Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Cryptographic Module (FPR 3100 Series)

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (29)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Cryptographic Module (FPR 3100 Series)
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback services<br/><i>Firmware Load Test<br/>Perform Zeroization</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Block Cipher (SSHv2)<br/>Block Cipher (TLSv1.2)<br/>Block Cipher (IPSec/IKEv2)</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Trusted code is reachable<br/>through update and<br/>recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Cryptographic Module (FPR 3100 Series)
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery / rollback services<br/><i>Firmware Load Test<br/>Perform Zeroization</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Block Cipher (SSHv2)<br/>Block Cipher (TLSv1.2)<br/>Block Cipher (IPSec/IKEv2)</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3 clueHigh;
  class C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Cryptographic Module (FPR 3100 Series) Americas Headquarters: Cisco Systems, Inc., 170 West Tasman Drive, San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems logo is registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc.

Defense Cryptographic Module (FPR 3100 Series) (hereinafter referred to as FTD or Module), version 7.4. The following details how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-3, SP 800-140 and ISO/IEC 19790 for a Security Level 2 hardware cryptographic module. The security requirements cover areas related to the design and implementation of a cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic table indicates the actual security levels for each area of the cryptographic module.

Purpose and Use: This module is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module which houses Firepower solutions with underlying operating system identified as Linux 4 (also referred to as Firepower eXtensible Operating System or FX-OS throughout this document). The Module is operated in FTD delivers enterprise-class firewall for businesses, improving security at the Internet edge, high performance and throughput for demanding enterprise data centers. The FTD solution offers the combination of the industry's most deployed stateful firewall with a comprehensive © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

range of next-generation network security services, intrusion prevention system (IPS), content security and secure unified communications, HTTPS/TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2, SNMPv3 and Cryptographic Cipher Suite B. Module Type: Hardware Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand Module Characteristics: Cryptographic Boundary: The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire chassis unit’s physical perimeter encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," “rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case, and shown in the figures below and in the Physical Security section. The FPR 3105, FPR 3110, FPR 3120, FPR 3130 and FPR 3140 all have the same exterior appearance. Where they differ is in Firewall throughput, IPS throughput, IPsec VPN throughput and number of VPN peers allowed. Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):

Tested Module Identification

• Hardware: © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 2: Tested Module Identification

• Hardware Tested Module Identification
• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): N/A for this module. Tested Module Identification
• Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module.

N/A for this module. Modes List and Description: Table 3: Modes List and Description operation after initial operations are performed (See Section 11). The module does not claim implementation of a degraded mode of operation. Section 4 provides details on the service

Approved Algorithms: CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 4: Approved Algorithms - CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation Marvell Cavium Nitrox V HMAC-SHA2256 HMAC-SHA2384 HMAC-SHA2512 Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Marvell Cavium Nitrox V Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:

KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Methods:: modp2048 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

HMAC-SHA2256 HMAC-SHA2384 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. HMAC-SHA2256

AsymKeyPairKeyGen AsymKeyPairKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

© 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. HMAC-SHA2256 HMAC-SHA2256 HMAC-SHA2384 HMAC-SHA2256 HMAC-SHA2384 HMAC-SHA2512 HMAC-SHA2256 HMAC-SHA2384 HMAC-SHA2512 HMAC-SHA2256 HMAC-SHA2384 HMAC-SHA2224

HMAC-SHA2512 Table 7: Security Function Implementations

There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in this table. The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation Guidance C.H scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. The keys for the client and server negotiated in the TLSv1.2 handshake process (client_write_key and server_write_key) are compared and the module aborts the session if the key values are identical. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. Two keys established by IKEv2 for one security association (one key for encryption in each direction between the parties) are not identical and abort the session if they are. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.

Table 8: Entropy Certificates NonPhysical A2810 (SHA3256) Table 9: Entropy Sources

The module generates RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DH asymmetric key pairs compliant with FIPS 186-4, using a NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG or NIST SP 800-90A Hash DRBG for random number generation. In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs CKG for asymmetric keys as per section 5.1 of NIST SP 800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) by obtaining a random bit string directly from an approved DRBG. The random bit string supports the required security strength requested by the calling application (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H.).

The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of operation:

• KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation: The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 112 and

• KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation: The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC

shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 128 and

The module supports SSHv2, TLS v1.2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 industrial protocols. Please refer to the Security Function Implementations Table for more information. No parts of SSH, TLS, IKE and SNMP protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

N/A N/A Table 10: Ports and Interfaces The module’s physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in Table 2. The module provides physical ports which are mapped to logical interfaces provided The module’s data output interface will be disabled when performing pre-operational self-tests, loading new firmware, zeroizing keys, or when in an error state.

RSABased ECDSABased © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

and the User role. The module also allows the concurrent operators.

Table 12: Roles Unauthenticated Users can run the self-test service by power-cycling the module by removing the power and re-applying.

n (Preoperational N/A N/A the selftests Z Z © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

n N/A N/A with AESGCM) © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. W,Z W,Z W,E W,E W,E W,E

n KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E

n with AESGCM) KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E

n KAS-ECCKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E

n with AESGCM) © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E

n KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E

n with AESGCM) KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E

n KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. W,E W,E W,E W,E

N/A for this module. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. W,E

The module supports the firmware load test by using HMAC-SHA2-512 (HMAC Cert. #A4446) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test Key was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to load new firmware, the Crypto Officer must authenticate to the module before loading the firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails.

