Motorola Solutions Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) HSM – Security Level 3

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (35)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Motorola Solutions Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) HSM – Security Level 3
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update<br/>Upgrade</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>IPSEC<br/>no library/version identified</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Motorola Solutions Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) HSM – Security Level 3
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update<br/>Upgrade</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>IPSEC<br/>no library/version identified</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Motorola Solutions Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) HSM

• Security Level 3 Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Version: 1.6 Date: May 22, 2025 The Motorola Solutions Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) HSM is used in the Motorola Solutions Micro HSM product. Motorola Solutions Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

This document defines the non-propriety Security Policy for the Motorola Solutions Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) HSM

• Security Level 3, hereafter denoted as the Module. The MACE is a single-chip cryptographic module to meet FIPS 140-3 Level-3 physical security requirements. The Module provides encryption and decryption services for secure key management, and secure voice/data traffic for Motorola Solutions Micro HSM products. The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows: Table 1
• Security Levels Motorola Solutions Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The MACE cryptographic module is a single chip hardware cryptographic module. The Module is used in Motorola Solutions, Inc. Micro HSM products. The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated overall security level 3.

The Module is tested on the following operational environment. Table 2

• Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration The Module supports the following Approved Mode algorithms that may be installed separately from the Module’s base firmware using the program update service. While the installation of AES may be done separately, for the purposes of this validation the Module includes this firmware. Table 3
• Approved Mode Drop-in Algorithms

Figure 1 and Figure 2 depict the physical form of the MACE cryptographic module. The perimeter of the MACE IC as shown in Figure 3 is the cryptographic boundary. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Cryptographic Boundary

Status Indicator

KV

LK VL

Figure 2: MACE Chip (Interfaces) Figure 1: MACE Chip (Top) The MACE IC has an EBI port, a KVL port when connected to the Motorola Key Variable Loader (KVL), and Power Connections. Boundary KYLD KVLKVL MACE 1.8V Power EBI Port Host

The MACE HSM module is originally non-compliant and must be configured to operate in an approved mode of operation. The Module must be installed, initialized and configured, including a required change of the factory-default password, in order to be in an approved mode. Documented below are the additional configuration settings that are required for the Module to be used in an Approved Mode of operation at overall security level

3. At any given time, use the Module Info service to determine whether the Module is operating at overall security level
4. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Note that at least one of the AES-128 and AES-256 drop-in algorithms must be loaded into the Module, however if they are loaded, they must match the values in Table 3 to be in the Approved Mode. Use Module Info service to verify that the firmware version matches an approved version listed on NIST’s website: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html Also, the module status service will output the AES DIA versions installed with a display of APCO AES128 Version: R01.00.05 and/or APCO AES256 Version R01.00.07.

In order to configure the Module for an Approved Mode at overall Security Level 3, the operator shall use the Module Configuration service to set the following configuration parameters as shown below.

1. Clear Key Import: Disabled
2. Clear Key Export: Disabled
3. Key Loss Key (KLK): Disabled
4. Red Keyloading: Disabled
5. FIPS Security Level 3 compliant key transport: Enabled The Module will operate in Approved Mode only if it receives external entropy from the operator. Additionally, the Module supports “drop-in algorithms” via the Program Update service. Drop-in algorithms may be added or removed from the Module independent of the base FW. In order to remain in the Approved Mode, only Approved algorithms may be loaded into the Module; in particular AES-128 (Cert. #A5274) and/ or AES-256 (Cert. #A5275). The loading and unloading of any firmware within the validated cryptographic module invalidates the Module’s validation and zeroizes all SSPs except those entered at manufacturing. The Module is then in a non-compliant state.

The Module implements the Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed in the tables below. Table 5

• Approved Algorithms Motorola Solutions Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The entropy for seeding the SP 800-90A DRBG is determined by the operator of the Module that is outside of the module’s physical and logical boundary. The operator shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the random number generation mechanism as shown in [SP 800-90A] Table 3 (CTR_DRBG) and set required bits into the module by using Load Entropy service listed in section 4.3. Since entropy is loaded passively into the module, there is no assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Note: No parts of SRTP and TLS, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Table 6

• Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation Table 7
• Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security These algorithms do not claim any security and are not used to meet FIPS 140-3 requirements. Therefore, SSPs do not map to these algorithms. Motorola Solutions Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

1. The Module provides two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The Module provides identity-based authentication.
3. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
5. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting
6. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output are inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
9. The Module does not support manual SSP establishment method.
10. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of
11. The Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
12. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
13. The Module does not provide bypass services for ports/interfaces.
14. The Module does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability.

