| Standard | FIPS 140-3 |
|---|---|
| Overall level | 1 |
| Module type | Software-hybrid |
| Embodiment | Single Chip |
| Status | Active |
| Sunset date | 9/22/2026 |
| Caveat | Interim validation. When operated in the approved mode and installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section 11.5 of the Security Policy with bound module Qualcomm® Pseudo Random Number Generator validated to FIPS 140-3 under Cert. #4778 |
| Vendor | Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. |
flowchart LR
%% Deterministic review-risk graph for Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library
%% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update<br/>recovery</i>"]
C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>self-test<br/>Status Output<br/>Show Status</i>"]
C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i>"]
C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
end
subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
end
subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
end
subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
end
C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;flowchart LR
%% Deterministic clue tier for Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library
%% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update<br/>recovery</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>self-test<br/>Status Output<br/>Show Status</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
end
classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library Module version 513b121d8d789b1e5a7fd22743994650a94b222d 108c33b0d82c98ff282bac64 Document Version 1.1 Last update: 08-26-2024 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation
Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
© 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
© 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
This Security Policy describes the features and design of the module named Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library using the terminology contained in the FIPS 140-3 specification. The FIPS 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Module specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive but unclassified information. The NIST/CCCS Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) validates cryptographic module to FIPS 140-3. Validated products are accepted by the Federal agencies of both the USA and Canada for the protection of sensitive or designated information. The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-3 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains: The validation report prepared by the lab. Other supporting documentation and additional references. and including this notice. Other documentation is proprietary to their authors.
was further consolidated into this document by atsec information security together with other vendor-supplied documentation. In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation for consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained. The further refining of the Security Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the conformance testing, wherein the Security Policy was submitted to the vendor, who would then edit, modify, and add technical contents. The vendor would also supply additional documentation, which the laboratory formatted into the existing Security Policy, and resubmitted to the vendor for their final editing. This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library. It has a one-to-one mapping to the [SP800-140B] starting with section B.2.1 named “General” that maps to section 1 in this document and ending with section B.2.12 named “Mitigation of other attacks” that maps to section 12 in this document. ISO/IEC 24759 FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level Section 6. [Number Below]
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 1
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
© 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
5 Software/Firmware Security 1
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Physical Security 2
8 Non-invasive Security N/A
9 Sensitive Security Parameter 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle Assurance 2
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
Overall 1 Table 1 - Security Levels © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library is used by secure applications. It is part of the common library and provides APIs to the secure applications for cryptography and hashing functions. The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library uses the Arm® v8 instruction set architecture for hash operations for SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256.
