PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (12)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>firmware load<br/>update</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Show Status<br/>Status output</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>library named: nss</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>firmware load<br/>update</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Show Status<br/>Status output</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>library named: nss</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Document Version: 0.8 Date: 11/11/2024 SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Table of Contents SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy List of Tables Table 6: Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed List of Figures SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy This document defines the Security Policy for the SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs cryptographic module, hereafter denoted the Module. The Module is a multiple chip embedded self-encrypting drive (SED) compliant with TCG Core, TCG Opal, TCG Single User Mode (SUM), PCIe, and NVMe specifications. The Module is also compliant with the IEEE1667 storage specification. The cryptographic module’s controller has a built-in AES-XTS HW engine which encrypts and decrypts the user data without any performance loss. The Module meets FIPS 140-3 overall security Level 1. The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows: SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Cryptographic Module Specification The Module is designed to be embedded in a General Purpose Computer (host). The Module does not support a maintenance access interface. The Module uses a single chip controller (Atomos) with a PCIe/NVMe and SMBus interface on the systems side and SK hynix NAND flash internally. The Module is composed of the following major components:

• Atomos Controller
• The controller SoC (System On Chip). This component is responsible for terminating PCIe/NVMe commands; reading or writing data to the Host platform; encrypting or decrypting data from the Host platform; and storing or retrieving data to SK hynix NAND nonvolatile memory.
• PMC
• Power Management Controller –Manages power control of the Module
• PCIe/NVMe Interface
• Provides PCI/NVMe Interface access to the controller
• SMBus Interface
• Provides SMBus Interface access to the controller
• CPU
• Central Processing Unit of the controller
• ROM
• Read only memory
• Non-volatile memory which has first bootable code for controller
• ECC
• Error Correction Code memory provides Error correction and detection access to the controller
• SRAM
• Static Random Access memory
• DRAM Interface
• Provides access to SK hynix DRAM
• NAND Interface
• Provides access to SK hynix NAND Memory
• SK hynix DRAM
• Dynamic Random Access Memory. DRAM Provides variable storage, instruction memory, data mapping tables and buffer for user data going into and out of the device.
• SK hynix NAND memory
• NAND flash is the storage medium where encrypted user data, firmware for the Atomos controller, and other non-volatile configuration data needed by the Atomos controller during execution.

The following Module configurations were tested: Table 2: Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration

The PE9110 has an E1.S physical form factor, while the PE9010 has an M.2 22110D physical form factor as depicted in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire PCB of each form factor, as outlined with a red dotted line. Note that the PE9110 SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy E1.S includes a metallic enclosure, while the PE9010 M.2 22110D does not. No components have been excluded from the cryptographic boundary. Figure 1: PE9110 E1.S Top and Bottom (Cryptographic Boundary in Red) Figure 2: PE9010 M.2 22110D Top and Bottom (Cryptographic Boundary in Red) The Module only supports an Approved Mode of operation and is thus continually in an Approved mode of operation. In order to confirm the module’s versioning information and that it is operating in an Approved manner, the operator may invoke the “Read FIPS Compliance” service, as specified in Section 11.1. Per IG 2.4.C, Example Scenario #2, a global indicator is used to identify the Approved mode of operation, along with the implicit indicator for the successful completion of each Approved service.

The Module implements the Approved Mode cryptographic functions listed in the table below. The module does not support any non-Approved cryptographic functions. Table 3: Approved Algorithms SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D                                                        FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Table 4: Vendor Affirmed Approved Algorithms N/A                 N/A                                         N/A Claimed Table 7: Security Function Implementation (SFI) N/A           N/A            N/A                   N/A                      N/A SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Table 8: Entropy Certificates N/A N/A

Per IG C.I, the module assures Key1 and Key2 are not equal for AES-XTS operations. The module implements the following security elements:

1. No additional interface or service is implemented by the Module which would provide access to CSPs.
2. Data output is inhibited during self-tests, Key generation, Zeroization, error states, and firmware load verification.
3. The module does not support manual key entry.
4. The module does not output plaintext CSPs or intermediate key values.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
6. The Module does not support a bypass capability.
7. Power on self-tests do not require any operator action.
8. The Module does not support the update of the serial number and vendor ID.
9. The Module does not support concurrent operators.

