CorSSL

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (63)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for CorSSL
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>HTTPS<br/>library named: openssl</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for CorSSL
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>HTTPS<br/>library named: openssl</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Corsec Security, Inc. CorSSL™ Software Version: 1.1.1s.005 FIPS Security Level: 1 Document Version: 0.1 Prepared by: Corsec Security, Inc.

12600 Fair Lakes Circle, Suite 210

Fairfax, VA 22033 United States of America Phone: +1 703 267 6050 www.corsec.com

Abstract This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for CorSSL™ (version: 1.1.1s.005) from Corsec Security, Inc. (Corsec). This Security Policy describes how CorSSL™ meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3, which details the U.S. and Canadian government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp. This document also describes how to run the module in a secure Approved mode of operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-3 validation of the module. CorSSL™ is also referred to in this document as the module. References This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-3 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:

• The Corsec website www.corsec.com contains information on the full line of services and solutions from Corsec.
• The search page on the CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/Validated-Modules/Search) can be used to locate and obtain vendor contact information for technical or sales-related questions about the module. Document Organization ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B uses the same section naming convention as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7 - Security requirements. For example, Annex B section B.2.1 is named “General” and B.2.2 is named “Cryptographic module specification,” which is the same as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7.1 and section 7.2, respectively. Therefore, the format of this Security Policy is presented in the same order as indicated in Annex B, starting with “General” and ending with “Mitigation of other attacks.” If sections are not applicable, they have been marked as such in this document. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

Corsec Security, Inc. is a privately owned company dedicated to assisting organizations through the security certification and validation process. Over the past 22 years, Corsec has grown significantly, becoming a global leader in product and corporate security, offering critical guidance and expertise to meet important business challenges in product security and third-party certifications and security validations, including FIPS 140-2, FIPS 140-3, Common Criteria, and the DoDIN1 APL2. Corsec’s certification methodology helps open doors to new markets and increase revenue for clients with products ranging from mobile phones to satellites. Corsec’s broad knowledge safeguards against common pitfalls and thwarts delays, translating to a swift and seamless path to certification. Corsec has created the benchmark for providing business leaders with fast, flexible access to industry knowledge on security certifications and validations. CorSSL™ v1.1.1s.005 is a software library providing a C language API 3 for use by other applications requiring cryptographic functionality. CorSSL™ v1.1.1s.005 offers symmetric encryption/decryption, digital signature generation/verification, hashing, cryptographic key generation, random number generation, message authentication, and key establishment functions to secure data-at-rest/data-in-flight and to support industrystandard secure communications protocols (including TLS4 1.2/1.3). Corsec’s CorSSL™ is built upon the OpenSSL 1.1.1 code base, providing engineering teams with a completely compatible cryptographic/protocol engine, allowing quick “drop-in” replacement into any existing OpenSSL 1.1.1based architecture. CorSSL™ (which includes both the libcrypto crypto library and the libssl protocol library) does not modify the OpenSSL interface, maintaining complete compatibility, and eliminating engineering development time to meet FIPS 140-3 requirements. CorSSL™ is validated at the FIPS 140-3 section levels shown in Table 1. Table 1 – Security Levels

1 DoDIN – Department of Defense Information Network

2 APL – Approved Product List

API – Application Programming Interface

4 TLS – Transport Layer Security

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

The module has an overall security level of 1. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

2. Cryptographic Module Specification CorSSL™ v1.1.1s.005 is a software module with a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The module is designed to operate within a modifiable operational environment.

The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-3 requirements on the environments listed in Table 2. Table 2 – Tested Operational Environments The module is designed to utilize the AES-NI5 extended instruction set when available on the host platform’s CPU to accelerate the processing of its AES implementation. There are no vendor-affirmed operational environments claimed. The cryptographic module maintains validation compliance when operating on any general-purpose computer (GPC) provided that the GPC uses any single-user operating system/mode specified on the validation certificate, or another compatible single-user operating system. The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.

The module implements cryptographic algorithms in the following providers:

• CorSSL (libcrypto) v1.1.1s.005 (Cert. A3254)
• CorSSL (libssl) v1.1.1s.005 (Cert. A3253) Validation certificates for each Approved security function are listed in Table 3 below.

