Gloo Boring Crypto

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (28)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Gloo Boring Crypto
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Status Output<br/>Self-Test<br/>Show Status</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>HTTPS<br/>library named: boringssl</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Gloo Boring Crypto
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Status Output<br/>Self-Test<br/>Show Status</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>HTTPS<br/>library named: boringssl</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Solo.io Gloo BoringCrypto Software Version: 2022061300 Date: November 04, 2024 Prepared by: http://www.intertek.com/iot/cybersecurity/ewacanada/ Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Introduction Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3

• Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140-3 program. The NVLAP accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140-3 testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS 140-3 validation. Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140-3 criteria. Additional information is available on the CMVP website at: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program About this Document This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Gloo BoringCrypto from Solo.io provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it meets the overall Level 1 security requirements of FIPS 140-3. The Gloo BoringCrypto module is also referenced in this document as the “module.” Disclaimer The contents of this document are subject to revision without notice due to continued progress in methodology, design, and manufacturing. S o l o . i o have no liability for any error or damages of any kind resulting from the use of this document. Notices This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification. Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

This document describes Solo.io’s cryptographic module Security Policy (SP) for the Gloo BoringCrypto (Software version: 2022061300) cryptographic module (also referred to as the “module” hereafter). It contains specification of the security rules under which the cryptographic module operates, including the security rules derived from the requirements of the FIPS 140-3 standard. The module is a software module and has a Multi-Chip Stand Alone embodiment. The module meets the overall Level 1 security requirements of FIPS 140-3. The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-3: Table 1 - Security Levels Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

2. Cryptographic Module Specification Gloo BoringCrypto module by Solo.io is an open-source, general-purpose cryptographic library which provides approved cryptographic algorithms to serve BoringSSL and other user-space applications. The module is intended for use in environments specified in Table 2 below and any general-purpose environment that requires cryptographic primitives. The Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) of the module is the physical perimeter of the tested environment, which is listed in Table 2 below. The module is a software module and has a Multi-Chip Stand Alone embodiment. The installation instructions are provided in Section 11 of this document. The boundary of the module is defined as a single object file, bcm.o. The module version is: 2022061300. The module was tested on the following operational environments: Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments The cryptographic module is also supported on the following operational environments for which operational testing and algorithm testing was not performed. The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module on the operational environments for which operational testing was not performed. Table 3 - Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments Table 4 below lists all the approved algorithms implemented in the module: Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

There are algorithms that have been CAVP-tested on the same certificate but are not used by any approved service of the module Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in this table are used by an approved service of the module. No parts of this protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 4 - Approved Algorithms Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 6 - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation Figure 1

• Gloo BoringCrypto boundary Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

AES GCM encryption and decryption are used in the context of the TLS protocol version 1.2 (compliant to Scenario 1a in FIPS 140-3 IG C.H). The module is compliant with NIST SP 800-52 and the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288. The module ensures that it is strictly increasing and thus cannot repeat. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party (client or server) to encounter this condition may either trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key in accordance with RFC 5246 or fail. In either case, the module prevents any IV duplication and thus enforces the security property. The module’s IV is generated internally by the module’s Approved DRBG, which is internal to the module’s boundary. The IV is 96 bits in length per NIST SP 800-38D, Section 8.2.2 and FIPS 140-3 IG C.H scenario 2. The selection of the IV construction method is the responsibility of the user of this cryptographic module. In approved mode, users of the module must not utilize GCM with an externally generated IV. Per IG C.H, in the event module power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that any of its AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed. The module implements the KDF TLS 1.2, and other cryptographic primitives used in TLS 1.2, but does not implement the TLS 1.2 protocol itself.

The module allows the use of 1024-bit RSA keys for legacy purposes including signature generation, which is disallowed in Approved mode as per NIST SP800-131Arev2. Therefore, cryptographic operations with the Non-Approved key sizes will result in the module operating in Non-Approved mode. The elliptic curves utilized shall be the validated NIST-recommended curves and shall provide a minimum of 112 bits of encryption strength.

Non-Approved cryptographic algorithms shall not share the same key or CSP as an approved algorithm. As such, Approved algorithms shall not use the keys generated by the module’s Non-Approved key generation methods or the converse.

The module supports two modes of operation: Approved and Non-approved. The module will be in approved mode when all self-tests have completed successfully, and only Approved algorithms are invoked. See Table 4 above for a list of the supported Approved algorithms. The non-Approved mode is entered when a non-Approved algorithm is invoked. See Table 6 for a list of non-Approved algorithms. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces functions. Table 7 - Ports and Interfaces The module does not implement a power input interface or a control output interface. As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside the module scope. However, when the module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the module’s logical data output interfaces is inhibited. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

4. Roles, Services, and Authentication

The cryptographic module only implements a Crypto Officer (CO) role. The CO role is implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services implemented by the module. An operator is considered the owner of the thread that instantiates the module and, therefore, only one operator is allowed, and no concurrent operators are allowed. The module does not support operator authentication.

