Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (164)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Recovery<br/>update</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Self-test<br/>Show Status</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>IPSEC<br/>HTTPS</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Recovery<br/>update</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Self-test<br/>Show Status</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>IPSEC<br/>HTTPS</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C5,C6 clueLow;
  class C3 clueHigh;

Security Policy, page by page

Apple Inc. Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] September 2024 Prepared for: Apple Inc. One Apple Park Way Cupertino, CA 95014 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Trademarks Apple’s trademarks applicable to this document are listed in https://www.apple.com/legal/intellectualproperty/trademark/appletmlist.html. Other company, product, and service names may be trademarks or service marks of others. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Table of Contents 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 4.1 4.2 4.3 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 5.1 5.2 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed... 14 10.1 10.2 10.2.1 10.2.2 10.3 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] List of Tables This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] cryptographic module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for a Security Level 1 module. This document provides all tables and diagrams (when applicable) required by NIST SP 800-140B. The column names of the tables follow the template tables provided in NIST SP 800-140B. Table 1 describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the Security Levels of those individual areas. [Number Below] Table 1 - Security Levels This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Cryptographic Module Specification The Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] cryptographic module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a Software module running on a multi-chip standalone general-purpose computing platform. The version of module is 12.0. The module provides implementations of low-level cryptographic primitives to the Device OS’s (iOS 15, iPadOS 15, watchOS 8, tvOS 15, T2OS 12 and macOS 12 Monterey) Security Framework and Common Crypto. 2.1 Tested Operational Environments # This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] # Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments 2.2 Vendor-affirmed Operational Environments # This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate. 2.3 the service utilized. by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 14 - Non-Approved Services. If the device starts up successfully, then the module has NonApproved 2.4 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] 2.5 Approved Algorithms The table below lists all Approved security functions of the module, including specific key size(s) -in bits otherwise noted- employed for approved services. Not all algorithms tested with CAVP are used by the module. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] DRBG [SP80090Arev1] DRBG [SP80090Arev1] DRBG [SP80090Arev1] This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] N/A N/A This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] PBKDF [SP800132] PBKDF [SP800132] This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 6 - Approved Algorithms 2.6 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation There are no non-Approved but “Allowed functions” with security claimed algorithms in approved mode. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] 2.7 2.8 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Table 8 - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation 2.9 Module components Table 9 - Executable Code Sets The module cryptographic boundary is delineated by the dotted green rectangle in the Figure

1. The Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] executes within the user space of the computing platforms and operating systems listed in Table
2. The tested operational environment’s physical perimeter (TOEPP) is represented by the most exterior black line in the block diagram Figure
3. Figure 1 - Block diagram This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Cryptographic Module Interfaces detail these interfaces are described in (Table 10): Table 10 - Ports and Interfaces The module is optimized for library use within the Device OS user space and does not contain any terminating assertions or exceptions. It is implemented as a Device OS dynamically loadable library. After the dynamically loadable library is loaded, its cryptographic functions are made available to the Device OS application. Any internal error detected by the module is returned to the caller with an appropriate return code. The calling Device OS application must examine the return code and act accordingly. The module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented return codes, thus Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] 4.1 The module supports a single instance of one authorized role: the Crypto Officer. No support is provided for multiple concurrent operators. Table 11 - Roles 4.2 FIPS 140-3 does not require an authentication mechanism for level 1 modules. Therefore, the module does not support an authentication mechanism for Crypto Officer. The Crypto Officer role is authorized to access all services provided by the module (see - Approved Services and - Non-Approved Services below). 4.3 Services The module implements a dedicated API function (section "Modes of Operation" above) to indicate if a requested service utilizes an approved security function. For services listed in Table Approved Services, the W,E W,E This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] message, hash message, hash message, hash message, hash W, E W, E N/A W, E W, E W, E random bitstring W, E E/ G, W, E / G, W, E W, E / G, R W, E / G, R G, R W, E W, E G, R E, W

2 non-approved but allowed for TLS 1.0/1.1. Used in the context of TLS in conjunction with the approved algorithm SHA-1. No security claimed.