The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library cryptographic module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a hybrid software Single-Chip cryptographic module that consists of components listed in the table below. The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library is bound to the on-chip Pseudo Random Number Generator module with version 3.1.0 validated to FIPS 140-3 under Cert. #4778. The bound module resides within the same physical perimeter of the binding module. Component Type Version Number Operating System 513b121d8d789b1e5a7fd2 Qualcomm TEE Qualcomm® Trusted Hybrid 2743994650a94b222d108c Execution Environment software TZ.XF.5.24 33b0d82c98ff282bac64 (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library (64 bit) 513b121d8d789b1e5a7fd2 ARMv8 processor1 Hardware 2743994650a94b222d108c N/A 33b0d82c98ff282bac64 TZ_SW_CRYPTO_FIPS_ENA BLE fuse with value of 12 Table 2 - Components of the Hybrid Software Cryptographic Module The ARMv8.5-a is the instruction set version used within the Snapdragon 8 Gen 2 Mobile Platform Snapdragon is a product of Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. and/or its subsidiaries. Arm is a registered trademark of Arm Limited (or its subsidiaries) in the US and/or elsewhere. The TZ_SW_CCRTPTO_FIPS_ENABLE fuse will enable FIPS compliance for Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library. Disabled by default and blow to enable. © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
The module has been tested on the operational environments indicated in Table 3 with the corresponding module variants and configuration options. # Operating System Hardware Platform Processor PAA/Acceleration
1 Qualcomm TEE Snapdragon 8 Gen Snapdragon 8 Gen 2 ARMv8 instruction set
TZ.XF.5.24 2 Mobile Platform Mobile Platform architecture (SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256) Table 3 - Tested operational environments
Table 4 lists all approved security functions (cryptographic algorithms) of the module, including specific key lengths employed for approved services, and implemented modes or methods of operation of the algorithms. CAVP Algorithm and Mode / Method Description / Key Size(s) / Use / Function Cert Key Strength(s) Standard #A2940 AES 128, 192, 256 bits (CBC, CBC, ECB, CTR, ECB, CTR, CCM, CFB128, Encryption, FIPS 197, CCM, CFB128, XTS, OFB) Decryption SP800-38A, SP800- OFB 128, 256 bits (XTS) 38C, SP800-38E #A2940 AES Encryption, CBC-CS2 128, 192, 256 bits SP800-38A Decryption Addendum #A2940 SHA-1 (ARMv8) N/A N/A Hash FIPS 180-4 #A2940 SHA-224 (ARMv8) N/A N/A Hash FIPS 180-4 #A2940 SHA-256 (ARMv8) N/A N/A Hash FIPS 180-4 #A2940 SHA-384 (software) N/A N/A Hash FIPS 180-4 © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
CAVP Algorithm and Mode / Method Description / Key Size(s) / Use / Function Cert Key Strength(s) Standard #A2940 SHA-512 (software) N/A N/A Hash FIPS 180-4 #A2940 Key sizes are between Message HMAC SHA-1, SHA-224, 112-4096 bits in length Authentication SHA-256, SHA-384, FIPS 198-1 SHA-512 112-256 bits of key strength #A2940 ECDSA Key Pair Generation 112
CAVP Algorithm and Mode / Method Description / Key Size(s) / Use / Function Cert Key Strength(s) Standard #A2940 RSA Signature 112-149 bits of security Generation (PKCS#1 strength V1.5) SHA-224, SHA-256, Signature SHA-384- SHA-512 Generation 2048, 3072, 4096 bit FIPS 186-4 modulus #A2940 80-149 bits of security strength RSA Signature Verification (PKCS#1 SHA-1, SHA-224, V1.5) 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature SHA-256, SHA-384, bit modulus Verification SHA-512 FIPS 186-4 (RSA SigVer with a modulus length of 1024 is a legacy algorithm) #A2940 112-149 bits of security RSA Signature strength Generation (PSS) SHA-224, SHA-256, Signature SHA-384, SHA-512 Generation FIPS 186-4 2048, 3072, 4096 bit modulus #A2940 80-149 bits of security strength RSA Signature SHA-1, SHA-224, 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096 Verification (PSS) Signature SHA-256, SHA-384, bit modulus Verification FIPS 186-4 SHA-512 (RSA SigVer with a modulus length of 1024 is a legacy algorithm) #A2940 RSA Signature 112 bits of security Generation
FIPS 186-4 #A2940 PBKDF2 SHA-1, SHA-256, SP800-132 (Option 128-256 bits Key Derivation SHA-512 1b) Vendor CKG RSA 2048, 3072, 4096 bit Key Pair Affirmed SP800-133rev2 modulus Generation Section 4 without V 112
CAVP Algorithm and Mode / Method Description / Key Size(s) / Use / Function Cert Key Strength(s) Standard P-224, P-256, P-384, PECDSA
strength Pseudo Random Number Generator bound module (FIPS 140-3 certificate #4778) #A2945 SHA-256 (bound) and N/A N/A Hash #A2949 FIPS 180-4 #A2945 Hash DRBG Random Number SHA-256 N/A Generation SP800-90Arev1 Table 4 – Approved Algorithms Table 5 lists all non-approved security functions not allowed in approved services of the module. Algorithm/Functions Use/Function DES Encryption, Decryption Triple DES3 Encryption, Decryption Encryption, Decryption, Message GCM/GMAC4 Authentication HMAC (key sizes below 112 bits) Message Authentication RIPEMD-160 Hash MD5 Hash Signature Generation, Signature Verification, SM2 Hybrid Encryption, Hybrid Decryption SM3 Hash Triple DES is CAVP certified with CAVP Cert. #A2940. However, there are two requirements from FIPS 140-3 IG C.G below that contribute to the non-compliance:
