PAN-OS 11.0 running on PA-400 Series, PA-800 Series, PA-1400 Series, PA-3200 Series, PA-3400 Series, PA-5200 Series, PA-5400 Series, PA-5450, and PA-7000 Series NGFWs

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (35)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for PAN-OS 11.0 running on PA-400 Series, PA-800 Series, PA-1400 Series, PA-3200 Series, PA-3400 Series, PA-5200 Series, PA-5400 Series, PA-5450, and PA-7000 Series NGFWs
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C1["[high] Firmware / bootloader<br/>versions disclosed<br/>(identity, not provenance)<br/><i>11.0.3-h12 [1] and 11.0.6-h2 [2]</i>"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback services<br/><i>Firmware Update</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Show Status<br/>Zeroize<br/>Self-Tests</i>"]
    C4["[high] Physical/logical<br/>interfaces (some 'blocked<br/>in firmware')<br/><i>Micro USB Console (PA-800 Series, PA-1400 Series,…<br/>RJ45 Console<br/>RJ45 Ethernet</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I1["Component identity is<br/>disclosed, but provenance<br/>and patch lineage are not."]
    I2["Trusted code is reachable<br/>through update and<br/>recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I4["Interface reachability may<br/>vary by boot stage and<br/>lifecycle state."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R1["Do the vendor version<br/>strings obscure the<br/>upstream baseline, fork<br/>lineage, or known-CVE<br/>exposure?"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R4["Are interfaces blocked<br/>before the bootloader<br/>runs, or only after<br/>approved mode starts?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E1["SBOM / component baselines<br/>· patch and backport<br/>manifest · CVE disposition"]
    E2["update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E4["lifecycle reachability<br/>matrix · boot-stage<br/>interface timing ·<br/>factory/recovery/error-state<br/>access controls"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C1 --> I1 --> R1 --> E1
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C4 --> I4 --> R4 --> E4
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,C6 clue;
  class I1,I2,I3,I4,I5,I6 infer;
  class R1,R2,R3,R4,R5,R6 risk;
  class E1,E2,E3,E4,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for PAN-OS 11.0 running on PA-400 Series, PA-800 Series, PA-1400 Series, PA-3200 Series, PA-3400 Series, PA-5200 Series, PA-5400 Series, PA-5450, and PA-7000 Series NGFWs
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C1["[high] Firmware / bootloader versions disclosed (identity, not provenance)<br/><i>11.0.3-h12 [1] and 11.0.6-h2 [2]</i><br/>src: certificate.firmwareVersions"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery / rollback services<br/><i>Firmware Update</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Show Status<br/>Zeroize<br/>Self-Tests</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C4["[high] Physical/logical interfaces (some 'blocked in firmware')<br/><i>Micro USB Console (PA-800 Series, PA-1400 Series,…<br/>RJ45 Console<br/>RJ45 Ethernet</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.portsAndInterfaces"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C1,C2,C3,C4 clueHigh;
  class C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

PAN-OS 11.0 running on PA-400 Series, PA-800 Series, PA-1400 Series, PA-3200 Series, PA-3400 Series, PA-5200 Series, PA-5400 Series, PA-5450, and PA-7000 Series NGFWs Version: 1.3 Revision Date: May 6, 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.​ www.paloaltonetworks.com​ © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks. A list of our trademarks can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective companies. This document may be freely reproduced and

Palo Alto Networks offers a full line of next-generation security appliances. Our platform architecture is based on our single-pass engine, PAN-OS, for networking, security, threat prevention, and management functionality that is consistent across all platforms. The devices differ only in capacities, performance, and physical configuration. The cryptographic modules meet the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-3. Table 1 - Security Levels N/A N/A N/A Purpose The Palo Alto Networks PA-400 Series, PA-800 Series, PA-1400 Series, PA-3200 Series, PA-3400 Series, PA-5200 Series, PA-5400 Series, PA-5450, and PA-7000 Series NGFWs (hereafter referred to as the modules) are multi-chip standalone hardware modules that provide network security by enabling enterprises to see and control applications, users, and content

