Quadient Postal Security Device

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (17)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Quadient Postal Security Device
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update<br/>Firmware load</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>status output<br/>Unauthenticated<br/>Self-test</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>no library/version identified</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Quadient Postal Security Device
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update<br/>Firmware load</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>status output<br/>Unauthenticated<br/>Self-test</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>no library/version identified</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Classification: External Quadient Postal Security Device Security Policy Valid from: 27/11/2024 Version No.: V 1.2 This document is non-proprietary. It may be reproduced or transmitted only in its entirety without revision. © Quadient

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy Content Page 2/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy Page 3/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy Figure list Table list Page 4/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy This document describes the security policy of the Quadient Technologies France (Quadient) Postal Security Device under the terms of FIPS 140-3 validation. This document contains a statement of the security rules under which the Quadient Postal Security Device operates. The Quadient Postal Security Device is designed to meet the overall requirements applicable for FIPS 140-3 Table 1: Security Levels Page 5/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy 2. Cryptographic module specification 2.1. Overview The Quadient Postal Security Device is a hardware cryptographic module embedded within Quadient postal franking machines. The Quadient Postal Security Device performs all franking machine’s cryptographic and postal security functions and protects the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and Postal Relevant Data from unauthorized access. Table 2: Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration The Quadient Postal Security Device (Figure 1) is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module enclosed within a hard, opaque, plastic enclosure encapsulating the epoxy potted module which is wrapped in a tamper detection envelope with a tamper response mechanism. This enclosure constitutes the cryptographic module’s physical boundary. 2.2. Excluded Components The module does not exclude any components from the requirements of FIPS 140-3. 2.3. Modes of operation The module only supports an Approved mode of operation that is entered upon powering-on the module. The module does not support a degraded mode of operation. Page 6/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy 2.4. Security industry protocols The cryptographic module implements the TLS v1.2 protocol and uses only one cipher suite (TLS-DHE-RSAWITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256). The TLS protocol is composed of TLS Handshake protocol (used for mutual authentication and TLS pre-master secret establishment) and TLS Record protocol (used for application data confidentiality and integrity). 2.5. Security functions 2.5.1. Approved Algorithms The Quadient Postal Security Device supports the following approved security functions:

1 ECDSA P-244 Signature Verification is included on the algorithm certificate but not used by the module.

Classification:                  External Document Name:                   Security Policy Table 3: Approved Algorithms 2.5.2.         Vendor Affirmed Algorithms The module supports the following vendor affirmed algorithms. Table 4: Vendor Affirmed Algorithms 2.5.3.         Allowed Algorithms The module supports only approved algorithms. N/A                       N/A                          N/A                                   N/A Table 5: Allowed Algorithms

2 RSA Signature Verification to FIPS 186-2 with modulo 1536 is listed on the algorithm certificate but not utilized by the module.

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy 2.5.4. Non-Approved Algorithms The module supports only approved algorithms. N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 6: Non-Approved Algorithms 2.5.5. Security Function Implementations (SFI) (2). Table 7: Security Function Implementations 2.5.6. Entropy Sources The module includes an internal entropy source for the generation of the DRBG seed. Please refer to the entropy source validation (ESV) certificate E58. Table 8: Entropy Source Implementations The entropy source generates 384 bits of entropy input which is combined with a 64-bit nonce, 64-bit personalization string, and 128 bits of additional input. This input is used to instantiate (or reseed) the CTRDRBG. The entropy source has a rate of 88% and therefore provides the DRBG with a full 128-bit security 2.5.7. Key Establishment The module supports the establishment of cryptographic keys using finite field cryptography (FFC) in conformance with NIST SP 800-56A Rev3. The module implements KAS-FFC-SSC per NIST SP 800-56A Rev3 (Cert. #A2929), used in conjunction with TLS KDF per NIST SP 800-135 (Cert. #A761). Key establishment methodology provides at least 112 bits of encryption strength. This is used to establish TLS v1.2 Page 9/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy communication sessions in conformance with NIST SP 800-38F using AES (Cert. #A728) and HMAC (Cert. #A729). 2.6. Security Rules This section documents the security rules applied by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of a FIPS 140-3 level 3 module:

1. The PSD shall process only one request at a time (single thread). The PSD will ignore all other inputs to the module while processing the request. The only output performed by the PSD is the response to the request.
2. Quadient Postal Security Device shall employ identity-based authentication mechanism.
3. All authenticated sessions shall end when the module is power cycled.
4. All keys generated in the module shall have at least 112 bits of cryptographic security strength for an Approved mode of operation.
5. The module shall not provide any bypass capability.
6. The PSD shall not support a maintenance role.
7. The PSD shall not support manual input or output of CSPs.
8. The PSD shall perform pre-operational and conditional self-tests without external control or operator intervention either in approved or non-approved mode. The PSD shall pass into the error state if the test fails.
9. The PSD shall automatically perform periodic self-tests without external input or control. The PSD shall enter the error state if the test fails.
10. The PSD shall inhibit all data output interfaces when performing self-tests, firmware loading, zeroization or while in the error state.
11. The module shall not output any CSP in plaintext form.
12. The module shall not accept any CSP in plaintext form.
13. The PSD shall test the accessibility and validity of all CSP values in nonvolatile memories at power up. If any are not accessible (i.e., device failure) or contain erroneous data (16-bit EDC fails) then the PSD shall enter in error state.
14. The PSD shall enter in the Faulted state and zeroize all SSPs if physical cryptographic boundary is breached or if the temperature inside the module exceeds 84°C.
15. Once the PSD has been zeroized, it must be returned to the factory for destruction.
16. Cryptographic module interfaces To communicate with the franking machine’s base the cryptographic module provides a physical 10-pin serial connector with five logical interfaces: Page 10/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy Table 9: Ports and Interfaces The data output interface and cryptographic operations are inhibited during zeroization, key generation, self-tests, and error states. No plaintext CSPs are input or output from the module through this serial interface. 4. Roles, services, and authentication 4.1. Roles The Quadient Postal Security Device supports authorized roles for operators and corresponding services within each role. The Quadient Postal Security Device supports the following Crypto-Officer roles: Field Crypto-Officer and Postal Crypto-Officer. The Quadient Postal Security Device supports the following User roles: Base User, R&D Signer and Unauthenticated User. For each role, the Quadient Postal Security Device provides the following services and the corresponding input and outputs: Page 11/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy Page 12/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy Table 10: Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output Page 13/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy To control access to the module the Quadient Postal Security Device employs identity-based authentication mechanism. For each role, the Quadient Postal Security Device provides the following authentication method: Table 11: Roles and Authentication Mutual authentication is based on the TLS v1.2 Handshake Protocol using the "TLS-DHE-RSA" cryptographic suite, with 2048 RSA key length for authentication.

• The RSA key is 2048 bits and is considered to have 112 bits of strength. For any attempt to use the authentication mechanism, the probability that a random attempt will succeed, or a false acceptance will occur will be at least 1 in 2112 (equivalent to less than 2 x 10-34). This is considerably more difficult to break than 1 in 1,000,000 random attempts.
• The time necessary to generate an authentication is 100ms; therefore, 600 attempts could occur in a one-minute period. For multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a oneminute period the probability that a random attempt will be accepted or that a false acceptance will occur will be 1 in 2112 multiplied by 600 - maximum number of attempts in one minute (equivalent to 1 x 10-31). This is considerably more difficult to break than 1 in 100,000 within a oneminute period. Page 14/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy 4.3. Services 4.3.1. Approved services Page 15/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy Page 16/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy Page 17/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy Table 12: Approved Services G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. Page 18/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy 4.3.2. Non-approved services The module does not support any non-approved services.

5. Software/Firmware security At power-up, the Quadient Postal Security Device tests the integrity of its firmware (binary file) by verifying the RSA 2048 PKCS1 v1.5 signature with SHA-256 hash function. If the signature verification fails, the PSD enters an error state. At any time, the operator can initiate the firmware integrity test on demand by either power-cycling the module or calling the ‘Self-Test’ service.
6. Operational environment The cryptographic module’s operational environment is limited. The Quadient Postal Security Device is designed to meet FIPS 140-3 Level 3 Physical Security requirements. The Quadient Postal Security Device includes a non-removable enclosure that comprises a hard epoxy resin with an outer plastic casing. The outer plastic casing is defined as the cryptographic boundary of the cryptographic module. The Quadient Postal Security Device employs a tamper detection envelope designed to detect penetration attempts and a response mechanism that will zeroize all plaintext Sensitive Security Parameters. Table 13: Physical Security Inspection Guidelines Quadient Postal Security Device was designed to securely operate when voltage supplied to the module is between 9.6V and 15.6V and the environmental temperature is between -30°C and 84°C. The module mitigates environmental attacks by using a high temperature fuse so that when the temperature of the module exceeds 84°C the module zeroizes all plaintext SSPs. Page 19/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy Table 14: EFP/EFT The non-removable enclosure and epoxy resin maintain strength and hardness characteristics over the operating, storage and distribution temperature range of the PSD, i.e. -30°C and 84°C. 8. Non-invasive security The module does not provide protections against non-invasive security methods. Page 20/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy 9. Sensitive security parameters management Page 21/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy UK Belgium

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy Table 15: SSPs Page 24/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy 10. Self-tests The Quadient Postal Security Device performs pre-operational (§10.1) and conditional self-tests (§10.20) without external control or operator intervention. The Quadient Postal Security Device inhibits the data output and control interfaces during self-tests. If a self-test fails, the Quadient Postal Security Device enters in error state and outputs an error indicator (error code). The Quadient Postal Security Device does not perform any cryptographic operations or output control and data via the control and data output interface while in an error state. The PSD must be repowered to exit the error state and if the error persists the module must be returned to Quadient. The Quadient Postal Security Device maintains a self-test error log that is accessible by an authorized operator of the module. 10.1. Pre-operational self-tests The Quadient Postal Security Device performs the following pre-operational self-tests at power-up:

• Firmware integrity test
• Critical security functions test 10.1.1. Firmware integrity test The Quadient Postal Security Device verifies the integrity of its firmware using RSA 2048 with SHA-256. To ensure the validity of the underlying algorithm, the RSA 2048 signature verification known answer self-test is performed prior to performing the firmware integrity test. At any time, the operator is able to initiate the firmware integrity test on demand. 10.1.2. Critical security functions test The Quadient Postal Security Device performs the following pre-operational critical functions tests:
• Accessibility and validity test (16-bit EDC) of the following CSPs:
• Master Secret Key
• DRBG - Key & V
• PSD TLS Communication Public Key
• Tamper detection test If any of these CSP is not accessible (i.e., device failure) or contains erroneous data, the Quadient Postal Security Device enters an error state. If the tamper detection test fails, the Quadient Postal Security Device enters an error state and zeroizes all plaintext CSPs. Page 25/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy 10.2. Conditional self-tests The Quadient Postal Security Device performs the following conditional self-tests:

• Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test (see 10.2.1), at power up
• RSA (2048) Pairwise Consistency Tests, at power up and when RSA key generation occurs
• ECDSA (P-224) Pairwise Consistency Tests, at power up and when ECDSA key generation occurs
• ECDSA (P-256) Pairwise Consistency Tests, at power up and when ECDSA key generation occurs
• KAS-SSC Assurances per SP 800-56Ar3 5.6.2 (Private Key Validation, Public Key Validation, and DH Pairwise Consistency Tests) at power up and when DH key generation occurs
• Firmware load test
• Conditional Critical Functions Test: SSPs accessibility and validity test (16-bit EDC), before their use 10.2.1. Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests The Quadient Postal Security Device performs the following cryptographic algorithm self-tests:
• AES (CBC 128) Encrypt KAT
• AES (CBC 128) Decrypt KAT
• AES (CMAC 128) KAT
• DRBG KATs (CTR-DRBG) (Instantiate KAT, Generate KAT, Reseed KAT)
• ECDSA (P-224) signature generation KAT
• ECDSA (P-224) signature verification KAT
• ECDSA (P-256) signature generation KAT
• ECDSA (P-256) signature verification KAT
• HMAC (SHA-1) KAT
• HMAC (SHA-256) KAT
• KAS-SSC KAT
• TLS-KDF (SHA-256) KAT
• RSA (2048) signature generation KAT
• RSA (2048) signature verification KAT
• SHA-1 KAT
• SHA-256 KAT Entropy Source Continuous Tests, at power up and during the noise source operation:
• Repetition Count Test (ref. NIST SP 800-90B)
• Adaptive Proportion Test (ref. NIST SP 800-90B) 10.3. Periodic self-tests The Quadient Postal Security Device automatically performs self-tests repeatedly at a defined time period without external input or control. The Quadient Postal Security Device performs the periodic self-test at midnight. The time period is configurable between 1 and 30 days (default 30 days). The periodic self-test Page 26/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy execution date and time is stored in non-volatile memory. The periodic self-test execution failure is recorded in the error log. 11. Life-cycle assurance Quadient Technologies France is using a system configuration management tool (Windchill) to manage products configurations (including the cryptographic module). 11.1. Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures The module is initialized and configured for a specific country in manufacturing. The postal meter is then authorized and shipped to the end customer. 11.2. Administrator Guidance The PSD TLS Communication RSA key pair is generated at the customization center during manufacturing. The PSD TLS Communication key pair is generated internally, by the module itself. Once the key pair is available, the public key is immediately output for certification by the Manufacturing CA entity. After the certificate is available and downloaded into the module, all communication between the manufacturing environment and the module are mutually authenticated and encrypted via a TLStunnel. Once installed in the postage meter (at the customer site), the module first connects to the Postal Server via a mutually authenticated TLS session and sends its certificate for certification. A new certificate chain is downloaded into the module to be used for communication with Quadient infrastructure (Postal Server) to access available services, during the operational phase. 11.3. Non-Administrator Guidance The Quadient postage meters include detailed user guidance in its free online manuals: iX Range - KCMS (quadient.com). 11.4. Design and rules The cryptographic module’s firmware has been implemented using a high-level language (C), except for the limited use of assembly language where it was essential for performance. 11.5. End of life Upon end of life, the module is withdrawn from service and returned to manufacturing for decommissioning and scrapping. Page 27/28

Classification: External Document Name: Security Policy

12. Mitigation of other attacks The module employs a tamper detection envelope designed to detect penetration attempts and a response mechanism that immediately zeroizes all plaintext CSPs.
13. Glossary Page 28/28