SM4 Encryption, Decryption SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 (software) Hash ECDSA (secp160r1, P-192) Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation ECDSA (secp160r1) Signature Verification ECDSA (P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521) Signature Verification
The module implements two modes of operation: (1) the approved mode, in which the approved services are available; and (2) the non-approved mode, in which the non-approved services are available. The current mode of operation of the module can be inferred by the service indicator, which indicates the approved state of the current service being invoked. No configuration is necessary for the module to operate and remain in the approved or non-approved modes. All SSPs are kept separate between the two modes. After the module successfully passes the pre-operational integrity self-test, the module is in the approved mode. If the operator requests a non-approved service, the module implicitly switches to the non-approved mode of operation. When in the non-approved mode of operation, if the operator requests an approved service, the module implicitly switches to the approved mode of operation. Table 8 and 9 list the services available in approved and non-approved mode of operation, respectively. The ECDH has been tested with CAVP certificate #A2940. However, the shared secret generation does not check the key assurance requirements from SP800-56A Rev 3 around trusted third parties during key import. There is a self-test for ECDH but is not listed since it is non-approved. © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
The physical perimeter of the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library is the physical perimeter of the device that contains it. Consequently, the embodiment of the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library is a single-chip cryptographic module. Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the module, with the cryptographic boundary indicated in red, and the physical perimeter in black. Figure 1
The TOEPP (tested operational environment’s physical perimeter) of the module is the entire single chip, the Snapdragon 8 Gen 2 Mobile Platform.
The Crypto Officer interacts with the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library in two distinct ways:
Physical port Logical Interface Data that passes over port/interface N/A Data Input Input parameters of API calls for data Data Output Output parameters of API calls for data Control Input Function calls, input parameters for control Status Output Return code, status values Physical power connector Power Input Power port or pin for single-chip Table 6
The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library supports the Crypto Officer role. The role is implicitly assumed based on the services requested. Table 7 lists the roles supported by the module with corresponding services with input and output. Role Service Input Output From module Crypto Ciphertext, Encryption Key, Plaintext Officer Success/Fail Decryption Key, Ciphertext Plaintext, Success/Fail Hash Input data Hash value Message Authentication HMAC key, Input data HMAC value Key pair (public key + Key Pair Generation Key size private key) Private key, Input data, Signature Generation Signature Hash algorithm Public key, Input data, Signature Verification Success/Fail Signature, Hash algorithm Signature Generation
Hybrid Decryption Key, Ciphertext Plaintext, Success/Fail Public key, Input data, Signature Verification
The module does not support authentication for roles.
The module provides services to operators that assume the available role. Services are accessed through documented API interfaces from the calling application. Additional services are provided by the bound Pseudo Random Number Generator module on the Snapdragon 8 Gen 2 Mobile Platform SoC. This Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library utilizes the random number generation service from the bound Pseudo Random Number Generator module. The next tables define the services that utilize approved, allowed, and non-approved security functions in this module. For the respective tables, the convention below applies when specifying the access permissions (types) that the service has for each SSP. Generate (G): The service establishes the SSP by generation, agreement, or derivation. Read I: The SSP exists in the module and is read by the service and may be output. Write (W): The caller provides the SSP to the service to be imported into the module; written; or updated if the SSP already exists in the module. Execute (E) (or use): The service uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Other access types identify the provenance of the SSP. Zeroize (Z): The service zeroizes the SSP. N/A: The service does not access any SSP or key during its operation. An operator can read the service indicator from a service by invoking the qsee_get_fips_approval_status() function with enum value for QSEE_FIPS_CRYPTO_SVC_TYPE. For details on the enum values please see the product documentation.