• not just ports, IP addresses, and packets
• using three unique identification technologies: App-ID, User-ID, and Content-ID. These identification technologies, found in Palo Alto Networks' enterprise firewalls, enable enterprises to create business-relevant security policies
• safely enabling organizations to adopt new applications, instead of the traditional “all-or-nothing” approach offered by traditional port-blocking firewalls used in many security infrastructures. Features and Benefits
• ​ Application visibility and control: Accurate identification of the applications traversing the network enables policy-based control over application usage at the firewall, the strategic center of the security infrastructure.
• ​ Visualization tools: Graphical visibility tools, customizable reporting and logging enables administrators to make a more informed decision on how to treat the applications traversing the network.
• ​ Application browser: Helps administrators quickly research what the application is, its behavioral characteristics and underlying technology resulting in a more informed decision making process on how to treat the application.
• ​ User-based visibility and control: Seamless integration with enterprise directory services facilitates application visibility and policy creation based on user and group information, not just IP address. An XML API enables integration with other, 3rd party user repositories.
• ​ Real-time threat prevention: Detects and blocks application vulnerabilities, viruses, spyware, and worms; controls web activity; all in real-time, dramatically improving performance and accuracy. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 3

• ​ File and data filtering: Taking full advantage of the in-depth application inspection being performed by App-ID, administrators can implement several different types of policies that reduce the risk associated with unauthorized file and data transfer.
• ​ Legacy firewall support: Support for traditional inbound and outbound port-based firewall rules mixed with application-based rules smooth the transition to a Palo Alto Networks next generation firewall.
• ​ Networking architecture: Support for dynamic routing (OSPF, RIP, BGP, etc.), virtual wire mode and Layer 2 / Layer 3 modes facilitate deployment in nearly any networking environment.
• ​ Policy-based Forwarding: Forward traffic based on policy defined by application, source zone/interface, source/destination address, source user/group, and service.
• ​ Virtual Systems: Create multiple virtual “firewalls” within a single device as a means of supporting specific departments or customers. Each virtual system can include dedicated administrative accounts, interfaces, networking configuration, security zones, and policies for the associated network traffic.
• ​ VPN connectivity: Secure site-to-site connectivity is enabled through standards-based IPSec VPN support while remote user access is delivered via SSL VPN connectivity.
• ​ Quality of Service (QoS): Deploy traffic shaping policies (guaranteed, maximum and priority) to enable positive policy controls over bandwidth intensive, non-work related applications such as streaming media while preserving the performance of business applications.
• ​ Real-time bandwidth monitor: View real-time bandwidth and session consumption for applications and users within a selected QoS class.
• ​ Purpose-built platform: combines single pass engine with parallel processing hardware to deliver the multi-Gbps performance necessary to protect today’s high-speed networks. Tested Configurations The configurations for this validation are highlighted in Table 2.

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 5

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration The following procedure will put the modules into the Approved mode of operation:

• ​ Install physical kit opacity shields and tamper evidence seals according to the Physical Security Policy section. Physical KitFIPS kits must be correctly installed to operate in the Approved mode of operation. The tamper evidence seals and opacity shields shall be installed for the module to operate in the Approved mode of operation.
• ​ During initial boot up, break the boot sequence via the console port connection (by pressing the maint button when instructed to do so) to access the main menu.
• ​ Select “Continue.”
• ​ Select the “Set FIPS-CC Mode” option to enter the Approved mode.
• ​ Select “Enable FIPS-CC Mode”.
• ​ When prompted, select “Reboot” and the module will re-initialize and continue into “FIPS-CC” mode (Approved
• ​ The module will reboot.
• ​ In “FIPS-CC” mode, the console port is available as a status output port.
• ​ Once the module has finished booting, the Crypto Officer can authenticate using the default credentials that come o​ Once authenticated, the module will automatically require the operator to change their password; and the default credential is overwritten PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 7

The module will automatically indicate the Approved mode of operation in the following manner:

• ​ Status output interface will indicate “**** FIPS-CC MODE ENABLED ****” via the CLI session.
• ​ Status output interface will indicate “FIPS-CC mode enabled successfully” via the console port.
• ​ The module will display “FIPS-CC” at all times in the status bar at the bottom of the web interface. Should one or more power-up self-tests fail, the Approved mode of operation will not be achieved. Feedback will consist of:
• ​ The module will output “FIPS-CC failure”
• ​ The module will reboot and enter a state in which the reason for the reboot can be determined.
• ​ To determine which self-test caused the system to reboot into the error state, connect the console cable and follow the on-screen instructions to view the self-test output. Note: Disabling FIPS-CC mode causes a complete factory reset, which is described in the Zeroization section below. Non-Compliant State Failure to follow the directions in the Approved Mode of Operation above and Section 11 will result in the module operating in a non-compliant state. Zeroization The following procedure will zeroize the module:
• ​ Access the module’s CLI via SSH, and command the module to enter maintenance mode; the module will reboot o​ Note: Establish a serial connection to the console port
• ​ After reboot, select “Continue.”
• ​ Select “Factory Reset”
• ​ The module will perform a zeroization, and provide the following message once complete: o​ “Factory Reset Status: Success” Note: Following the completion of this procedure, the module will be placed back into an uninitialized state. Uninitialized State If the module does not successfully transition into the Approved mode of operation, or zeroization is performed, the module will be in an uninitialized state. It is required to initialize the module in order to perform cryptographic functions. Approved and Allowed Algorithms The following table details the cryptographic algorithms and their algorithm certificates. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes specified in this table are used by the module. The CAVP certificate may contain more tested options than listed in this table. Table 3 - Approved Algorithms

