Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (11)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update<br/>Rollback</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Status Output<br/>Show Status<br/>self-test</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3 clue;
  class I2,I3 infer;
  class R2,R3 risk;
  class E2,E3 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update<br/>Rollback</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Status Output<br/>Show Status<br/>self-test</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip Document Version: 1.2 Last update: 2025-01-28 Prepared for: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. 1-1, Samsungjeonja-ro Hwaseong-si, Gyeonggi-do Korea, 18448 www.samsung.com Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

4516 Seton Center Pkwy Suite 250

Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com

©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy of the Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip cryptographic module (hereafter referred to as “the module”). This Security Policy contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 2 module. This Non-Proprietary Security Policy may be reproduced and distributed, but only whole, intact, and must include this notice. Other documentation is proprietary to their authors. Table 1 describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the security levels of the module with respect to each of those individual areas.

Table 1: Security Levels ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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Purpose and Use: The Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip (referred to as “the module” in the rest of this document) is a hardware cryptographic module which provides FIPS 140-

Module Type: Hardware Module Embodiment: Single Chip Module Characteristics: The sub-chip hardware is contained within the Samsung S4LV006A01 SSD controller found within a Samsung TCG Opal SEDs. Cryptographic Boundary: The cryptographic boundary of the module consists of following components: - S-Core, - A dedicated OTP on the SoC for the S-Core - A set of fuses on the SoC which are dedicated to the S-Core - Sub-Chip’s main firmware and bootloader. Figure 1: Block Diagram ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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Tested Module Identification – Hardware: Software Version(s): The module does not contain a software component. Table 2: Hardware Operating Environments Note: S4LV006A01 refers to the SoC on which the sub-chip cryptographic module runs on.

The vendor does not claim any excluded components within the module’s boundary.

Modes List and Description: Table 3: Modes List and Description Mode change instructions and status indicators: After passing all pre-operational self-tests and cryptographic algorithm self-tests executed on startThe module automatically switches between the approved and non-approved modes depending on to the indicator of the service that was requested. For each service the module provides a response message that includes the service indicator for the requested service. Output “1” suggests that the ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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Approved Algorithms: Table 4: Approved Algorithms Vendor Affirmed Algorithms: The module implements Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG), as a vendor affirmed algorithm Non-approved, Allowed Algorithms: The module does not implement any non-approved algorithms that could be used in an approved Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: The module does not implement any non-approved algorithms that could be used in an approved Non-Approved, Not-Allowed Algorithms:

1 The CAVP certs also list ECB decryption and ECDSA signature generation algorithm which is not used by the module.

©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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ECDSA verification with AES XTS decryption

Used for Verify Decrypt Firmware together with AES-XTS decryption to verify a signature of and encrypted FW provided by H-Core

Table 5: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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Table 5A: Security Function Implementation

The ECDSA algorithm as implemented by the module conforms to FIPS 186-4, which has been superseded by FIPS 186-5 on February 3, 2024. For the current module context, FIPS 186-4 can still be used in the approved mode. See IG C.K for details. Entropy Information: RNG Information: The module implements SP 800-90ARev1 CTR_DRBG that with AES-256 as the block cipher and has a derivation function. The CTR_DRBG is provided with a 256-bit nonce and 512-bits of entropy input from the entropy source, which provides 256-bit of entropy.

©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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AES Key Transport

GCM

AES GCM using 256 bit Key Compliant with IG D.G and SP 800-38F

The module does not implement any industry protocols. ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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Table 9: Ports and Interfaces This module does not have a Control Output interface. ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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4. Roles, Services, and Authentication Table 10: Authentication Methods

Table 11: Roles ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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2 Manufactured or Factory state refers to TCG Opal SSC’s policy state, not a FIPS 140-3 module state.

3* “authenticate” and “deauthenticate” services are not functions used to comply with FIPS authentication requirements but instead used as part of the TCG Opal SSC specification’s commands. ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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4 These services are only indicated for use within the firmware update process. If any of these services are called

during operation of the module outside of a firmware update process, the module will fail to verify the firmware during boot, resulting in halting during boot and becoming unavailable for use. Also note that use of any firmware version other than the one specific in Table 2 is not part of validated module. ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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Table 13: Non-Approved Services

The module loads its firmware component from outside of the sub-chip boundary during module start up. The module uses firmware load test described in Section 5.1 to ensure the firmware’s validity.