5 AES-NI – Advanced Encryption Algorithm New Instructions

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

6 This table includes vendor-affirmed algorithms that are approved but CAVP testing is not yet available.

7 CBC – Cipher Block Chaining

9 CCM – Counter with Cipher Block Chaining - Message Authentication Code

10 CFB – Cipher Feedback

11 CMAC – Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code

13 ECB – Electronic Code Book

14 GCM – Galois Counter Mode

15 GMAC – Galois Message Authentication Code

16 KW – Key Wrap

KWP – Key Wrap with Padding

18 OFB – Output Feedback

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

19 XOR – Exclusive OR

20 XEX – XOR Encrypt XOR

XTS – XEX-Based Tweaked-Codebook Mode with Ciphertext Stealing

22 XOR – Exclusive OR

23 XEX – XOR Encrypt XOR

24 XTS – XEX-Based Tweaked-Codebook Mode with Ciphertext Stealing

25 DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator

27 ECDSA – Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

28 KAS-ECC-SSC – Key Agreement Scheme - Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Shared Secret Computation

KAS-FFC-SSC – Key Agreement Scheme - Finite Field Cryptography - Shared Secret Computation CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

31 RSA – Rivest Shamir Adleman

32 RSA – Rivest Shamir Adleman

33 PSS – Probabilistic Signature Scheme

34 RSA – Rivest Shamir Adleman

PSS – Probabilistic Signature Scheme

36 SHAKE – Secure Hash Algorithm KECCAK

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

TLS – Transport Layer Security CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

D.G. D.G. The vendor affirms the following cryptographic security methods: uses its Approved DRBG to generate random values and seeds used for asymmetric key generation. The generated seed is an unmodified output from the DRBG. The cryptographic module invokes a GET command to obtain entropy for random number generation (the module requests 256 bits of entropy from the calling application per request), and then passively receives entropy from the calling application

39 KTS – Key Transport Scheme

40 Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES-CCM is Approved for key wrap/unwrap.

Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES-GCM is Approved for key wrap/unwrap. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

while having no knowledge of the entropy source and exercising no control over the amount or the quality of the obtained entropy. The calling application and its entropy sources are located within the operational environment inside the module’s physical perimeter but outside the cryptographic boundary. Thus, there is no assurance of the minimum strength of generated SSPs (e.g., keys) The module implements the Non-Approved but allowed algorithms shown in Table 4 below. Table 4

• Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation The module does not implement any Non-Approved algorithms allowed in the approved mode of operation for which no security is claimed. The module employs the Non-Approved algorithms shown in Table 5 below. These algorithms shall not be used in the module’s Approved mode of operation. Table 5
• Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation

43 OCB – Offset Codebook

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

As a software cryptographic module, the module has no physical components. The physical perimeter of the cryptographic module is defined by each host platform on which the module is installed. Figure 1 below illustrates a block diagram of a typical GPC and the module’s physical perimeter. EdDSA – Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm

45 RC – Rivest Cipher

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

Hardware                               Network                           DVD RAM Management                              Interface HDD Clock                                                          SCSI/SATA Generator                                                       Controller LEDs/LCD CPU                                                                              Serial I/O Hub Audio Cache                 PCI/PCIe Slots                                                       USB BIOS Power              Graphics                                               PCI/PCIe Interface            Controller                                              Slots External Power Supply KEY: BIOS – Basic Input/Output System               PCIe – PCI express Plaintext Data             CPU – Central Processing Unit                  HDD – Hard Disk Drive Encrypted Data             SATA – Serial Advanced Technology Attachment   DVD – Digital Video Disc Control Input              SCSI – Small Computer System Interface         USB – Universal Serial Bus Status Output              PCI – Peripheral Component Interconnect        RAM – Random Access Memory Physical Perimeter         LED – Light Emitting Diode                     LCD – Liquid Crystal Display Figure 1 – GPC Block Diagram The module’s cryptographic boundary consists of all functionalities contained within the module’s compiled source code. Including: •    libcrypto (cryptographic primitives library file) •    libssl (TLS protocol library file) •    libcrypto.hmac (an HMAC digest file for libcrypto integrity checks) •    libssl.hmac (an HMAC digest file for libssl integrity checks) The cryptographic boundary is the contiguous perimeter that surrounds all memory-mapped functionality provided by the module when it is loaded and stored in the host platform’s memory. The module is entirely contained within the physical perimeter. Figure 2 shows the logical block diagram of the module executing in memory, its interactions with surrounding software components, and the module’s physical perimeter and cryptographic boundary. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