The following security rules must also be considered when operating the module:

1. All CSPs are zeroized by the Zeroization service. Only the Maker role can call the Zeroization service.
2. The Module shall provide five (5) distinct operator roles: Cryptographic Officer, User, Maker, PSID, and Anybody
3. The operator shall be capable of commanding the Module to perform the power up self-tests by power cycling or resetting the Module. SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Cryptographic Module Interfaces The Module’s ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed in Table 9. The module does not support a Control Output interface. Table 9: Ports and Interfaces The module also supports a JTAG and UART port, which are permanently disabled. The NVMe interface provides the primary interface to interact with the Module. Most services provided by the Module are accessed via the NVMe Interface including Opal configuration, reading and writing user data, retrieving FIPS capability support, and retrieving FIPS status reporting. The SMBus interface provides the ability to audit the SSD environment (temperature, Vital Product Data). SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Roles, Services, and Authentication

The module supports five distinct operator roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO), User, Maker, PSID, and Anybody. The method for assuming a role is implicit based on the services invoked. The module only asserts conformance with Level 1 requirements; PINs and passwords are optional as required by TCG standards and are defined as non-SSPs; the module makes no claim to support FIPS 140-3 authentication mechanisms. The module supports the following operator roles:

1. Crypto Officer (CO): a. Admin SP SID - This operator is responsible for transitioning from uninitialized mode to initialized mode. b. Admin SP Admin – This operator is disabled by default but can be enabled by SID authority. When enabled, it can transition the Module back to the uninitialized state from the initialized state. c. Locking SP Admins – This operator is used to enable and disable Users, create and delete user ranges, lock or unlock the ranges and cryptographically erase the user ranges. The CO is also responsible for performing firmware updates.
2. User: The Locking SP Users can unlock and lock the drive to allow the operator to read and write data to the drive. This user can also call the “Cryptographic Erase” service.
3. Maker: This is an assumed role which enables the operator to execute the “Zeroise Service” command.
4. PSID: The TCG PSID Authority has access to perform the “PSID Revert” service.
5. Anybody: This role is assumed when the operator executes services that does not require a TCG role to be assumed. The Module does not support a maintenance role or bypass capability. The Module does not support concurrent operators. Table 10: Roles and Authentication

All services implemented by the Module are listed in Table 11, while SSP usage for each service is specified in Table 12. Note: SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

• CO= Cryptographic Officer Role
• M = Maker Role
• P = PSID Role
• A = Anybody Table 11: Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output SK hynix Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output)
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
• - = Not accessed by the service. Table 12: Approved Services SK hynix Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Software/Firmware Security The firmware components are protected by an RSA signature. The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by power cycling or resetting the module. Operational Environment The Module has a limited operational environment under FIPS 140-3 definitions. The tested operational environments are listed in Table 2. The Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. The Module will not load or execute firmware which is not signed with SK hynix 3072-bit RSA Private Key. Firmware versions validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP will be explicitly identified on a validation certificate. Any firmware not identified in this Security Policy does not constitute the Module defined by this Security Policy or covered by this validation. Please see the operator instructions provided in Section 11 for the initialization, uninitialization, and sanitation of the module. Physical Security Policy The Module meets commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, and shock/vibrations. The Module uses standard passivation techniques and only asserts compliance with Level 1 physical security requirements. Non-Invasive Security The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack. Sensitive Security Parameter (SSP) Management CSPs and PSPs are defined in the tables below. The following legend is used to describe the generation, storage, input, output, and zeroization methods:

