| Standard | FIPS 140-3 |
|---|---|
| Overall level | 1 |
| Module type | Hardware |
| Embodiment | Multi-Chip Stand Alone |
| Status | Active |
| Sunset date | 10/10/2029 |
| Caveat | When installed, initialized and configured as specified in section "Secure Operation" of the Security Policy and operated in approved mode |
| Vendor | Ruckus Wireless LLC |
| Algorithm | ACVP Cert |
|---|---|
| AES-CBC | A2345 |
| AES-CFB128 | A2345 |
| AES-CMAC | A2345 |
| AES-CTR | A2345 |
| AES-ECB | A2345 |
| AES-ECB | AES 4550 |
| AES-GCM | A2345 |
| AES-GCM | AES 4550 |
| AES-KW | A2345 |
| AES-KWP | A2345 |
| Counter DRBG | A2345 |
| ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) | A2345 |
| ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) | A2345 |
| ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A2345 |
| HMAC-SHA-1 | A2345 |
| HMAC-SHA2-256 | A2345 |
| HMAC-SHA2-384 | A2345 |
| KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 | A2345 |
| KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 | A2345 |
| KDF SNMP | A2345 |
| KDF SP800-108 | A2345 |
| KDF SSH | A2345 |
| KDF TLS | A2345 |
| RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) | A2345 |
| RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) | A2345 |
| RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A2345 |
| Safe Primes Key Generation | A2345 |
| SHA-1 | A2345 |
| SHA2-256 | A2345 |
| SHA2-384 | A2345 |
flowchart LR
%% Deterministic review-risk graph for Ruckus FastIron ICX ™ 7550/7650/7850 Series Switch/Router
%% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Update<br/>Firmware Load</i>"]
C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output</i>"]
C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>HTTPS</i>"]
C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>bootloader<br/>application</i>"]
end
subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
end
subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
end
subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
end
C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;flowchart LR
%% Deterministic clue tier for Ruckus FastIron ICX ™ 7550/7650/7850 Series Switch/Router
%% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Update<br/>Firmware Load</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>HTTPS</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>bootloader<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
end
classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;Ruckus FastIron ICX™ 7550/7650/7850 Series Switch/Router Firmware Version: IronWare OS 09.0.10 Document Version: 1.5 Last Update Date: 10-07-2024 Prepared by: Ruckus Wireless LLC Salarpuria Supreme, #137, Marathahalli Bangalore, Karnataka 560037 India www.commscope.com
| # | Section | Page |
|---|
Table 1 - Security Levels The module is designed to meet an overall security level 1.
2. Cryptographic Module Specification Cryptographic Boundary The module is a hardware, multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The cryptographic boundary is defined as the module’s chassis unit encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," “rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case representing the module’s physical perimeter. This section illustrates the module hardware with the help of photographs. Ruckus ICX-7550 Series Figure 1 - ICX7550 Series Figure 2 - ICX 7550
Figure 4 - ICX 7550-24P Figure 5 - ICX 7550-24ZP Figure 6 - ICX 7550-48 Figure 7 - ICX 7550-48F Figure 8 - ICX 7550-48P
Figure 9 - ICX 7550-48ZP Figure 10 - ICX 7550-Rear View Please note that Ruckus ICX 7550 Series switches offer up to 2 redundant power supplies (AC or DC), one RJ-45 Ethernet port for out of band network management, one USB Type-C port for console management, and one RJ-45 port for serial console management. Ruckus ICX-7650 Series Figure 11 - ICX7650 Series Figure 12 - ICX 7650-48ZP Figure 13 - ICX 7650-48P Figure 14 - ICX7650-48F