libssl libssl.hmac Calling Application libcrypto libcrypto.hmac KEY: Cryptographic Boundary Physical Perimeter Operating System Data Input Data Output Control Input Control Output CPU Memory Storage Ports Status Output System Calls Host Device Figure 2 – Module Block Diagram (with Cryptographic Boundary)

The module supports two modes of operation: Approved and Non-Approved. The module operates in the Approved mode when all pre-operational self-tests have completed successfully, and only Approved services are invoked. Table 3 and Table 4 list the Approved and allowed algorithms, while Table 8 provides descriptions of the Approved services. The module alternates on a service-by-service basis between Approved and Non-Approved modes of operation. The module will implicitly switch to the Non-Approved mode upon execution of a Non-Approved service. The module will implicitly switch back to the Approved mode upon execution of an Approved service. Table 5 lists the Non-Approved algorithms implemented by the module, while Table 9 below lists the services that constitute the Non-Approved mode. When following the guidance in section 11.5 of this document, CSPs are not shared between Approved and nonApproved services and modes of operation. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

FIPS 140-3 defines the following logical interfaces for cryptographic modules: As a software library, the cryptographic module has no direct access to any of the host platform’s physical ports, as it communicates only to the calling application via its well-defined API. A mapping of the FIPS-defined interfaces and the module’s logical ports and interfaces can be found in Table 6. Note that the module does not output Table 6 – Ports and Interfaces CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

4. Roles, Services, and Authentication The sections below describe the module’s authorized roles, services, and operator authentication methods.

The module supports a Crypto Officer (CO) that authorized operators can assume. The CO role performs cryptographic initialization or management functions and general security services. The module also supports the following role(s):

• User
• The User role performs general security services, including cryptographic operations and other approved security functions. The module does not support multiple concurrent operators. The calling application that loaded the module is its only operator. Table 7 below lists the supported roles, along with the services (including input and output) available to each role. Table 7
• Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output

46 MAC – Message Authentication Code

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

The module does not support authentication methods; operators implicitly assume an authorized role based on the service selected.

Descriptions of the approved services available to the authorized roles are provided in Table 8 below. This module is a software library that provides cryptographic functionality to calling applications. As such, the security functions provided by the module are considered the module’s security services. Indicators for Approved services (in the case of this module, those security functions with algorithm validation certificates and all required self-tests) are provided via API return value. When invoking a security function, the calling application provides inputs via an internal structure, or “context”. Upon each service invocation, the module will determine if the invoked security function is an Approved service. To access the resulting value, the calling application must pass the finalized context to the indicator API associated with that security function (note the indicator check must be performed prior to any context cleanup is performed). The indicator API will return “1” to indicate the usage of an Approved service. Indicators for services providing Non-Approved security functions (as well as for services not requiring an indicator) will have a value other than “1”, ensuring that the indicators for Approved services are unambiguous. Additional details on the APIs used for the Approved service indicators are provided in Appendix B below. The keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the following notation:

• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

Table 8 – Approved Services CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

*Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance 2.4.C, the Show Status, Zeroize, and Show Versioning Information services do not require an Approve security The following services/algorithms are allowed for legacy use only: • Digital signature verification using ECDSA with curves B-163, K-163, and P-192 CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

• Digital signature verification using DSA with key lengths of 1024 bits
• Digital signature verification using RSA with modulus lengths of 1024 bits
• Digital signature verification using SHA-1
• Symmetric decryption using two-key and three-key Triple DES
• Key unwrapping using two-key and three-key Triple DES
• MAC verification using two-key and three-key Triple DES CMAC Table 9 below lists the Non-Approved services available to module operators. Table 9
• Non-Approved Services CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

