Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (13)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update<br/>recovery</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Show status<br/>Self-test</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>SSH<br/>HTTPS<br/>library named: openssl</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update<br/>recovery</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Show status<br/>Self-test</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>SSH<br/>HTTPS<br/>library named: openssl</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C5,C6 clueLow;
  class C3 clueHigh;

Security Policy, page by page

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library VERSION 1.2 Version 1.1 Last update: 2024-08-29 Prepared by: Prepared for: atsec information security corporation Juniper Networks, Inc.

Austin, TX 78759 Sunnyvale, CA 94089 www.atsec.com www.juniper.net © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 Table of Contents 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5.1 2.5.2

2.5.3 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security

2.5.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3.1 4.3.2 4.3.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 9.1 © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 11.1 11.2 © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 List of Tables List of Figures © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 1.1 Overview This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version 1.2 of the Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for a Security Level 1 software module. This Security Policy has a one-to-one mapping to the [SP 800-140B] starting with section B.2.1 named “General” that maps to section 1 in this document and ending with section B.2.12 named “Mitigation of other attacks” that maps to section 12 in this document. including this notice. Other documentation is proprietary to their authors. 1.2 How this Security Policy was Prepared In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation for consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained. The further refining of the Security Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the conformance testing, wherein the Security Policy was submitted to the vendor, who would then edit, modify, and add technical contents. The vendor would also supply additional documentation, which the laboratory formatted into the existing Security Policy, and resubmitted to the vendor for their final editing. 1.3 Security Levels The following sections describe the cryptographic module and how it conforms to the FIPS 140-3 specification in each of the required areas. [Number Below] N/A N/A N/A Table 1 - Security Levels © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION 2.1 Module Embodiment The Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a software module. The module is composed by a shared library in software, which provides cryptographic services for key wrapping and random number generation. The module is also bound to the following cryptographic modules:

• Junos® OS Evolved Kernel Cryptographic Module Version 2.0 (validated under FIPS certificate #4776), which provides the integrity check utility that the module uses to check the integrity of the module’s software component, and the SP800-90A compliant random number generation implementation used for the random number generation service. Junos® OS Evolved OpenSSL Cryptographic Module Version 3.0.8 (validated under FIPS certificate #4775), which provides the algorithm implementation for integrity test. For the purpose of the FIPS 140-3 validation, the module is a software-only, multi-chip standalone cryptographic module validated at overall security level 1. 2.2 Module Design, Components, Versions Figure 1 below shows the cryptographic boundary of the module, and its interfaces with the operational environment. Figure 1 - Cryptographic Boundary 2.2.1 Module Components Table 2 below enumerates the components that comprise the module with their location in the target platform. © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

1.2 Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Components 2.3 Tested Operational Enviroments The module has been tested on the following platforms with the corresponding module variants and configuration options: # Table 3 - Tested Operational Environments 2.4 Modes of Operation The module supports only the approved mode of operation. When the module starts up successfully, after passing all the pre-operational self-tests and conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs), the module is operating in the approved mode of operation. The module does not implement a degraded mode of operation. 2.5 2.5.1 Security Functions Approved Algorithms Table 4 below lists all security functions of the module, including specific strengths employed for approved services.

© 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 Table 4 - Approved Algorithms provided by the module Table 5 below lists the approved algorithms provided by the bound OpenSSL module that are used by the module to perform integrity tests. Table 5 - Approved Algorithms provided by the bound OpenSSL module Table 5 below lists the approved algorithms provided by the bound Kernel module that are used by the module to obtain random numbers. Table 6 - Approved Algorithms provided by the bound Kernel module 2.5.2 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation The module does not implement non-approved algorithms allowed in the approved mode of operation. 2.5.3 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed The module does not implement non-approved algorithms. 2.5.4 Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation The module does not implement non-approved algorithms. © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PORTS AND INTERFACES Ports and interfaces implemented are shown in the following table. The Control Output interface is omitted because the module does not implement it. All data output via data output interface is inhibited when the module is performing self-tests or zeroization, or when the module is in the error state. Table 7 - Ports and Interfaces © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION 4.1 Roles The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly assumed by the operator of the module when performing a service. The module does not support concurrent operators. 4.2 The module does not implement authentication. 4.3 Services The module only provides approved services, which are shown in Table 9. 4.3.1 Service Indicator The module provides an approved service indicator as specified in the “Indicator” column in Table 9. 4.3.2 Approved Services The table below shows the services available in the Approved mode. For each service, the table lists the associated cryptographic algorithm(s), the role to perform the service, the cryptographic keys or SSPs involved, and their access type(s). The following convention is used to specify access rights to a SSP:

• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP. N/A: the calling application does not access any SSP or key during its operation. The details of the approved cryptographic algorithms including the CAVP certificate numbers can be found in Section 2.5.1. © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 s W, E W, E W, E W, E W, E E, G W, E, G N/A N/A N/A N/A Z N/A N/A 4.3.3 The module does not implement non-approved services. © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE SECURITY 5.1 Integrity Techniques The integrity of the module is ensured with the HMAC-SHA2-256 value stored in the corresponding /usr/lib64/.libquicksec-macsec.so.1.hmac file that is computed at build time for the shared library. During Pre-Operational Self-Tests, the module invokes the fips_chk_hmac utility provided by the bound Kernel module (and whose cryptographic functionality is provided by the bound OpenSSL module) to calculate the HMAC value of the shared library, and then compares it with the prestored value. If the two HMAC values do not match, the test fails and the module enters the error state. The integrity of the fips_chk_hmac utility itself is performed before the integrity tests of the module, and ensured with the HMAC-SHA2-256 value stored in the corresponding .hmac file that is computed at build time of the utility. The fips_chk_hmac utility calculates the HMAC value, and then compares it with the pre-stored value. If the two HMAC values do not match, the test fails and the module enters the error state. 5.2 On-demand Integrity Tests Integrity tests are performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests, and can be invoked by reloading the module which will cause the module to run the power-up tests again. 5.3 Executable Code The module consists of the software component that implements the cryptographic algorithms, in the form of a shared library as stated in Table 2. © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 6.1 Applicability The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The module runs on a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the hardware specified in Table 3. 6.2 Policy and Requirements The module shall be installed as stated in Section 11 . If properly installed, the operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented. The module does not have the capability of loading software or firmware from an external source. Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace utilities, userspace live patching, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-tested operational environment. © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 PHYSICAL SECURITY The module is comprised of software only, and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 NON-INVASIVE SECURITY The module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism, and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 SENSITIVE SECURITY PARAMETER MANAGEMENT Table 10 summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module. e AES key Import: CM from TOEPP Path. macsec_util_z Use: Key eroize_key() wrapping; Key unwrapping; Message authentication code (MAC) Message authentication code (MAC) verification; 128, 256 AES-KW, N/A bits AES-CMAC #4156 N/A RAM Passed into the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) form. Related SSPs: none Table 10

• SSPs The bound Kernel module is used for obtaining random numbers using a DRBG implemented in the Kernel; all CSPs related to the DRBG are managed internally by the bound module and do not constitute CSPs for this module. 9.1 Random Bit Generators The module provides a random number generator service using the Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) provided by the bound Kernel cryptographic module, which is based on [SP80090Arev1]. The bound Kernel cryptographic module provides the DRBG using HMAC_DRBG with SHA2-256 without prediction resistance, and uses the Kernel CPU Time Jitter RNG as an entropy source to seed the DRBG. The module generates random strings whose strength is modified by available entropy. 9.2 The module does not support any key generation or derivation methods. 9.3 Key Agreement The module does not support any approved key agreement methods. 9.4 Key Transport The module the following key transport mechanisms:
• AES key wrapping using AES-KW. According to Table 2: Comparable strengths in [SP 800-57rev5], the key sizes of AES provide the following security strength in the approved mode of operation: © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2

• 9.5 AES key wrapping in KW mode provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength. SSP Entry and Output The module only supports SSP entry and output to and from the calling application running on the same operational environment. This corresponds to manual distribution (MD), electronic entry/output (EE) (“CM Software to/from App via TOEPP Path”) per FIPS 140-3 IG 9.5.A Table 1. SSPs can be entered into the module via API input parameters, when required by a service. SSPs can also be output from the module via API output parameters, immediately after key wrapping (in encrypted form) and key unwrapping (in plaintext form) services. 9.6 SSP Storage The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs. The SSPs are temporarily stored in the RAM in plaintext form; the module does not support storage of any cryptographically protected SSP. SSPs are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when released by the appropriate zeroization function calls. 9.7 SSP Zeroization The memory occupied by SSPs is allocated by regular memory allocation operating system calls. The module calls internally the appropriate zeroization functions (i.e. memset) before returning to the calling application. The zeroization functions overwrite the memory occupied by SSPs with “zeros” and deallocate the memory with the regular memory deallocation operating system call. The completion of a zeroization routine(s) will indicate that a zeroization procedure succeeded. For SSPs that are input or output through the services, it is the responsibility of the calling application to zeroize them by calling macsec_util_zeroize_key() once they are no longer utilized. © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2

