Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R)

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (11)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R)
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Update<br/>recovery</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>show status<br/>Status output</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R)
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Update<br/>recovery</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>show status<br/>Status output</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy Solidigm® Corporation Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Version: 1.3 Date: July 28, 2025 Prepared by: www.acumensecurity.net

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy Table of Contents

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy List of Tables Table 4 - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security List of Figures

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy © 2025 Solidigm® Corporation. This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy About FIPS 140-3 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a sensitive but unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) oversees the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). The NVLAP accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140-3 testing and the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS 140-3 compliance. Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140-3 criteria. More information is available on the CMVP website at: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program About this Document This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Solidigm® P5316 Solid State Drive (SSD) (ADP-R) provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it meets the overall Level Security Level 2 security requirements of FIPS 140-3. The Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) may also be referred to as the “module”, “ADP-R”, or simply the “drive” in this document. Disclaimer The contents of this document are subject to revision without notice due to continued progress in methodology, design, and manufacturing. Solidigm® shall have no liability for any error or damages of any kind resulting from the use of this document. Notices This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy

This document describes the cryptographic module security policy for the Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R), Hardware and Firmware versions described in Table 2. It contains specification of the security rules, under which the cryptographic module operates, including the security rules derived from the requirements of the FIPS 140-3 standard.

The Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) is a hardware module in a multi-chip embedded embodiment which provides data-at-rest protection, using AES-XTS-256 to encrypt user data prior to being written to media. Authentication and access controls in the module are provided by the Opal Storage Specification (v2.01) by the Trusted Computing Group Storage Workgroup. The module is designed to be installed in a data center environment configured as a Single Port NVMe storage device. The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-3: Table 1 - Security Levels The module meets the overall Security Level 2 requirements. The Module implementation is compliant with:

• NVM Express 1.2b: o https://nvmexpress.org/wp-content/uploads/NVM_Express_1_2b_20160601-1.pdf
• TCG Opal 2.01: o https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_StorageOpal_SSC_v2.01_rev1.00.pdf

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy • NVMe-MI 1.0a: o https://nvmexpress.org/wpcontent/uploads/NVM_Express_Management_Interface_1_0a_2017.04.08_-_gold.pdf

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy 2. Cryptographic Module Specification The multi-chip embedded Module, pictured below in Figure 1, is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated Self Encrypting Solid State Disks. Figure 1

• U.2 Module Picture (Intel Branding) Figure 2
• U.2 Module Picture (Solidigm Branding)

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy Figure 3 -- E1.L Module Picture (Top Side with secured black latch) Figure 4 – E1.L Module Picture (Top Side with secured black latch with Solidigm branding) Figure 5 -- E1.L Module Picture (Bottom Side with secured black latch with Intel branding) The cryptographic boundary is defined as the external perimeter of the SSD enclosure represented in Figures 1-4. Figure 5 below shows the module block diagram where the red dotted line depicts the module’s physical perimeter.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy Figure 6 – Module Block Diagram

The module was tested in two different form factors (U.2 and E1.L), each with two different capacities.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration

The Module implements the Approved cryptographic functions listed in the table below. This table includes vendor-affirmed algorithms that are approved but CAVP testing is not yet available. ECB is only supported as a prerequisite for XTS and is not directly used by the module.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy Table 3

• Approved Algorithms Table 4 - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed The module does not implement any of the following algorithms:
• Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation

The cryptographic boundary is defined as the external perimeter of the SSD enclosure and is composed of the following components: 1. Sentinel Rock Plus ASIC (B1 stepping) – The storage controller ASIC. This component is responsible for terminating PCIe/NVMe commands, reading or writing data to the Host platform, encrypting

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy or decrypting data from the Host platform, and storing or retrieving data to NAND non-volatile memory.

2. DRAM – Dynamic RAM.
3. NAND – non-volatile memory. These components comprise the non-volatile media of the storage device. These components store encrypted user data, firmware for the P5316, and other nonvolatile configuration data needed by the ASIC controller during execution.
4. MIC – SMBus controller The Module relies on the PCIe/NVMe interface as input/output devices. Two capacitors within the module boundary are excluded from the FIPS 140-3 requirements. The exclusion of these components does not affect the security of the module.