5. Software/Firmware Security All software components within the cryptographic boundary are verified using an Approved integrity technique implemented within the cryptographic module itself. The module implements independent HMAC SHA2-256 digest checks to test the integrity of each library file; failure of the integrity test for either library file will cause the module to enter a critical error state. Details regarding the keys used for the integrity checks can be found in Table 10 below. The module’s integrity check is performed automatically at module instantiation (i.e., when the module is loaded into memory for execution) without action from the module operator. The CO can initiate the pre-operational tests on demand by re-instantiating the module or issuing the FIPS_selftest() API command. CorSSL™ is not a standalone application; it is a cryptographic toolkit intended for use in a with a vendor’s solution. The module will be linked to a host application, and the host application will be pre-installed onto a target platform by the vendor or installed onto target platforms by the end-user. The module requires no configuration steps to be performed by application developers or end-users, and no action is required from developers or end-users to initialize the module for operation. The module is designed with a default entry point (DEP) that ensures that the pre-operational tests and conditional CASTs are initiated automatically when the module is loaded. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

6. Operational Environment The CorSSL™ comprises a software cryptographic library that executes in a modifiable operational environment. The cryptographic module has control over its own SSPs. The process and memory management functionality of the host device’s OS prevents unauthorized access to plaintext private and secret keys, intermediate key generation values and other SSPs by external processes during module execution. The module only allows access to SSPs through its well-defined API. The operational environment provides the capability to separate individual application processes from each other by preventing uncontrolled access to CSPs and uncontrolled modifications of SSPs regardless of whether this data is in the process memory or stored on persistent storage within the operational environment. Processes that are spawned by the module are owned by the module and are not owned by external processes/operators. Please refer to section 2.1 of this document for a list/description of the applicable operational environments. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

7. Physical Security The cryptographic module is software module and does not include physical security mechanisms. Therefore, per ISO/IEC 19790:2021 section 7.7.1, requirements for physical security are not applicable. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

8. Non-Invasive Security This section is not applicable. There is currently no approved non-invasive mitigation techniques referenced in ISO/IEC 19790:2021 Annex F. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

The module supports the keys and other SSPs listed Table 10 below. Table 10 – Keys CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

The module implements the following Approved DRBG: This DRBG is used to generate random values at the request of the calling application. Outputs from this DRBG are also used as seeds in the generation of asymmetric key pairs. The module implements the following Non-Approved DRBGs (which are only available in the Non-Approved mode of operation):

• Hash-based DRBG (non-compliant)
• HMAC-based DRBG (non-compliant)
• ANSI X9.31 RNG (Non-Approved) The module obtains entropy input from the calling application (which is outside of the cryptographic boundary) but exercises no control over the amount or the quality of the obtained entropy. As such, there is no assurance of the minimum strength of generated SSPs (e.g., keys). CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

There is no mechanism within the module’s cryptographic boundary for the persistent storage of SSPs. The module stores DRBG state values for the lifetime of the DRBG instance. The module uses SSPs passed in on the stack by the calling application and does not store these SSPs beyond the lifetime of the API call.

Maintenance, including protection and zeroization, of any keys and CSPs that exist outside the module’s cryptographic boundary are the responsibility of the end-user. For the zeroization of keys in volatile memory, module operators can unload the module from memory or reboot/power-cycle the host device. Table 11 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

10. Self-Tests Both pre-operational and conditional self-tests are performed by the module. Pre-operational tests are performed between the time the cryptographic module is instantiated and before the module transitions to the operational state. Conditional self-tests are performed by the module during module operation when certain conditions exist. The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status, and the error resolutions.

The module performs the following pre-operational self-test(s):

• Software integrity test for libcrypto (using an HMAC SHA2-256 digest)
• Software integrity test for libssl (using an HMAC SHA2-256 digest)

The module performs the following conditional self-tests:

• Conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs)
• AES ECB encrypt KAT48 (128-bit)
• AES ECB decrypt KAT49 (128-bit)
• AES CCM encrypt KAT (192-bit)
• AES CCM decrypt KAT (192-bit)
• AES GCM encrypt KAT (128-bit)
• AES GCM decrypt KAT (128-bit)
• AES XTS encrypt KAT (128/256-bit)
• AES XTS decrypt KAT (128/256-bit)
• AES CMAC generate KAT (CBC mode; 128/192/256-bit)
• AES CMAC verify KAT (CBC mode; 128/192/256-bit)
• Triple-DES ECB decrypt KAT (3-Key)
• Triple-DES CMAC verify KAT (CBC mode; 3-Key)
• CTR_DRBG KAT (AES, 256-bit, with derivation function)
• CTR_DRBG generate/instantiate/reseed KAT (256-bit AES)
• DSA sign KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256)
• DSA verify KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256)
• ECDSA sign KAT (P-224 and K-233 curves; SHA2-256)
• ECDSA verify KAT (P-224 and K-233 curves; SHA2-256)
• RSA sign KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1.5 scheme)
• RSA verify KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1.5 scheme)
• HMAC KATs (SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512)
• SHA-1 KAT KAT
• Known Answer Test

49 KAT – Known Answer Test

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

• SHA-2 KATs (SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512)
• SHA-3 KAT (SHA3-256)
• FFC DH Shared Secret “Z” Computation KAT (2048-bit)
• ECC CDH Shared Secret “Z” Computation KAT (P-224 curve)
• PBKDF2 KAT (SHA2-256)
• TLS 1.2 KDF KAT
• TLS 1.3 KDF KAT To ensure all CASTs are performed prior to the first operational use of the associated algorithm, all CASTs are performed during the module’s initial power-up sequence. The SHA and HMAC KATs are performed prior to the pre-operational software integrity test; all other CASTs are executed after the successful completion of the software integrity test.
• Conditional pair-wise consistency tests (PCTs)
• DSA sign/verify PCT50
• ECDSA sign/verify PCT
• RSA sign/verify PCT
• DH key generation PCT
• ECDH key generation PCT
• Conditional critical functions tests
• XTS AES duplicate key test

The CO can initiate the pre-operational self-tests and conditional CASTs on demand for periodic testing of the module by re-instantiating the module, rebooting/power-cycling the host device, or issuing the FIPS_selftest() API command.

The module reaches the critical error state when any self-test fails. Upon test failure, the module immediately terminates the calling application’s API call with a returned error code and sets an internal flag, signaling the error condition. For any subsequent request made by the calling application for cryptographic services, the module will return a failure indicator, thereby disabling all access to its cryptographic functions, sensitive security parameters (SSPs), and data output services while the error condition persists. To recover, the module must be re-instantiated by the calling application. If the pre-operational self-tests complete successfully, then the module can resume normal operations. If the module continues to experience self-test failures after reinitializing, then the module will not be able to resume normal operations, and the CO should contact Corsec Security, Inc. for assistance.

50 PCT – Pairwise Consistency Test

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

11. Life-Cycle Assurance The sections below describe how to ensure the module is operating in its validated configuration, including the following:

• Procedures for secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module
• Maintenance requirements
• Administrator and non-Administrator guidance Operating the module without following the guidance herein (including the use of undocumented services) will result in non-compliant behavior and is outside the scope of this Security Policy.

The module is distributed as a package containing the binaries and HMAC digest files that the Crypto Officer is to install onto a target platform specified in section 2.1 or one where portability is maintained.

This module is designed to support third-party vendor applications, and these applications are the sole consumers of the cryptographic services provided by the module. No end-user action is required to initialize the module for operation; the calling application performs any actions required to initialization the module. The pre-operational integrity test and conditional CASTs are performed automatically via a default entry point (DEP) when the module is loaded for execution, without any specific action from the calling application or the end-user. End-users have no means to short-circuit or bypass these actions. Failure of any of the initialization actions will result in a failure of the module to load for execution.

No startup steps are required to be performed by end-users.

There are no specific management activities required of the CO role to ensure that the module runs securely. If any irregular activity is observed, or if the module is consistently reporting errors, then Corsec Customer Support should be contacted. The following list provides additional guidance for the CO: • The fips_post_status() API can be used to determine the module’s operational status. A non-zero return value indicates that the module has passed all pre-operational self-tests and is currently in its Approved mode. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

• The OpenSSL_version() API can be used to obtain the module’s versioning information. This information will include the module name and version, which can be correlated with the module’s validation record.

