Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 3100 Series)

Certificate

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 3100 Series)
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Firmware Load</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>UnAuth</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 3100 Series)
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Firmware Load</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>UnAuth</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 3100 Series) Americas Headquarters: Cisco Systems, Inc., 170 West Tasman Drive, San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems logo is registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc.

Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 3100 Series) (hereinafter referred to as ASA or Module), version 9.20. The following details how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-3, SP 800-140 and ISO/IEC 19790 for a Security Level 2 Hardware cryptographic module. The security requirements cover areas related to the design and implementation of a cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic table indicates the actual security levels for each area of the cryptographic module.

Purpose and Use: This module is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module deployed under the Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) with Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA). The module’s ASA delivers enterprise-class firewall for businesses, improving security at the Internet edge, high performance and throughput for demanding enterprise data centers. The ASA solution offers the combination of the industry's most deployed stateful firewall with a comprehensive range of next-generation network security services, intrusion prevention system (IPS), content © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

security and secure unified communications, HTTPS/TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2, SNMPv3 and Cryptographic Cipher Suite B using the ASA Cryptographic Module. Module Type: Hardware Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand Module Characteristics [O]: Cryptographic Boundary: The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire chassis unit’s physical perimeter encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," “rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case, and shown in the figures below and in the Physical Security section. The FPR 3105, FPR 3110, FPR 3120, FPR 3130 and FPR 3140 all have the same exterior appearance. Where they differ is in Firewall throughput, IPS throughput, IPsec VPN throughput and number of VPN peers allowed.

Tested Module Identification

• Hardware: Table 2: Tested Module Identification
• Hardware Tested Module Identification
• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

N/A for this module. Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module.

N/A for this module. Modes List and Description: Table 3: Modes List and Description operation after initial operations are performed (See Section 11). The module does not claim implementation of a degraded mode of operation. Section 4 provides details on the service

Approved Algorithms: CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 4: Approved Algorithms - CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation Marvell Cavium Nitrox V Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Marvell Cavium Nitrox V © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module.

Table 7: Security Function Implementations

There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in this table. The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation Guidance C.H scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. The keys for the client and server negotiated in the TLSv1.2 handshake process (client_write_key and server_write_key) are compared and the module aborts the session if the key values are identical. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. When the IV exhausts the maximum number © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. Two keys established by IKEv2 for one security association (one key for encryption in each direction between the parties) are not identical and abort the session if they are. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. No parts of SSH, TLS, IKE and SNMP protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

Table 8: Entropy Certificates Table 9: Entropy Sources

The module generates RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DH asymmetric key pairs compliant with FIPS 186-4, using a NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG for random number generation. In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs CKG for asymmetric keys as per section 5.1 of NIST SP 800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) by obtaining a random bit string directly from an approved DRBG. The random bit string supports the required security strength requested by the calling application (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H.).

The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of operation: • KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation: The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 112 and

• KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation: The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC

shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 128 and

The module supports SSHv2, TLS v1.2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 industrial protocols. Please refer to SSPs Table for more information.

Table 10: Ports and Interfaces The module’s physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in Table 2. The module provides physical ports which are mapped to logical interfaces provided

and the User role. The module also allows the concurrent operators.

Table 12: Roles Unauthenticated Users can run the self-test service by power-cycling the module by removing the power and re-applying.

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access - SSH Peer DH Public Key: Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: Z - SSH RSA Private Key: Z - SSH RSA Public Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: Z - SSH Session Encryption Key: Z - SSH Session Authenticatio n Key: Z - TLS DH Private Key: Z - TLS DH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer DH Public

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access Key: Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: Z - TLS ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: Z - TLS RSA Private Key: Z - TLS RSA Public Key: Z - TLS Master Secret: Z - TLS Session Encryption Key: Z - TLS Session Authenticatio n Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: Z - SKEYSEED: Z - IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Authenticatio n Key: Z - SNMPv3

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access Key: W,E - SSH DH Shared Secret: W,E - SSH ECDH Private Key: W,E - SSH ECDH Public Key: W,E - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: W,E - SSH RSA Private Key: W,E - SSH RSA Public Key: W,E - SSH ECDSA Private Key: W,E - SSH ECDSA Public Key: W,E - SSH Session Encryption Key: W,E - SSH Session Authenticatio n Key: W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: W,E - DRBG Seed: W,E - DRBG Internal State V value: W,E

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access DH Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: W,E - SKEYSEED: W,E - IPSec/IKE

W,E Table 13: Approved Services © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

The module also supports the firmware load test by using HMAC-SHA2-512 (HMAC Cert. #A4446) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test Key was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to load new firmware, the Crypto Officer must authenticate to the module before loading the firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails. Any firmware loaded into the module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.

The module implements Bypass service. The operator shall assume Crypto Officer role and configure the Bypass capability. The module will conduct two independent internal actions activate the capability to prevent the inadvertent bypass of plaintext data due to a single error. To verify the module is in bypass state, the Crypto Officer needs to issue commands “show access-list” and “show ipsec sa” to verify the module is in bypass state.

The module implements Self-initiated cryptographic output capability without external operator request. The Crypto Officer shall configure self-initiated cryptographic output capability. Prior to executing the self-initiated cryptographic output capability, the module conducts two independent internal actions to activate the capability to prevent the inadvertent output due to a single error.