The Module shall be installed in the Motorola Solutions Micro HSM products. After authentication with the default password, the operator shall change the default passwords for Crypto Officer (CO) and User role. The Module is not usable until the factory default passwords are changed. The Module shall be operated such that only approved Drop-in algorithms listed in the Table 3 are installed including section 11 secure installation, initialization, startup and operation of the Module. The Module’s ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed in Table 8. Table 8

• Ports and Interfaces Motorola Solutions Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Note: The module does not have Control Output. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module supports two distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO). Table 9 lists all operator roles supported by the Module and their related services. In addition, the Module supports services which do not require to be authenticated, listed UA in Table 9. Table 9– Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module supports two distinct operator roles (User and Crypto-Officer). The Module uses a minimum separation of roles using login credentials and re-authentication is enforced when changing roles. The module ensures that there is no visible display of the authentication data Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

All services implemented by the Module are listed in Table 11. The Module does not allow any nonapproved service while operating in FIPS 140-3 level 3 mode. The SSPs modes of access shown in Table 11 are defined as:

• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module.
• E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP. Table 11– Approved Services Motorola Solutions Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

N/A N/A N/A Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

E Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Note: The module does not implement any Non-Approved Services and only provides an Approved mode of operation. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module has a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. The Module is composed of base firmware version identified in Table

2. On top of that, customer shall load at least one of the Drop-in algorithms listed in Table
3. The firmware components are protected with the authentication technique(s) RSA Programmed Signature Key described in Table
4. The Module includes a firmware verification and load service to support necessary updates for the base firmware. The operator can initiate the firmware integrity test on demand by power cycling the Module. The Module is composed of the following firmware component(s): ● non-modifiable operating system - binary Firmware versions validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP will be explicitly identified on a validation certificate. Any firmware not identified in this Security Policy does not constitute the Module defined by this Security Policy or covered by this validation. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The MACE has a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions with a Physical Security at Level 3 therefore this section in not applicable. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module is a production grade, single-chip cryptographic module as defined by FIPS 140-3 and is designed to meet level 3 physical security requirements. The information below is applicable to cryptographic module hardware kit numbers 5185912Y03, 5185912Y05, and 5185912T05, which have identical physical security characteristics. at ambient temperature (-40 to 85 degrees Celsius) only. No assurance of the epoxy hardness is claimed for this physical security mechanism outside of this range. The Module does not contain any doors, removable covers, or ventilation holes or slits. No maintenance access interface is available. No special procedures are required to maintain physical security of the Module while delivering to operators. There are two voltage powers that power the MACE. VDDCORE voltage powers all MACE chip functions while VDDBU voltage powers the MACE chip battery. VDDCORE and VDDBU voltages enter the cryptographic boundary of the module separately; and therefore, were tested separately to verify that they both cause the MACE chip to zeroize SSPs. Table 12

• Physical Security Inspection Guidelines Table 13
• Environmental Failure Protection Table 14
• Coating testing Motorola Solutions Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The SSPs access methods are described in Table 15 below: Table 15– SSP Management Methods NOTE: Change and Validate Password services zeroizes when 15 attempts have failed, and the module is reset to factory settings. Note: For zeroization methods with an asterisk, once zeroization is complete the Module will reboot, indicating successful zeroization. The output status of all other methods of success of zeroization are implicit and any attempt to use previous keys/CSPs will trigger an error. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Module is described in the services detailed in 4.3. Table 16– SSPs Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 17

• Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification Motorola Solutions Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the Module. Per FIPS 140-3 these are categorized as either pre-operational self-tests or conditional self-tests. Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CAST) are periodically performed by the Module in every X3 minutes, where X is configured by the operator during module configuration. The Module will not accept any commands when a periodic self-test is required; the commands still in the I/O buffer will be processed by the Module at the end of periodic self-test when the I/O buffer is emptied. The periodic self-test process should take no more than 2-3 minutes. The Module will reset if any selftests fails, otherwise it will continue to operate normally. The Module logs the most recent self-test errors to the internal flash; the operator (UA) can extract the error logs using Extract Error Log service list in section 4.3. The self-tests error states and status indicator are described in table below: Table 18– Error states and indicators The operator can configure the periodic self-tests interval to any value between 1 to 712800 minutes. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests: Table 19– Pre-Operational Self-Test The Module performs the following conditional self-tests: Table 20– Conditional Self-Tests Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module is originally a non-compliant module and must be initialized to be in approved mode. There is no non-approved mode. During initialization the operator shall configure the MACE from the instructions below:

