WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (31)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update<br/>firmware load</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>status output</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update<br/>firmware load</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>status output</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Version: 1.3 Revision Date: November 14, 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. www.paloaltonetworks.com © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks, Inc. is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. A list of our trademarks can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective companies.

The WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B from Palo Alto Networks Inc., hereafter referred to as “Wildfire” or the “cryptographic module” is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module designed to fulfill FIPS 140-3 level 2 requirements. The WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B module identifies unknown malware, zero-day exploits, and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) through dynamic analysis, and automatically disseminates protection in near real-time to help security teams meet the challenge of advanced cyber-attacks. Unknown files are analyzed by WildFire (WF) in a scalable sandbox environment where new threats are identified, and protections are automatically developed and delivered in the form of an update. The result is a unique, closed loop approach to controlling cyber threats that begins with positive security controls to reduce the attack surface, inspection of all traffic, ports, and protocols to block all known threats, and rapid detection of unknown threats by observing their actual behavior. The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-3. Table 1- Security Levels ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6. FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level [Number Below]

2                   Cryptographic Module Specification                              2
3                   Cryptographic Module Interfaces                                 2
4                   Roles, Services, and Authentication                             3
5                   Software/Firmware Security                                      2
6                   Operational Environment                                        N/A
7                   Physical Security                                               2
8                   Non-Invasive Security                                          N/A
9                   Sensitive Security Parameter Management                         2
11                  Life-Cycle Assurance                                            3
12                  Mitigation of Other Attacks                                    N/A

Overall Level 2 © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 2

2. Cryptographic Module Specification The Palo Alto Networks, Inc. WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B is a multi-chip standalone hardware module. The cryptographic boundary includes all firmware components contained within the physical enclosure of the module. Figures below provide images of the module with the physical kit’s opacity shields in place. See the Physical Security section for details regarding the module’s physical security mechanisms. Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration Model Hardware [Part Number and Firmware Version Distinguishing Features Physical Kit: 920-000145 Approved Mode of Operation The following section details the procedure necessary to place the module into the Approved mode of operation.

• Install module and interface connections in addition to the physical kit.
• The tamper-evident seals and opacity shields must be installed as per the ‘Physical Security’ section for the module to operate in the Approved mode of operation.
• Apply power to the device.
• Establish a serial connection to the console port and command the module to enter into maintenance mode.
• During initial boot up, break the boot sequence via the console port connection (by pressing the maint button when instructed to do so) to access the main menu.
• Select “Continue.”
• Select the “Set FIPS-CC Mode” option to enter the Approved mode.
• Select “Enable FIPS-CC Mode,” and press enter.
• When prompted, select “Reboot” and the module will re-initialize and continue into the Approved mode.
• The module will reboot.
• In the Approved mode, the console port is available only as a status output port.
• Once the module has finished booting, the Crypto Officer can authenticate using the default credentials that come with the module
• Once authenticated, the module will automatically require the operator to change their password; and the default credential is overwritten The module will automatically indicate the Approved mode of operation in the following manner:
• Status output interface will indicate “**** FIPS-CC MODE ENABLED ****” via the CLI session.
• Status output interface will indicate “FIPS-CC mode enabled successfully” via the console port. Should one or more power-up self-tests fail, the module will not enter the Approved mode of operation. Feedback will consist of:
• The module will output “FIPS-CC failure.”
• The module will reboot and enter a state in which the reason for the reboot can be determined by following the on-screen instructions. Note: Disabling “FIPS-CC” mode causes a complete factory reset, which is described in the Zeroization section below. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 3

Non-Compliant State Failure to follow the directions in the Approved Mode of Operation above and Section 11 will result in the module operating in a non-compliant state. Zeroization To initiate the zeroization service, perform the following steps:

• Access the module’s CLI via SSH, and command the module to enter maintenance mode; the module will reboot
• Note: Establish a serial connection to the console port
• After reboot, select “Continue.”
• Select “Factory Reset.”
• The module will perform a zeroization, and provide the following message once complete: o “Factory Reset Status: Success” Uninitialized State If the module does not successfully transition into the Approved mode of operation, or zeroization is performed, the module will be in an uninitialized state. It is required to initialize the module in order to perform cryptographic functions. Approved and Allowed Algorithms The cryptographic modules support the following Approved algorithms. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes specified in this table are used by the module. The CAVP certificate may contain more tested options than listed in this table. Table 3 - Approved Algorithms Conditioning Component Vetted conditioning A2518 AES-CBC-MAC SP AES-CBC-MAC 128 bits component for ESV Cert.