Figure 15 - ICX7650 Rear View Please note that Ruckus ICX 7650 Series switches offer dual power supply slots, one RJ-45 Ethernet port for out-of-band network management, one USB Type-C port for console management, and one RJ-45 port for serial console management. Ruckus ICX-7850 Series Figure 16 - ICX7850 Series Figure 17
Figure 20 - ICX7850-48C Please note that Ruckus ICX 7850 Series switches offer dual power supply slots, one RJ-45 Ethernet port for out-of-band network management, one USB Type-C port for console management, and one RJ-45 port for serial console management. The module delivers the performance, flexibility, and scalability required for enterprise access deployment. Table 2 below lists the model and firmware version included in this validation. Hardware Hardware Distinguishing [Part Numbers and Firmware Version Model Features Versions]
Hardware Hardware Distinguishing [Part Numbers and Firmware Version Model Features Versions] See Cryptographic Module Interfaces section for more information
Hardware Hardware Distinguishing [Part Numbers and Firmware Version Model Features Versions]
Mode/Method Description / Key Use / Function /Notes CAVP Algorithm and Size(s) / Key Cert Standard Strength(s) #A2345 AES AES-ECB 128 and 256 bits Data
Mode/Method Description / Key Use / Function /Notes CAVP Algorithm and Size(s) / Key Cert Standard Strength(s) #A2345 KAS-FFC-SSC KAS-FFC-SSC MODP-2048, MODP- KAS-FFC Shared Secret
strength #A2345 KTS (SSH) KTS (AES Cert. Key establishment Key Transport using AES SP800-38F #A2345 and methodology provides and HMAC in SSH HMAC Cert. 128 or 256 bits of #A2345) encryption strength #A2345 KTS (TLS) KTS (AES Cert. Key establishment Key Transport using AES
encryption strength #A2345 SHS SHA-1 N/A Secure hashing
Mode/Method Description / Key Use / Function /Notes CAVP Algorithm and Size(s) / Key Cert Standard Strength(s)
Mode/Method Description / Key Use / Function /Notes CAVP Algorithm and Size(s) / Key Cert Standard Strength(s) AES AES AES-ECB 128 bits ECB is a pre-requisite #4550
acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-3 defined logical interfaces: Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Control Output (N/A) and Status Output. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the Tables 5-7 below. Please note that the module doesn’t support Control Output logical interface. Physical Port Logical Interface Data that passes over port/interface Console port, Mgmt port, Ethernet ports Data Input SSH, TLS, SNMPv3, or SFP/SFP+ ports, RJ-45 POE+ ports, MACSec traffic Uplink/Stack QSFP+ ports Console port, Mgmt port, Ethernet ports Data Output SSH, TLS, SNMPv3, or SFP/SFP+ ports, RJ-45 POE+ ports, MACSec traffic Uplink/Stack QSFP+ ports Console port, Mgmt port, Ethernet ports Control Input Control Input SFP/SFP+ ports, RJ-45 POE+ ports, Uplink/Stack QSFP+ ports Console port, Mgmt port, Ethernet ports Status Output Status information SFP/SFP+ ports, RJ-45 POE+ ports, Uplink/Stack QSFP+ ports, and LEDs N/A Control Output N/A Power N/A Provides the power supply to the module Table 5 - Ports and Interfaces for ICX 7550 Physical Port Logical Interface Data that passes over port/interface Console port, Mgmt port, Ethernet ports Data Input SSH, TLS, SNMPv3, or SFP/SFP+ ports, RJ-45 POE+ ports MACSec traffic Console port, Mgmt port, Ethernet ports Data Output SSH, TLS, SNMPv3, or SFP/SFP+ ports, RJ-45 POE+ ports MACSec traffic Console port, Mgmt port, Ethernet ports Control Input Control Input SFP/SFP+ ports, RJ-45 POE+ ports Console port, Mgmt port, Ethernet ports Status Output Status information SFP/SFP+ ports, RJ-45 POE+ ports, and LEDs N/A Control Output N/A Power N/A Provides the power supply to the module Table 6