This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] G, R W, E/ W, E/ G, R W, E/ W, E/ G, R N/A N/A Z N/A N/A Z N/A N/A Z N/A N/A Z N/A Z N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 13 - Approved Services The abbreviations of the access rights to SSPs have the following interpretation: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. N/A = The service does not access any SSP during its operation. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Table 14 - Non-Approved Services This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Software/Firmware security 5.1 Integrity Techniques The Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] which is made up of a single component, is provided in the form of binary executable code. A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the module. The HMAC-SHA256 implemented in the module is used as the approved algorithm for the integrity test. If the test fails, the module enters an error state where no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited i.e., the module is not operational. 5.2 On-Demand Integrity Test The module’s integrity test can be performed on demand by power-cycling the computing platform. Integrity test on demand is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests, automatically executed at power-on. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Operational Environment The Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The module is supplied as part of Device OS, a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the computing platforms specified in section 2. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Physical Security The FIPS 140-3 physical security requirements do not apply to the Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] since it is a software module. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Non-invasive Security Currently, the ISO/IEC 19790:2012 non-invasive security area is not required by FIPS 140-3 (see NIST SP 800140F). The requirements of this area are not applicable to the module. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Sensitive Security Parameter Management The following table summarizes the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module: N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 128256 N/A This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] N/A N/A to SP800133rev2 using SP80090Arev1 to SP800133rev2 using SP80090Arev1 N/A N/A N/A SP80090Arev1 N/A N/A This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] SP80090Arev1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A via SP800108rev1 N/A values) / PSPCSP to SP800133rev2 N/A state, DiffieHellman This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] N/A SP80056Arev3 KAS-FFCSSC values) / PSPCSP N/A to SP800133rev2 using SP80090Arev1 N/A SP80056Arev3 KAS-ECCSSC EC DiffieHellman Table 15 - SSPs 9.1 The NIST SP 800-90Arev1 approved deterministic random bit generator is a CTR_DRBG based on block cipher. The CTR_DRBG is using AES-256 with derivation function and without prediction resistance. The module performs DRBG health tests according to section 11.3 of [SP800-90Arev1]. The deterministic random bit generators are seeded by /dev/random. The /dev/random is the User Space interface. No non-DRBG functions or instances are able to access the DRBG internal state This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Two entropy sources (one non-physical entropy source and one physical entropy source) residing within the TOEPP provide the random bits. The operator does not have the ability to modify the F5 entropy source (ES) configuration settings (see details in Public Use Document referenced in section 11.2). The output of entropy pool provides 256-bits of entropy to seed and reseed SP800-90Arev1 DRBG during initialization (seed) and reseeding (reseed). Table 16

• Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification 9.2 Key / SSP Generation The module generates Keys and SSPs in accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H. The cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys (RSA/ EC and DH) per [SP800-133r2] section 4 example

1 (vendor affirmed), compliant with [FIPS186-4], and using DRBG compliant with [SP800-90A]. A seed (i.e., the

random value) used in asymmetric key generation is obtained from [SP800-90A] DRBG. The key generation service for RSA, ECDSA, Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman as well as the [SP 800-90A] DRBG have been ACVT tested with algorithm certificates found in Table 6. The key derivation functions are as follows:

• PBKDF Key Derivation The module implements a CAVP compliance tested key derivation function compliant to [SP800132], IG D.N. The service returns the key derived from the provided password to the caller. The length of the password used as input to PBKDFv2 shall be at least 8 characters and the worst-case probability of guessing the value is 10^8 assuming all characters are digits only. The user shall choose the password length and the iteration count in such a way that the combination will make the key derivation computationally intensive. PBKDFv2 is implemented to support the option 1a specified in section 5.4 of [SP800-132]. The keys derived from [SP800-132] maps to section 4.1 of [SP800-133rev2] as indirect generation from DRBG. The derived keys may only be used in storage applications.
• KBKDF Key Derivation The KBKDF is compliant to [SP800-108rev1] and IG D.M. The module implements both Counter and Feedback modes with HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, or HMAC-SHA2-512 as the Pseudorandom Function (PRF). The module implements Counter mode with CMAC-AES128, CMAC-AES192, CMAC-AES256 as the PRFs. 9.3 Keys/ SSPs Establishment The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the Approved mode:
• AES-Key Wrapping This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] The module implements a Key Transport Scheme (KTS) using AES-KW compliant to [SP800-38F], IG D.G. The SSP establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.

• Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Computation The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (1) with DH shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength.
• EC Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Computation The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (1) with ECDH shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength. 9.4 Keys/SSPs Import/Export All keys and SSPs that are entered from, or output to module, are entered from or output to the invoking application running on the same device. Keys/SSPs entered into the module are electronically entered in plain text form. The module only outputs asymmetric keys in plain text form when key generation service is requested 9.5 Table 17 - Storage Areas 9.6 Keys and SSPs are explicitly zeroised when the appropriate context object is destroyed or when the system is powered down. Input and output interfaces are inhibited while zeroisation is performed. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. If the test fails either pre-operational and conditional self-tests, the module reports an error message indicating the cause of the failure and enters the Error State (See section 10.3). The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational or conditional self-tests for on demand and periodic testing by rebooting the system (i.e., power-cycling). 10.1 The module performs a pre-operational software integrity test automatically when the module is loaded into performed on the runtime image of the Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] with HMAC-SHA256 which is an approved integrity technique. The HMAC value of the runtime image is recalculated and compared with the stored HMAC value precomputed at compilation time Table 18 - Preoperational Self-Tests

This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Table 19

• Conditional Self-Tests

The Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] generates RSA, Diffie-Hellman, EC DiffieHellman and ECDSA asymmetric keys and performs a pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs. Error States If any of the above-mentioned self-tests described in Sections 10.1, 10.2.1 or 10.2.2 fail, the module reports the cause of the error and enters an error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to power cycle the device which results in the module being reloaded into memory and reperforming the pre-operational self-test and the conditional This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] algorithm self-tests. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the preoperational self-test and the conditional self-tests. Table 20- Error states This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures Startup Procedures: The module is built into Device OS defined in section 2 and delivered with the respective Device OS. There is no standalone delivery of the module as a software library. Installation Process and Authentication Mechanisms: The vendor’s internal development process guarantees that the correct version of module goes with its intended Device OS version. For additional assurance, the module is digitally signed by vendor, and it is verified during the integration into Host Device OS. This digital signature-based integrity protection during the delivery/integration process is not to be confused with the HMAC-256 based integrity check performed by the module itself as part of its pre-operational self-tests. 11.2 Crypto Officer Guidance The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 14 - Non-Approved Services. If the device starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode. The ESV Public Use Document (PUD) reference for physical entropy source is: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/entropy/E14_PublicUse.pdf The ESV Public Use Document (PUD) reference for non-physical entropy source is: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/entropy-validations/certificate/15 Apple Platform Certifications guide [platform certifications] and Apple Platform Security guide [SEC] are provided by Apple which offers IT System Administrators with the necessary technical information to ensure FIPS 140-3 Compliance of the deployed systems. This guide walks the reader through the system’s assertion of cryptographic module integrity and the steps necessary if module integrity requires remediation. 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance Not Applicable 11.4 Design and Rules The Crypto Officer shall consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module.

• AES-GCM internal IV is constructed in compliance with IG C.H scenario 1. The GCM IV generation follows RFC 5288 and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2; thus, the module is compliant with Section 3.3.1 SP 800-52r2. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. The module does not implement the TLS protocol. The module’s implementation of AES-GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module’s cryptographic boundary. The design of the TLS protocol implicitly ensures that the nonce_explicit, or counter portion of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] The GCM IV generation follows RFC 4106 and shall only be used for the IPsec-v3 protocol version 3. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. The module does not implement the IPsec protocol. The module’s implementation of AES-GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module’s cryptographic boundary. The design of the IPsec protocol implicitly ensures that the nonce_explicit, or counter portion of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values. In both protocols in case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed. This condition is not enforced by the module; however, it is met implicitly. The module does not retain any state when power is lost. As indicated in Table 11, column Storage, the module exclusively uses volatile storage. This means that AES-GCM key/IVs are not persistently stored during power off: therefore, there is no re-connection possible when the power is back on with re-generation of the key used for GCM. After restoration of the power, the user of the module (e.g., TLS, IKE) along with User application that implements the protocol, must perform a complete new key establishment operation using new random numbers (Entropy input string, DRBG seed, DRBG internal state V and Key, shared secret values that are not retained during power cycle, see table 11) with subsequent KDF operations to establish a new GCM key/IV pair on either side of the network communication channel. These protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