AES 256 bits with Counter DRBG A3453                                                  CTR DRBG                 Derivation Function       Random Bit Generator ECDSA KeyGen                                                                   Key Generation (FIPS 186-4) A3453                      ECDSA KeyVer                ECDSA KeyVer             P-256, P-384, P-521       Public Key Validation © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                      Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 4

(FIPS 186-4) ECDSA SigGen                                                                         Signature Generation (FIPS 186-4) A3453                      ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)   ECDSA SigVer                                             Signature Verification A3453                                                                                                           Authentication for [FIPS 198-1]                                                                         protocols [FIPS 198-1]                                           λ=256                         protocols [FIPS 198-1]                                           λ=384                         protocols [FIPS 198-1]                                           λ=512                         protocols Ephemeral Unified Model: (SP 800-56Ar3) (SP 800-56Ar3) Engine ID: KDF SNMP [SP 800-135rev1] (CVL) A3453                                                  SSHv2 KDF                                                SSH (FIPS 186-4)                (FIPS 186-4) (FIPS 186-4)                (FIPS 186-4) (FIPS 186-4)                (FIPS 186-4) +++ This Hash algorithm is not supported for ANSI Digital Signature A3453                      SHA-1 [FIPS 180-4]          SHA Non-Digital Signature component of HMAC) Digital Signature © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                        Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 5

Non-Digital Signature component of HMAC) Digital Signature Non-Digital Signature component of HMAC) Digital Signature Non-Digital Signature component of HMAC) Digital Signature Non-Digital Signature component of HMAC) Safe Primes Key           Safe Primes Key                                            Safe Primes Key Generation [RFC 3526]     Generation                                                 Generation Safe Primes Key           Safe Primes Key                                            Safe Primes Key Verification [RFC 3526]   Verification                                               Verification TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627      TLS1.2 KDF                   TLS v1.2 Hash Algorithm: SP 800-38A, FIPS 198-1,                                    AES-CTR with 128, 192, and 256-bit keys HMAC Cert. #A3453          [SP 800-38F]              wrapping and unwrapping)                                   HMAC-SHA2-256, bits of encryption strength SP 800-38D and SP

AES-GCM Cert. #A3453                                                              providing 128 or 256 bits     Key Wrapping [SP 800-38F]              wrapping and unwrapping) of encryption strength per IG D.G. ESV Cert. #E64                                                                    Palo Alto Networks DRNG Entropy Source ESV Cert. #E130                                                                   Palo Alto Networks RTC Entropy Source Key Exchange with #A3453, KDF IKEv2 Cert.    KAS [SP 800-56Arev3]      per IG D.F Scenario 2 path   providing 128 or 192 bits protocol KDF #A3453                                               (2).                         of encryption strength #A3453, KDF SSH Cert.                                                             curves providing 128, 192,    Key Exchange with KAS [SP 800-56Arev3]      per IG D.F Scenario 2 path #A3453                                                                            or 256 bits of encryption     protocol KDF (2). #A3453, TLS v1.2 KDF                                                              curves providing 128, 192,    Key Exchange with KAS [SP 800-56Arev3]      per IG D.F Scenario 2 path RFC7627 Cert. #A3453                                                              or 256 bits of encryption     protocol KDF (2). KAS-FFC-SSC Cert.                                    SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-FFC 2048-bit key providing 112    Key Exchange with #A3453, KDF IKEv2 Cert.    KAS [SP 800-56Arev3]      per IG D.F Scenario 2 path bits of encryption strength   protocol KDF KAS-FFC-SSC Cert.                                    SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-FFC 2048-bit key providing 112    Key Exchange with #A3453, KDF SSH Cert.      KAS [SP 800-56Arev3]      per IG D.F Scenario 2 path bits of encryption strength   protocol KDF © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                     Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 6

KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-FFC 2048-bit key providing 112 Key Exchange with #A3453, TLS v1.2 KDF KAS [SP 800-56Arev3] per IG D.F Scenario 2 path bits of encryption strength protocol KDF RFC7627 Cert. #A3453 (2). Key Generation Cryptographic Key Note: The seeds used for Vendor CKG Generation; SP 800- asymmetric key pair Section 5.1, Section 5.2 Affirmed (SP 800-133rev2) 133rev2 and IG D.H generation are produced (asymmetric seeds). using the unmodified/direct output of the DRBG *The module is compliant to IG C.H: GCM is used in the context of TLS, IPsec/IKEv2, and SSH:

• For TLS, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with SP 800-52 and in accordance with Section 4 of RFC 5288 for TLS key establishment, and ensures when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts all possible values for a given session key, that a new TLS handshake is initiated per sections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 of RFC 5246. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly.
• From this RFC 5288, the GCM cipher suites in use are TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.)
• For IPsec/IKEv2, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with RFCs 4106 and 7296 (RFC 5282 is not applicable, as the module does not use GCM within IKEv2 itself), and ensures when the module exhausts all possible values for a given session key that this triggers a rekey condition. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of IPsec with IKEv2 and found to behave correctly.
• For SSH, the module meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H. The module conforms to RFCs 4252, 4253, and 5647. The fixed field is 4-byte in length and is derived using the SSH KDF; this ensures the fixed field is unique for any given GCM session. The invocation field is 8-byte in length and is incremented for each invocation of GCM; this prevents the IV from repeating until the entire invocation field space of 264 is exhausted, which can take hundreds of years. (In “FIPS-CC Mode”, SSH rekey is automatically configured at 1 GB of data or 1 hour, whichever comes first.) In all the above cases, the nonce_explicit is always generated deterministically. AES GCM keys are zeroized when the module is power-cycled. For each new TLS or SSH session, a new AES GCM key is established. The module does not have any algorithms that fall under: - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation The module is compliant to IG C.F: The module utilizes Approved modulus sizes 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits for RSA signatures. This functionality has been CAVP tested as noted above. The minimum number of Miller Rabin tests for each modulus size is implemented according to Table C.2 of FIPS 186-4. For modulus size 4096, the module implements the largest number of Miller-Rabin tests shown in Table C.2. RSA SigVer is CAVP tested for all three supported modulus sizes as noted above. The module does not perform FIPS © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 7