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© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

The module is compliant to IG C.H: GCM is used in the context of TLS, IPsec/IKEv2, SSH:

• ​ For TLS, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with SP 800-52 and in accordance with Section 4 of RFC 5288 for TLS key establishment, and ensures when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts all possible values for a given session key, that a new TLS handshake is initiated per sections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 of RFC 5246. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly o​ From this RFC, the GCM cipher suites in use are TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.
• ​ For IPsec/IKEv2, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with RFCs 4106 and 7296 (RFC 5282 is not applicable, as the module does not use GCM within IKEv2 © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 11

itself). During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of IPsec with IKEv2 and found to behave correctly.

• ​ For SSH, the module meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H. The module conforms to RFCs 4252, 4253, and 5647. The fixed field is 32 bits in length and is derived using the SSH KDF; this ensures the fixed field is unique for any given GCM session. The invocation field is 64 bits in length and is incremented for each invocation of GCM; this prevents the IV from repeating until the entire invocation field space of 264 is exhausted. (It would take hundreds of years for this to occur.) In all of the above cases, the nonce_explicit is always generated deterministically. AES GCM keys are zeroized when the module is power-cycled. For each new TLS or SSH session, a new AES GCM key is established. The module is compliant to IG C.F: The module utilizes Approved modulus sizes 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits for RSA signatures. This functionality has been CAVP tested as noted above. The minimum number of Miller Rabin tests for each modulus size is implemented according to Table C.2 of FIPS 186-4. For modulus size 4096, the module implements the largest number of Miller-Rabin tests shown in Table C.2. RSA SigVer is CAVP tested for all three supported modulus sizes as noted above. The module does not perform FIPS 186-2 SigVer. All supported modulus sizes are CAVP testable and tested as noted above. The module does not implement RSA key transport in the approved mode. The module does not have any algorithms that fall under: -​ Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation -​ Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed -​ Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation The following table documents the module’s algorithms that are non-approved and not allowed for use in the approved mode of operation. Table 4 - Supported Protocols in the Approved Mode TLSv1.2 SSHv2 IPSec and IKEv2 SNMPv3 Note: These protocols were not reviewed or tested by the CMVP or CAVP. Module Diagrams Figure 1 depicts the logical block diagram for the modules. The cryptographic physical boundary includes all of the logical components of the modules and the boundary is the physical enclosure of the firewall.

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Figure 1 - Logical Diagram Figures 2 - 29 depict the modules and their interfaces. Please refer to the appendices for depictions of the modules with the physical kits installed. Figure 2 - PA-410 Front Figure 3 - PA-410 Rear © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 13

Figure 4 - PA-400 Front (PA-440/450/460 front panels are identical) Figure 5 - PA-400 Rear (PA-440/450/460 rear panels are identical) Figure 6 - PA-415/445 Front

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

Figure 7 - PA-415/445 Rear Figure 8 - PA-1400 Series Front Figure 9 - PA-1400 Series Rear Figure 10 - PA-3200 Series Front Figure 11 - PA-3200 Series Rear © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 15

Figure 12 - PA-3410/3420 Front Figure 13 - PA-3430/3440 Front Figure 14 - PA-3400 Rear Figure 15 - PA-5200 Series Front

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

Figure 16 - PA-5200 Rear Figure 17 - PA-5410/5420/5430/5440 Front (Note: All modules are identical) Figure 18 - PA-5410/5420/5430/5440 Rear (Note: All modules are identical) © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 17

Figure 19 - PA-5450 Front Figure 20 - PA-5450 Management Processor Card

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

Figure 21 - PA-5450 Networking Card Figure 22 - PA-5450 Data Processing Card © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 19

Figure 23 - PA-5450 Rear Figure 24 - PA-7050 Front1 Note: The PA-7050 can include various cards