The Module ships from the manufacturing facility with either the Approved firmware identified in Table

To determine if a module is using an Approved firmware version, the Compliance Descriptor will be retrieved via the Read Compliance (show status) service and the following information will be verified (Note: Byte references below are from a starting index of zero):

1. Related Standard indicates FIPS 140-3 (3) on byte 13
2. Overall Security Level indicates Level 2 (2) on byte 14
3. Compliance Descriptor Hardware Version (byte 16) matches the HW P/N and Version column of a configuration in Table 2.
4. Compliance Descriptor Version (byte 144) matches the FW Version column of a configuration in Table 2.
5. Compliance Descriptor Module Name (byte 272) matches the Module column of a configuration in Table
6. When the Approved firmware is installed, the module is in an uninitialized state and user authentication is not enabled. When the Approved firmware is not installed, the Cryptographic Officer will have to perform the following procedure to transition the module to an uninitialized state:
7. Update the firmware with the Firmware Update service to the Approved firmware
8. Reset the module
9. Enable/Activate Opal
10. Perform an AdminSP Revert method on the AdminSP Once in the uninitialized state, the Module must be placed into the approved mode of operation (Initialized) through the following initialization procedure:
11. Taking ownership of Opal by setting the AdminSP SID credential to something other than MSID (default password)
12. Activating the LockingSP
13. Setting the WriteLockEnabled and ReadLockEnabled column within the Locking Table of all ranges containing sensitive user data via the Lock, Unlock Ranges service.
14. Power cycle the drive or set the WriteLock and ReadLock columns to True within the Locking Table of all ranges containing sensitive user data.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy The CO role is responsible for configuration of other CO and user roles as well as enabling locking/unlocking of any of the CO role-controlled areas (locking ranges). The User roles are responsible for enabling locking/unlocking of the assigned locking ranges as well as performing locking/unlocking of their assigned locking range. In Approved mode (Initialized), the CO Role requires authentication and unlock prior to allowing access to data, whereas the uninitialized mode does not. The module will be in a non-compliant state if not initialized. To determine if a Module is in the Approved mode of operation (Initialized), the following must be verified:

1. The LockingEnabled bit of the TCG Level 0 Discovery Locking Feature Descriptor is set to 1
2. Minimally, the ReadLockEnabled column of the Locking Table is set to the True state for all ranges covering sensitive user data It is possible to switch from the Initialized state to an uninitialized state by performing the AdminSP Revert service. The module shall be initialized to be in an Approved mode of operation before any User accesses the Module and calls any services different than those described in this section’s instructions.

The Module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic Module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-3 Level 2 Module.

1. The Module shall provide three distinct operator roles: Cryptographic Officer, User, and Maintenance.
2. The Module shall provide role-based authentication.
3. The Module shall clear previous authentications on power cycle.
4. If an operator has not been successfully authenticated, no cryptographic services are available to the operator.
5. The operator shall be capable of commanding the Module to perform the power-up self-tests by cycling power or resetting the Module.
6. Power-up self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Control Input and Data output shall be inhibited during self-tests and error states.
8. Data output shall be logically disconnected during key generation and zeroization.
9. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the Module.
10. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
11. The Module does not support manual key entry.
12. The Module does have external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
13. The Module does not output plaintext CSPs.
14. The Module does not output intermediate key values.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy

15. The Module does not support a bypass capability service.
16. The Module does not support the update of the logical serial number or vendor ID. The following section documents the security rules imposed by the vendor.
17. The operator is capable of commanding the Module to perform the power-up Self-Tests by cycling power or resetting the Module.
18. The shipping container protecting the module or set of modules in transit should be verified for tamper evidence.
19. If the Module is shipped from the factory with the Approved firmware installed and uninitialized (TCG Opal is in a manufactured inactive state), the steps in section 2.4 will have to be followed.
20. If the module is shipped with the Approved firmware not installed, seals will need to be applied as described in Section 7 and then the module must be initialized as described in Section 2.4.
21. The module CSPs may be zeroized by calling the Revert method on the AdminSP in the Opal interface of the cryptographic Module.
22. Successful execution of the challenge / response protocol zeroizes the module prior to allowing a Maintenance operation.
23. The module shall be zeroized using the service: “Module Reset” and “Zeroize/Admin SP Revert” after performing a Maintenance operation. The operator shall follow the procedure contained in “Solidigm SSD_DC_D7-D4512 _Procedure_To_Exit_Maintenance_Mode.pdf” - Version 1.0 to exit the maintenance mode.
24. The password length must be equal or greater to 8 bytes.
25. The Module shall be initialized by the CO before any User access to the Module and calling any services different than those described in Section 2.4

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces The physical ports and logical interfaces4 are identified in Table 4 below: Table 5 – Ports and Interfaces The NVMe interface provides the primary interface to interact with the module. Most services provided by the module are accessed via the NVMe Interface including Opal configuration, reading and writing user data, retrieving capability support, and retrieving status reporting. The SMBus interface provides the ability to audit the SSD environment (temperature, Vital Product Data). Control output is not supported.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy 4. Roles, Services, and Authentication

