PrismPlus Cryptographic Module

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (4)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for PrismPlus Cryptographic Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C1["[high] Firmware / bootloader<br/>versions disclosed<br/>(identity, not provenance)<br/><i>14.2.338.0</i>"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback services<br/><i>Firmware Update</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Show Status</i>"]
    C4["[high] Physical/logical<br/>interfaces (some 'blocked<br/>in firmware')<br/><i>PCIe Intf.(16 lane):<br/>SMBus Interface:<br/>I2C General Purpose(x1):</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>IKEV<br/>no library/version identified</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I1["Component identity is<br/>disclosed, but provenance<br/>and patch lineage are not."]
    I2["Trusted code is reachable<br/>through update and<br/>recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I4["Interface reachability may<br/>vary by boot stage and<br/>lifecycle state."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R1["Do the vendor version<br/>strings obscure the<br/>upstream baseline, fork<br/>lineage, or known-CVE<br/>exposure?"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R4["Are interfaces blocked<br/>before the bootloader<br/>runs, or only after<br/>approved mode starts?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E1["SBOM / component baselines<br/>· patch and backport<br/>manifest · CVE disposition"]
    E2["update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E4["lifecycle reachability<br/>matrix · boot-stage<br/>interface timing ·<br/>factory/recovery/error-state<br/>access controls"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C1 --> I1 --> R1 --> E1
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C4 --> I4 --> R4 --> E4
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,C6 clue;
  class I1,I2,I3,I4,I5,I6 infer;
  class R1,R2,R3,R4,R5,R6 risk;
  class E1,E2,E3,E4,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for PrismPlus Cryptographic Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C1["[high] Firmware / bootloader versions disclosed (identity, not provenance)<br/><i>14.2.338.0</i><br/>src: certificate.firmwareVersions"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery / rollback services<br/><i>Firmware Update</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Show Status</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C4["[high] Physical/logical interfaces (some 'blocked in firmware')<br/><i>PCIe Intf.(16 lane):<br/>SMBus Interface:<br/>I2C General Purpose(x1):</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.portsAndInterfaces"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>IKEV<br/>no library/version identified</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C1,C2,C3,C4 clueHigh;
  class C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Broadcom, Inc. PrismPlus Cryptographic Module Broadcom, Inc. Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Document Version: 1.2 Date: January 17, 2025 Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. Table of Contents Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. List of Tables Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. List of Figures Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. Glossary Of Terms Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. Acronyms and Definitions Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. This document defines the Security Policy for the Broadcom Inc. PrismPlus Cryptographic Module, hereafter denoted the Module. The PrismPlus ASIC based module is implemented on a PCIe Host Bus Adapter (HBA) and is assumed to operate within a Storage Server Appliance or a Storage Device Appliance operating in a Fibre Channel Storage Area Network (FC-SAN) environment. The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the module are as follows: N/A N/A Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. The PrismPlus Cryptographic Module is a hardware module intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require a FIPS 140-3 validated network encryption device. The module implemented on a PCIe Adapter is intended to be used in Fibre Channel based Storage Area Networks. The module allows a Connection to be established between one of the multiple Host Initiator Entities (e.g., 256 Virtual Machine Drivers running on multiple CPU cores) on a Storage Server Appliance and one of the multiple Remote Host Target Entities (e.g., 1000s of Storage LUNs) on multiple Storage Device Appliances via one of the multiple Physical Ports (e.g., 4x 64GFC ports). The Connection facilitates transfer of data between a Host Initiator Entity on a Storage Server Appliance and Host Target Entity on a Storage Server Appliance using the FC (Fibre Channel) Protocol. The module allows multiple (1000s) of connections between Host Initiator Entities on a Storage Server Appliance and Host Target Entities on Storage Device Appliances. The module can be used to support Data-in-Flight Encryption/Decryption between Storage Appliances in a FC-SAN environment. Encryption decisions are made on a connection basis, whereby only a subset of the connections could be enabled for Encryption. If a connection is enabled for Encryption, only a subset of the Frame Types (e.g., Data Frames only, not Command/Status/Control/etc. Frames) could be enabled for Encryption. Note: Frames are units of transfer in Fibre Channel akin to Packets in Ethernet. Please note that while the module includes an entropy source; the entropy source is not utilized in the current design and is reserved for future use. Table 2

• Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. 2.1 Cryptographic Boundary The module is a multiple-chip embedded embodiment. The cryptographic boundary is defined as a subregion of the PCB depicted by the red dotted line in Figure 1, which encompasses the PrismPlus ASIC and Flash. FC SAN FABRIC Remote Peer FC Switch FC Switch Flash QSPI SFF/SFP I2C Prism+ SFF/SFP Pro cesso r Pro cesso r I2C EEPROM/ uCtrlr Power Regulator Me mory PCIe HOST Storage Device Appliance, Target OR Storage Server Appliance, Initiator Me mory SFF/SFP Me mory Me mory Me mory Power Regulator SFF/SFP Me mory M emory M emory M emory Processor Processor Local Terminal M emory M emory M emory PCIe HOST Storage Server Appliance, Initiator OR Storage Device Appliance, Target Figure 1

• Module Diagram Figure 2
• Module Images (Bottom and Top) Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. 2.2 Modes of Operation The module supports an Approved mode of operation and assumes the Approved mode as soon as it is powered-on. The module does not support a non-Approved mode. Approved mode of operation requires FW Load, FW Integrity and Pre-Operational Self Tests to pass. All services are offered only in Approved mode of operation. If Firmware Integrity Tests or the Pre-Operational Self tests fail, the module will halt all operations and will need to be reset, unless the module has automatically done so. The module does not support a degraded mode of operation. To verify that the module is in the Approved mode of operation, the operator may invoke the “Show Status” service. The Approved Security Service Indicator is provided by the successful completion of each service, as an implicit indicator for the use of an Approved service per IG 2.4.C, Example Scenario 2. 2.3 Security Functions The module implements the approved cryptographic functions listed in Table 3 below, which were tested on the ARM Cortex R4 processor internal to the module. The module does not support any non-Approved algorithms or non-Approved algorithms allowed in the approved mode. There are algorithms, modes, and keys that have been CAVP tested, but not used by the module; such unused algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths are shown in this table with “Tested, but not used” specified in the Use/Function column. Table 3 – Approved Algorithms The module does not implement any KAS or KTS Security Function Implementations. 2.4 Overall Security Design

1. The module provides a single operator role: Cryptographic Officer Role.
2. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
3. The module allows the operator to initiate pre-operational and conditional self-tests by power cycling or resetting the module.
4. Pre-operational self-tests do not require any operator action.
5. Data output is inhibited during self-tests, FW loading, zeroization, and error states.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module. Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc.

7. There are no restrictions on which CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
8. The module does not support concurrent operators.
9. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
10. The module does not support manual key entry.
11. The module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
12. The module does not output any plaintext CSPs.
13. The module does not output intermediate key values.
14. The module provides bypass services for connections.
15. AES GCM IV uniqueness: The AES GCM implementation meets Option 3 of IG C.H Key/IV Pair Uniqueness Requirements from SP 800-38D. The module uses the IV construction in Section 8.2.1 Deterministic Construction of SP800-38D for the 96bit IV that is used. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES-GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. 2.5 Rules of Operation The module is installed on a PCIe Adaptor that shall be installed either in a storage server appliance or a storage device appliance. The module will power on in the Approved mode of operation. Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. Cryptographic Module Interfaces The module’s ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed in Table 4. The ports are defined as the PCB traces crossing the perimeter of the physical cryptographic boundary. The module inhibits all control output upon entry into the error state. Table 4