Console port, Mgmt port, Ethernet ports, Status Output Status information SFP+ ports, SFP28 ports, QSFP28 ports, and LEDs N/A Control Output N/A Power N/A Provides the power supply to the module Table 7– Ports and Interfaces for ICX7850
Role Service Input Output Crypto Officer Configure MACSec Commands to configure Status of the completion of MACSec Function MACSec function configuration Crypto Officer Account management Command to create user The status of the new user accounts account Crypto Officer Show Version Command to show version Module’s name and versioning information Crypto Officer Show Status Command to get the status of Module’s current status information the module Crypto Officer Port Configuration Commands to configure the Port configuration completion status Management port parameters of information switch/router Crypto Officer Run SSHv2 Function Initiate SSHv2 tunnel Status of SSHv2 tunnel establishment request establishment Crypto Officer Run SSL over Initiate SSL over Status of TLSv1.1/v1.2 tunnel TLSv1.1/v1.2 Function TLSv1.1/v1.2 tunnel establishment establishment request Crypto Officer Run SNMPv3 Function Initiate SNMPv3 tunnel Status of SNMPv3 tunnel establishment request establishment Crypto Officer Run MACSec Function Initiate MACSec tunnel Status of MACSec tunnel establishment request establishment Table 8 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output (Crypto Officer role) Role Service Input Output User Show Version Command to show version Module’s name and versioning information User Show Status Command to get the status of Module’s current status information the module User User Authentication User role authentication Status of the User role authentication request User Run SSHv2 Function Initiate SSHv2 tunnel Status of SSHv2 tunnel establishment request establishment Table 9 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output (User role) Role Service Input Output Port Config Admin Show Version Command to show version Module’s name and versioning information Port Config Admin Show Status Command to get the status of Module’s current status information the module Port Config Admin Port Config Admin Port Config Admin role Status of the Port Config Admin role Authentication authentication request authentication Port Config Admin Port Configuration Commands to configure the Port configuration completion status Management port parameters of information switch/router Port Config Admin Run SSHv2 Function Initiate SSHv2 tunnel Status of SSHv2 tunnel establishment request establishment Table 10 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output (Port Config Admin role) Authentication Role Authentication Strength Method Crypto Officer, Password-based The minimum length is eight (8) characters (94 possible characters). The User, Port authentication probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is Config Admin 1/(948) which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 10/(948), which is less than 1/100,000. The configuration supports at most ten failed attempts to authenticate in a one-minute period. This calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52
alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total Crypto Officer, RSA-based The minimum length is eight (8) characters (94 possible characters). The User, Port authentication probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is Config Admin 1/(948) which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 10/(948), which is less than 1/100,000. The configuration supports at most ten failed attempts to authenticate in a one-minute period. This calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total Crypto Officer, ECDSA-based RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048 bits, thus providing 112 bits of strength, User, Port authentication which means an attacker would have a 1 in 2112 chance of randomly obtaining Config Admin the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chances required by FIPS 140-3. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 8.65x10^31 (2112 /60 = 8.65 x 1031) attempts per second, which is less than 1/100,000 Table 11