The Module supports three (3) distinct roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO), User, and Maintenance roles. The cryptographic Module enforces the separation of CO and User roles using a credential (named password or PIN) that is provisioned for the administrator (CO) role as part of taking ownership and personalization of the Opal security subsystem. The credential is verified as part of authentication as the specific role during session startup to the Opal Security Subsystem. Access control over configuration mechanisms under control of the administrator is enforced by the Module firmware. The Maintenance role is entered via authentication of an RSA 2048-bit challenge/response protocol with 512-bit nonce and PSID verification (to prove physical presence). This role grants maintenance and recovery capabilities to the Module implementer. The PSID is a unique identifier of each device and is classified as a non-CSP. A unique PSID value is printed on each device label and stored in the module’s OTP. No security is claimed from this value but is used solely to prove physical presence. It is feasible for the Module to process concurrent operations by roles. However, the Module can only support one Opal session at a time. This implies that authentication to the Module by various roles must be serialized. Once authenticated, various roles may interact with the Module simultaneously. As an example, the CO role may perform administrative tasks while the User role is simultaneously reading and writing data to the module.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy Table 7 – Roles and Authentication

All services implemented by the Module in Approved mode are listed in Table 7 below. Each service description also describes all usage of CSPs by the service. The service names highlighted in bold can be called in the uninitialized state. Note:

• CO = Cryptographic Officer Role
• MR = Maintenance Role The following abbreviations of the access rights are used in Table 7 below: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy Table 8 – Approved Services The module does not implement any non-Approved services.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy

5. Software/Firmware Security The Module is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions and operates on the Sentinel Rock Plus B1 ASIC processor. The Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary field updates. The Module will not load or execute firmware which is not signed with the Solidigm 2048-bit RSA private key. The mechanisms available to perform a firmware load are the following:
6. Through NVMe using NVMe Firmware Download and Commit operations
7. Through NVMe, SMBUS or UART (after removing tamper evident label for E1.L) after entering the Maintenance role New firmware versions within the scope of this FIPS 140-3 validation must be validated through the CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this Module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The module’s integrity test can be run on demand by power cycling the Module or by the Module Reset service.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy 6. Operational Environment This section is not applicable to the module.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy The following physical security measures are implemented in the module, which meet the requirements for a multi-chip embedded embodiment at Security Level 2: • The Module consists of production-grade components enclosed in an aluminum alloy enclosure, which is opaque within the visible spectrum. • The U.2 enclosure contains two parts: a top and bottom part that affix together using a hinge on the back side of the Module and two (2) screws that affix the top to the bottom near the PCIe edge connector. • The E1.L enclosure contains three parts: a top and a bottom part that affix together using eight (8) screws that affix the top and bottom together as well as a latch affixed with two (2) screws. the Module top and bottom are separated, exposing the internals of the Module, that the tamper-evident seal will be broken in the process. The position of the one (1) tamper-evident seal is indicated in Figure 1 and Figure

2. The tamper-evident seals are captured as part of the model part number that is listed in Table 2. that if the Module top and bottom are separated, exposing internals of the Module, that the tamper-evident seals will be broken in the process. The position of the three (3) tamper-evident seals are indicated in Figure 3 and Figure
3. The tamper evident seals are captured as part of the model number that is listed in Table
4. The Cryptographic Officer is responsible for obtaining, storing, and applying new tamper-evident labels should the module require maintenance or repair upon inspection. The Crypto Officer can order new tamper evident seals using the part number M45818-002 (E1.L form factor) or M52551-001 (U.2 form factor).

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy Figure 7 - U.2 Module Seal Application Locations - Front Figure 8 - E1.L Module (Intel Branded) Seal Application Locations – Bottom

Some modules may be shipped without the required tamper- evident seals. The tamper-evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in Approved mode of operation. To convert the module to Approved mode of operation, the following procedure must be followed to apply the provided seals to the module:

1. Clean seal surface a. Use isopropyl alcohol of equivalent solution to remove any contaminants from the enclosure seam seal location b. Handle drive and seal with gloves
2. Locate the Tamper Evident Label Locations a. For U.2 Module: There is just one seal to be placed on the right front of the module (see Figure 7) b. For E1.L Module There are three seals to be placed on the bottom side of the module; one seal over the upper far right screw next to the PCIe connector, one seal over the lower third screw from the PCIe connector and one seal on the lower screw on the far left attaching the black latch (see Figure 9).
3. Use tweezers to lift seal from liner and place on the seam of the enclosure for the designated area (see Figure below for an example on the U.2 Module).
4. Apply finger pressure to seal pressing out any air or lifted edges

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy Figure 9 - Applying Tamper-Evident Seals EFP/EFT testing of the module is not applicable as the module does not claim Security Level 3 or above. 8. Non-invasive Security This section is not applicable to the module.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy 9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy

Verification Key (PSP)