186-2 SigVer. All supported modulus sizes are CAVP testable and tested as noted above. The module does not implement RSA key transport in the approved mode. Table 4 - Supported Protocols in the Approved Mode Supported Protocols* TLS 1.2 SSHv2 SNMPv3 IPsec and IKEv2 *Note: No parts of these protocols, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Module Diagrams Figures 1 - 4 depict the modules and their interfaces. The cryptographic boundary includes the physical perimeter of the enclosure of the appliance and all logical components within. Please refer to the ‘Physical Security’ section for depictions of the module with the physical kit installed. Figure 1 - WF-500 Front Figure 2 - WF-500 Rear © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 8

Figure 3 - WF-500-B Front Figure 4 - WF-500-B Rear 3.       Cryptographic Module Interfaces The module is a multi-chip standalone with ports and interfaces as shown below. The module does not implement a control output interface. Table 5 - Ports and Interfaces Physical Port                        Logical Interface                        Data that passes over port/interface LED                       Status output                                           Module status via LED indicators Console                   Status output                                           Self-test output RJ45 Ethernet             Data input, control input, data output, status output   TLS, IPSec, or SSH SFP+ (WF-500-B)           Data input, control input, data output, status output   TLS Note: USB and IPMI ports are present but not used (i.e. disabled). © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                             Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 9

4.         Roles, Services, and Authentication Services When initialized into the Approved mode of operation, all authenticated services are accessed via SSH or TLS sessions. Approved and allowed algorithms, relevant CSPs and public keys related to these protocols are accessed to support the following services. CSP access by services is further described in the following tables. The module implements two Crypto-Officer roles, one User role, and an Unauthenticated role. The Crypto-Officer (CO) role may access all services and has the ability to manage multiple other COs/Users. The Peer-to-Peer VPN is a Crypto-Officer role that consists of managing the establishment of VPN connections between several WF-500 and WF-500-B modules. The User role provides read-only access to the system via the System Audit service. The Unauthenticated role invokes services which do not require the assumption of an authorized role per FIPS 140-3 IG 4.1.A. Table 6 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output CO                               Show Version                  Query module for version          Module provides version CO                               System Operational            Configuring and managing          Confirmation of service via Management                    networking parameter              Configuration Logs configuration, and other non-security relevant CO                               System Configuration          Configuring and managing          Confirmation of service via Management                    cryptographic parameters and      Configuration Logs setting/modifying security policy, including creating User accounts and additional CO accounts via CLI CO                               Data Analysis Management      Configure data submission,        Confirmation of service via analysis and reporting            Configuration Logs functions via CLI CO                               Check Status                  Query status of the module via    Module status information CLI                               via CLI or System Logs CO                               Firmware Update               Loading new image                 System log noting version updated successfully CO, User                         System Audit                  View the System Logs via CLI      System Logs © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                 Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Page 10

CO, Peer-to-Peer VPN IKE/IPsec configuration Initialize VPN connection Confirmation of service via System Logs Unauthenticated Zeroize Initialize factory reset via Confirmation of zeroization Maintenance Mode via console output Unauthenticated Self-Tests Power removal Confirmation of self-test Unauthenticated Show Status (LEDs) N/A LEDs Assumption of Roles The module supports distinct authorized operator roles. The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles using unique authentication credentials associated with operator accounts. The module supports concurrent operators with identity-based authentication. The module does not provide a maintenance role or bypass capability. Table 7 – Roles and Authentication Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength Single-Factor Cryptographic possible characters). The probability that a Software (certificate common random attempt will succeed or a false name / public key-based acceptance will occur is 1/(958) which is less authentication than 1/1,000,0002. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 10/(958), which is less than 1/100,000. The module’s configuration supports at most ten failed attempts to Memorized Secret (Unique authenticate in a one-minute period. User Single-Factor Cryptographic Certificate/Public key-based Software (certificate common The security modules support public-key based name / public key-based authentication using RSA 2048 and 2048, RSA 3072, RSA 4096, ECDSA P-256, In “FIPS-CC Mode”, the module checks and enforces the minimum password length of eight (8) as specified in SP 800-63B. Passwords are securely stored hashed with salt value, with very restricted access control, and rate limiting mechanism for authentication attempts. SP 800-63B, Appendix A.4 establishes a minimum acceptable security strength of 10^6 based on the minimum acceptable random pin size of six (6) digits. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 11