The following list provides additional policies for the User role:

• The module uses PBKDF2 option 1a from section 5.4 of NIST SP 800-132. The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the resultant key is acceptable for module operators. The minimum iteration count shall be 1000. The length of the password/passphrase used in the PBKDF shall be of at least 20 characters, and shall consist of lower-case, upper-case, and numeric characters. The upper bound for the probability of guessing the value is estimated to be 1/6220 = 10-36, which is less than 2-112. As specified in NIST SP 800-132, keys derived from passwords/passphrases may only be used in storage applications.
• The cryptographic module’s services are designed to be provided to a calling application. Excluding the use of the NIST-defined elliptic curves as trusted third-party domain parameters, all other assurances from FIPS PUB 186-4 (including those required of the intended signatory and the signature verifier) are outside the scope of the module and are the responsibility of the calling application.
• The module performs assurances for its key agreement schemes as specified in the following sections of NIST SP 800-56Arev3:
• Section 5.5.2 (for assurances of domain parameter validity)
• Section 5.6.2.1 (for assurances required by the key pair owner) The module includes the capability to provide the required recipient assurance of ephemeral public key validity specified in section 5.6.2.2.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3. However, since public keys from other modules are not received directly by this module (those keys are received by the calling application), the module has no knowledge of when a public key is received. Invocation of the proper module services to validate another module’s public key is the responsibility of the calling application.
• AES GCM encryption is used in the context of the TLS protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3. To meet the AES GCM (key/IV) pair uniqueness requirements from NIST SP 800-38D, the module complies with FIPS 140-3 IG C.H as follows:
• For TLS v1.2, the counter portion of the IV is strictly increasing. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, a failure in encryption will occur and a handshake to establish a new encryption key will be required. It is the responsibility of the module operator (i.e., the first party, client, or server) to trigger this handshake in accordance with RFC 5246 when this condition is encountered. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

The module supports acceptable AES GCM cipher suites from section 3.3.1 of NIST SP 800-52rev2. The AES GCM IV generation is performed internally, is compliant with the RFC 5288, and shall only be used for the TLS 1.2 protocol to be compliant with scenario 1 in FIPS 140-3 IG C.H; thus, the module is compliant with NIST SP 800-52rev2.

• For TLS v1.3, a 64-bit sequence number is maintained separately for reading and writing records. Each sequence number is set to zero at the beginning of a connection and is incremented by one after reading or writing each record. Because the size of sequence numbers is 64-bit, they should not wrap. If a sequence number needs to wrap, the TLS implementation is responsible for either rekeying or terminating the connection. The module supports the TLS 1.3 GCM cipher suite from section 3.3.1.2 of NIST SP 800-52rev2. The AES GCM IV generation is performed internally, is compliant with the RFC 8446, and shall only be used for the TLS 1.3 protocol to be compliant with scenario 5 in FIPS 140-3 IG C.H; thus, the module is compliant with NIST SP 800-52rev2. The module also supports internal IV generation using the module’s Approved DRBG. The IV is at least 96 bits in length per section 8.2.2 of NIST SP 800-38D. Per NIST SP 800-38D and scenario 2 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H, the DRBG generates outputs such that the (key/IV) pair collision probability is less than 2-32. In the event that power to the module is lost and subsequently restored, the calling application must ensure that any AES GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
• The length of a single data unit encrypted or decrypted with the AES-XTS shall not exceed 2²⁰ AES blocks; that is, 16 MB of data per AES-XTS instance. An XTS instance is defined in section 4 of NIST SP 800-38E. The AES-XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices. The AES-XTS shall not be used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in transit. The module implements the check to ensure that the two AES keys used in the XTS-AES algorithm are not identical.
• The calling application is responsible for ensuring that CSPs are not shared between Approved and NonApproved services and modes of operation.
• The calling application is responsible for using entropy sources that meet the minimum security strength of 112 bits required for the CTR_DRBG as shown in NIST SP 800-90Arev1, Table 3.

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) program is a dictionary or glossary of vulnerabilities that have been identified for specific code bases, such as software applications or open libraries. This list allows interested parties to acquire the details of vulnerabilities by referring to a unique identifier known as the CVE ID.