The module supports unauthenticated service. The unauthenticated User/Operators can trigger the self-test service by power-cycling the module.

The module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure firmware security, the module is protected by RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-512 (RSA Cert. #A4446) algorithm. A Firmware Integrity Test Key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware integrity test only at the pre-operational self-test. The module uses the RSA © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

2048 bits modulus public key to verify the digital signature. If the firmware integrity test fails, the

module would enter to an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited.

Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the firmware integrity test on-demand.

Type of Operational Environment: Limited

Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required The module utilizes a production-grade enclosure and removable cover along with tamper evidence labels as the physical security mechanisms. Step 1: Turn off and unplug the module. Step 2: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, oil or any other material other than the surface coating from manufacture before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. Step 3: Apply a label to cover the module as shown in the figures below. The tamper evident labels are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive backing. Any attempt to open the module will damage the tamper evident labels or the material of the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident labels have non-repeated serial numbers, they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to verify that the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident labels can also be inspected for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices. The word “FIPS” may appear if the label was peeled back. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Number: Nine (9) Placement: Figure 2 Module’s front view opacity shield TEL 1 Figure 3 Module’s back view TEL 7 TEL 8 TEL 6 TEL 2 TEL 4 TEL 5 TEL 1 TEL 3 Figure 4 Module’s top view with opacity shield © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

TEL 8 TEL 9 TEL 7 TEL 6 Figure 5 Module’s bottom view with opacity shield TEL 3 Figure 6 Module’s left view with opacity shield TEL 2 Figure 7 Module’s right view with opacity shield Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Must be stored in a secure location under controlled access

3105, 3110, 3120, 3130, 3140 Opacity Shield FPR3K-FIPS-KIT= © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Step 1: Attach the Slide Rail Locking Bracket, #2 in diagram to the Side of the Chassis using the countersink screws #3 in diagram. Step 2: Attach the Cable Management Bracket (#1) to the Slide Rail Locking Bracket (#2) using the countersink screws (#3) Step 3: Route the Cables through the Cable Management Brackets Step 4: Attach the FIPS Opacity Shield (#1) to the Cable Management Brackets (#3) using the countersink screws (#2) © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Figure 8 Opacity Shield Brackets

Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods

Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods Please note that the Firmware Load Test Key is only used for Firmware Load Test Authentication and not subject to the zeroization requirement. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

y y Table 18: SSP Table 1 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

The module performs the following self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and Conditional self-tests. Prior to the module providing any data output via the data output interface, the module performs and passes the pre-operational self-tests. Following the successful pre-operational self-tests, the module executes the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs). If anyone of the self-tests fails, the module transitions into an error state and outputs the error message via the module’s status output interface. While the module is in the error state, all data through the data output interface and all cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the module transitions to the operational state.

Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information

Table 24: Error States If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the error and enters the Error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and perform the selftests, including the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs.

The validated module firmware was installed onto the respective test platforms listed in Table 2 above. The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps: Step 1: The Crypto Officer must install opacity shields as described in section 7 above. Step 2: The Crypto Officer must apply tamper evidence labels as described in section 7 above. Step 3: The Crypto Officer must securely store any unused tamper evidence labels. Note: Each module has a Type A USB 2.0 port, but it is considered to be disabled once the Crypto Officer has applied the TEL #9. Step 4: Crypto Officer performs the following configurations: © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

ciscoasa# configure terminal Note, the Crypto Officer needs to connect the platform to cisco.com to obtain the license for ASA from Cisco. ciscoasa(config)# license smart register idtoken [token data] ciscoasa(config)#license smart ciscoasa(config-smart-lic)# show license all Smart Licensing Status ====================== Smart Licensing is ENABLED -ORciscoasa(config-smart-lic)# show license summary Smart Licensing is ENABLED Registration: Step 5: Enable “Approved Mode” to allow the module to startup the cryptographic module, such as run power-on self-tests and bypass test by using the following command: ciscoasa(config)# fips enable Note: Startup operational mode will not take effect until you save configuration and reboot the device Rebooting the device will force new self-test Step 6: Crypto Officer can verify the version installed and running ciscoasa(config)# show version Step 7: Crypto Officer will need to configure ASA ciscoasa> en ciscoasa# conf t ciscoasa(config)# Step 8: Assign users a Privilege Level of 1. Step 9: Configure IP address for unit and all distant endpoints. Step 10: Define RADIUS and TACACS+ shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long and secure traffic between the security module and the RADIUS/TACACS+ server via secure (IPSec, TLS) tunnel. Note: Perform this step only if RADIUS/TACAS+ is configured, otherwise skip over and proceed to next step. Step 11: Configure the security module so that any remote connections via Telnet are secured through IPSec. Step 12: Configure the security module so that only approved algorithms are used for IPsec tunnels. Step 13: Configure the security module so that error messages can only be viewed by Crypto Officer. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Step 14: Disable the TFTP server. Step 15: Disable HTTP for performing system management in approved mode of operation. HTTPS with TLS should always be used for Web-based management. Step 16: Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using approved algorithms.

No specific Administrator guidance.

No specific Non-Administrator guidance.

N/A for this module. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.