SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (37)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Status Output<br/>Show status<br/>Self-Test</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>library named: openssl<br/>library named: nss</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Status Output<br/>Show status<br/>Self-Test</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>library named: openssl<br/>library named: nss</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module Software version 1.1 Hardware version IBM z15 Version 1.1 Last update: 2024-10-01 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

4516 Seton Center Parkway, Suite 250

Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

2.8 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security

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This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for software version 1.1 and hardware version "IBM z/15" of the SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module. It has a one-to-one mapping to the [SP 800-140B] starting with section B.2.1 named “General” that maps to section 1 in this document and ending with section B.2.12 named “Mitigation of other attacks” that maps to section 12 in this document. Table 1 – Security Levels © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a software-hybrid module that provides general purpose cryptographic algorithms to applications running in the user space of the underlying operating system through a C language application program interface (API). The module is composed by a software library, which provides the API and a subset of the cryptographic algorithms, and the Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Functions (CPACF), which is part of the z15 processor and provides cryptographic algorithms implemented in hardware. In addition, the module uses the SUSE Linux Enterprise OpenSSL Cryptographic Module as a bound module (also referred to as “the bound OpenSSL module”), which provides additional algorithms not implemented in Libica. The SUSE Linux Enterprise OpenSSL Cryptographic Module has been FIPS 140-3 validated with certificate #4725. For the purpose of the FIPS 140-3 validation, the module is a software-hybrid, multi-chip standalone cryptographic module validated at overall security level 1.

The software block diagram below shows the cryptographic boundary of the module, and its interfaces with the operational environment. Figure 1 – Cryptographic Boundary Table 2 lists the components of the cryptographic module that define the cryptographic boundary of the Libica module. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Table 2 – Cryptographic Module Components

The module supports two modes of operation:

• Approved: only approved or allowed security functions with sufficient security strength can be used.
• Non-Approved: only non-approved security functions can be used. When the module starts up successfully, after passing all the pre-operational self-tests, the module is operating in the approved mode of operation by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 11. Please see section 4 for the details on service indicator provided by the module that identifies when an approved service is called. Critical security parameters (CSPs) used or stored in the approved mode are not used in nonapproved mode, and vice versa. The module creates separate contexts for each cryptographic service; therefore, the CSPs used in approved services and non-approved services are separated by design and not shared.

The module has been tested on the following platforms with the corresponding module variants and configuration options: Table 3 – Tested Operational Environments

1 The IBM z/15 hardware must have Feature Code 3863 (FC3863) enabled. This feature code enables processor

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In addition to the platforms listed in Table 3, SUSE has also tested the module on the platforms in Table 4, and claims vendor affirmation on them. Note: the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate. Table 4 - Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments

Table 5 below lists all security functions of the Libica module, including specific key strengths employed for approved services, and implemented modes of operation. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Table 5 – Approved Algorithms provided by Libica module. Table 6 lists the approved algorithms that are used by the module but provided by the bound OpenSSL module in the approved mode of operation. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Table 6 – Approved Algorithms provided by the bound OpenSSL module.

of Operation The module does not implement non-approved algorithms that are allowed in the approved mode of operation.

of Operation with No Security Claimed The module does not implement non-approved algorithms that are allowed in the approved mode of operation.

Mode of Operation Table 7 lists non-approved algorithms implemented in the Libica module that are not allowed in the approved mode of operation. These algorithms are used by the non-approved services listed in Table 11. The Libica mode does not use any non-approved algorithm implemented in the bound OpenSSL module. Table 7 – Non-Approved Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The logical interfaces are the API through which applications request services. The ports and interfaces are shown in the following table. All data output via data output interface is inhibited when the module is performing preoperational test or zeroization or when the module enters error state. Table 8 – Ports and Interfaces

2 The control output interface is omitted on purpose because the module does not implement it.

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The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly assumed by the operator of the module when performing a service. The module does not support Table 9 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output The module provides services to the users that assume one of the available roles. All services are shown in Table 10 and Table 11. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Table 10 lists the approved services. For each service, the table lists the associated cryptographic algorithm(s), the role to perform the service, the cryptographic keys or CSPs involved, and their access type(s). The following convention is used to specify access rights to a CSP:

• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroise: The module zeroizes the SSP.
• N/A: the calling application does not access any CSP or key during its operation. The details of the approved cryptographic algorithms including the CAVP certificate numbers can be found in Table 5. The module implements the ica_get_fips_indicator() API function that outputs the value of .fips_approved field, when “1” is output it, indicates that the service is

3 This service is providing using algorithms implemented in the bound OpenSSL module.

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Service Digital signature generation Digital signature verification Shared secret computation Message digest Message authentication code (MAC) generation Message authentication code (MAC) verification

Description Generate ECDSA key pairs Generate ECDSA signature Verify ECDSA signature EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation Compute SHA hashes Compute AES- based CMAC Compute AES- based GMAC Verify AES-based CMAC Verify AES-based GMAC

Approved Security Functions ECDSA, DRBG ECDSA, DRBG, SHS ECDSA, SHS KAS-ECC-SSC SHA-1, SHA2- 224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256 CMAC with AES GMAC with AES CMAC with AES GMAC with AES

Keys and/or SSPs Module- generated ECDSA public key, Module- generated ECDSA private key ECDSA private key ECDSA public key EC Diffie- Hellman private key EC Diffie- Hellman public key from peer EC Diffie- Hellman shared secret None None AES key AES key AES key AES key

Roles

Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs E, G, R W, E W, E W, E W, E E, G, R N/A N/A W, E W, E

Indicator ica_get_fips_ indicator() returns .fips_ approved = 1 ica_get_fips_ indicator() returns .fips_ approved = 1 ica_get_fips_ indicator() returns .fips_ approved = 1 ica_get_fips_ indicator() returns .fips_ approved = 1 ica_get_fips_ indicator() returns .fips_ approved = 1 ica_get_fips_ indicator() returns .fips_ approved = 1 ica_get_fips_ indicator() returns .fips_ approved = 1 ica_get_fips_ indicator() returns .fips_ approved = 1 ica_get_fips_ indicator() returns .fips_ approved = 1 ica_get_fips_ indicator() returns .fips_ approved = 1

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Table 10 - Approved Services Table 11 lists the non-approved services. The details of the non-approved cryptographic algorithms available in the non-approved mode can be found in Table 7. Table 11 - Non-Approved Services © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The integrity of the module is verified by comparing an HMAC-SHA2-256 value calculated at run time with the HMAC value stored in the .hmac file that was computed at build time for each software component of the module. If the HMAC values do not match, the test fails and the module enters the error state. The module uses the HMAC-SHA2-256 algorithm provided by the OpenSSL bound module.

Integrity tests are performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. The module provides the Self-Test service to perform self-tests on demand which includes the preoperational tests (i.e., integrity test) and cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs). This service can be invoked by using the ica_fips_powerup_tests() API function call. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are not available, and no data output or input is possible. In order to verify whether the self-tests have succeeded and the module is in the Operational state, the calling application may invoke the ica_fips_status(). See section 10.3 for more information about the possible return values.

The module consists of executable code in the form of the Libica file stated in Table 2. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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This module operates in a modifiable operational environment per the FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The SUSE Linux Enterprise Server operating system is used as the basis of other products. Compliance is maintained for SUSE products whenever the binary is found unchanged per the vendor affirmation from SUSE based on the allowance FIPS 140-3 management manual [FIPS140-3_MM] section 7.9.1 item 1. c) i). Note: The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when supported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace utilities, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-tested operational environment.

