Samsung SAS TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1653/PM1655 Series

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (4)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Samsung SAS TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1653/PM1655 Series
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C1["[high] Firmware / bootloader<br/>versions disclosed<br/>(identity, not provenance)<br/><i>3P00[1], 3P01[2], DXG0[3], DXG2[4], DZG0[5],…</i>"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback services<br/><i>Update the firmware</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Show Status<br/>Status Output<br/>unauthenticated</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I1["Component identity is<br/>disclosed, but provenance<br/>and patch lineage are not."]
    I2["Trusted code is reachable<br/>through update and<br/>recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R1["Do the vendor version<br/>strings obscure the<br/>upstream baseline, fork<br/>lineage, or known-CVE<br/>exposure?"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E1["SBOM / component baselines<br/>· patch and backport<br/>manifest · CVE disposition"]
    E2["update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C1 --> I1 --> R1 --> E1
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C1,C2,C3,C6 clue;
  class I1,I2,I3,I6 infer;
  class R1,R2,R3,R6 risk;
  class E1,E2,E3,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Samsung SAS TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1653/PM1655 Series
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C1["[high] Firmware / bootloader versions disclosed (identity, not provenance)<br/><i>3P00[1], 3P01[2], DXG0[3], DXG2[4], DZG0[5],…</i><br/>src: certificate.firmwareVersions"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery / rollback services<br/><i>Update the firmware</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Show Status<br/>Status Output<br/>unauthenticated</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C1,C2 clueHigh;
  class C3,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

` Samsung SAS TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1653/PM1655 Series Document Version: 1.0 H/W Version: MZILG960HCHQ-00AC9, MZILG1T9HCJR-00AC9, MZILG3T8HCLS-00AC9, MZILG7T6HBLA-00AC9, MZILG15THBLA-00AC9, MZILG800HCHQ-00AC9, MZILG1T6HCJR-00AC9, MZILG3T2HCLS-00AC9, MZILG960HCHQ-00AD9, MZILG1T9HCJR-00AD9, MZILG3T8HCLS-00AD9, MZILG7T6HBLA-00AD9, MZILG800HCHQ-00AD9, MZILG1T6HCJR-00AD9, MZILG3T2HCLS-00AD9, MZILG3T8HCLS-00AG6, MZILG3T8HCLS-00AG7, MZILG3T8HCLS-00AVF, MZILG1T9HCJR-00AH9, MZILG3T8HCLS-00AH9, MZILG7T6HBLA-00AH9, MZILG15THBLA-00AH9 F/W Version: EXG0, EZG0, EXG5, EZG5, EXG6, EZG6, NA50, MS00, 3P00, 3P01, DXG0, DZG0, DXG2, DZG2 and LEB0

Revision History 1.0 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

1.1. Scope herein after referred to as a “cryptographic module” or “module”, SSD (Solid State Drive), satisfies all applicable FIPS 1403 security level 2 requirements, supporting TCG Enterprise SSC based SED (Self-Encrypting Drive) features, designed to protect unauthorized access to the user data stored in its NAND Flash memories. The built-in AES hardware engines in the cryptographic module’s controller provide on-the-fly encryption and decryption of the user data without performance loss. The SED’s nature also provides instantaneous sanitization of the user data via cryptographic erase. 1.2. Acronyms Table

1. Acronyms 1.3. Security Levels The cryptographic module is intended to meet requirements of FIPS 140-3 Security Level 2 overall. The following table lists Table
2. Security Levels Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy N/A N/A N/A

2. Cryptographic module specification 2.1. Hardware and Physical Perimeter This firmware version within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The following photographs show the cryptographic module’s top and bottom views. The multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module consists of hardware and firmware components that are all enclosed in two aluminum alloy cases, which serve as the physical perimeter of the module. Figure
3. Specification of the Samsung SAS TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1653/PM1655 Series Cryptographic Boundary Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

2.2. Firmware and Cryptographic Boundary The PM1653/PM1655 series use a single chip controller with a SAS interface on the system side and Samsung NAND flash internally. The following figure depicts the Module operational environment. Figure

2. Block Diagram for Samsung SAS TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1653 Series 2.3. Version Information Table
3. Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

