Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1743/PM1745 Series

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (13)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1743/PM1745 Series
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Update<br/>firmware load</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Show Status<br/>Status Output<br/>unauthenticated</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1743/PM1745 Series
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Update<br/>firmware load</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Show Status<br/>Status Output<br/>unauthenticated</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1743/PM1745 Series Document Version: 1.1 H/W Version: MZWLO1T9HCJR-00AD9 [1, 4], MZWLO3T8HCLS-00AD9 [1, 4], MZWLO7T6HBLA-00AD9 [1, 4], MZWLO15THBLA-00AD9 [1, 4], MZWLO1T6HCJR-00AD9 [1, 4], MZWLO3T2HCLS-00AD9 [1, 4], MZWLO6T4HBLA-00AD9 [1, 4], MZWLO12THBLA-00AD9 [1, 4], MZWLO1T9HCJR-00AH9 [2], MZWLO3T8HCLS-00AH9 [2], MZWLO7T6HBLA-00AH9 [2], MZWLO15THBLA-00AH9 [2], MZWLO1T9HCJR-00AH8 [3], MZWLO3T8HCLS-00AH8 [3], MZWLO7T6HBLA-00AH8 [3], MZWLO15THBLA-00AH8 [3] F/W Version: OPP90D5Q [1], 3P00 [2], 3R00 [3], 3.1.0 [4]

Revision History Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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1.1. Scope hereinafter referred to as a “cryptographic module” or “module”. The SSD (Solid State Drive) satisfies all applicable FIPS features. It is designed to protect unauthorized access to the user data stored in its NAND Flash memories. The built-in AES hardware engines in the cryptographic module’s controller provide on-the-fly encryption and decryption of the user data without performance loss. The SED’s nature also provides instantaneous sanitization of the user data via cryptographic erase. Table

1. Security Levels 1.2. Acronyms Table
2. Acronyms Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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2. Cryptographic Module Specification 2.1. Cryptographic Boundary This firmware version, within the scope of this validation, must undergo validation through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is beyond the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The following photographs depict the top and bottom views of the cryptographic module. This multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module comprises both hardware and firmware components, all enclosed within two aluminum alloy cases. These cases serve as the cryptographic boundary of the module. Figure
3. Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1743/PM1745 Series The PM1743/PM1745 series utilizes a single-chip controller with an NVMe interface on the system side and internally integrates Samsung NAND flash. The following figure illustrates the operational environment of the module. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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Figure

2. Block Diagram for Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1743/PM1745 Series 2.2. Version Information 3.1.0 Table
3. Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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2.3. Cryptographic Functionality 2.3.1. Approved Algorithm1 The cryptographic module supports the following Approved algorithms for secure data storage:

1 Not all algorithms/modes that appear on the module’s CAVP certificates are utilized by the module.

2 AES-ECB is the pre-requisite for AES-XTS (#4661); AES-ECB alone is NOT supported by the cryptographic module in Approved Mode.

3 AES-ECB is the pre-requisite for Counter DRBG (#4662); AES-ECB alone is NOT supported by the cryptographic module in Approved Mode.

4 AES-ECB is the pre-requisite for Counter DRBG (#4662); AES-ECB alone is NOT supported by the cryptographic module in Approved Mode.

5 2nd technique of IG C.H for generating an IV is implemented in this module. In other words, Key and IV are generated internally using by

approved CTR-DRBG (A4662 and A4846). And AES-ECB is the pre-requisite for AES-GCM (#4663); AES-ECB alone is NOT supported by the cryptographic module in Approved Mode.

6 HMAC is the pre-requisite for PBKDF2 (#4663); HMAC alone is NOT supported by the cryptographic module in Approved Mode.

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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8 The Iteration Count parameter is 281. It was set accordingly in order to meet the minimum response time required from the application while

maintaining acceptable performance. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces The module does not support a Control Output Interface. Table
4. Ports and Interfaces Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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4. Roles, Services, and Authentication The following table defines the roles, associated services, and inputs/outputs supported by the cryptographic module: Table
5. Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output The module supports role-based authentication that necessitates verification for assuming the authorization of each role. The authentication mechanism allows a minimum 8-byte length or longer (up to 32-byte) password, with each byte ranging from 0x00 to 0xFF, applicable to every Cryptographic Officer and User role supported by the module. This implies that a single random attempt can succeed with a probability of 1/264 or lower. Each password authentication attempt takes at least 750 ms. The maximum number of attempts possible in a one-minute period is 80 (60000 ms/750 ms). The Password is considered a Memorized Secret Authenticator Type as per SP 800-140E/SP 800-63B. The module claims compliance with IG 4.1.A by implementing a Lock-based authentication model for the "IO command" service. This protects data-at-rest. The "Lock/Unlock an LBA Range" service enables or disables the "IO command" service. Power cycling the module completely disables the "IO command" service if it was enabled. Afterward, the service reverts to its original state, requiring authentication and being enabled/disabled by the "Lock/Unlock an LBA Range" service. Table
6. Roles and Authentication The cryptographic module only supports the following approved services and does not support any non-approved services. The abbreviations of the type of access to keys and SSPs have the following interpretation: • E = Execute: The module performs approved security functions with the SSPs. • G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. • W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the volatile storage specified in Table 12. • Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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E W G Z Table 9. Approved Services - Authenticated - The following table displays unauthenticated services. Initially, it is possible to use the services in the table without authentication. The operator can configure settings that comply with NVM and TCG specifications. E W G Z

10 This service can lock/unlock an “IO Command” Service that doesn’t require any authentication specified in the Role column.

11The “IO Command” service is unlocked in advance by using the “Lock/Unlock an LBA Range” service, which complies with IG 4.1.A Additional Comment 8. Power cycling the module re-locks this service.