The module shall be installed as stated in section 11. The operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The Libica module inherits the physical characteristics of the host running it; the module has no physical security characteristics of its own. Figure 3 illustrates the IBM System z15 mainframe computer that represents the testing platform, that includes the hardware component of the cryptographic module. Figure 2 – IBM z15 Mainframe Computer The Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Functions (CPACF) is part of the CoProcessor Unit (CoP) integrated in the z15 processor, and offers full implementation of several algorithms; this module uses the processor algorithm implementations (PAI) for AES, SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3, SHAKE, ECDSA signature generation and verification, and ECDH shared secret computation. The module is a multi-chip standalone with a physical security level of 1. This security level is satisfied by the device (CoP) being included within the cryptographic boundary of the module and the device being made of production grade components that include standard passivation techniques. The module does not implement a maintenance access interface. With regards to the CPACF physical design, each microprocessor (core) on the 8-core chip (see Figure 4) has its own dedicated CoP, which implements the crypto instructions and provides the hardware compression function. The compression unit is integrated with the CPACF, benefiting from combining (sharing) the use of buffers and interfaces. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Figure 3 – IBM z15 Processor Unit Chip © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism, and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Table 12 summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic

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Table 12 – SSPs The following sections describe how CSPs, in particular cryptographic keys, are managed during its life cycle. The Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) is provided by the bound OpenSSL module. The DRBG is based on [SP800-90Arev1] for the creation of RSA and ECDSA keys in OpenSSL, and for the random generation of the IV used in AES GCM and the k value used in ECDSA signature that the Libica module implements a separate DRBG for providing a random generation number service, but this algorithm implementation, as well as the service, are considered non-approved. The DRBG is initialized during initialization of the bounded OpenSSL module; this module loads the without prediction resistance. The bound Open SSL module uses an SP800-90B-compliant entropy source specified in Table 13. This entropy source is located within the physical perimeter, but outside of the cryptographic © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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boundary of the module. The module obtains 384 bits to seed the DRBG, and 256 bits to reseed it, sufficient to provide a DRBG with 256 bits of security strength. Table 13 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

The bounded OpenSSL module provides an [SP800-90Arev1]-compliant Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) for the creation of key components of asymmetric keys, and random number generation. For generating RSA, ECDSA keys, the bounded module implements asymmetric key generation services compliant with [FIPS186-4]. A seed (i.e., the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is directly obtained from the [SP800-90Arev1] DRBG. The public and private keys used in EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation are generated internally by the bound OpenSSL module using the ECDSA key generation method compliant with [FIPS186-4] and [SP800-56Arev3]. In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the bound cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per section 5.1 of SP800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) by obtaining a random bit string directly from an approved DRBG and that can support the required security strength requested by the caller (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H).

The module does not provide key transport mechanisms.

The module provides EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation compliant with SP800-56Arev3, in accordance with scenario 2 (1) of IG D.F. According to Table 2: Comparable strengths in [SP800-57rev5], the key sizes of EC Diffie-Hellman provides the following security strength in the approved mode of operation: • EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.

The module does not support direct manual SSP entry or intermediate SSP generation output. The SSPs are provided to the module via API input parameters in plaintext form and output via API This is allowed by [FIPS140-3_IG] 9.5.A, according to the “CM Software to/from App via TOEPP Path” entry on the Key Establishment Table. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs. The SSPs are temporarily stored in the RAM in plaintext form. SSPs are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when released by the appropriate zeroization function calls.

For those SSPs that are either imported or exported, it is the responsibility of the calling application to zeroize them once they are no longer utilized. Internal values to store SSPs are zeroized automatically before returning the control to the calling application. Zeroization is performed by overwriting the memory with zeroes. For services implemented in the bound OpenSSL module, the Libica module calls internally the appropriate zeroization functions provided by the bound module (e.g. OPENSSL_cleanse) before returning to the calling application. The zeroization functions overwrite the memory occupied by SSPs with “zeros” and deallocate the memory with the regular memory deallocation operating system call. The completion of a zeroization routine will indicate that a zeroization procedure succeeded. Also, module reset can zeroize all SSPs for both the module and the OpenSSL bound module. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The module performs pre-operational tests and CASTs automatically when the module is loaded into memory. Pre-operational tests ensure that the module is not corrupted, and the CASTs ensure that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. While the module is executing the preoperational tests and CASTs, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. The module is not available for use by the calling application until the pre-operational tests are completed successfully. After the pre-operational test and the CASTs succeed, the module becomes operational. If any of the pre-operational test or any of the CASTs fail an error message is returned, and the module transitions to the error state.