PKCS #1 v2.1 (PKCS1.5)] (#A2881)

firmware binary)

firmware image

from modification)

of the request to unlock the drive for diagnostic access

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy Table 10

• SSPs The module includes two non-SSPs, the Device Root Key and the Ephemeral Blob Encryption Key. The 32-bit Device Root Key is burned into device OTP in plaintext and cannot be zeroized. The Device Root Key is used to derive the non-security relevant Ephemeral Blob Encryption Key using the SP 800-108 KBKDF. The Ephemeral Blob Encryption Key is stored in volatile memory and is generated and then zeroized upon every Crypto Erase operation. The Ephemeral Blob Encryption is used to wrap Encrypted Key Blobs (MEKS wrapped with MKEKs) when storing to NAND. The blobs are considered obfuscated, since the wrapping is being done with a non-SSP. Table 11
• Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator Specification

Pre-operational Software/Firmware Integrity Test

Description

Conditional Self-Tests Test Target

Description

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy Each time the Module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms operate correctly, and that sensitive data has not been damaged. Pre-operational and conditional cryptographic algorithm tests are available on demand by power cycling the Module or by the Module Reset service. On power-up or reset, the Module performs the Self-Tests described below. All Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CASTS) must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the CASTs fails, the Module enters an error state requiring reset of the Module. The module uses RSA 2048 with SHA2-256 to satisfy the pre-operational integrity self-test requirement. RSA Integrity Test Signature verification with RSA 2048 bit key and SHA2-256 (Cert. #A2880) AES-CTR (Cert. #A2881) CASTs: Encryption in CTR mode with 256 bit key KAT, Decryption in CTR mode with 256 bit key KAT AES-KW (Cert. #A2881) CASTs: Encryption in KW mode with 256 bit key KAT, Decryption in KW mode with 256 bit key KAT AES-XTS (Cert. #A2879) CASTs: Encryption in XTS mode with 256 bit key KAT, Decryption in XTS mode with 256 bit key KAT DRBG (Cert. #A2881) CASTs: HMAC DRBG (inclusive of instantiate, generate and reseed) PBKDF (Cert. #A2881) CASTs: Key Derivation Iterations: 10,000 KBKDF (Cert. #A2881) CASTs: HMAC-SHA2-256 Key Derivation KAT RSA (Cert. #A2881) CASTs: Signature Verification with 2048 bit key and SHA2-256

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy SP 800-90B Health NIST SP 800-90B ENT Health Tests, per SP 800-90B Section 4.5 Tests Firmware Load Test Firmware signature verification based on RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA2-256 and 2048-bit key. Key Equality Check When an XTS key is generated, the module verifies that Key1!=Key2 If a self-test fails, the Module will indicate the following information:

• Firmware integrity: either the Module will not respond or will not enumerate
• CAST: the module will not enumerate
• Key Equality Check: Returns an error
• Firmware upload: the SSD will return Invalid Image
• Entropy Source: the module will retry three times then enter an error state During the Initialization period, the module can send the NVMe SSD driver to the host to allow the host to communicate with the SSD after the POST.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy 11. Life-Cycle Assurance

The module is shipped using a certified mail carrier. The shipping container protecting the module or set of modules in transit should be verified for tamper evidence. The module is shipped in a shipping container with yellow tape. The tape should be sealing the container. Additionally, the module is contained within a clamshell with seals that should be inspected for tampering. If the shipping container or clamshell appears to be tampered with, the CO should contact Solidigm.

On receipt of the Module, the CO should examine the product to ensure it has not been tampered with during shipping according to the procedures outlined in the Section 7. Upon verification that the Module has not been tampered with, the user should initialize the module as described in Section 2.4.

See instructions in section 2.4 for module start-up information.

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy 12. Mitigation of Other Attacks This module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3.

Abbreviation

Full Specification Name

Acronym

Definition

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy References and Definitions The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy. [ISO/IEC 19790]       Information technology - Security techniques - Security requirements for cryptographic modules, June 25, 2014 [SP800-140C]          CMVP Approved Security Functions [SP800-131Arev2]      Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, March 2019 [TCG-OPAL]            Storage Work Group Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal, Version 2.01 Final, Revision 1.00 [SFSC]                Information technology – Security Features for SCSI Commands (SFSC) ASCII                 American Standard Code for Information Interchange AES                   Advanced Encryption Standard CAST                  Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test CBC                   Cipher Block Chain mode of AES encryption/decryption CO                    Cryptographic Officer CSP                   Critical Security Parameters DRBG                  Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB                   Electronic Code Book mode of AES encryption/decryption KBKDF                 Key Based Key Derivation Function KDF                   Key Derivation Function MSID                  Manufactured SID, Public value that is used as default password NVMe                  Non-Volatile Memory express PBKDF                 Password Based Key Derivation Function PCIe                  Peripheral Component Interconnect express POST                  Power-On Self-Test PSID                  Physical SID, a public unique value for each drive RSA                   Rivest Shamir Adleman SHA                   Secure Hash Algorithm SHS                   Secure Hash Standard

Acronym

Definition

Solidigm® P5316 SSD (ADP-R) Security Policy