The minimum equivalent strength supported is

will succeed is 1/(2112) which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 6,000/(2112), which is less than 1/100,000. The module supports at most 100 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period. Certificate/Public key-based The security modules support public-key based 2048, RSA 3072, RSA 4096, ECDSA P-256, Single-Factor Cryptographic The minimum equivalent strength supported is Software (certificate common 112 bits. The probability that a random attempt name / public key-based will succeed is 1/(2112) which is less than authentication 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 6,000/(2112), which is less than 1/100,000. The module supports at most 100 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period. SSP Access Rights The table below defines the relationship between access to SSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. Table 8 – Approved Services Description Approved Security Functions Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access rights to Indicator Keys and/or SSPs Query the module to Version displayed via Show Version N/A N/A CO N/A display the version System Logs / CLI CKG RSA Private Keys CO G/W/E System Logs Perform system RSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4) System management RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4) Operational functions including CKG ECDSA Private Keys G/W/E Management firmware updates, ECDSA KeyGen licensing, (FIPS 186-4) ECDSA SigGen © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 12

diagnostics and    (FIPS 186-4) debug functions.            TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627     TLS Pre-Master Secret        G/E/Z TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627     TLS Master Secret            G/E/Z CKG,                     TLS DHE/ECDHE Private        G/E/Z ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS       Components 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer KAS                               TLS DHE/ECDHE Public         G/E/R/W/Z Primes Key Generation, Safe Primes Key SSH Shared Secret            G/E/Z KDF SSH SSH DHE/ECDHE Private        G/E/Z ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer Primes Key Generation,   Components Safe Primes Key HMAC-SHA-1               SSH Session                  G/E/Z AES-CBC,                 SSH Session Encryption       G/E/Z N/A                               CO, User Password            G/E/W DRBG Seed                    G/E DRBG V Counter DRBG, ESV DRBG Key Entropy Input String G/E/Z KDF IKEv2 IPSec/IKE Shared Secret ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS       Private Components 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer Primes Key Generation,   Public Components Safe Primes Key N/A                               Protocol Secrets             W/E RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)           RSA Public Keys              G/R/E/W ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)         ECDSA Public Keys            G/R/E/W RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)           SSH Client Public Key        W/E © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                         Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 13

RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)           SSH Host Public Key            G/R/E/W ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) Firmware Integrity ECDSA SigVer Public Key for Firmware        W/E RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) Load Test CKG                               RSA Private Keys               G/W/E           System Logs RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4) CKG                               ECDSA Private Keys             G/W/E ECDSA KeyGen ECDSA SigGen TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627     TLS Pre-Master Secret          G/E/Z TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627     TLS Master Secret              G/E/Z CKG,                     TLS DHE/ECDHE Private          G/E/Z ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS       Components 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer KAS                               TLS DHE/ECDHE Public           G/E/R/W/Z Primes Key Generation, KDF SSH configuration                                           SSH Shared Secret options for                                             SSH DHE/ECDHE Private          G/E/Z interfaces and communication for peer services.                 CKG, ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS and validate                   KAS-FFC-SSC, Safe        SSH DHE/ECDHE Public           G/E/R/W/Z configurations and             Primes Key Generation,   Components Management      Define access control methods via admin role AES-CBC,                 SSH Session Encryption         G/E/Z authentication        N/A                               CO, User Password              G/E/W DRBG Seed                      G/E DRBG V Counter DRBG, ESV DRBG Key Entropy Input String KDF SNMP                          SNMPv3 Authentication          W/E KDF SNMP                          SNMPv3 Privacy Secret          W/E KDF IKEv2                IPSec/IKE Shared Secret        G/E/Z © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                             Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 14

ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS       Private Components 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer Primes Key Generation,   Public Components Safe Primes Key N/A                               Protocol Secrets                W/E RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)           SSH Host Public Key             G/R/E/W ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)           SSH Client Public Key           W/E Firmware Integrity ECDSA SigVer Verification Key CKG                               RSA Private Keys           CO   G/W/E          System Logs RSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4) RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4) CKG                               ECDSA Private Keys              G/W/E ECDSA KeyGen ECDSA SigGen TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627     TLS Pre-Master Secret           G/E/Z TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627     TLS Master Secret               G/E/Z CKG,                     TLS DHE/ECDHE Private           G/E/Z ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS       Components 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer KAS                               TLS DHE/ECDHE Public            G/E/R/W/Z Primes Key Generation, Safe Primes Key Configure data analysis and reporting                 KDF SSH G/E/Z functions.                                         SSH Shared Secret SSH DHE/ECDHE Private           G/E/Z ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer Primes Key Generation,   Components Safe Primes Key HMAC-SHA-1               SSH Session                     G/E/Z AES-CBC,                 SSH Session Encryption          G/E/Z RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)           SSH Host Public Key             R/E © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                        Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 15

ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)           SSH Client Public Key            W/E DRBG Seed                        G/E DRBG V Counter DRBG, ESV DRBG Key Entropy Input String CKG                               RSA Private Keys          CO     G/W/E         System Logs RSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4) RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4) CKG                               ECDSA Private Keys               G/W/E ECDSA KeyGen ECDSA SigGen G/E/Z KDF SSH SSH Shared Secret SSH DHE/ECDHE Private            G/E/Z ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer KAS-FFC-SSC, Safe        SSH DHE/ECDHE Public             G/E/R/W/Z Primes Key Generation,   Components Review system, Check Status   debug logs, and HMAC-SHA-1               SSH Session                      G/E/Z AES-CBC,                 SSH Session Encryption           G/E/Z RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)           SSH Host Public Key              R/E ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)           SSH Client Public Key            W/E DRBG Seed                        G/E DRBG V Counter DRBG, ESV DRBG Key Entropy Input String KDF SNMP                          SNMPv3 Authentication            W/E KDF SNMP                          SNMPv3 Privacy Secret            W/E HMAC-SHA-1                        SNMPv3 Authentication            G/E/Z Firmware       Used to load/install                                     Public Key for Firmware   CO     W/E           System Logs RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) Update         new firmware                                             Load Test Allows review of       RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)           RSA Private Keys          CO,    E             System Logs limited                ECDSA SigGen                      ECDSA Private Keys               E System Audit system status via      KAS      KDF SSH                                                   G/E/Z © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                             Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 16

logs, dashboard and                                     SSH Shared Secret configuration                                           SSH DHE/ECDHE Private                G/E/Z no configuration commit capability. ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer Primes Key Generation,   Components Safe Primes Key HMAC-SHA-1               SSH Session                          G/E/Z AES-CBC,                 SSH Session Encryption               G/E/Z RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)           SSH Host Public Key                  R/E ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)           SSH Client Public Key                W/E N/A                               CO, User Password                    G/E/W DRBG Seed                            G/E DRBG V Counter DRBG, ESV DRBG Key Entropy Input String CKG                               RSA Private Keys           CO,       G/W/E       System Logs CKG                               ECDSA Private Keys                   G/W/E ECDSA KeyGen ECDSA SigGen DRBG Seed                            G/E DRBG V Counter DRBG, ESV DRBG Key Entropy Input String G/E/Z KDF IKEv2                IPSec/IKE Shared Secret Configures                     ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS       Private Components IKE/IPsec setup for   KAS      186-4), ECDSA KeyVer Primes Key Generation,   Public Components Safe Primes Key RSA Public Keys                      G/R/E/W RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) CA Certificates © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                             Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 17

ECDSA Public Keys G/R/E/W ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) CA Certificates Destroys all keys in Console Output / Zeroize N/A All Keys and SSPs enticat Z the module Zeroization indicator Run power up Unauth E System Logs self-tests on demand Firmware Integrity enticat Self-Tests ECDSA SigVer by power cycling the Verification Key ed (FIPS 186-4) View hardware status Unauth Show Status of the module via the N/A N/A enticat N/A LEDs Note: Configuration/System Logs for Approved services above will indicate FIPS-CC mode is enabled and that the service succeeded. The module does not implement a non-Approved Mode, so does not implement any Non-Approved Services.

5. Software/Firmware Security The module performs the Firmware Integrity test by using HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA signature verification (HMAC and ECDSA Cert. #A3453) during the Pre-Operational Self-Test. In addition, the module also conducts the firmware load test by using the Public Key for Firmware Load Testy (RSA 2048 with SHA-256, Cert. #A3453) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module via the System Operational Management service. The Firmware Integrity Verification Key and Public Key for Firmware Load Test used for the Firmware Integrity and Firmware Load test, respectively, are generated externally and delivered as part of the module firmware image. The pre-operational self-tests can be initiated by power cycling the module. When this is performed, the module automatically runs the cryptographic algorithm self-tests in addition to the pre-operational firmware integrity test. The module’s executable code is in the form of the compiled firmware image loaded onto the module.
6. Operational Environment The FIPS 140-3 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the module does not contain a modifiable operational environment. The operational environment is limited since the module includes a firmware load service (via the System Operational Management service) to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into the module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 18

7. Physical Security Physical Security Mechanisms The multi-chip standalone module is production quality and contains standard passivation. Chip components are protected by an opaque enclosure. There are tamper-evident seals that are applied on the module by the Crypto-Officer, and any unused seals are to be controlled by the Crypto-Officer. The Crypto-Officer must ensure that the module surface is clean and dry before applying the seals. The seals prevent removal of the opaque enclosure without evidence, which should be inspected by the Crypto-Officer every 30 days for evidence of tampering. If the seals or opacity shields show evidence of tamper, the Crypto-Officer should assume that the module has been compromised and contact Customer Support. Note: For ordering information, see Table 2 for physical kit part numbers and version. Opacity shields are included in the physical kits. Operator Required Actions The following table provides information regarding the various physical security mechanisms, and their recommended frequency of inspection/test. Table 9 - Physical Security Inspection Guidelines Physical Security Mechanism Recommended Frequency Inspection/Test Guidance Details Tamper-Evident Seals 30 days Verify integrity of tamper-evident seals in the locations specified in this section. Front and Rear Opacity Shields 30 days Verify that the front and rear opacity shields have not been deformed from their original shape, thereby reducing their effectiveness. Vent Overlays 30 days Verify that the vent overlays have not been removed or deformed. All edges should maintain strong adhesion characteristics. Refer to the following sections for instructions on installation and placement of the tamper seals and opacity shields. Tamper-evident seals must be pressed firmly onto the adhering surfaces during installation, and once applied, the Crypto-Officer shall permit 24 hours of cure time for all tamper-evident seals. WF-500 Tamper Seal Installation (12 Seals)
8. Remove the two pull handles and front modules on the left and right side of the appliance by removing the three (3) screws located behind each handle/module. There is no need to disconnect the LED circuit board attached to the end of the ribbon cable. Retain these screws for Step 2. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 19