1. Upon first access, the operator (CO) will use the default password provided by Motorola in a separate communication.
2. The CO will then change the default passwords (user and CO) based on the requirements in the Roles and Authentication table.
3. The CO will then configure the MACE using the Module configuration service as specified in the section 2.3.1.
4. Finally, the CO will set the periodic self-tests timer as part of the Module configuration in every X minutes, where X is a minimum value = 1 minute and maximum value = 712,800 minutes (495 days). Note: the default minimum = 0* but must be changed to a minimum of 1. * periodic self-tests will not perform if minimum = 0

The MACE is embedded in multiple Motorola Solutions, Inc. radios (aka, subscribers). Motorola uses commercially available courier systems such as UPS, FedEx, and DHL with a tracking number and requires a signature at the end by an authorized client. During manufacturing, all of the firmware modules are signed by the RSA private Programmed Signature Key and the module is loaded with the RSA public Programmed Signature (FW-LD-Pub) key. The signature of the firmware is verified to ensure the integrity of the module when it is delivered to authorized operators. The module is embedded into Motorola radio products, and it's put into the radio circuitry during Manufacturing. Hence, the module is directly shipped from the Motorola factory to the end customers through sales and distribution channels.

Use radio specific user guide available on the www.motorolasolutions.com website for secure operations.

Use radio specific user guide available on the www.motorolasolutions.com website for secure operations.

The MACE does not require any special maintenance. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

After the end-of-life, the operator should zeroize all SSPs, except those SSPs entered at manufacturing, using the “Configure Module“ listed in the Section 4.3 followed by shredding the MACE chip. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module generates GCM IVs deterministically as specified in SP800-38D Section 8.2.1 using the following protocols: ● TLS 1.2: The Module is compliant with TLS v1.2 and SP800-52 Rev2, Section 3.3.1 in accordance with RFC 5246 for TLS key establishment which implies compliance with TLS v1.2 and SP800-52 Rev2, Section 3.3.1. The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with RFC 5288 and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option

1. The fixed field consists of a 32-bit salt that is generated internally to the Module and the invocation field consists of a 64-bit nonce_explicit passed into the Module as an input parameter. o When the nonce_explicit (counter) part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key this condition triggers a handshake to establish a new encryption key per RFC 5246. o During operational testing, the Module was tested against an independent version of TLS1.2 and found to behave correctly. ● TLS 1.3: The AES GCM IV is in compliance with RFC 8446 section 5.3. Section 8.1 IV construction and shall only be used for the TLS1.3 protocol to be compliant with FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option
2. It is generated by XORing the lower 64-bit of 96-bit TLS 1.3 HKDF derived data (internal/static IV) and 64-bit SSL sequence numbers. o During operational testing, the Module was tested against an independent version of TLS1.3 and found to behave correctly. ● SRTP: The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with RFC 7714, Section 8.1 IV construction and shall only be used for the SRTP protocol to be compliant with FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option
3. The fixed field consists of a 32-bit Synchronization Source identifier and 16-bits of zeroes, and the invocation field consists of a 16-bit Sequence Number and 32-bit Rollover Counter. Both the fixed field and invocation field are passed into the Module as input parameters and XORed with a 96bit random salt imported or generated internally. Note that the XOR operation does not have an impact on SP 800-38D requirements because the salt is not regenerated until a key is reestablished and therefore acts as a constant within an individual key’s lifecycle. o During operational testing, the Module was tested against an independent version of SRTP and found to behave correctly. ● SRTCP: The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with RFC 7714, Section 9.1 IV construction and shall only be used for the SRTCP protocol to be compliant with FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option
4. The fixed field consists of 16 bits of zeroes, a 32-bit Synchronization Source, 17 bits of zeroes, and the invocation field which consists of a 31-bit SRTCP Index. Both the fixed field and invocation field are passed into the Module as input parameters and XORed with a 96-bit random salt imported or generated internally. Note that the XOR operation does not have an impact on SP 800-38D requirements because the salt is not regenerated until a key is re-established and therefore acts as a constant within an individual key’s lifecycle. o During operational testing, the Module was tested against an independent version of SRTP and found to behave correctly. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

If the Module's power is lost and restored for any of the protocols listed above, a new GCM key will be established. The invocation field is incremented externally and input to the Module; if the new invocation field is not greater than the last value then the Module will transition to an error state. Following an overflow of the invocation field, the Module will transition to an error state.

The Module generates GCM IVs randomly as specified in SP800-38D section 8.2.2 using approved DRBG (Cert #A2529) and is to be compliant with FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option 2 and the IV length is 96 bits. Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy. Table 21– References Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 22– Acronyms and Definitions Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Motorola Solutions Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).