Table 8 lists the approved services in this module, the roles that can request the service, the algorithms involved, the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) involved and how they are accessed, and the respective service indicator. In the service tables, CO specifies the Crypto Officer role. © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
Service Description Approved Security Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access Indicator Functions rights
Encrypts data using value with Encryption symmetric AES AES key CO W, E enum cryptography QSEE_FIPS_ AES_*
Decrypts data using value with Decryption symmetric AES AES key CO W, E enum cryptography QSEE_FIPS_ AES_* SHA-1 (ARMv8) SHA-224 (ARMv8) 0 return SHA-256 (ARMv8) value with Computes the hash Hash SHA-384 N/A CO N/A enum value of data (software) QSEE_FIPS_ SHA-512 SHA* (software)
Message value with Computes the HMAC Authenticatio HMAC HMAC key CO W, E enum value of data n QSEE_FIPS_ HMAC* ECDSA private 0 return G, R key value with enum ECDSA Key Pair ECDSA public key G, R QSEE_FIPS_ Generation, CKG ECDSA_KE Generates Intermediate key Y_PAIR_GE G, E, Z N_* Key Pair asymmetric key generation value CO Generation pairs using the bound DRBG RSA private key G, R 0 return value with RSA Key Pair RSA public key G, R enum Generation, CKG QSEE_FIPS_ Intermediate key RSA_KEY_P G, E, Z AIR_GEN_* generation value Signature Generates CO W, E 0 return Generation cryptographic value with signatures of data ECDSA Signature ECDSA private enum Generation key QSEE_FIPS_ ECDSA_SIG _GEN_* RSA Signature RSA private key 0 return Generation value with (PKCS#1 V1.5) enum © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
Service Description Approved Security Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access Indicator Functions rights QSEE_FIPS_ RSA Signature RSA_SIG_G Generation (PSS) EN_*
value with ECDSA Signature enum ECDSA public key Verification QSEE_FIPS_ ECDSA_SIG Verifies _VER_* Signature cryptographic CO W, E Verification RSA Signature 0 return signatures of data Verification value with (PKCS#1 V1.5) RSA public key enum QSEE_FIPS_ RSA Signature RSA_SIG_V Verification (PSS) ER_*
value with ECDSA Signature ECDSA private QSEE_FIPS_ Generation key ECDSA_SIG Component _GEN_COM Signature Generates P_* Generation
Service Description Approved Security Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access Indicator Functions rights Show the versioning information of the module and execute self-tests on Get FIPS Info None N/A CO N/A N/A demand (preoperational selftests and HMAC CAST) Zeroizes all SSPs in Zeroization None All SSPs CO Z N/A the module Table 8 - Approved Services
Table 9 lists the non-approved services that utilize the non-approved security functions listed in Table 5. Service Description Algorithms Accessed Role Indicator Encrypts data using DES, Triple DES, GCM, Encryption CO N/A symmetric cryptography SM4 Decrypts data using DES, Triple DES, GCM, Decryption CO N/A symmetric cryptography SM4 Encrypts data using Hybrid Encryption SM2, ECIES CO N/A hybrid cryptography Decrypts data using Hybrid Decryption SM2, ECIES CO N/A hybrid cryptography RIPEMD-160, MD5, SM3, Computes the hash Hash SHA-1, SHA-224 and CO N/A value of data SHA-256 (software) Message Computes the MAC GMAC, HMAC (key sizes CO N/A Authentication value of data below 112 bits) ECDSA (secp160r1, PKey Pair Generates asymmetric 192) CO N/A Generation key pairs RSA (1024-bit modulus) Ed25519 ECDSA (secp160r1, P192) Signature Generates cryptographic RSA (1024-bit modulus) CO N/A Generation signatures of data Ed25519 SM2 ECDSA (secp160r1) Signature Verifies cryptographic Ed25519 CO N/A Verification signatures of data SM2 © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
Service Description Algorithms Accessed Role Indicator Signature Verifies cryptographic Verification signatures of pre-hashed ECDSA CO N/A Component data Wraps a key using Key Wrapping asymmetric RSA OAEP CO N/A cryptography Shared Secret Computes a shared ECDH CO N/A Computation secret Key Derivation Derive a key HKDF CO N/A Table 9 - Non-Approved Services © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
The integrity of the module is verified by comparing a HMAC-SHA-256 value calculated at run time with the HMAC-SHA-256 value stored in the module that was computed at build time. If the comparison verification fails, the module transitions to the error state (Section 10.3). The HMACSHA-256 algorithm goes through its cryptographic algorithm self-test before the integrity test is performed (Table 11).
The software integrity test is performed as part of the pre-operational self-tests. The preoperational self-tests can be invoked when Get_FIPS_Info service is called.
The module consists of code that will perform algorithmic services for trusted applications. The code is compiled into a shared library. © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
The procurement, build and configuring procedure are controlled. The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library is installed into a commercial off-theshelf (COTS) mobile device by the customer. The software components of this module are executed in the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Therefore, the operational environment is considered limited.
Please see Section 2.3 for the tested operational environment.