The Approved services supported by the module and access rights within services accessible over the module’s public interface are listed in the table below: Table 8 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output Approved services are listed in Table 9. The SSPs listed in the table indicate the access required using below notation: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

D.G Table 9 - Approved Services Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Non-Approved Services are listed in the Table 10 below: Table 10 - Non-Approved Services Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

5. Software/Firmware Security The pre-operational integrity test is performed using HMAC-SHA2-256. The integrity test can be executed on demand by power-cycling the host platform and reloading the module. The module does not support software loading. Please refer to Section 11.1 for instructions on compiling the source code into executable.

The form of the module is a single object file, bcm.o.

6. Operational Environment The module runs on a GPC, which is a modifiable operational environment, running one of the operating systems specified in Table
7. Each approved operating system manages processes and threads in a logically separated manner. The module’s user is considered the owner of the calling application that instantiates the module. No specific security rules, settings or restrictions to the configuration of the operational environment applies to the module. The module is designed to ensure that all the self-tests are initiated automatically when the module is loaded.
8. Physical Security As a software module, the physical security requirements are not applicable.
9. Non-invasive Security The module does not claim any non-invasive security measures. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management All the SSPs are zeroized implicitly when host platform is restarted. The various SSPs used by the module are listed in Table 11 below: As specified in Section 2.1.1, usage of externally generated IV is only allowed for AES-GCM decryption in the approved mode of operation. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 11

• SSP Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 12 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification 10. Self-Tests ISO/IEC 19790 requires the module to perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the correctness of the cryptographic functionality. Some functions also require conditional tests during normal operation of the module. The self-tests can be requested on demand by power cycling the host platform. The module has a single error state, which is called the error state. This state is entered upon failure of a self-test. The module indicates this error state by providing the output status “*** KAT failed” where *** is the algorithm name (example: ECDSA-sign KAT failed). The module can be recovered by terminating execution of the host program and reclamation by the host operating system. The supported tests are listed and described in this section.

Pre-operational self-tests are run upon the initialization of the module and further reboots of the host platform. The CAST (Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test) for HMAC-SHA2-256 is performed before the integrity test. Self-tests do not require operator intervention to run. If any of the tests fail, the module will not initialize and enter an error state where no services can be accessed. The module implements the following pre-operational self-tests: • Software Integrity Test (HMAC-SHA2-256)

Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CAST) are run prior to the first use of the cryptographic algorithm. CASTs do not require operator intervention to run. If any of the tests fail, the module will enter an error state and no services can be accessed. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The module implements the following CASTs:

• ECDSA Signature Generation KAT (P-256)
• ECSDA Signature Verification KAT (P-256)
• RSA Signature Generation KAT (2048 bits, PKCSv1.5)
• RSA Signature Verification KAT (2048 bits, PKCSv1.5)
• SP800-56Arev3 KAS-ECC KAT (P-256)
• AES CBC Encryption KAT (128 bits)
• AES CBC Decryption KAT (128 bits)
• AES-GCM Encryption KAT (128 bits)
• AES-GCM Decryption KAT (128 bits)
• CAST, performed on DRBG, per SP800-90Arev1 Section 11.3 (Instantiate, Generate, Reseed)
• TLS v1.2 KDF KAT
• SHA-1 KAT
• SHA2-256 KAT
• SHA2-512 KAT
• HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT Conditional self-tests are run during the module’s operation. If any of these tests fail, the module will enter an error state, where no services can be accessed by the operators. The module can be reinitialized to clear the error and resume approved mode of operation. The module implements the following conditional pairwise consistency tests. The below PCTs are executed whenever a new key pair is generated:
• ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
• EC DH Pairwise Consistency Test
• RSA Pairwise Consistency Test Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

11. Life-Cycle Assurance The cryptographic module is initialized by loading the module before any cryptographic functionality is available. In User Space, the operating system is responsible for the initialization process and loading of the library. There are no maintenance requirements applicable. General guidance about the module can be found at https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl. This includes information about the APIs, building and specific information related to FIPS can be found at https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl.git/+/refs/heads/fips20220613/crypto/fipsmodule/FIPS.md (note this still mentions 140-2, but the information there is the same).