• see Table in Cryptographic Module Specification for line cards that are supported. It is required that an SMC is used with other networking cards

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

Figure 25 - PA-7050 Back © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 21

Figure 26 - PA-7080 Front (on Left) and Back (on Right) Interfaces2 Figure 27 - PA-820 / PA-850 Front Interfaces Note: The PA-7080 can include various cards

• see Table in Cryptographic Module Specification for line cards that are supported. It is required that an SMC is used with other networking cards

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

Figure 28 - PA-820 Rear Interfaces Figure 29 - PA-850 Rear Interfaces 3.​Cryptographic Module Interfaces The modules are multi-chip standalone modules with ports and interfaces as shown below. The modules do not implement a Table 5 - Ports and Interfaces3 N/A Interfaces depicted in Figures 2-29 above, but not listed in this table are disabled or do not transfer any data. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 23

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

4.​Roles, Services, and Authentication Services While in the Approved mode of operation, all CO and User services are accessed via SSH or TLS sessions. Approved and allowed algorithms, relevant CSPs, and public keys related to these protocols are accessed to support the following services. CSP access by services is further described in the following tables. Table 6 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output N/A Assumption of Roles The modules support four distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO), Remote Access VPN, and Site-to-site VPN. The cryptographic modules enforce the separation of roles using unique authentication credentials associated with operator accounts. The modules support concurrent operators. The modules do not provide a maintenance role or bypass capability. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 25

The modules all support the use of a password (i.e. Memorized Secret as per SP 800-140E). Upon first boot, the module enforces a maximum of 10 failed attempts. Passwords stored in the module are hashed using SHA-256, and any passwords that are transported into/out of the module are protected via TLS 1.2. The passwords for the RA VPN and S-S VPN roles are created as part of the Security Configuration Management service Table 7 - Roles and Authentication In FIPS-CC Mode, the module checks and enforces the minimum password length of eight (8) as specified in SP 800-63B. Passwords are securely stored hashed with salt value, with very restricted access control, and rate limiting mechanism for random number password allowance that sets a baseline minimum acceptable strength of 106.

The minimum equivalent strength supported is 112 bits. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2112) which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 288,000,000/(2112), which is less than 1/100,000. The fastest firewall supports at most 288,000,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period. The table below defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. Table 8 - Approved Services © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. N/A HMAC-SHA2256 HMAC-SHA2384 HMAC-SHA2256 N/A N/A G/W/E G/W/E G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 27

G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z G/E/W G/E W/E W/E G/E/Z G/E/Z W/E G/R/E/W G/R/E/W G/R/E/W G/R/E/W W/E W/E G/W/E G/W/E G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/Z G/E/R/W/Z © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

N/A © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z G/E/W G/E G/R/E/W W/E W/E E E G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E N/A G/E/R/W/Z PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 29

HMAC-SHA2256 HMAC-SHA2384 HMAC-SHA2512 N/A

G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z G/E/R/W/Z W/E W/E W/E E E G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z G/E/Z © 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

HMAC-SHA2256 HMAC-SHA2384 N/A N/A G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E/Z G/E W/E W/E W/E E Z E N/A R Note: Configuration/System Logs for Approved services above will indicate FIPS-CC mode is enabled, configuration requirements from Section 11 are followed, and that the service succeeded. ECDSA Cert. #A3453) during the Pre-Operational Self-Test. In addition, the module also conducts the firmware load test by using RSA 2048 with SHA-256 (Cert. #A3453) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. The pre-operational self-tests can be initiated by power cycling the module. When this is performed, the module automatically runs the cryptographic algorithm self-tests in addition to the pre-operational firmware integrity test. 6.​Operational Environment The FIPS 140-3 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the module does not contain a modifiable operational environment. The operational environment is limited since the modules include a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into these modules is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 31

The multi-chip standalone modules are production quality containing standard passivation. Chip components are protected by an opaque enclosure. There are tamper evident seals that are applied on the modules by the Crypto-Officer. All unused seals are to be controlled by the Crypto-Officer. The seals prevent removal of the opaque enclosure without evidence. The Crypto-Officer must ensure that the module surface is clean and dry. Tamper evident seals must be pressed firmly onto the adhering surfaces during installation and once applied the Crypto- Officer shall permit 24 hours of cure time for all tamper-evident seals. The Crypto-Officer should inspect the seals and shields for evidence of tamper every 30 days. If the seals show evidence of tamper, the Crypto-Officer should assume that the modules have been compromised and contact Customer Support. Note: For ordering information, see tables in Cryptographic Module Specification for Kit part numbers and versions. Opacity shields and Tamper Seals are included for the kits. Refer to this document’s Appendices for instructions on installation of the tamper seals and opacity shields. 8.​Non-Invasive Security No approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics are defined at this time.