There are no security rules, settings or restrictions to the configuration of the operational environment. The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library does not have the capability of loading software or firmware from an external source. The module does not support concurrent operators. © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library is a hybrid software module implemented as part of the Snapdragon 8 Gen 2 Mobile Platform SoC, which is the physical perimeter of the single-chip hybrid software module. The single-chip conforms to the Level 2 requirements for physical security. At the time of manufacturing, the die of the Snapdragon 8 Gen 2 Mobile Platform SoC is embedded within a printed circuit board (PCB), which prevents visibility into the internal circuity of the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library. The layering process which is used to embed the die into the PCB also prevents tampering of the physical components without leaving tamper evidence. The Snapdragon 8 Gen 2 Mobile Platform SoC is further protected by being enclosed in commercial off the shelf mobile device utilizing production grade, commercially available components and said mobile device enclosure completely surrounds the Snapdragon 8 Gen 2 Mobile Platform SoC. There are no steps required to ensure that physical security is maintained. © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
The module does not support any non-invasive security techniques; therefore, this section is not applicable. © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
Table 10 summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module in the approved services (Table 8). SSP Strength Security Generation Import Establish Storage Zeroization Use and Function ment related keys /Export and Cert. # AES key 128, 192, AES N/A Input in N/A RAM When the Encryption,
256 bits #A2940 plaintext via module is Decryption
API input powered Related SSPs: parameters. off N/A No output. HMAC key 112-256 HMAC Message bits #A2940 Authenticatio n Related SSPs: N/A ECDSA 112-256 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Input in N/A RAM Signature private key bits #A2940 compliant plaintext via Generation (P-224, P- method API input and Signature 256, P- described in parameters. Generation 384, P- Appendix component Output in 521) B.4.2. plaintext via Related SSPs: random API output paired with values parameters. ECDSA public obtained key, using the generated SP800from 90Arev1 Intermediate DRBG key provided by generation the bound value module. ECDSA 96-256 Signature public key bits Verification (P-192, P224, PRelated SSPs: 256, Ppaired with 384, PECDSA 521) private key, generated from Intermediate key generation value © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
SSP Strength Security Generation Import Establish Storage Zeroization Use and Function ment related keys /Export and Cert. # RSA 112-149 RSA FIPS 186-4 Input in N/A RAM Signature private key bits #A2940 compliant plaintext via Generation (2048, method API input and Signature 3072, described in parameters. Generation
4096 bit Appendix primitive
Output in modulus) B.3.3. plaintext via random API output Related SSPs: values parameters. paired with obtained RSA public using the key, SP800generated 90Arev1 from DRBG Intermediate provided by key the bound generation module. value RSA public 80-149 Signature key bits Verification (1024, 2048, Related SSPs: 3072, paired with
RSA private modulus) key, generated from Intermediate key generation value Password, N/A PBKDF2 N/A Input in N/A RAM When the Password Salt #A2940 plaintext via module is Based Key API input powered Derivation parameters. off Related SSPs: No output. used to derive Derived key Derived 128
SSP Strength Security Generation Import Establish Storage Zeroization Use and Function ment related keys /Export and Cert. # Intermedia 112-256 ECDSA During No input N/A RAM Automatica Key Pair te key bits #A2940, ECDSA key lly Generation No output generation RSA generation Related SSPs: value #A2940 and RSA key used to generation generate ECDSA public key, ECDSA private key, RSA public key, RSA private key Table 10 - SSPs
The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library implements Password-Based Key Derivation version 2 (PBKDF2) as defined in [SP800-132]. The PBKDF2 function is provided as a service and returns the key derived from the provided password to the caller. The supported option is 1a from Section 5.4 of SP 800-132, whereby the Master Key (MK) is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK). The keys derived from passwords, as shown in SP 800-132, may only be used for storage applications.
The SSP generation methods implemented in the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library for approved services are compliant with SP 800-133Rev2. EC key pair generation is performed according to Appendix B.4.2 of FIPS 186-4 (Testing Candidates) and corresponds to keys used for ECDSA operations. RSA key pair generation is performed according to Appendix B.3.3 of FIPS 186-4 (Probable Prime Generation). The seeds (i.e., the random values) used in asymmetric key pair generation are directly obtained from the SP 80090Arev1 Hash DRBG provided by the bound Qualcomm® Pseudo Random Number Generator module, compliant with SP 800-133r2 section 4 without the use of V (as specified in additional comment #2 to IG D.H). The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library does not generate symmetric keys. Intermediate key generation values are not output from the module during or after processing the service.