Service Description Approved Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access rights Indicator Security to Keys Functions and/or SSPs HMAC-SHA- SSH ECDSA Public Key, 1, SSH RSA Private Key, HMAC- SSH RSA Public Key, SHA2-256, SSH DH Private Key, KAS-ECC- SSH DH Public Key, SSC, SSH DH Shared Secret Key, SSH ECDH Private Key, KAS (ECC), SSH ECDH Public Key, KAS-FFCSSH ECDH Shared Secret SSC, Key, KAS (FFC), SSH Session Encryption KTS, Key, ECDSA SSH Session Integrity Key KeyGen, ECDSA SigGen, ECDSA SigVer, RSA KeyGen, RSA SigGen, RSA SigVer, Safe Primes KeyGen Configure SSL Configure AES-ECB, DRBG Entropy Input, Crypto R, W, G Global over TLSv1.1/1.2 AES-CBC, DRBG Seed, Officer indicator and TLSv1.1/1.2 Function AES-GCM, DRBG Internal State V TLS Function CKG, value, connection DRBG Key, success log CTR_DRBG, TLS ECDSA Private Key, message KDF TLS, TLS ECDSA Public Key, HMAC-SHA- TLS RSA Private Key, 1, TLS RSA Public Key, HMAC- TLS DH Private Key, SHA2-256, TLS DH Public key, HMAC- TLS DH Shared Secret, SHA2-384, TLS ECDH Private Key, KAS-ECC- TLS ECDH Public key, SSC, TLS ECDH Shared Secret, KAS (ECC), TLS Pre-Master Secret, KAS-FFC- TLS Master Secret, SSC, TLS Session Encryption Key, KAS (FFC), TLS Session Integrity Key KTS, ECDSA KeyGen, ECDSA SigGen, ECDSA SigVer, RSA KeyGen, RSA SigGen, RSA SigVer, Safe Primes KeyGen SNMPv3 Configure AES- SNMPv3 User Crypto R, W, G Global Function SNMPv3 CFB128, Authentication Secret, Officer indicator and Configuration Function KDF SNMP, SNMPv3 Session Encryption SNMPv3 Key, connection
Service Description Approved Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access rights Indicator Security to Keys Functions and/or SSPs HMAC-SHA- SNMPv3 Session Integrity success log 1, Key message HMACSHA2-256, HMACSHA2-384 Configure Configure AES-CMAC, MACSec CAK, Crypto R, W, G Global MACSec MACSec AES-GCM, MACSec ICK, Officer indicator and Function Function AES-KW, MACSec KEK, MACSec AES-KWP, MACSec SAK connection KTS, success log KBKDF message Port Perform Port N/A Crypto Officer Password, Crypto R, E N/A Configuration Configuration Port Config Admin Password Officer, Management Port Config Admin Account Account N/A Crypto Officer Password, Crypto W N/A management Creation User Password, Officer Port Config Admin Password Run SSHv2 Negotiation and AES-CBC, DRBG Entropy Input, Crypto R, E Global Function encrypted data AES-CTR, DRBG Seed, Officer, indicator and transport via CKG, DRBG Internal State V User, SSH SSH CTR_DRBG, value, Port Config connection DRBG Key, Admin success log KDF SSH, SSH ECDSA Private Key, message HMAC-SHASSH ECDSA Public Key, 1, SSH RSA Private Key, HMAC- SSH RSA Public Key, SHA2-256, SSH DH Private Key, KAS-ECC- SSH DH Public Key, SSC, SSH DH Shared Secret Key, KAS (ECC), SSH ECDH Private Key, KAS-FFC- SSH ECDH Public Key, SSC, SSH ECDH Shared Secret KAS (FFC), Key, KTS, SSH Session Encryption Key, ECDSA SSH Session Integrity Key KeyGen, ECDSA SigGen, ECDSA SigVer, RSA KeyGen, RSA SigGen, RSA SigVer, Safe Primes KeyGen Run SSL over Negotiation and AES-ECB, DRBG Entropy Input, Crypto R, E Global TLSv1.1/1.2 encrypted data AES-CBC, DRBG Seed, Officer indicator and Function transport via SSL AES-GCM, DRBG Internal State V TLS (TLSv1.1/1.2) CKG, value, connection DRBG Key, success log CTR_DRBG, TLS ECDSA Private Key, message KDF TLS, TLS ECDSA Public Key, HMAC-SHA- TLS RSA Private Key, 1, TLS RSA Public Key, TLS DH Private Key,