2.4. Cryptographic Functionality 2.4.1. The cryptographic module supports the following approved algorithms for secure data storage: N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.4.2. Following algorithms are not intended to be used as a security function, and not used whatsoever to meet any FIPS 1403 requirements. These algorithms are not provided through a non-approved service to an operator. 2.5. The cryptographic module has only one mode of operation, which is the approved mode of operation. The operator is responsible for following the guidance outlined in section 12. The module shows the approved mode through validated version status by Show Status Service and in Table 8 via SCSI Inquiry command. AES-ECB is the pre-requisite for AES-XTS; AES-ECB alone is NOT supported by the cryptographic module in approved mode. CKG is applied to generate the MEK in compliance with sections 4, 6.1 and 6.3 of SP800-133. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

Table 6. Ports and Interfaces Note: The module does not implement the Control Output Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

4. Roles, services, and authentication 4.1. The following table defines the roles, type of authentication, and associated authenticated data types supported by the cryptographic module. Table
5. Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output 4.2. E: EXECUTE; W: WRITE; G: GENERATE; Z: ZEROISE E W G Z O O O O O O O O O Table
6. Authenticated Services Firmware Loader role is classified as a Cryptographic Officer. It means that “Write” and “Zeroise” perform in each storage of SSPs that is described in Table
7. The (R)ead column, which is specified in NIST SP 800-140B, is not applicable to the module.

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

The following table shows unauthenticated services. It is initially possible to use the services in following table without authentication. The operator can configure the setting that complied with Samsung SAS, TCG spec. e E W G Z N/A N/A N/A N/A O O O N/A O O O O O O O O O O O O O O Table

9. Unauthenticated Services It means that “Write” and “Zeroise” perform in each storage of SSPs that is described in Table
10. The (R)ead column, which is specified in NIST SP 800-140B, is not applicable to the module.

7 The module only supports approved services in an approved manner. The module uses implicit indicators through the result of the SCSI or

9 The cryptographic module shows the hardware version and firmware version through the ‘COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR HARDWARE VERSION’

and ‘COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR VERSION’ of FIPS 140 compliance descriptor Structure.

10 Through Step3 to Step4 in the Section 12.1, the procedure handled by EraseMaster (CO) enforces to configure SICOC functionality which

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

4.3. The module supports role-based authentication that requires authentication to assume for the authorization of each role. Table 10. Roles and Authentication The CO and User role requires password-based authentication, where each byte can be any of 0x00 to 0xFF. Each password authentication failure holds the cryptographic module for 750ms. This restricts the maximum attempts for a one-minute to less than 80 attempts (60,000ms/750ms) no matter how large Trylimit 11 is set. The FL role is implemented by RSA signature verification. The firmware signed by Samsung is authenticated by verifying the 3072-bit RSA signature which has 128 security strength in every power-on. Each signature verification attempt takes at least 10ms. This can be enforced with up to 6,000 attempts in a minute. Trylmit is maximum number of failed authentication attempts that are able to be made using password for each role. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

5. Software/Firmware security The cryptographic module implements the 482 bytes per 4KB error detection code and SHA-256 hash verification for firmware integrity test. The firmware integrity test is performed every power on reset. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

6. Operational environment The cryptographic module operates in a limited operational environment that is consist of the module’s firmware. This operational environment does not require any specific security rules, settings/configurations or restrictions to be set. The cryptographic module does not provide any general-purpose operating system to the operator. Unauthorized modification of the firmware is prevented by the pre-operational firmware integrity test and conditional firmware load test. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

The following physical security mechanisms are implemented in the cryptographic module:

• The module consists of production-grade components enclosed in an aluminum alloy enclosure, which is opaque within the visible spectrum. Even if the top panel of the enclosure can be removed by unscrewing screws, the module is sealed with tamper-evident labels in accordance with FIPS 140-3 Level 2 physical security requirements so that tampering evidence can be easily detected when the top and bottom cases are detached.