The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library only supports manual distribution and electronic entry for SSPs. The SSPs are provided to the module via API input parameters in plaintext form and output via API output parameters in plaintext form. The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library does not enter or output SSPs in plaintext format outside its physical perimeter. © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
All SSPs are output from and input to the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library through the calling process and are destroyed from memory when released. The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library does not persistently store SSPs. The SSPs are stored temporarily in plaintext in the RAM.
The module’s functions deallocate and zeroize temporary SSP values in volatile memory used during the function’s execution. The zeroization consists of writing zeroes to the memory location used by the SSP before deallocating the area. The module does not overwrite SSPs with another SSP. The zeroization service for the SSPs in volatile memory consists of powering off the module, which will remove power from the volatile memory. This action will cause the value of the SSPs in volatile memory to be overwritten by random values the next time the module is powered on. The successful act of powering off the module serves as the implicit indicator of zeroization. © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
All the self-tests are listed in Table 11, with the respective condition under which those tests are performed. The self-tests for the DRBG and SHA used from the bound module are implemented by the bound module. Algorithm Parameters Condition for test Type Test HMAC SHA-1, SHA- Power up Cryptographic Algorithm KAT HMAC 256, SHA- Self-Test computation HMAC-SHA- SHA-256 Power up (after Pre-Operational Self-Test Software integrity
256 HMAC CASTs) test
AES CCM Before first use Cryptographic Algorithm KAT encryption
KAT decryption ECB Before first use Cryptographic Algorithm KAT decryption Self-Test RSA PKCS#1 Before first use Cryptographic Algorithm KAT signature V1.5 with Self-Test generation SHA-256 and 2048 KAT signature bit modulus verification ECDSA P-256 with Before first use Cryptographic Algorithm KAT signature SHA-256 Self-Test generation KAT signature verification PBKDF2 SHA-1, SHA- Before first use Cryptographic Algorithm KAT key derivation 256, SHA- Self-Test RSA PKCS#1 Key pair Pair-wise Consistency PCT signature V1.5 with generation Test generation/verifica SHA-256 tion ECDSA SHA-256 Key pair Pair-wise Consistency PCT signature generation Test generation/verifica tion Table 11 - Self-tests © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library performs pre-operational self-tests when loaded into memory, without operator intervention. The preoperational self-tests ensure that the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library is not corrupted. The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library transitions to the operational state only after the pre-operational self-tests are passed successfully. The types of pre-operational self-tests are described in the next sub-sections. 10.1.1Software Integrity Test Section 5.1 describes the integrity test and the details if the integrity tests are defined in Table 11.
10.2.1Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library performs self-tests on all approved cryptographic algorithms as part of the approved services using the tests shown in Table 11. Data output through the data output interface is inhibited during the selftests. The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library transitions to the operational state only after the cryptographic algorithm self-tests are passed successfully. The known answer test for DRBG is performed by the bound module. 10.2.2Pair-wise Consistency Tests Pair-wise consistency tests are run whenever the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library generates an asymmetric (RSA or ECDSA) key pair using a SHA-256 hash. 10.2.3Periodic/On-Demand Self-Tests The Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library performs on-demand self-tests initiated by calling the Get_FIPS_Info service. All self-tests in Table 11 marked as “Power up” are then executed. An operator can perform the pair-wise consistency tests on demand by requesting the Key Pair Generation service for RSA or ECDSA.
If the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library fails any of the self-tests, the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library enters the error state. In the error state, the data output interface is inhibited, and the module accepts no more inputs or requests. To recover from the error state, re-initialization is possible by successful execution of the pre-operational self-tests and cryptographic algorithm selftests, which can be triggered by a power-off/power-on cycle. Table 12 lists the error state and the status indicator (through calling the qsee_get_fips_info() function with the info_type parameter set to QSEE_FIPS_SELFTEST_STATUS) values that explains the error that has occurred. Error State Error Condition Status Indicator Error Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test, or The module has halted and is © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
Error State Error Condition Status Indicator Software Integrity Test unable to boot. Error Pair-wise Consistency Test The module returns ICryptoSelfTest_CRYPTO_SELFTE ST_FAILED_xxx and enters “Error” state and no further operations is allowed. Table 12 - Error states © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
Perforce Visual Client (P4V), a version control system from Perforce, is used to manage the revision control of the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library software code. The Perforce Visual Client provides version control, branching and merging of code lines, and concurrent development. Git, an open-source version control system, is also used to manage the revision control of the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library unified crypto software code. Git provides version control, branching and merging of code lines, and concurrent development.