The module performs the integrity test of the software component using HMAC-SHA2-256. The integrity test uses the HMAC algorithm implemented in the bound OpenSSL module, which tests this algorithm as part of the CASTs when loaded into memory and before Libica performs the preoperational tests. The details of integrity test are provided in section 5.1.

Table 14 specifies the CASTs performed by the Libica module. All CASTs performed are in the form of the Known Answer Tests (KATs) and are run prior to performing the integrity test. A KAT includes the comparison of a calculated output with an expected known answer, hard coded as part of the test vectors used in the test. If the values do not match, the KAT fails. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Table 14

• Conditional Cryptographic Algorithms Self-Tests performed by the Libica module Table 15 lists the CASTs performed by the bound OpenSSL module for the services provided in the approved mode of operation. Table 15
• Conditional Cryptographic Algorithms Self-Tests performed by the OpenSSL module

The bound OpenSSL module performs the Pair-wise Consistency Tests (PCT) shown in Table 16. If at least one of the tests fails, the module returns an error code and enters the Error state. When the module is in the Error state, no data is output, and cryptographic operations are not allowed. Table 16 - Pairwise Consistency Test performed by the bound OpenSSL module

On-Demand self-tests can be invoked by calling the fips_powerup_tests() API function, which causes the module to run the pre-operational tests again. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are not available, and no data output or input is possible. To verify whether the self-tests have succeeded, and the module is in the Operational state, the calling application may invoke the ica_fips_status() API function. See section 10.3 for more information about the possible return values. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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When the module fails any pre-operational self-test or conditional test, the module will return an error code to indicate the error and will enter the Error state. Any further cryptographic operation is inhibited. The calling application can obtain the module state by calling the ica_fips_status() API function. The function can return one following flags indicating the module is in the error state. Table 17 - Error States For errors occurred in the bound OpenSSL, any transition to the error state of the bound OpenSSL module puts the Libica module in the error state. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The Crypto Officer can install the RPM packages containing the module as listed in Table 19 using the zypper tool as follows. # zypper install libica4 The integrity of the RPM package is automatically verified during the installation, and the Crypto Officer shall not install the RPM package if there is any integrity error.

The module requires to run on a z15 processor that has Feature Code 3863 enabled. This feature enables processor acceleration implementations (PAI) in CPACF for AES and ECC algorithms (SHA1, SHA-2, SHA-3 and SHAKE algorithms are enabled by default in z15 processors). Make sure with your system administrator that the hardware platform meets this requirement. In addition, the operating environment needs to be configured to support the approved mode of operation, so the following steps shall be performed with the root privilege:

1. Install the dracut-fips RPM package: # zypper install dracut-fips
2. Recreate the INITRAMFS image: # dracut -f
3. After regenerating the initrd, the Crypto Officer has to append the following parameter in the /etc/default/grub configuration file in the GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT line: fips=1
4. After editing the configuration file, please run the following command to change the setting in the boot loader: # grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg If /boot or /boot/efi resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=<partition of /boot or /boot/efi> must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command "df /boot" or "df /boot/efi" respectively. For example: # df /boot Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on /dev/sda1 233191 30454 190296 14% /boot The partition of /boot is located on /dev/sda1 in this example. Therefore, the following string needs to be appended in the aforementioned grub file: "boot=/dev/sda1"
5. Reboot to apply these settings. Now, the operating environment is configured to support the approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer should check the existence of the file /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled, and verify it contains a numeric value “1”. If the file does not exist or does not contain “1”, the operating © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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environment is not configured to support the approved mode of operation and the module will not operate as a FIPS validated module properly.

Table 18 includes the information on module installation process for the vendor affirmed platforms that are listed in Table 4. Table 18 - Installation for Vendor Affirmed Platforms Note: Per section 7.9 in the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual [FIPS140-3_MM], the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when this module is ported and executed in an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.

For secure sanitization of the cryptographic module, the module must first to be powered off, which will zeroize all keys and CSPs in volatile memory. Then, for actual deprecation, the module shall be upgraded to a newer version that is FIPS 140-3 validated. The module does not possess persistent storage of SSPs, so further sanitization steps are not required.