2 tamper-evident labels are applied over both top and bottom cases of the module at the Samsung manufacturing. The

tamper-evident labels cannot be removed and reapplied without remaining tamper evidence. The following table summarizes the actions required by the Crypto Officer Role to ensure that physical security is maintained: Figure 3. Module Seal Application Location Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

8. Non-invasive security Non-invasive security has not applicable for this cryptographic module. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

9. Sensitive security parameter management Temporary SSPs are zeroised when power on reset. Firmware integrity temporary values are zeroised after the firmware integrity test is complete. The zeroisation is performed before overwriting to the target SSP with random value which is generated from the DRBG. SSP’s are not exported outside the module. Min. 64bit Min. 64bit N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Table
10. SSPs

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

The module contains an entropy source, compliant with SP 800-90B, within the module’s cryptographic boundary. nout=384. Table 13. Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

10. Self-tests While executing the following self-tests, all data output is inhibited until the self-test is completed. To execute the preoperational tests on-demand, the operator may run the power-cycle of the module. If the self-test fails, the module enters an error state. All data output is inhibited during self-tests or in an error state. 10.1. Pre-operational Test • Firmware integrity test – SHA-256 hash-based verification is performed at power-on. – 482-byte error detection code is performed at power-on. 10.2. Conditional Test • The cryptographic algorithm test can be executed on-demand during the pre-operational test at power-on. Table
11. Self-tests • • Firmware load test Firmware load test is performed using RSA-3072 with SHA-256. The firmware load test can be executed on-demand by executing the Update the firmware service. The cryptographic module has performed the below 2 types of tests and each test includes the Repetition Count Test and Adaptive Proportion Test described in SP800-90B. Start-up test is performed for Entropy Source every power on reset. Continuous test is performed for Entropy Source while the module is operating. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

11. Life-cycle assurance The cryptographic module can operate in approved mode once shipped from the vendor's manufacturing site. The followings describe the security rules for secure installation and operation which the cryptographic module and Crypto Officer shall be enforced under FIPS 140-3 security level 2 compliant manner: 11.1. C.Secure Installation

• [Step1] User should examine the tamper evidence. Inspect the entire perimeter for cracks, gouges, lack of screw(s) and other signs of tampering including the tamper evident sealing label.
• If there is any sign of tampering, do not use the product and contact Samsung. [Step2] Identify the firmware version in the device.
• Confirm that the firmware version is equivalent to the version(s) listed in this document via SCSI Inquiry command. [Step3] Take the drive’s ownership. Change the PIN of SID/EraseMaster to new PIN. Run Erase Method on each Band. Note: If required to use the additional Band in Locking SP, new PINs must be set after setting a Band by the Crypto Officer.
• Configure the Band(s) by setting ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled columns to True. Don’t change LockOnReset column in Locking Table. [Step4] Power cycle the module. [Step5] Periodically examine the tamper evidence. If there is any sign of tampering, stop using the product to avoid a potential security hazard or information leakage. 11.2. Operational Description of Module
• The cryptographic module shall maintain logical separation of data input, data output, control input, control output, and power. The cryptographic module shall not output CSPs in any form. The cryptographic module shall use the approved DRBG for generating all cryptographic keys. The cryptographic module shall enforce role-based authentication for security relevant services. The cryptographic module shall enforce a limited operational environment by the secure firmware load test using RSA PSS-3072 with SHA-256. The cryptographic module shall provide a production-grade, opaque, and tamper-evident cryptographic boundary. The cryptographic module enters the error state upon failure of Self-tests. All commands except for supported command from the Host (General Purpose Computer (GPC) outside the cryptographic boundary) are rejected in the error state and the IO command returns a sense key (0x4) via the status output. Cryptographic services and data output are explicitly inhibited when in the error state. The module enforces to enter the power on reset if DRBG or NDRBG health test fails. The cryptographic module satisfies the requirements of FIPS 140-3 IG C.I (i.e. key_1 ≠ key_2) The RSA signature verification satisfies the requirements of FIPS 140-3 IG C.F The module generates at a minimum 256 bits of entropy for use in key generation. Bypass capability is not applicable to the cryptographic module. Critical functions are not applicable to the cryptographic module. The module generates symmetric keys which are unmodified outputs from the DRBG. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy

The cryptographic module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3. N/A N/A N/A Table 15. Mitigation of Other Attacks Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SSD FIPS Security Policy