Service Description Approved Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access rights Indicator Security to Keys Functions and/or SSPs HMAC- TLS DH Public key, SHA2-256, TLS DH Shared Secret, HMAC- TLS ECDH Private Key, SHA2-384, TLS ECDH Public key, KAS-ECC- TLS ECDH Shared Secret, SSC, TLS Pre-Master Secret, TLS Master Secret, KAS (ECC), TLS Session Encryption KAS-FFCKey, SSC, TLS Session Integrity Key KAS (FFC), KTS, ECDSA KeyGen, ECDSA SigGen, ECDSA SigVer, RSA KeyGen, RSA SigGen, RSA SigVer, Safe Primes KeyGen Run SNMPv3 Negotiation and AES- SNMPv3 User Crypto R, E Global Function encrypted data CFB128, Authentication Secret, Officer indicator and transport via KDF SNMP, SNMPv3 Session Encryption SNMPv3 SNMPv3 HMAC-SHA- Key, connection 1, SNMPv3 Session Integrity success log HMAC- Key, message SHA2-256, HMACSHA2-384 Run MACSec Negotiation and AES-CMAC, MACSec CAK, Crypto R, E Global Function encrypted data AES-GCM, MACSec ICK, Officer indicator and transport via AES-KW, MACSec KEK, MACSec MACSec AES-KWP, MACSec SAK connection success log KTS, message KBKDF Table 12 - Approved Services G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output) W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP
5. Software/Firmware Security Integrity Techniques The module performs the Firmware Integrity tests by using CRC-32 during the Pre-Operational Self-Test. At Module’s initialization, the integrity of the runtime executable binary file is verified using the following two integrity check mechanisms to ensure that the module has not been tampered:
256 (RSA Cert. #A2345) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A
Firmware Load Test Key was preloaded to the module’s binary at the binary the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to load new firmware, the Crypto Officer must authenticate into the module before loading any firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails. Integrity Test On-Demand Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the module to initiate the firmware integrity test on-demand. This automatically performs the integrity test of all firmware components included within the boundary of the module.
9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management Key/SSP Strength Security Generation Import/ Establis Storage Zeroization Use & related Name/Type Function and Export hment Keys Cert Number DRBG 384 bits N/A Generated from Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to seed Entropy noise source (plaintext) SSP the DRBG Input Export: No (CSP/PSP) Zeroization Command DRBG Seed 256 bits DRBG Internally Derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used DRBG from entropy input (plaintext) SSP generation Cert. #A2345 string as defined by Export: No (CSP/PSP) SP800-90Arev1 Zeroization Command DRBG 256 bits DRBG Internally Derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used DRBG Internal from entropy input (plaintext) SSP generation State V Cert. #A2345 string as defined by Export: No (CSP/PSP) value SP800-90Arev1 Zeroization Command DRBG Key 256 bits DRBG Internally Derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used DRBG from entropy input (plaintext) SSP generation Cert. #A2345 string as defined by Export: No (CSP/PSP) SP800-90Arev1 Zeroization Command Port Config 8 to 60 N/A N/A Import: MD/EE Flash Zeroized by Used for Port Admin Characters Encrypted (plaintext) SSP Config Admin Password by SSH (CSP/PSP) authentication session key Zeroization Command Export: No Crypto 8 to 60 N/A N/A Import: MD/EE Flash Zeroized by Used for Officer Characters Encrypted (plaintext) SSP Crypto Password by SSH (CSP/PSP) Officer session key Zeroization authentication Command Export: No User 8 to 60 N/A N/A Import: MD/EE Flash Zeroized by Used for User Password Characters Encrypted (plaintext) SSP authentication by SSH (CSP/PSP) session key Zeroization Command Export: No RADIUS 8 to 64 N/A N/A Import: MD/EE Flash Zeroized by Used for Secret Characters Encrypted (plaintext) SSP RADIUS by SSH (CSP/PSP) Server