• G1 Generated external to the Module and installed during manufacturing
• G2 Unmodified output of the internal ENT (P) during power-up
• G3 Derived from the DRBG output per SP800-90Ar1
• G4 Derived from PBKDF2
• G5 Symmetric key generated by internal CAVP validated DRBG
• S1 Only stored in volatile, dynamic RAM in plaintext
• S2 Stored in static eFUSE in plaintext, associated by memory location (index)
• S3 Stored in static NAND encrypted with AES-KW by the HRK, associated by memory location (index) SK hynix Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D                                                          FIPS 140-3 Security Policy •    S4      Stored in static NAND in plaintext, associated by memory location (index) •    S5      Stored in dynamic RAM in plaintext, associated by memory location (index) •    S6      Stored in static NAND encrypted obfuscated (treated as plaintext) with AES-KW using the AUTH_KEY, associated by memory location (index) •    S7      Stored in static NAND encrypted with AES-KW using SUM_KEK, TPER_KEK, or MEK_KEK, associated by memory location (index) •    S8      Stored in static NAND encrypted with AES-KW using the TPER_SALT_KEK, associated by memory location (index) •    S9      Stored in plaintext as part of static firmware, which is RSA signed •    I1      Input in plaintext (Non-SSPs only) •    O1      Plaintext to host (Non-SSPs only) •    Z1      Zeroized by Module power cycle or hard reset •    Z2      Zeroized by the “Zeroization” service by overwriting with zeroes or ones •    Z3      Zeroize after service completion by overwriting the RAM location by zeroes

All SSPs used by the Module are described in this section. Table 13: SSPs SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy e. SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Table 14: Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification Self-Tests Each time the Module is powered up, tests are run to guarantee the proper functioning of the crypto algorithms. Power on self-tests are available on demand by power cycling or resetting the Module. The module zeroises all temporary values used as part of the pre-operational and conditional self-tests On power-on or reset, the Module performs self-tests as described in the tables below. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails during the ROM boot stage of the device, then the Module enters an internal error state. If the Module has exited ROM boot stage, the Module enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state which can be retrieved by NVMe Identify Controller command word at offset 4092, bit 0 will be 1. Power cycle is required to recover the Module from self-test failure. Table 15: Pre-Operational and Conditional Self-Tests performed at Power-On Table 16: Additional Conditional Self-Tests SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Life-Cycle Assurance The Module design corresponds to the Module Security rules. This section documents the Cryptographic Officer instructions that are necessary to implement in order to maintain compliance with FIPS 140-3 security requirements.

The Module is shipped from the factory in an Approved mode of operation (uninitialized state). The keys generated during manufacturing are used to encrypt/decrypt the user data. The shipping container protecting the Module or set of Modules in transit should be verified for evidence of tampering. The CO should initialize the Module by taking the following steps:

To verify that a module is in the Approved mode of operation the operator will perform the Read FIPS Compliance by issuing TCG IF-RECV command with Protocol Id 0 and ComID 2. Refer [SFSC] spec. For example, the sample of data below is returned from the module: ----------------FIPS 140 compliance descriptor-----------------------COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR INFORMATION LENGTH -> 528 COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR DESCRIPTOR TYPE -> 1 COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR DESCRIPTOR LENGTH -> 520 COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR RELATED STANDARD -> 511 COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR OVERALL SECURITY LEVEL -> 492 COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR HARDWARE VERSION -> HFS1T9GEEWX132N COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR VERSION ->51082A30 COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR MODULE NAME -> SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs ----------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Take Ownership - Set Admin SP SID.
2. Activate Opal with Single User Mode.
3. Set WriteLockEnabled and ReadLockEnabled column of all valid Locking ranges.
4. Power cycle the Module.
5. Verify the module is in initialized mode by checking the • LockingEnabled bit of the TCG Level 0 Discovery Locking Feature Descriptor is set to 1. • WriteLockEnabled and ReadLockEnabled columns of all valid Locking ranges in the Locking Table are set to True.

The Deactivate OPAL may be invoked by an authorized role to affect a transition into the uninitialized state of operation. The PSID Revert may be done by the PSID role to affect a

1 “51” is an ASCII data field that indicates “FIPS 140-3” per the Security Features for SCSI Commands, Revision 2, Section 5.1.5.3

2 “49” is an ASCII data field that indicates the FIPS 140 overall security level of “1” per the Security Features for SCSI Commands, Revision 2,

Section 5.1.5.3. SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy transition into the uninitialized state of operation. This is analogous to restoring the module to the factory default state.

The Zeroization service may be invoked to destroy all SSPs and render the module inoperable. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy The Module does not support the mitigation of other attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-3. SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy References and Definitions The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy Table 17: References SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Table 18: Acronyms and Definitions SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

XTS

XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with Cipher text Stealing

SK hynix PE9110 E1.S and PE9010 M.2 22110D FIPS 140-3 Security Policy SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).