The following table lists the applicable CVEs impacting the module, as well as methods of mitigation. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

Post-submission, the module has been continually updated to provide mitigations for the CVEs listed above. These mitigations will be included in a future revalidation of the module. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

12. Mitigation of Other Attacks This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 requirements for this validation. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations Table 13 below provides definitions for the acronyms and abbreviations used in this document. Table 13 – Acronyms and Abbreviations CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

Appendix B. Approved Service Indicators This appendix specifies the APIs that are externally accessible and return the Approved service indicators. Synopsis #include <openssl/service_indicator.h> #include <openssl/ssl.h> int EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int DSA_get_service_indicator(DSA * ptr_dsa, DSA_MODES_t mode); int RSA_key_get_service_indicator(RSA * ptr_rsa); int PBKDF_get_service_indicator(); int EVP_Digest_get_service_indicator(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int EC_key_get_service_indicator(EC_KEY *ec_key); int CMAC_get_service_indicator(CMAC_CTX *cmac_ctx, CMAC_MODE_t mode); int HMAC_get_service_indicator(HMAC_CTX *ctx); int TLSKDF_get_service_indicator(EVP_PKEY_CTX *tls_ctx); int TLS1_3_kdf_get_service_indicator(EVP_MD *md); int TLS1_3_get_service_indicator(SSL *s); int DRBG_get_service_indicator(RAND_DRBG *drbg); Description These APIs are high-level interfaces that return the Approved service indicator value based on the parameter(s) passed to them.

• EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator() is used to return the Approved service indicator status for block ciphers like AES and Triple-DES.
• DSA_get_service_indicator() is used to return the Approved service indicator status for the DSA algorithm and its modes. You must include the mode you want the indicator for, which are specified in the DSA_MODES_t enum.
• RSA_key_get_service_indicator() is used to return the Approved service indicator status for RSA algorithm and its modes.
• PBKDF_get_service_indicator() is used to return the Approved service indicator status for PBKDF usage.
• EVP_Digest_get_service_indicator() is used to return the Approved service indicator status for SHS algorithms like SHA-1 and SHAKE.
• EC_key_get_service_indicator() is used to return the Approved service indicator status for elliptic curve algorithms like ECDSA and its modes. CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

• CMAC_get_service_indicator() is used to return the Approved service indicator status for CMAC requests that use AES or Triple-DES. You must include the mode you want the indicator for, which are specified in the CMAC_MODE_t enum.
• HMAC_get_service_indicator() is used to return the Approved service indicator status for HMAC requests and the associated SHS algorithm.
• TLSKDF_get_service_indicator() is used to return the Approved service indicator status for TLS KDF usage excluding TLS 1.3.
• TLS1_3_kdf_get_service_indicator() is used to return the Approved service indicator status for TLS 1.3 KDF usage. This function requires the ssl.h file and is used to call the TLS1_3_get_service_indicator() function because of the SSL struct requirement. You cannot call TLS1_3_get_service_indicator() directly unless you have the SSL struct that was used.
• DRBG_get_service_indicator() is used to return the Approved service indicator status for DRBG usage. Return Values Each function returns “1” when indicating the usage of approved services and “0” for Non-Approved services. Notes When calling a I<get> function, always call it after the variables have been finalized but before they are freed or destroyed. Examples The code sample below provides examples of how to check the Approved service indicators for Triple-DES (3-key, in ECB mode) encryption and decryption: int 3des_indicator_test() { static EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; static EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; int outLen; unsigned char pltmp[8]; unsigned char citmp[8]; unsigned char key[] = { 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18, 19,20,21,22,23,24}; unsigned char plaintext[] = { 'e', 't', 'a', 'o', 'n', 'r', 'i', 's' }; cipher = EVP_des_ede3_ecb(); //Encrypt ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, 24); EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, citmp, &outLen, plaintext, 8); // Check the indicator int NID = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx); fprintf(stdout,"EVP_des_ede3_ecb (NID %i) encrypt indicator = %i\n", NID, EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator(ctx)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

//Decrypt ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, 24); EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, pltmp, &outLen, citmp, 8); // Check the indicator fprintf(stdout,"EVP_des_ede3_ecb (NID %i) decrypt indicator = %i\n", NID, EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator(ctx)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); } CorSSL™ 1.1.1s.005 ©2024 Corsec Security, Inc.

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