session key Zeroization authentication Command Export: No SSH P-256, P- CKG, Internally generated Import: No N/A Flash Zeroized by Used for SSH ECDSA 384 DRBG, conformant to (plaintext) SSP authentication Private Key ECDSA KeyGen, SP800-133r2 Export: No (CSP/PSP) ECDSA SigGen (CKG) using FIPS Zeroization 186-4 ECDSA key Command Cert. #A2345 generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBG SSH P-256, P- ECDSA SigVer Internally derived Import: No N/A Flash Zeroized by Used for SSH ECDSA 384 per the FIPS 186-4 (plaintext) SSP authentication Public Key Cert #A2345 ECDSA key Export: to (CSP/PSP) generation method SSH peer Zeroization application Command
Key/SSP Strength Security Generation Import/ Establis Storage Zeroization Use & related Name/Type Function and Export hment Keys Cert Number SSH RSA 2048 bits CKG, Internally generated Import: No N/A Flash Zeroized by Used for SSH Private Key DRBG, conformant to (plaintext) SSP authentication RSA KeyGen, SP800-133r2 Export: No (CSP/PSP) RSA SigGen (CKG) using FIPS Zeroization 186-4 RSA key Command Cert. #A2345 generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBG SSH RSA 2048 bits RSA SigVer Internally derived Import: No N/A Flash Zeroized by Used for SSH Public Key per the FIPS 186-4 (plaintext) SSP authentication Cert #A2345 RSA key generation Export: to (CSP/PSP) method SSH peer Zeroization application Command SSH DH MODP- CKG, Internally Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to derive Private Key 2048, DRBG, generated. (plaintext) SSP SSH DH 4096, KAS-FFC-SSC conformant to Export: No (CSP/PSP) Shared secret
8192 bits SP800-133r2 Zeroization
Cert. #A2345 (CKG) using Command SP800-56Arev3 Diffie-Hellman key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBG SSH DH MODP- KAS-FFC-SSC Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to derive Public Key 2048, internally per the (plaintext) SSP SSH DH 4096, Cert. #A2345 Diffie-Hellman key Export: to (CSP/PSP) Shared secret
8192 bits agreement SSH peer Zeroization
(SP800-56Arev3) application Command SSH DH MODP- KAS-FFC-SSC Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to derive Shared 2048, 4096, using (plaintext) SSP SSH Session Secret 8192 bits Cert. #A2345 SP800-56A rev3 Export: No (CSP/PSP) Encryption EC Diffie-Hellman Zeroization Key, SSH shared secret Command Session computation Integrity Key SSH ECDH P-256, CKG, Internally Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to derive Private Key P-384, DRBG, generated. (plaintext) SSP SSH ECDH P-521 KAS-ECC-SSC conformant to Export: No (CSP/PSP) Shared secret SP800-133r2 Zeroization Cert. #A2345 (CKG) using Command SP800-56Arev3 EC Diffie-Hellman key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBG SSH ECDH P-256, KAS-ECC-SSC Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to derive Public Key P-384, internally per the (plaintext) SSP SSH ECDH P-521 Cert. #A2345 (CSP/PSP) Shared secret
Key/SSP Strength Security Generation Import/ Establis Storage Zeroization Use & related Name/Type Function and Export hment Keys Cert Number EC Diffie-Hellman Export: to Zeroization key agreement SSH peer Command (SP800-56Arev3) application SSH ECDH P-256, KAS-ECC-SSC Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to derive Shared P-384, using (plaintext) SSP SSH Session Secret P-521 Cert. #A2345 SP800-56A rev3 Export: No (CSP/PSP) Encryption EC Diffie-Hellman Zeroization Key shared secret Command SSH Session computation Integrity Key SSH Session 128, 256 AES-CTR, Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used for SSH Encryption bits KDF SSH, via key derivation (plaintext) SSP session Key KTS function defined in Export: No (CSP/PSP) confidentiality SP800-135rev1 Zeroization protection Cert. #A2345 KDF (SSHv2) Command SSH Session At least HMAC-SHA-1, Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used for SSH