Figure 5 - Remove Front Handles and Modules

2. Attach the left and right front cover brackets to the appliance using the six (6) screws that were removed in Step
3. First attach the brackets using the bottom screws (one (1) on each side) as shown in Figure 6, ensuring that you feed the ribbon cable and LED circuit board through the left bracket. Replace the front modules and secure them using the middle and top screws on each side as shown in Figure 7. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 20

Figure 6 – Secure the Front Brackets Figure 7 - Attach Pull Handles and Front Modules

3. Secure the front opacity shield to the right and left front brackets that you installed in Step
4. Use two (2) screws (provided) on each side. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 21

Figure 8

• Install Front Opacity Shield Figure 9
• Front Opacity Shield Installed 4. Attach the rear opacity shield tray to the appliance. First, remove the two (2) screws (shown in Figure 10) from the appliance and use these screws to secure the rear opacity shield tray. Note: Install the back cables (power cords and network/management cables) because you will not be able to access these ports after the next step. Figure 10 - Install Rear Opacity Shield Tray © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 22

5. Place the rear opacity shield on top of the rear opacity shield tray ensuring that you run the cables through the opening at the bottom. Secure the opacity shields with two (2) screws (provided) on each side. Figure 11 - Install Rear Opacity Shield
6. Cover the vent openings as shown in Figure 12 by applying one (1) overlay tamper-evident seal over the left side vent and one overlay tamper-evident seal over the right side vent. Each overlay requires two (2) tamper-evident seals as shown in Figure
7. Also apply one (1) additional tamper-evident seal as shown in Figure 13, #5. Figure 12 - Apple Tamper-Evident Seals on Vent Overlays © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 23

Figure 13 - Apply Tamper-Evident Seals on Vent Overlays and Side Opening

7. Attach the rail kit to the appliance as shown in Figure 14 and then add three (3) tamper-evident seals to the bottom of the appliance as shown in Figure
8. One (1) tamper-evident seal #6 prevents tampering of the front opacity shield connected to the bottom of the appliance and two (2) tamper-evident seals #7 and #8 wrap around the upper and lower rear opacity shields to prevent tampering of the rear opacity shields. Figure 14 - Install Rail Kit © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 24

Figure 15 - Apple Tamper-Evident Seals on the Bottom of the Appliance

8. Place four (4) tamper seals on the top of the appliance. Two (2) tamper seals (#9 and #11) prevent tampering of the top front and rear opacity shields and two (2) tamper seals (#10 and #12) prevents someone from attempting to access the vent overlays by sliding the rail kit. This completes the physical kit installation. Figure 16 – Apply Tamper Seals on the Top and Sides of the Appliance WF-500-B Tamper Seal Installation (21 Seals)
9. Replace the top cover with the physical kit top cover. a. Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the kit). © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 25

Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left side cover screw then use a Phillips-head screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration. b. Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the cover toward the back of the appliance to remove it. c. Slide the physical kit top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release buttons click. Replace the two screws that you removed from the old cover Figure 17 – WF-500-B: Top Cover Replacement © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 26

2. Attach the physical kit front cover brackets. Remove the front pull handles by removing two (2) screws from each handle (one (1) handle on each side), insert the WF-500-B physical kit front-cover brackets under each handle, and then replace the handles and secure them using the screws that you removed. The physical kit handles have standoffs that are used to secure the front cover. Figure 18 – WF-500-B: Front Cover Bracket
3. Attach the physical kit front cover to the front of the appliance. Slide the WF-500-B physical kit front cover over the physical kit pull handle brackets and secure the cover by turning the thumb screws clockwise (one thumb screw on each side). © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 27

Figure 19 – WF-500-B: FIPS Front Cover

4. Install a tamper-evident seal on the back of the appliance. This is seal #13 in the WF-500-B Figure
5. You need to install this seal before you install the WF-500-B physical kit back cover.
6. Attach the physical kit back cover to the back of the appliance. a. Slide the back cover onto the back of the appliance and turn the two (2) thumb screws clockwise until tight (one (1) screw on each side) to secure the cover.
7. Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following WF-500-B illustrations below. Also install the overlay stickers to cover vent openings (two (2) stickers on each side). You then install tamper-evident seals over the overlay stickers. Apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the back side of the right rack handle (see seals #18 and #19 on the left side in Figure 19). Apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the power supplies (see seals #11 and #12 with rear inset of Figure 19). Before you apply the tamper-evident seals, ensure that the appliance and physical kit surfaces are clean and dry. Firmly press one (1) seal on each of the locations shown in the illustrations. Avoid touching the seals for at least 24 hours to allow time for the seals to properly adhere to the appliance and physical kit surfaces. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 28

Figure 20

• WF-500-B: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Rear) Figure 21
• WF-500-B: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Front) © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 29