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

9.​Sensitive Security Parameter Management The following table details all the sensitive security parameters utilized by the module. Table 10 - SSPs N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C C N/A N/A C C N/A N/A © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 33

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

C C N/A N/A N/A HMAC-SHA1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A HMAC-SHA1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 35

Note: SSPs are implicitly zeroized when power is lost, or explicitly zeroized by the zeroize service. In the case of implicit zeroization, the SSPs are implicitly overwritten with random values due to their ephemeral memory being reset upon power loss. For the zeroization service and zeroization at session termination, the SSP's memory location is overwritten with random values. Table 11 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification 10.​ Self-Tests The cryptographic module automatically performs the following tests below. The operator can command the module to perform the pre-operational and cryptographic algorithm self-tests by cycling power of the module; these tests do not require any additional operator action. Pre-operational Self-Tests Pre-operational Firmware Integrity Test

• ​ Verified with HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256 Note: the ECDSA and HMAC-SHA-256 KATs are performed prior to the Software integrity test PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 37

Conditional self-tests Cryptographic algorithm self-tests

• ​ AES 128-bit ECB Encrypt Known Answer Test*
• ​ AES 128-bit ECB Decrypt Known Answer Test *
• ​ AES 128-bit CMAC Known Answer Test* *Note: Supported by the module cryptographic implementation, but only utilized for CAST
• ​ AES 256-bit GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• ​ AES 256-bit GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• ​ AES 192-bit CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• ​ AES 192-bit CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• ​ RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Sign Known Answer Test
• ​ RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Verify Known Answer Test
• ​ RSA 2048-bit Encrypt Known Answer Test
• ​ RSA 2048-bit Decrypt Known Answer Test Note: RSA Encrypt/Decrypt are only used for self-tests
• ​ ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Sign Known Answer Test
• ​ ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Verify Known Answer Test
• ​ HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• ​ HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• ​ HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• ​ SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• ​ SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• ​ SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• ​ DRBG SP 800-90Arev1 Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Known Answer Tests
• ​ SP 800-90Arev1 Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Section 11.3 Health Tests
• ​ SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-FFC-SSC 2048-bit Known Answer Test
• ​ SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.2 with SHA-256 KDF Known Answer Test
• ​ SP 800-135rev1 SSH KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ SP 800-135rev1 IKEv2 KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• ​ SP 800-90B RCT/APT Health Tests on Entropy Source Note: The SP 800-90B Health Tests are implemented by the entropy source. Conditional Pairwise Consistency Self-Tests
• ​ RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
• ​ ECDSA/KAS-ECC Pairwise Consistency Test
• ​ KAS-FFC Pairwise Consistency Test Conditional Software Load test
• ​ Firmware Load Test
• Verify RSA 2048 with SHA-256 signature on software at time of load Conditional Critical Functions Tests
• ​ SP 800-56A Rev. 3 Assurance Tests (Based on Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3) Error Handling In the event of a conditional test failure, the module will output a description of the error. These are summarized below.

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Table 12 - Errors and Indicators 11. Life-Cycle Assurance The vendor provided life-cycle assurance documentation describes configuration management, design, finite state model, development, testing, delivery & operation, end of life procedures, and guidance. For details regarding the approved mode of operation, see “Approved Mode of Operation''. For details regarding secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module, see below. Palo Alto Network provides an Administrator Guide for additional information noted in the “Reference Documents” section of this Security Policy. Module Enforced Security Rules The module design corresponds to the module security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-3 Level 2 module. 1.​ The cryptographic module provides four distinct operator roles. These are the User role, Remote Access VPN role, Site-to-site VPN role, and the Cryptographic Officer role. 2.​ The cryptographic module provides identity-based authentication. 3.​ The cryptographic module clears previous authentications on each power cycle. 4.​ When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic services. 5.​ Data output is inhibited during power-up self-tests, zeroization and error states. 6.​ Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module. 7.​ There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service. 8.​ The module maintains separation between concurrent operators. 9.​ The module does not support a maintenance interface or role. 10.​ The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data. 11.​ The module does not enter or output plaintext SSPs. 12.​ The module does not output intermediate key generation values. 13.​ Pre-shared keys used for IKE/IPSec must be at least 6 bytes in length, but no more than 255 bytes. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 39