Integrity 160 bits HMAC-SHA2- via key derivation (plaintext) SSP session Key 256, function defined in Export: No (CSP/PSP) integrity KDF SSH SP800-135rev1 Zeroization protection KDF (SSHv2) Command Cert. #A2345 SNMPv3 8 to 20 N/A Please see Import: MD/EE Flash Zeroized by SNMPv3 User User characters Establishment Encrypted by (plaintext) SSP Authentication Authenticati SSH session (CSP/PSP) on Secret key Zeroization Command Export: No SNMPv3 128 bits AES-CFB128, Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used for Session KDF SNMP via key derivation (plaintext) SSP SNMPV3 Encryption function defined in Export: No (CSP/PSP) session Key Cert. #A2345 SP800-135rev1 Zeroization confidentiality KDF (SNMPv3) Command protection SNMPv3 At least 160 HMAC-SHA-1, Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used for Session bits KDF SNMP via key derivation (plaintext) SSP SNMPv3 Integrity function defined in Export: No (CSP/PSP) session Key Cert. #A2345 SP800-135rev1 Zeroization integrity KDF (SNMPv3) Command protection
Key/SSP Strength Security Generation Import/ Establis Storage Zeroization Use & related Name/Type Function and Export hment Keys Cert Number TLS ECDSA P-256, P- CKG, Internally generated Import: No N/A Flash Zeroized by Used for TLS Private Key 384 DRBG, conformant to (plaintext) SSP authentication ECDSA KeyGen, SP800-133r2 Export: No (CSP/PSP) ECDSA SigGen (CKG) using Zeroization FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Command Cert. #A2345 key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBG TLS ECDSA P-256, P- ECDSA SigVer Internally derived Import: No N/A Flash Zeroized by Used for TLS Public Key 384 per the FIPS 186-4 (plaintext) SSP authentication Cert. #A2345 ECDSA key Export: to (CSP/PSP) generation method TLS peer Zeroization application Command TLS RSA 2048 bits CKG, Internally generated Import: No N/A Flash Zeroized by Used for TLS Private Key DRBG, conformant to (plaintext) SSP authentication RSA KeyGen, SP800-133r2 Export: No (CSP/PSP) RSA SigGen (CKG) using Zeroization FIPS 186-4 RSA Command Cert. #A2345 key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBG TLS RSA 2048 bits RSA SigVer Internally derived Import: No N/A Flash Zeroized by Used for TLS Public Key per the FIPS 186-4 (plaintext) SSP authentication Cert. #A2345 RSA key generation Export: to (CSP/PSP) method TLS peer Zeroization application Command TLS DH MODP- CKG, Internally Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to derive Private Key 2048 DRBG, generated. (plaintext) SSP TLS DH KAS-FFC-SSC conformant to Export: No (CSP/PSP) Shared secret SP800-133r2 Zeroization Cert. #A2345 (CKG) using Command SP800-56Arev3 Diffie-Hellman key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBG TLS DH MODP- KAS-FFC-SSC Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to derive Public Key 2048 internally per the (plaintext) SSP TLS DH Cert. #A2345 Diffie-Hellman key Export: to (CSP/PSP) Shared secret agreement TLS peer Zeroization (SP800-56Arev3) application Command TLS DH MODP- KAS-FFC-SSC Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to derive Shared 2048 using (plaintext) SSP TLS Session Secret Cert. #A2345 SP800-56A rev3 Export: No (CSP/PSP) Encryption
Key/SSP Strength Security Generation Import/ Establis Storage Zeroization Use & related Name/Type Function and Export hment Keys Cert Number Diffie-Hellman Zeroization Key, TLS shared Command Session secret Integrity Key computation TLS ECDH P-256, P- CKG, Internally Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to derive Private Key 384 DRBG, generated. (plaintext) SSP TLS ECDH KAS-ECC-SSC conformant to Export: No (CSP/PSP) Shared Secret SP800-133r2 Zeroization Cert. #A2345 (CKG) using Command SP800-56Arev3 EC Diffie-Hellman key generation method, and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP800-90Arev1 DRBG TLS ECDH