The module performs the pre-operational self-tests automatically when the module is loaded into memory. These self-tests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithm used in the integrity test works as expected. Conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests are performed by the module when the library is initialized by the calling application, verifying that all cryptographic algorithms work as expected before their first use. While the module is executing the pre-operational and the conditional cryptographic algorithms selftests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. The module is not available for use by the calling application until the self-tests are completed successfully. If any of the self-tests fails, an error message is returned and the module transitions to error state. See Section 10.4 for descriptions of possible self-test errors and recovery procedures.

The module performs a pre-operational software integrity test automatically when the module is powered on before the module transitions into the operational state. The details on the integrity test are specified in Section 5.1.

Table 11 lists the cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs). The CASTs include the KATs for the integrity mechanism that is run prior to performing the integrity test. The details of the integrity test are provided in Section 5.1. Each KAT includes comparison of the calculated output with the expected known answer, hard coded as part of the test vectors used in the test. Data output through the data output interface is inhibited during the self-tests. If the values do not match, the KAT fails and the module transitions to the error state. Table 11

• Conditional Cryptographic Algorithms Self-Tests performed by the module KATs for HMAC and DRBG algorithms used in this module are performed by the respective bound modules.

The module does not perform any pairwise consistency test.

On-demand self-tests can be invoked by powering-off and reloading the module which cause the module to run the pre-operational and conditional cryptographic algorithms self-tests. © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 When the module fails any pre-operational or conditional self-test, the module will enter the Error state. Any further cryptographic operation is inhibited. The calling application can obtain the state with the return value of the API function used to initialize the module (after finishing self-tests), or by requesting the get status service (using a dedicated API function). The Crypto Officer can recover from the Error state by restarting the hardware platform on which the module is running. Table 12 - Error States © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2

The binaries of the module are contained in the base Junos Evolved installation image. The Crypto Officer shall follow this Security Policy to configure the operational environment and install the module to be operated as a FIPS 140-3 validated module.

As the module does not persistently store SSPs, secure sanitization of the module consists of unloading the module. This will zeroize all SSPs in volatile memory.

In order to run in the Approved mode, the module must be operated using the approved services, with their corresponding approved and allowed cryptographic algorithms provided in this Security Policy (see Section 4.3). In addition, key sizes must comply with [SP800-131A].

The module is already pre-installed on the image file (junos-evo-install-ptx-fixed-x86-64-22.4R2.11S1-EVO.iso). The crypto officer is responsible to verify the correct installation of the module by executing the following command: cli show security macsec crypto version Verify that the command returns the following name and version of the module: Crypto library version : Junos OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library, version 1.2 © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2

The module does not implement any mitigation mechanism. © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2

AES Advanced Encryption Standard AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions API Application Program Interface CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CBC Cipher Block Chaining CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CSP Critical Security Parameter DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB Electronic Code Book EE Electronic Entry FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication GCM Galois Counter Mode HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code IG Implementation Guidance KAT Known Answer Test KW Key Wrap MAC Message Authentication Code MD Manual Distribution NIST National Institute of Science and Technology PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration PR Prediction Resistance PCT Pair-wise Consistency Test SHA Secure Hash Algorithm TOEPP Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2

FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program October 2022 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard November 2001 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 2008 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf KERNEL-SP August 2023 https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/security-policies/140sp4776.pdf OPENSSL-SP Junos® OS Evolved OpenSSL Cryptographic Module version 3.0.8 - FIPS 140-3 August 2023 https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/security-policies/140sp4775.pdf SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques December 2001 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication May 2005 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping December 2012 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Junos® OS Evolved MACsec Cryptographic Library Version 1.2 SP800-57 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 4 - Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General January 2016 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4.pdf SP800-90A NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators June 2015 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf SP800-131A NIST Special Publication 800-131A

• Revision 2 - Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf SP800-140B NIST Special Publication 800-140B - CMVP Security Policy Requirements March 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140B.pdf © 2024 Juniper Networks, Inc. / atsec information security

Referenced URLs

• www.atsec.com
• www.juniper.net
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
• http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
• http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4.pdf
• http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140B.pdf