The Snapdragon 8 Gen 2 Mobile Platform SoC is delivered from the vendor via a trusted delivery courier. On the reception of the SoC, the operator shall first check all sides of the box to verify that it has not been tampered during the shipment. Then, after opening the box the operator shall verify that the moisture barrier bag is still sealed and does not present any trace of tampering. Finally, after retrieving the SoC, the operator shall perform a visual inspection of the external SoC package of the module, it should appear similar to the pictures in Section 2.6. If one of these verifications fail, the operator shall contact their Qualcomm representative which released the delivery before operating the module. Once the product is received by the customer, configured as defined in section 11.5, and powered up, the test defined in section 10 will be executed.
There are no maintenance requirements.
As stated in Section 9.4, the module does not possess persistent storage of SSPs. The SSP values only exist in volatile memory and these values vanish when the module is powered off. The procedure for secure sanitization of the module at the end of life is simply to power it off, which is the action of zeroization of the SSPs (as specified in Section 9.5). As a result of this sanitization via power-off, all SSPs are removed from the module, so that the module may either be distributed to other operators or disposed.
To enable FIPS for the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library, the fuse must be set according to Table 2. The fuse enablement is mandatory to run as a FIPS validated module. This step needs to be performed only once during initial configuration. The information required for the Crypto Officer to verify the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library is provided by the qsee_get_fips_info() function © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
in qsee_fips_services.h. To verify that a Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library is FIPS certified, the Crypto Officer should verify the following: The HMAC of the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library is on a list of HMACs of certified crypto modules.
Cryptographic Library does not need FIPS 140-3 specific guidance. The FIPS 140-3 functional requirements are always invoked. To use the cryptographic services of the Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Software Cryptographic Library, please refer to 80-NH537-4: Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Version 5.0 User Guide. NOTES: In compliance with [SP 800-38E], the AES algorithm in XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices, and the length of a single data unit encrypted with the AES-XTS shall not exceed 2^20 AES blocks. In compliance with IG C.I, the module performs a check to ensure that the two AES-XTS keys are different. The module supports option 1a from section 5.4 of [SP800-132] PBKDF, in which the Master Key (MK) or a segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK). In compliance with [SP800-132] and IG D.N, the following requirements are met.
The elliptic curve implementation uses the Montgomery Ladder, as well as blinding of base points and private key multiplication. The RSA implementation uses base and modulus blinding to mitigate timing-based side-channel attacks. Blinding countermeasures add randomness to private key operations, making determination of secrets from observations more difficult for the attacker. © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
Appendix A. Glossary and Abbreviations AES Advanced Encryption Standard CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CBC Cipher Block Chaining CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code CFB Cipher Feedback CMT Cryptographic Module Testing CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CSP Critical Security Parameter CTR Counter Mode DES Data Encryption Standard DF Derivation Function DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB Electronic Code Book ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code KAT Known Answer Test MAC Message Authentication Code NDF No Derivation Function NIST National Institute of Science and Technology OFB Output Feedback O/S Operating System PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SHS Secure Hash Standard XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
Appendix B. References FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules March 2019 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3 FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program November 2023 https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) August 2015 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) July 2013 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard November 2001 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 2008 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 February 2003 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques December 2001 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality May 2004 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices January 2010 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.
SP800-57 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5 - Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General May 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf SP800-90A NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators June 2015 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf SP800-131A NIST Special Publication 800-131A Revision 2- Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132 - Recommendation for PasswordBased Key Derivation - Part 1: Storage Applications December 2010 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-132/nist-sp800-132.pdf SP800-133 NIST Special Publication 800-133rev2 - Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation June 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf SP800-140B NIST Special Publication 800-140B - CMVP Security Policy Requirements March 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140B.pdf © 2024 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. / atsec information security.