-105.amzn2023.0.1.x86_64

There is no non-administrator guidance.

As the module does not persistently store SSPs, secure sanitization of the module consists of unloading the module. This will zeroize all SSPs in volatile memory. Then, if desired, the RPM packages can be uninstalled from the Amazon Linux 2023 or SnowOS 1.0 system. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API

The module does not offer mitigation of other attacks and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Appendix A. Glossary and Abbreviations © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API KW Key Wrap © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API Appendix B. References © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 Kernel Cryptographic API © 2024 Amazon Web Services, Inc., atsec information security.

Referenced URLs

• www.atsec.com
• https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-140-3-ig-
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf
• https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
• https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4106
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a-add.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-108r1.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140Br1.pdf