The module is open source. A Linux workstation with the following tools is required to build and compile the module: Android 13 git 2.23 or later (https://git-scm.com/download/linux) base64, curl, sha256sum (these should come with the Linux installation) Linux Clang compiler version 14.0.0 (http://releases.llvm.org/download.html) Go programming language version 1.18.1 (https://golang.org/dl/) Ninja build system version 1.10.2 (https://github.com/ninjabuild/ninja/releases) Cmake version 3.22.1 (https://cmake.org/download/)

Once a Linux workstation with the above tools has been obtained, issue the following commands to download and verify repo: curl 'https://gerrit.googlesource.com/git-repo/+/e778e57f11/repo?format=TEXT' | base64 -d > ~/repo chmod u+x ~/repo gpg --recv-key 8BB9AD793E8E6153AF0F9A4416530D5E920F5C65 curl https://storage.googleapis.com/git-repo-downloads/repo.asc | gpg --verify - ~/repo Download the manifest from https://ci.android.com/builds/submitted/8918218/aosp_arm64userdebug/latest/manifest_8918218.xml by clicking the Download button. Verify the manifest using the following command: Sha256sum ~/manifest_8918218.xml Manually validate that the output from the final command indicates the following expected hash values for this file: fae7a587167b3b3ebdf5b2c53335a1d1827beddcf23d2788d07f3bbbe9ff7182 manifest_8918218.xml Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The module can be obtained by issuing the following commands: mkdir aosp cd aosp ~/repo init -u https://android.googlesource.com/platform/manifest --depth 1 ~/repo init -m ~/manifest_8918218.xml ~/repo sync -q -c -j 20 Once downloaded, the module can be built using the following command: . build/envsetup.sh lunch aosp_arm64-eng m clean m test_fips

Once the above tools have been obtained, issue the following command to create a Cmake toolchain file to specify the use of Clang: printf "set(CMAKE_C_COMPILER \"clang\")\nset(CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER \"clang++\")\n" > ${HOME}/toolchain The FIPS 140-3 validated release of the module can be obtained by downloading the tarball containing the source code at the following location: https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-boringssl-fips/boringssl0c6f40132b828e92ba365c6b7680e32820c63fa7.tar.xz or by issuing the following command: wget https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-boringssl-fips/boringssl0c6f40132b828e92ba365c6b7680e32820c63fa7.tar.xz The set of files specified in the archive constitutes the complete set of source files of the validated module. There shall be no additions, deletions, or alterations of this set as used during module build. The downloaded tarball file can be verified using the below SHA2-256 digest value: 62f733289f2d677c2723f556aa58034c438f3a7bbca6c12b156538a88e38da8a By issuing the following command: sha256sum boringssl-0c6f40132b828e92ba365c6b7680e32820c63fa7.tar.xz The tarball can be extracted using the following command: tar xJ < boringssl-0c6f40132b828e92ba365c6b7680e32820c63fa7.tar.xz After the tarball has been extracted, the following commands will compile the module: cd boringssl mkdir build && cd build && cmake -GNinja -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=${HOME}/toolchain -DFIPS=1 DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release .. ninja && ninja run_tests Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The following methods will provide the module name and versions:

• FIPS_module_name()
• GlooBoringCrypto
• FIPS_version()
• 2022061300 12. Mitigation of Other Attacks The module is not designed to mitigate attacks which are outside of the scope of FIPS 140-3. Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Abbreviation

Full Specification Name

References and Standards The following Standards are referenced in this Security Policy: FIPS 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic IG Module Validation Program Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of SP 800-38A Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for SP 800-38C Authentication and Confidentiality SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key SP 800-38F Wrapping Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer SP 800-52 Security (TLS) Implementations Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete SP 800-56A Logarithm Cryptography SP 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators SP 800-131A Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths SP 800-133 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation SP 800-135 Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Acronym

Definition

Acronyms AES            Advanced Encryption Standard API            Application Programming Interface CAVP           Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CBC            Cipher-Block Chaining CCCS           Canadian Centre for Cyber Security CFB            Cipher Feedback CKG            Cooperative Key Generation CMVP           Crypto Module Validation Program CO             Cryptographic Officer CRNGT          Continuous Random Number Generator Test CSP            Critical Security Parameter CTR            Counter-mode DES            Data Encryption Standard DH             Diffie-Hellman DRBG           Deterministic Random Bit Generator DSS            Digital Signature Standard EC             Elliptic Curve ECB            Electronic Code Book ECC            Elliptic Curve Cryptography EC DH          Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA          Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Authority FIPS           Federal Information Processing Standards GCM            Galois/Counter Mode GMAC           Galois Message Authentication Code GPC            General Purpose Computer HMAC           Key-Hashed Message Authentication Code IG             Implementation Guidance IV             Initialization Vector KAS            Key Agreement Scheme KAT            Known Answer Test KDF            Key Derivation Function KW             Key Wrap KWP            Key Wrap with Padding LLC            Limited Liability Company MAC            Message Authentication Code MD4            Message Digest algorithm MD4 MD5            Message Digest algorithm MD5 N/A            Not-Applicable NIST           National Institute of Standards and Technology NVLAP          National Voluntary Lab Accreditation Program Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

OFB            Output Feedback PAA            Processor Algorithm Accelerator RAM            Random Access Memory RFC            Request For Comment RSA            Rivest Shamir Adleman SHA            Secure Hash Algorithm SHS            Secure Hash Standard SP             Special Publication SSL            Secure Socket Layer TLS            Transport Layer Security Triple-DES     Triple Data Encryption Standard Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).