• AES-XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications. The length of the AES-XTS data unit does not exceed 220 blocks. The module checks explicitly that Key_1 ≠ Key_2 before using the keys in the XTS-Algorithm to process data with them compliant with IG C.I.
• RSA modulus size (IG C.F): In compliance with FIPS 186-4, the RSA signature verification is greater or equal to 1024 bits. All supported RSA modulus sizes have been CAVP tested.
• Legacy use (IG C.M): Per SP800-131r2, the SHA-1 within FIPS 186-4 RSA and ECDSA Digital Signature Verification is used in approved mode (for legacy use), the RSA 1024-bit modulus is used in approved mode for FIPS 186-4 signature verification (for legacy use).
• PBKDF see section 9.2
• KBKDF see section 9.2 11.5 End of Life The module secure sanitization is accomplished by first powering the module down, which will zeroize all SSPs within volatile memory. Following the power-down, an uninstall by way of system wipe or system update will zeroize the binary file listed in section 2.9. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

The module does not claim mitigation of other attacks. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Appendix A. AES CAVP CAST CAST5 CBC CCM CFB CMAC CMVP CSP CTR DRBG ECB ESVP FFC FIPS GCM HMAC KAS KAT KBKDF KDF KW MAC NIST OAEP OFB PAA PBKDF PKG PKV PRF PSS PUD RSA SHA SHS SSC TOEPP XTS Glossary and Abbreviations Advanced Encryption Standard Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test A symmetric-key 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit key Cipher Block Chaining Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code Cipher Feedback Cipher-based Message Authentication Code Cryptographic Module Validation Program Critical Security Parameter Counter Mode Deterministic Random Bit Generator Electronic Code Book Entropy Source Validation Program Finite Field Cryptography Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Galois Counter Mode Hash Message Authentication Code Key Agreement Schema Known Answer Test Key Based Key Derivation Function Key Derivation Function AES Key Wrap Message Authentication Code National Institute of Science and Technology Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding Output Feedback Processor Algorithm Acceleration Password Based Key Derivation Function Key-Pair Generation Public Key Validation Pseudo-Random Function Probabilistic Signature Scheme Public Use Document Rivest, Shamir, Adleman Secure Hash Algorithm Secure Hash Standard Shared Secret Computation Tested Operational Environment Physical Perimeter XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Appendix B. References FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules March 2019 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3 SP 800-140x CMVP FIPS 140-3 Related Reference https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-140-3-standards FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program August 2023 https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-140-3-ig-announcements FIPS140-3_MM CMVP FIPS 140-3 Draft Management Manual https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips%201403/Draft%20FIPS-140-3-CMVP%20Management%20Manual%2009-18-2020.pdf SP 800-140 FIPS 140-3 Derived Test Requirements (DTR) https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140/final SP 800-140A CMVP Documentation Requirements https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140a/final SP 800-140B CMVP Security Policy Requirements https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140b/final SP 800-140C CMVP Approved Security Functions https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140c/final SP 800-140D CMVP Approved Sensitive Security Parameter Generation and Establishment Methods https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140d/final SP 800-140E CMVP Approved Authentication Mechanisms https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140e/final SP 800-140F CMVP Approved Non-Invasive Attack Mitigation Test Metrics https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800140f/final FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) March 2012 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) July 2013 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard November 2001 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 2008 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf FIPS202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions August 2015 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 February 2003 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm September 2002 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt RFC5649 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm September 2009 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques December 2001 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication May 2005 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality May 2004 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC November 2007 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices January 2010 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping December 2012 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf SP800-38G NIST Special Publication 800-38G - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Format - Preserving Encryption March 2016 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38G.pdf SP800-52r2 Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations August 2019, https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-52r2 SP800-56Arev3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography April, 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf SP800-56Brev2 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Br2.pdf SP800-56Crev2 Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes August 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf SP800-57 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5 - Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General May 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v12.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] SP800-67 NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1 - Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher January 2012 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf SP800-90Arev1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators June 2015 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf SP800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation January 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf SP800-108r1 NIST Special Publication 800-108r1-upd1 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions August 2022 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1 SP800-131Arev2 Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132 - Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation - Part 1: Storage Applications December 2010 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-132/nist-sp800-132.pdf SP800-133rev2 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation June 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf SP800-135r1 NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions December 2011 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-135r1.pdf SEC Apple Platform Security https://support.apple.com/guide/security/welcome/web https://manuals.info.apple.com/MANUALS/1000/MA1902/en_US/apple-platform-security-guide.pdf platform certifications Apple Security Certifications and Compliance Center https://support.apple.com/en-gw/guide/certifications/welcome/web This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

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