The binaries of the module are contained in the RPM packages for delivery. The Crypto Officer shall follow sections 11.1.1 and 11.1.2 to configure the operational environment and install the module to be operated as a FIPS 140-3 validated module. Table 19 lists the RPM package that contains the FIPS validated module and the OE directory where the components are installed. The "Show module name and version" service is implemented via the following API functions:

• ica_get_build_version() returns the software version, whose value is “FIPS-SUSE-4.2.1150400.3.8.1”. This identifier matches the version included in the RPM package filenames.
• ica_get_hw_info() returns the hardware version, whose value is “IBM/S390, model type 8561”. This identifier corresponds to the IBM z/15 hardware with z15 processor. Table 19
• RPM packages © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The AES algorithm in XTS mode can be only used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices, as specified in [SP800-38E]. The length of a single data unit encrypted with the XTS-AES shall not exceed 2²⁰ AES blocks, that is 16MB of data. To meet the requirement stated in IG C.I, the module implements a check that ensures, before performing any cryptographic operation, that the two AES keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical.

The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with section 8.2.2 of [SP800-38D] and IG C.H scenario

2 [FIPS140-3_IG], in which the GCM IV is generated internally at its entirety randomly. The DRBG

provided by the OpenSSL bound module, compliant with SP800-90A-rev1, is used for generating the IV. The DRBG is fully seeded with entropy provided by the non-physical entropy source that is not within the cryptographic boundary of the module but within its physical perimeter. The GCM IV must be at least 96 bits in length, which is enforced by the module. When a GCM IV is used for decryption, the responsibility for the IV generation lies with the party that performs the AES GCM encryption. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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The module does not implement any mitigation mechanism. © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Appendix A.                      Glossary and Abbreviations AES                Advanced Encryption Standard CAVP               Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CBC                Cipher Block Chaining CCM                Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code CFB                Cipher Feedback CMAC               Cipher-based Message Authentication Code CMVP               Cryptographic Module Validation Program CPACF              Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Function CSP                Critical Security Parameter CTR                Counter Mode DES                Data Encryption Standard DF                 Derivation Function DRBG               Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB                Electronic Code Book ECC                Elliptic Curve Cryptography FIPS               Federal Information Processing Standards Publication GCM                Galois Counter Mode HMAC               Hash Message Authentication Code KAS                Key Agreement Schema KAT                Known Answer Test MAC                Message Authentication Code NIST               National Institute of Science and Technology OFB                Output Feedback O/S                Operating System PAA                Processor Algorithm Acceleration PAI                Processor Algorithm Implementation PR                 Prediction Resistance PSS                Probabilistic Signature Scheme RNG                Random Number Generator RSA                Rivest, Shamir, Addleman SHA                Secure Hash Algorithm SHS                Secure Hash Standard XTS                XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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Appendix B. References FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules March 2019 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3 FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program October 2022 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf FIPS140-3_MM FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Validation Program Management Manual April 2024 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS-140-3CMVP%20Management%20Manual.pdf FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) March 2012 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) July 2013 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard November 2001 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 2008 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf FIPS202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions August 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf OPENSSL-SP SUSE Linux Enterprise Server OpenSSL Cryptographic Module https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/security-policies/140sp4725.pdf PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 February 2003 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques December 2001 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038a.pdf SP800-38A-add Addendum to NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode October 2010 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38aadd.pdf SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication May 2005 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38B.pdf SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality May 2004 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038c.pdf SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC November 2007 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038d.pdf SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices January 2010 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80038e.pdf SP800-56Arev3 NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2 - Recommendation for Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography April 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf SP800-57rev5 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5 Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General May 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.80057pt1r5.pdf © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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SP800-90Arev1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators June 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf SP800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation January 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf SP800-131Arev2 NIST Special Publication 800-131A Revision 2 - Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800131Ar2.pdf SP800-133rev2 NIST Special Publication 800-133 Revision 2 - Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation June 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf SP800-135rev1 NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions December 2011 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800135r1.pdf SP800-140B NIST Special Publication 800-140B - CMVP Security Policy Requirements March 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140B.pdf © 2024 SUSE, LLC / atsec information security.

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