Figure 22 – WF-500-B: Tamper Seals Location for Side Rails

8. Non-Invasive Security Not applicable. There are currently no defined Approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics in SP 800-140F.
9. Sensitive Security Parameters Management The module contains the SSPs specified in the table below. “TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted” corresponds to the following KTS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table: ● AES Cert. #A3453, HMAC Cert. #A3453 ● AES-GCM Cert. #A3453 “IPSec/IKE, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3” corresponds to the following KAS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table: ● KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A3453, KDF IKEv2 Cert. #A3453 ● KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A3453, KDF IKEv2 Cert. #A3453 “SSH, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3” corresponds to the following KAS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table: ● KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A3453, KDF SSH Cert. #A3453 ● KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A3453, KDF SSH Cert. #A3453 “TLS, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3” corresponds to the following KAS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table: © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 30

Table 10 – SSPs (FIPS 186-4)                                                                                     Used to trust a root CA RSA public keys managed as certificates for the RSA SigVer                                                                                       verification of signatures, RSA Private keys for RSA SigGen                                                                                       generation of signatures, as certificates for the verification of signatures, peer authentication. N/A               N/A                                                component used in TLS ECC component Ephemeral N/A             N/A                                values used in key agreement TLS v1.2 SC or                                                                             Secret value used to derive 800-56A                                                                           random nonces TLS v1.2 TLS Master                                                                              RAM –         Zeroize at session   Secret value used to derive © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                            Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 31

TLS v1.2                                                                         HMAC keys used in TLS N/A             N/A Diffie Hellman or EC Diffie Hellman or EC DRBG, FIPS   N/A             N/A                            Zeroize Service RSA SigVer                                                                                      Public RSA key used to N/A          Session Key     N/A                            Zeroize Service Used in all SSH connections to the security module’s
128 bits                                               SSH, KAS SP      RAM -         Zeroize at session   command line interface.
Authentication keys used in -1 all SSH connections to the SSH Session                                                                                                               security module’s command DHE/ECDHE      112 bits   KAS-FFC-SS     DBRG, SP                                      RAM -         Zeroize at session   component used in key N/A             N/A DHE/ECDHE      112 bits   KAS-FFC-SS     DRBG, SP                                      RAM -         Zeroize at session   component used in key N/A             N/A Diffie Hellman or EC
112 bits                  SC or                                         RAM -         Zeroize at session

© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 32

IPSec/IKE, KAS                                      Used to encrypt IKE/IPSec IPSec/IKE      128 bits   AES-GCM                                                     RAM -         Zeroize at session N/A          N/A            SP 800-56A                                          data. These are AES CBC or Rev. 3                                              GCM (128 or 256 bits) -1 2-256                                                                                          HMAC keys for
160 bits   HMAC-SHA                                                    RAM -         Zeroize at session   authentication
on Keys                                                              Rev. 3 HMAC-SHA                                                                                       Used to check the integrity 2-256,                                                                                         of crypto-related code. Firmware                                              Import only, Integrity                                             TLS or SSH                      HDD (FIPS 186-4) Cert.                                                                                          (Note: This is not considered an RSA SigVer                  Import only,                                                       Used to authenticate Public Key (FIPS 186-4)                TLS or SSH                      HDD -                              firmware and content to be for Firmware   112 bits                  Pre-loaded                  N/A                            N/A Cert.                       Session Key                     plaintext                          installed on the module (RSA Load Test SHA2-256                    TLS or SSH                                                         Authentication string with a N/A        Cert.          External     Session Key    N/A                            Zeroize Service      minimum length of eight (8) TLS or SSH                                                         Secrets used by RADIUS or N/A        N/A            External     Session Key    N/A                            Zeroize Service      TACACS+ (8 characters

384 bits Entropy input string coming

Entropy        (E64)                                                                  RAM -                              from the entropy source DRBG           per          N/A            N/A                            Power cycle Input String   194 bits                                                               plaintext (E130)                                                                                                    Input length = 384 bits

384 bits DRBG seed coming from the

DRBG Seed DRBG per N/A N/A Power cycle

194 bits Plaintext

(E130)                                                                                                    Seed length = 384 bits DRBG Key       256 bits   DRBG           per          N/A            N/A                            Power cycle          Key used in the generation of SP 800-90B                                                                      a random values DRBG V         128 bits   DRBG           per          N/A            N/A                            Power cycle          used in the generation of a SP 800-90B                                                                      random values © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.                                         Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 33

KDF SNMP                          TLS or SSH                                                                     Used to support SNMPv3 N/A            Cert.            N/A              Session Key         N/A                                 Zeroize Service        services SNMPv3                           KDF SNMP                          TLS or SSH                                                                     Used to support SNMPv3 Privacy           N/A            Cert.            N/A              Session Key         N/A                                 Zeroize Service        services -1 Authenticati                                      KDF SNMP         N/A                 N/A                                 Zeroize Service        /512 Authentication on Key                                                                                                                                            protocol key (160 bits) Privacy protocol encryption KDF SNMP         N/A                 N/A                                 Zeroize Service        key Note: SSPs are implicitly zeroized when power is lost, or explicitly zeroized by the zeroize service. In the case of implicit zeroization, the SSPs are implicitly overwritten with random values due to their ephemeral memory being reset upon power loss. For the Zeroize Service and Zeroize at session termination, the SSP's memory location is overwritten with random values. The cryptographic module utilizes the following entropy sources, which are internal to the cryptographic boundary. Table 11 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification of bits of entropy Palo Alto Networks DRNG                                                          Entropy source provides full entropy, which is provided in