Vendor imposed security rules In FIPS-CC mode, the following rules shall apply: 1.​ The operator shall not enable TLSv1.0 or use RSA for key wrapping; it is disabled by default a.​ Checked via CLI using “show shared” command 2.​ The operator should not enable TLSv1.3, it is disabled by default. a.​ Checked via CLI using “show profiles” command 3.​ If using RADIUS, it must be configured using TLS. a.​ Checked via CLI using “show shared” command 4.​ If using TACACS+, configure the service route via an IPSec tunnel, and ensure the TACACS+ server is configured for a minimum password length of eight (8) characters or greater. a.​ Checked via CLI using “show deviceconfig” command

12. Mitigation of Other Attacks The module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-3. These requirements are not applicable.
13. Definitions and Acronyms API – Application Programming Interface App-ID – Application Identification - Palo Alto Networks’ ability to identify applications and apply security policy based on the ID rather than the typical port and protocol-based classification. BGP – Border Gateway protocol – Dynamic routing protocol CA – Certificate authority Content-ID – Content Identification – Palo Alto Networks’ threat prevention features including Antivirus, Antispyware, and Intrusion Prevention. CO – Cryptographic Officer DLP – Data loss prevention Gbps – Gigabits per second HA – High Availability HSCI - High Speed Chassis Interconnect IKE – Internet Key Exchange IP – Internet Protocol IPSec – Internet Protocol Security LDAP – Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LED – Light Emitting DiodeOCSP – Online Certificate Status Protocol OSPF – Open Shortest Path First – Dynamic routing protocol PAN-OS – Palo Alto Networks’ Operating System QoS – Quality of Service QSFP - Quad Small Form-factor Pluggable RA VPN – Remote Access Virtual Private Network RIP – Routing Information Protocol – Dynamic routing protocol RJ45 – Networking Connector RNG –Random number generator S-S VPN – Site to site Virtual Private Network SFP – Small Form-factor Pluggable Transceiver SSL – Secure Sockets Layer TLS – Transport Layer Security

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USB

• Universal Serial Bus User-ID
• User Identification
• Palo Alto Networks’ ability to apply security policy based on who initiates the traffic rather than the typical IP-based approach. VPN
• Virtual Private Network XML
• Extensible Markup Language 14. Reference Documents FIPS 140-3 - FIPS Publication 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic ModulesPalo Alto Networks Administrator’s Guide : https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/techdocs/en_US/pdf/pan-os/11-0/pan-os-admin/pan-os-admin.pdf Appendix A - PA-410 - FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (4 Seals) The PA-410 requires four tamper labels. Refer to Table 2 of this document for the part number of the physical kit containing the tamper labels. The placement of these seals are needed in the following areas. Affix one seal to the front of the module that connects to the top/bottom. The left and right side of the module requires one seal each in the same location, as noted in the following area. This wraps to the top and bottom of the module. The last seal is placed on the rear side of the module, and wraps to the top and bottom of the module. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 41

Appendix B - PA-415 - FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (5 Seals) The PA-415 requires 5 tamper labels in the following locations. Refer to Table 2 of this document for the part number of the physical kit containing the tamper labels. Affix the tamper labels as shown below: Attach one label on the top side that wraps around the rear side of the module: Affix four labels on the bottom of the device. One on each side that wraps to the bottom of the module, and two in locations

Appendix C - PA-440/450/460 FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (4 Seals) The PA-440/450/460 require four tamper labels that are placed at the same location as the modules have the same enclosure. Refer to Table 2 of this document for the part number of the physical kit containing the tamper labels. Affix the tamper labels on the rear of the module as shown below:

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Appendix D - PA-445 FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (8 Seals) The Physical Kit for this module requires 8 tamper labels. Refer to Table 2 of this document for the part number of the physical kit containing the tamper labels. Placement is as follows. Apply 6 seals on the top of the module: Place one seal on the right and one seal on the left of the module: © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 43

Appendix E - PA-1400 and PA-3400 Series FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (12 Seals) The PA-1410/PA-1420 and PA-3410/PA-3420/PA-3430/PA-3440 require 12 tamper labels that are placed at the same location on all devices in the series. Refer to Table 2 of this document for the part number of the physical kit containing the tamper labels and opacity shields. Affix the tamper labels and install the opacity shields on the module as shown below in the diagrams. Install the front opacity shield as such:

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Note: Depending on the module, there may be 1 or 2 power supplies provided. Regardless of 1 or 2 being installed, the location of the tamper label is the same. Appendix F

• PA-3200 Series
• FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (19 Seals) The PA-3220/PA3250/PA-3260 require 19 tamper labels that are placed at the same location on all devices in the series. Refer to Table 2 of this document for the part number of the physical kit containing the tamper labels and opacity shields. Affix the tamper labels and install the opacity shields as shown in the below diagrams. 1.​ Install the back cover to the back of the firewall © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 45

2.​ Attach the bracket to the firewall that will be used. Note: The firewall can use a mid-mount, front-mount or four-post mount. All seal placement is the same for the various use cases.