12 The result of NVM or TCG command is used as an indicator. NVM status code is stated in NVM Express® Base Specification and TCG status

code is stated in TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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Table 10. Approved Services - Unauthenticated

13 This service is exempted from being authenticated by exception clause (c) of IG 4.1.A.

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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5. Software/Firmware Security - The cryptographic module employs ECDSA P-384 with SHA2-384 for firmware integrity testing, which is performed during power-on reset. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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6. Operational Environment - The cryptographic module operates in a limited operational environment, consisting of the module’s firmware because this module does not have any operating system but designed in a manner to allow controlled validated firmware modification by an authenticated limited operator. This limited operational setting does not require any specific security rules, settings/configurations, or restrictions to be set. - The cryptographic module does not provide any general-purpose operating system to the operator. - Unauthorized modification of the firmware is prevented by the pre-operational firmware integrity test and conditional firmware load test. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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The following physical security mechanisms are implemented in a cryptographic module:

• The module consists of production-grade components enclosed in an aluminum alloy enclosure, which is opaque within the visible spectrum. The top panel of the enclosure can be removed by unscrewing screws. However, the module is sealed with tamper-evident labels in accordance with FIPS 140-3 Level 2 Physical Security requirements so that tampering is easily detected when the top and bottom cases are detached.
• Two tamper-evident labels are initially applied over the top case of the module during factory production. Once applied, these labels cannot be removed and reapplied without evidence of tampering.
• The tamper-evident label is applied by Samsung at Manufacturing. The following table summarizes the actions required by the CO Role to ensure that physical security is maintained: Table 11. Physical Security Inspection Guidelines Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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8. Non-Invasive Security - Non-invasive security is not applicable to this cryptographic module Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management - Temporary SSPs stored in RAM are zeroised during power on reset. - The zeroisation is performed by overwriting the target SSP with a random value generated through the DRBG. - The module does not export SSPs. - All SSPs in volatile memory, including HW SFR, are automatically zeroised instantly either after key generation/use or upon performing power-on-reset, depending on the characteristics of volatile memory. - This module does not support SSP establishment.

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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15 HW SFR (Special Function Register) is a register within a hardware cryptographic algorithm IP, which has characteristic of volatile memory.

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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per ISO/IEC 19790:20 12 section 7.5 but is included in the list for complete ness

Table

12. SSPs The cryptographic module contains an entropy source, compliant with SP 800-90B. Table
13. Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

16 Estimated amount of entropy per the source’s output bit is 0.85444 and Samsung conservatively claims to be set at 0.5 per bit.

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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While executing the following self-tests, all data output is inhibited until the completion of the self-test. The operator can initiate pre-operational tests on-demand by power-cycling the module. Conditional self-tests are conducted before the initial operation of approved algorithms. If a cryptographic module fails a self-test, it will enter an error state, during which all data output is inhibited. 10.1. Pre-Operational Test Table 14. Pre-operational Self-tests Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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11. Life-Cycle Assurance Failure to follow the requirements for the Approved Mode of Operation or the rules in Section 11 will result in the module operating in a non-compliant state, which is out of scope for this validation. The following specifies the security rules under which the cryptographic module shall operate in accordance with FIPS 140-3: • The cryptographic module always operates in Approved Mode once the Secure Installation instructions are followed. • The steps required for the secure installation, initialization, and start-up of the cryptographic module, as per FIPS 140-3 VE11.33.01 are as follows: 11.1. Secure Installation
12. The user should examine for tamper evidence. - Inspect the entire perimeter for cracks, gouges, missing screw(s), and other signs of tampering, including the tamper-evident sealing label. - If there is any sign of tampering, do not use the product and contact Samsung.
13. Identify the firmware version in the device. - Confirm that the firmware version is equivalent to the version(s) listed in this document via NVM express Identify Controller command.
14. Take the drive’s ownership. - Change SID’s PIN by setting a new PIN. - Activate the Locking SP by using the Activate method. Note: If required to enable the additional Admin authorities in Locking SP, new PINs must be set by the Cryptographic Officer.
15. Periodically examine the tamper evidence - If there is any sign of tampering, stop using the product to avoid potential security hazards or information leakage. 11.2. Operational Description of Module • The cryptographic module maintains strict logical separation of data input, data output, control input, control output, and power. • The cryptographic module does not output CSPs in any form. • The cryptographic module provides the Approved DRBG for generating all cryptographic keys which complies with Section 6.1 of the SP 800-133r2. • Power cycling the module re-locks the previous unlocked “IO command” service. • The cryptographic module enforces a limited operational environment by the secure firmware load test using ECDSA with SHA2-384. • The cryptographic module provides a production-grade cryptographic boundary. • The cryptographic module enters the error state upon failure of Self-tests. Most commands except for supported command from the Host (General Purpose Computer (GPC) outside the cryptographic boundary) are rejected in the error state and the IO command returns Namespace Not Ready (SC=0x82, SCT=0x0), the other commands return Internal Error (SC=0x6, SCT=0x0) defined in NVMe specification via the status output. Cryptographic services and data output are explicitly inhibited when in the error state. When module fails FW Integrity test performed by Mask ROM, the module will fail to boot; module will not service any requests or provide any status output (module hangs). • The cryptographic module satisfies the requirements of FIPS 140-3 IG C.I (i.e. key_1 ≠ key_2) • The module generates at a minimum 256 bits of entropy for use in key generation. • Bypass capability is not applicable to the cryptographic module • The module generates symmetric keys which are unmodified outputs from the DRBG. • As specified in NIST SP 800-132, keys derived from passwords/passphrases are only used in storage applications. • AES-XTS is only approved for storage applications. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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12. Mitigation of Other Attacks The cryptographic module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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