©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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The module’s firmware component (i.e., main firmware and bootloader) is in executable form and is verified with ECDSA signature verification using P-384 ECDSA curve and SHA-384 by the ROM code. The corresponding firmware verification key (i.e., ECDSA public key) used for verification is stored in the ROM and its key index is stored in the OTP memory within the subchip. During the module startup time the firmware component is loaded from outside of the module’s sub-chip boundary. The firmware provides the “key index” of the public key stored in the OTP. The module reads this key index and its corresponding public key, which is then used to perform signature verification, i.e., the firmware load test required per IG 2.3.B. Only when the signature verification is successful the firmware component is loaded, and the module proceeds to boot. If the signature verification fails, the module enters Power on Error state. The module does not provide any data output until the firmware load test is successful.

The integrity tests can be invoked on demand by module reset. ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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The module has a non-modifiable operational environment; therefore, this section is not applicable. ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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7. Physical Security The module is hosted in a single chip that forms the physical perimeter of the module. The SoC is enclosed within production grade components. At the time of manufacturing, the module is embedded into its host SoC (shown in Figure 2), preventing visibility into the module’s internal circuitry. In addition, the layer process which embeds the module into the SoC prevents tampering of the module’s physical components without leaving tamper evidence. The module is intended to be deployed within a storage device which itself is made from production grade, commercially available components. The storage device’s enclosure surrounds the module’s SoC.

Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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8. Non-Invasive Security This module does not implement a non-invasive security technique. ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management

Table 16: SSP Input-Output All data output via data output interface is inhibited until completion of zeroization. Table 17: SSP Zeroisation Methods ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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Table 18: SSP Information First ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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Table 19: SSP Information Second ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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Bootloader Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

6 Even though the module implements AES ECB mode, it is not available as a standalone service and therefore does not

include any self-test. ECB encryption is only used internally by module’s AES GCM and DRBG algorithm which have their own self-test.

7 Including instantiate, generate, and reseed function per section 11.3 of SP 800-90A DRBG.

©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests

inhibited. available. inhibited. Only Table 22: Error States ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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The vendor uses trusted delivery courier to dispatch the SoC that hosts the module. The Crypto officer should verify the package and the received SoC to verify that there is no tamper evidence present.

The Crypto officer shall power up the module and call the “Show Status” service to verify the following output is provided. This confirms that the SoC is running a FIPS validated module that has booted successfully passing the pre-operational self-tests. - Tested Configuration: S4LV006A01 - Hardware Version: S01 - Firmware Version: SS0100

The module generates GCM IV internally in compliance with scenario 2 of IG C.H. The IV length is 96 bits, and the IV value is obtained from the SP 800-90ARev1 approved DRBG implemented by the module. ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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12. Mitigation of Other Attacks The module does not provide additional mitigations against other types of attacks. ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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13. Abbreviations AES              Advanced Encryption Standard CAVP             Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CMVP             Cryptographic Module Validation Program CK               Common Key CPK              Credential Protection Key CSP              Critical Security Parameter CTR              Counter Mode DRBG             Deterministic Random Bit Generator DTRNG            Deterministic True Random Number Generator ECB              Electronic Code Book ENT              NIST SP 800-90B Compliant Entropy Source FIPS             Federal Information Processing Standards GCM              Galois Counter Mode GRK              Grant Key HMAC             Hash Message Authentication Code KAT              Known Answer Test KDF              Key Derivation Function KDK_CPK          Key Derivation Key for CPK KDK_KPK          Key Derivation Key for KPK KMK              Secret Key metadata Mac Key KPK              Key Protection Key NVM              Non-Volatile Memory OTP              One Time Programmable PK               Public Key PKE              Public Key Encryption PSP              Public Security Parameter ROM              Read Only Memory RSA              Rivest, Shamir, Addleman SED              Self-Encrypting Device SHA              Secure Hash Algorithm SHS              Secure Hash Standard SID              Security ID ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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SK               Secret key SoC              System on Chip SSC              Security Subsystem Class SSP              Sensitive Security Parameter TCG              Trusted Computing Group XTS              XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext stealing ©2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and atsec information security.

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