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3.​ Place 19 tamper seals on the module. Note: Tamper seal placement is the same for all mount types. Seal #16 is required only for the front-mount of four-post rack installations. It is not required for the mid-mount installation © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 47

Appendix G - PA-5200- FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (28 Seals) The PA-5220/PA-5250/PA-5260/PA-5280 require 28 tamper labels that are placed at the same location on all devices in the series. Refer to Table 2 of this document for the part number of the physical kit containing the tamper labels and opacity shields. Affix the tamper labels and install the opacity shields as shown in the below diagrams. 1.​ Place the firewall upside down on a flat Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) protected surface and ground yourself by touching a metal surface on the firewall. 2.​ Install power cables: plug the power cords in to the power inlets located on the back of the firewall and connect the ground lug and ground cable to the ground lug bolts (you cannot access these back ports after you attach the FIPS back cover). 3.​ Place the FIPS back cover onto the back of the firewall and attach it to the firewall using four (4) #8-32 x 1/4” screws (two (2) screws on each side of the cover). Route the power cables through the back-cover cable-guide openings. ​ ​ 4.​ Attach the FIPS back-cover panel to the FIPS back cover using four (4) #4-40 x 1/4” screws (one (1) screw on each side of the cover and two (2) screws on the back of the cover). ​

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5.​ Place the FIPS front cover onto the front of the firewall and place the rack-mount brackets over the holes on the front cover. Attach the front cover and rack-mount brackets to the firewall using eighteen (18) #8-32 x 5/16” screws (shipped with the firewall)—use nine (9) screws on each side. ​ 6.​ Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the illustrations (28 seals). © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 49

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Appendix F - PA-5450 FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (12 Seals) The PA-5450 requires twelve tamper seals. Follow the directions below to install the Physical Kit. Affix 7 seals at the locations on the rear of the device: On the top cover of the module, place one seal at the following location: Affix the front opacity shield to the front of the device and screw into the locations as below:

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Finalize the process by adding four seals at the following locations to secure the screws: © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 53

Appendix H - PA-5400 Series FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (11 Seals) The PA-5410/PA-5420/PA-5430/PA-5430 require 11 tamper labels. The location of the tamper labels placement is the same for all models in the series. Refer to Table 2 of this document for the part number of the physical kit containing the tamper labels and opacity shields. Affix the tamper labels and install the opacity shields as shown in the below diagrams.

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

Appendix I - PA-7050 - FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (24 Seals) The PA-7050 requires 24 tamper labels. Refer to Table 2 of this document for the part number of the physical kit containing the tamper labels and opacity shields. Affix the tamper labels and install the opacity shields as shown in the below diagrams. 1.​ Attach front right rack mount brackets in 4-post rack position. Do not attach rear rack mount brackets. Note that brackets are rotated 180 degrees, so the screw holes lineup and the rack mount holes are now on the front of the chassis. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 55

2.​ Align right plenum bracket with five (5) open screw holes. Attach air plenum brackets using five (5) of the remaining bracket screws as shown. Repeat for left side. 3.​ Attach bottom plenum to the front right rack mount bracket. Place only the middle two (2) screws.

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4.​ Attach the bottom plenum to the rearward right plenum bracket. 5.​ Rotate PA-7050 chassis clockwise 90 degrees onto the bottom plenum. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 57

6.​ Assemble top plenum and cable guide hardware. 7.​ Attach top plenum to the front left rack mount bracket

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8.​ Attach front opacity shield using the four (4) captive screws 9.​ Attach top plenum to the rearward left plenum bracket along with plenum’s rear opacity shield as shown © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 59

10.​ Loosen four (4) screws on the panel containing the power supply vent. Insert the power supply vent opacity shield and tighten screws. 11.​ Facing the front of the module, affix two (2) seals to top of the front opacity shield, one (1) near left edge and one (1) near the right edge. Ensure the seals, when placed, overlap onto the top of the plenum, as shown. (2 total)