P-256, P- KAS-ECC-SSC Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to derive Public key 384 internally per the (plaintext) SSP TLS ECDH Cert. #A2345 EC Diffie-Hellman Export: to (CSP/PSP) Shared secret key agreement TLS peer Zeroization (SP800-56Arev3) application Command TLS ECDH P-256, P- KAS-ECC-SSC Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to derive Shared 384 using (plaintext) SSP TLS Session Secret Cert. #A2345 SP800-56A rev3 Export: No (CSP/PSP) Encryption EC Diffie-Hellman Zeroization Key, TLS shared Command Session Integrity Key secret computation TLS Pre- 256 bits N/A Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to derive Master via key derivation (plaintext) SSP TLS Session Secret function defined in Export: No (CSP/PSP) Encryption SP800-135rev1 Zeroization Key, TLS KDF (TLSv1.1/1.2) Command Session Integrity Key TLS Master 48 bytes N/A Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by TLS pre Secret via key derivation (plaintext) SSP master secret, function defined in Export: No (CSP/PSP) TLS SP800-135rev1 Zeroization Encryption KDF (TLSv1.1/1.2) Command Key TLS Session Integrity Key TLS Session 128 or 256 AES-ECB, Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used for TLS Encryption bits AES-CBC, via key derivation (plaintext) SSP session Key AES-GCM, function defined in Export: No (CSP/PSP) confidentiality KDF TLS, SP800-135 rev1 Zeroization protection KTS KDF TLSv1.1/1.2 Command KDF Cert. #A2345 TLS Session At least 160 KDF TLS Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used for TLS Integrity bits HMAC-SHA2- via key derivation (plaintext) SSP session Key 256, function defined in Export: No (CSP/PSP) integrity HMAC-SHA2- SP800-135 rev1 Zeroization protection
384 KDF TLSv1.1/1.2 Command
Cert. #A2345 MACSec 128 bits N/A N/A Import: MD/EE Flash Explicit Used to derive CAK Encrypted (plaintext) zeroization MACSec ICK by SSH by and MACSec session key zeroization KEK command Export: No
Key/SSP Strength Security Generation Import/ Establis Storage Zeroization Use & related Name/Type Function and Export hment Keys Cert Number MACSec 128 bits AES-CMAC, Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by used for ICK KBKDF using SP800-108 (plaintext) SSP MACSec Peer KDF Export: No (CSP/PSP) authentication Cert. #A2345 Zeroization Command MACSec 128 bits AES-KW, Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used to KEK AES-KWP, using SP800-108 (plaintext) SSP transport KBKDF, KDF Export: No (CSP/PSP) MACSec KTS Zeroization SAK to Command MACSec Peer Cert. #A2345 MACSec 128 bits AES-CMAC Internally derived Import: No N/A DRAM Zeroized by Used for SAK KBKDF using SP800-108 (plaintext) SSP MACSec KDF Export: (CSP/PSP) session Cert. #A2345 Encrypted Zeroization protection by MACSec Command AES-GCM KEK AES Cert: #4550 Firmware 2048 bits RSA SigVer, Pre-loaded at the N/A N/A Flash N/A User for Load Test SHA2-256 factory (in the (Plaintext) Firmware load Key module’s test Cert. #A2345 executable binary) Table 13 - SSPs Notes:
a self-test fails, the module will enter an error state, output an error message and follow up with a module reboot. The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational or conditional self-tests on demand for periodic testing of the module by rebooting the system (i.e., power-cycling). Pre-Operational Self-Tests:
In addition, the module also performs the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests to the following AES-GCM algorithm:
End of Life / Sanitization Crypto Officers should follow the procedure below for the secure destruction of their module.
NDPP Network Devices Protection Profile DRBG Deterministic Random Bits Generator CAVS Cryptographic Algorithm Validation System ACVP Automated Cryptographic Validation Program NDcPP Network Device collaborative protection profile JITC Joint Interoperability Test Command