Entropy Source the 384 bit seed. Entropy source provides 0.50694395678 bits of entropy per bit of output. The DRBG requests 384 bits of data from Palo Alto Networks RTC

194 bits the entropy source, so is seeded with at least 194 bits of

Entropy Source entropy. The module generates SSPs (e.g., keys) whose strengths are modified by available entropy 10. Self-Tests The cryptographic module automatically performs the following tests below. The operator can command the module to perform the pre-operational and cryptographic algorithm self-tests by cycling power of the module; these tests do not require any additional operator action. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 34

Pre-operational Self-Tests Pre-operational Software/Firmware Integrity Test

• Firmware Integrity Test - Verified with HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256 Note: the ECDSA and HMAC-SHA-256 KATs are performed prior to the Firmware integrity test Conditional self-tests Cryptographic algorithm self-tests
• AES 128-bit ECB Encrypt Known Answer Test*
• AES 128-bit ECB Decrypt Known Answer Test*
• AES 128-bit CMAC Known Answer Test*
• AES 256-bit GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES 256-bit GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• AES 192-bit CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test*
• AES 192-bit CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test*
• RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Sign Known Answer Test
• RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Verify Known Answer Test
• RSA 2048-bit Encrypt Known Answer Test*
• RSA 2048-bit Decrypt Known Answer Test*
• ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Sign Known Answer Test
• ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Verify Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• SP 800-90Arev1 Counter DRBG Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Known Answer Tests
• SP 800-90Arev1 Counter DRBG Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Section 11.3 Health Tests
• SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-FFC-SSC 2048-bit Known Answer Test
• SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 Known Answer Test
• SP 800-135rev1 TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 with SHA-256 KDF Known Answer Test
• SP 800-135rev1 KDF SSH with SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• SP 800-135rev1 KDF IKEv2 with SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• SP 800-90B RCT/APT Health Tests on Entropy Source Note: The SP 800-90B Health Tests are implemented by the entropy source. *Note: Supported by the module cryptographic implementation, but only utilized for CAST Conditional Pairwise Consistency Self-Tests
• RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
• ECDSA/KAS-ECC Pairwise Consistency Test
• KAS-FFC Pairwise Consistency Test Conditional Firmware Load test
• Firmware Load Test
• Verify RSA 2048 with SHA-256 signature on firmware at time of load Conditional Critical Functions Tests
• SP 800-56A Rev. 3 Assurance Tests (Based on Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3) © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 35

Error Handling In the event of a conditional test failure, the module will output a description of the error. These are summarized below. Table 12 - Errors and Indicators Cause of Error Error State Indicator Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test or FIPS-CC mode failure. <Algorithm test> failed. Software Integrity Test Failure Conditional Pairwise Consistency or Critical Functions System log prints an error message. Test Failure Conditional Firmware Load Test Failure System prints Invalid image message.

11. Life-Cycle Assurance The vendor provided life-cycle assurance documentation that describes configuration management, design, finite state model, development, testing, delivery + operation, end of life procedures, and guidance. For details regarding the secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module, see section “Approved Mode of Operation” in Section
12. Palo Alto Network provides an Administrator Guide for additional information noted in the “References” section of this Security Policy Vendor imposed security rules In FIPS-CC mode, the following rules shall apply:
13. The operator shall not enable TLSv1.0 or use RSA for key wrapping; it is disabled by default A. Checked via CLI using “show shared” command
14. If using RADIUS, it must be configured using TLS 1.2. A. Checked via CLI using “show shared” command Failure to follow these Security Rules will cause the module to operate in a non-compliant state.
15. Mitigation of Other Attacks The module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-3. These requirements are not applicable. © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 36

13. Definitions and Acronyms AES – Advanced Encryption Standard CA – Certificate Authority CLI – Command Line Interface CO – Crypto-Officer CSP – Critical Security Parameter CVL – Component Validation List DB9 – D-sub series, E size, 9 pins DES – Data Encryption Standard DH – Diffie-Hellman DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator EDC – Error Detection Code ECDH – Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA – Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standard HMAC – (Keyed) Hashed Message Authentication Code KDF – Key Derivation Function LED – Light Emitting Diode RJ45 – Networking Connector RNG –Random number generator RSA – Algorithm developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm SNMP – Simple Network Management Protocol SSH – Secure Shell TLS – Transport Layer Security USB – Universal Serial Bus VGA – Video Graphics Array WF – WildFire
14. References
15. WildFire Administrator Guide: https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/techdocs/en_US/pdf/advanced-wildfire/wildfire-appliance.pdf © 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks WildFire 11.0 WF-500 and WF-500-B Security Policy Page 37