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12.​ Facing the front of the module affix one (1) seal centered to the bottom of the front opacity shield to the bottom air plenum, as shown. (1 total) 13.​ Facing the rear of the module, affix two (2) seals to top of the rear opacity shield, one (1) near left edge and one (1) near the right edge. Ensure the seals, when placed, overlap onto the top of the plenum, as shown. (2 total) © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 61

14.​ Facing the rear of the module; A.​ Affix one (1) seal to the top plenum/opacity shield, covering the left and right outermost screws, as shown. B.​ Affix one (1) seal to the left and right edge of the top plenum bracket folding over the outer edge of the module, as shown. C.​ Affix one (1) seal to the top of each rear panel (three (3). Ensure that the seals lap onto the top rear plenum brackets, as shown. (7 total)

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15.​ Facing the rear of the module, A.​ Affix one (1) seal to the bottom of each rear panel (three (3). Ensure that the seals laps onto the bottom rear plenum brackets, as shown. B.​ Affix one (1) seal to the left and right edge of the bottom plenum bracket folding over the outer edge of the module, as shown. C.​ Affix one (1) seal to the bottom plenum’s rear side and the bottom plenum rear bracket. (6 total) © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 63

16.​ Facing the rear of the module;

• ​ Affix one (1) seal to cover one (1) screw for each power switch, as shown.
• ​ Affix one (1) seal to the top and bottom of the vent opacity shield, as shown. Please ensure that the captive screw is covered. (6 total)

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Appendix J - PA-7080 - FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (10 Seals) The PA-7080 requires 10 tamper labels. Refer to Table 2 of this document for the part number of the physical kit containing the tamper labels and opacity shields. Affix the tamper labels and install the opacity shields as shown in the below diagrams. 1.​ Using the supplied screws attach the Cable Manager Kit with upper opacity lip to the front of the PA-7080, as shown. 2.​ Using the supplied screws, attach the Left and Right Front Cover brackets to the sides of the PA-7080, as shown. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 65

3.​ Using the supplied screws attach front opacity shield to the PA-7080 as shown. 4.​ The final assembly for the PA-7080 with the Physical Kit is as shown.

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5.​ Facing the front of the PA-7080: A.​ Affix one (1) seal to the front and center of the exhaust fan tray. Ensure the seal overlaps the seam with the front PA-7080 branding panel as shown. (1 total) B.​ Affix one (1) seal to the left and right outer edge of mounting flanges for the front opacity shield. Seals should fold over the edge of the cover flange and mounting bracket onto the side of the PA-7080. (2 total) C.​ Affix one (1) seal to the front and center of the air intake fan tray. Ensure the seal overlaps the seam with the PA-7080 electrostatic discharge port panel as shown. (1 total) © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 67

6.​ Facing the rear of the PA-7080; D.​ Affix one (1) seal to the left and right outer edge of the upper back panel. Seals should be placed just below the rear exhaust vent as shown. Seals should wrap around onto the sides of the PA-7080 (2 total). E.​ Affix one (1) seal to the left and right outer edges of each power entry module as shown. Seals should wrap around onto the sides of the PA-7080 (4 total).

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Appendix K - PA-800 Series - FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (11 Seals) The PA-820/PA-850 require 11 tamper labels. Refer to Table 2 of this document for the part number of the physical kit containing the tamper labels and opacity shields. Affix the tamper labels and install the opacity shields as shown in the below diagrams. 1.​ Place the firewall on a flat Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) protected surface and ground yourself by touching a metal surface on the firewall. 2.​ Place the physical kit back cover onto the back of the firewall and attach it using four #4-40 x 5/16 screws (two screws on each side of the back cover). ​ 3.​ Insert the front (network, management, and console) cables in to the front ports. 4.​ Place the physical kit front cover onto the front of the firewall and place the rack-mount brackets over the holes on the front cover. Attach the front cover and rack-mount brackets to the firewall using eight (8) #6-32 x 5/16” rack-mount bracket screws (shipped with the firewall)—use four (4) screws on each side. Route the front cables through the front-cover cable-guide opening.

© 2025 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

​ ​ ​ 5.​ Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following illustrations (eleven (11) seals total). The seal placement over the power supply of the PA-820 firewall and PA-850 firewall is slightly different as shown. ​ © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. PAN-OS 11.0 Firewalls Security Policy 71

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Referenced URLs

• www.paloaltonetworks.com​
• https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html
• https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/techdocs/en_US/pdf/pan-os/11-0/pan-os-admin/pan-os-admin.pdf