• Ports and Interfaces N/A May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. N/A N/A N/A Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. Roles, Services and Authentication 4.1 Assumption of Roles and Related Services The module supports a single operator role, the Cryptographic Officer (CO) Role. The services that are available to the Cryptographic Officer are described later in the document. Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. Table 5 lists all services supported by the module in the CO Role. The module does not support authentication; the CO role is implicitly assumed. The module does not support a maintenance role. The module supports a Bypass Capability. The module does not support concurrent operators. The module does not support a self-initiated cryptographic output capability. Bypass On a connection between a Host Initiator Entity on a Storage Server Appliance and Host Target Entity on a Storage Device Appliance, encryption can be enabled or disabled. A Bypass capability is defined. A connection could be established to start operating in a non-protected mode with Encrypted Data In Flight (EDIF) disabled. It could then transition to operating in a protected mode with EDIF, once encryption parameters and traffic selectors have been negotiated with the peer entity by the host. The following conditions need to be met in the transition to encrypted mode of operation for a connection: a. The module receives a command with encryption parameters and Traffic Selectors, to enable a connection to move to an encrypted mode of operation. b. The module will verify the integrity of the governing bypass information in the connection table aka Remote Peer Information (RPI) table through an approved integrity technique (SHA2-256) immediately preceding modification of the governing information and generates a new integrity value using the Approved integrity technique immediately following the modification. A failure in this test is considered fatal for the adapter. The adapter is internally reset by the FW triggering a restart that includes reloading the FW and re-running all the pre-operational self-tests. c. The module performs a conditional Bypass SP-to-SP internal loopback self-test to check that the module is in a valid operational state for the connection. Check that specific types of frames targeted for encryption for the connection are correctly encrypted and decrypted after the SADB requested in the command for the connection is installed. A failure in this test is considered fatal for the adapter. The adapter is internally reset by the FW triggering a restart that includes reloading the FW and rerunning all the pre-operational self-tests. As a result of configuration changes, a connection can transition to outputting data in a non-protected form with EDIF disabled. The following conditions need to be met in the transition to non-encrypted mode of operation for a connection that prevents the inadvertent bypass of plaintext data due to a single error: a. The module receives a command for the connection, in order for the connection to move to a nonencrypted mode of operation. b. The module will verify the integrity of the governing bypass information in the connection table aka Remote Peer Information (RPI) table through an approved integrity technique (SHA2-256) immediately preceding modification of the governing information and generate a new integrity value using the Approved integrity technique immediately following the modification. A failure in this test is considered fatal for the adapter. The adapter is internally reset by the FW triggering a restart that includes reloading the FW and re-running all the pre-operational self-tests. Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. c. The module performs a conditional Bypass SP-to-SP internal loopback self-test to check that the module is in valid operational state for the connection. Check that frames targeted for the connection are no longer encrypted and decrypted using the deactivated SADB. A failure in this test is considered fatal for the adapter. The adapter is internally reset by the FW triggering a restart that includes reloading the FW and re-running all the pre-operational self-tests. Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. 4.2 Services All Approved services implemented by the module are listed in Table 6 below. The module does not support any non-Approved services. The following SSPs are declared: SSP3: SSP5: The SSPs modes of access shown in Table 6 are defined as: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Table 6

• Approved Services E E, Z Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. E, Z N/A N/A Z N/A N/A Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. Software/Firmware Security The module is composed of the following major firmware components:

• SRB (Software Register Block) Processor FW
• ULP (Upper Layer Protocol) Processors FW
• SP (Support Processor) FW The firmware components are protected with an RSA 2048 digital signature described in Table 3
• Approved Algorithms. The operator can initiate the FW integrity test on demand by initiating a PCIe Reset or a Power Cycle. Operational Environment The module has a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. The module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. Firmware versions validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP program will be explicitly identified on a validation certificate. Any firmware not identified in this Security Policy does not constitute the module defined by this Security Policy or covered by this validation. Physical Security The module asserts conformance with FIPS 140-3 Level 1 requirements only. The module is constructed of production grade components with a standard passivation applied to all. Non-Invasive Security The module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack. Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. Sensitive Security Parameter (SSP) Management The SSPs access methods are described in Table 7 below: Table 7

• SSP Management Methods Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. 9.1 Sensitive Security Parameters (SSP) All SSPs used by the module are described in this section. All usage of these SSPs by the module is described in the services detailed in Section 4.2 Services. Table 8

• SSPs Management Generation N/A N/A N/A N/A 9.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A DRBG Entropy Source The module supports an entropy source, which is not currently used. Table 9
• Entropy Source N/A N/A N/A Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. The module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the module. Per FIPS 140-3, these are Table 10

• Error States and Indicators -----------------------Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. Table 11

• Pre-Operational Self-Tests Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

Broadcom, Inc. Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

11.1 Procedures for Secure Installation, Initialization, Startup and Operation of the Module.

The cryptographic module does not require any installation activities as it is delivered to the customer installed on a PCIe Host Bus Adapter. The PCIe Host Bus Adapter can be plugged into an appropriate PCIe slot on a server and is ready for operation on Power-On. All required configuration details are programmed at the factory. The module will offer the declared services only in the Approved mode of operation. The module status can be determined by reading the READY status in the PORT_STATUS PCIe config register. If the module does not come up in the Approved mode of operation, it will have to be returned to the factory.

The module Approved mode status can be monitored regularly by reading the READY status in the PORT_STATUS PCIe config register, which will be set to ‘1’ for Approved Mode. All ephemeral keys used by the module are zeroized on reboot, loss of power, connection termination or by the supported Zeroize command.

The module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks. Version 1.2 May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries

The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy. Table 13

• References May only be distributed in its entirety without modification. The term “Broadcom” refers to Broadcom and/or its subsidiaries