The module implements Self-initiated cryptographic output capability without external operator request. The Crypto Officer shall configure self-initiated cryptographic output capability. Prior to executing the self-initiated cryptographic output capability, the module conducts two independent internal actions to activate the capability to prevent the inadvertent output due to a single error.

The module supports unauthenticated service. The unauthenticated User/Operators can trigger the self-test service by power-cycling the module, and is able to observe the module’s LEDs status.

The module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure firmware security, the module is protected by RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-512 (RSA Cert. #A4446) algorithm. A Firmware Integrity Test Key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware integrity test only at the pre-operational self-test. The module uses the RSA

2048 bits modulus public key to verify the digital signature. If the firmware integrity test fails, the

module would enter to an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited.

Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the firmware integrity test on-demand. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Type of Operational Environment: Limited

Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required Step 1: Turn off and unplug the module. Step 2: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, oil or any other material other than the surface coating from manufacture before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. Step 3: Apply a label to cover the module as shown in the figures below. The tamper evident labels are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive backing. Any attempt to open the module will damage the tamper evident labels or the material of the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident labels have non-repeated serial numbers, they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to verify that the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident labels can also be inspected for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices. The word “FIPS” may appear if the label was peeled back.

Number: Nine (9) Placement: © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Figure 2 Module’s front view opacity shield TEL 1 Figure 3 Module’s back view TEL 7 TEL 6 TEL 8 TEL 2 TEL 4 TEL 5 TEL 1 TEL 3 Figure 4 Module’s top view with opacity shield © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

TEL 8 TEL 9 TEL 7 TEL 6 Figure 5 Module’s bottom view with opacity shield TEL 3 Figure 6 Module’s left view with opacity shield TEL 2 Figure 7 Module’s right view with opacity shield Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Any unused TELs must be securely stored, accounted for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location.

3105, 3110, 3120, 3130, 3140 Opacity Shield FPR3K-FIPS-KIT= Step 1: Attach the Slide Rail Locking Bracket, #2 in diagram to the Side of the Chassis using the countersink screws #3 in diagram. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Step 2: Attach the Cable Management Bracket (#1) to the Slide Rail Locking Bracket (#2) using the countersink screws (#3) Step 3: Route the Cables through the Cable Management Brackets Step 4: Attach the FIPS Opacity Shield (#1) to the Cable Management Brackets (#3) using the countersink screws (#2) © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Figure 8 Opacity Shield Brackets

) c ) c d c with AESGCM) d c d c with AESGCM) d c ) ) ) ) © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. m

Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods

Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods Please note that the Firmware Load Test Key is only used for Firmware Load Test Authentication and not subject to the zeroization requirement. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

MODP2048, MODP3072, MODP2048, MODP3072, MODP2048, MODP3072, MODP2048, MODP3072, KASFFCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen KASECCKeyGen KAS-ECCKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

- 112128 bits - 112128 bits KASFFC© 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

- 128152 bits - 128152 bits - 128152 bits P-256, P384, P521 128-256 p-256, P384, P521 ) KAS-FFCKeyGen KASECCKeyGen ) KAS-ECCKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

P-256, P384, P521 128-256 P-256, P384, P521 128-256 - 112128 bits - 112128 bits MODP2048, MODP3072, KASFFCKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

MODP2048, MODP3072, MODP2048, MODP3072, MODP2048, MODP3072, P-256, P384, P521 128-256 P-256, P384, P521 128-256 P-256, P384, P521 128-256 KAS-FFCKeyGen KASECCKeyGen KAS-ECCKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

y y 2) s - N/A 2) Table 18: SSP Table 1 n n n n © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests The module performs the following self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and Conditional self-tests. Prior to the module providing any data output via the data output interface, the module performs and passes the pre-operational self-tests. Following the © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

successful pre-operational self-tests, the module executes the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs). If anyone of the self-tests fails, the module transitions into an error state and outputs the error message via the module’s status output interface. While the module is in the error state, all data through the data output interface and all cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the module transitions to the operational state.

(FIPS1864) (A4446) (FIPS1864) (A4446) HMACSHA-1 HMACSHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2256 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

HMACSHA2-384 HMACSHA2-512 KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 (FIPS1864) (A4446) (FIPS1864) (A4446) HMAC-SHA2384 HMAC-SHA2512 MODP2048 with SHA2256 with SHA2256 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

HMACSHA-1 HMACSHA2-256 HMACSHA2-384 HMACSHA2-512 N/A (FIPS1864) (A4446) (FIPS1864) (A4446) HMAC-SHA2256 HMAC-SHA2384 HMAC-SHA2512 N/A required pairwise required pairwise © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 N/A KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 MODP2048 N/A HMACSHA2-512 HMACSHA2-512 N/A required pairwise required pairwise Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests.

Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

N/A N/A Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information

Table 24: Error States If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the error and enters the Error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and perform the selftests, including the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs.

The validated module firmware was installed onto the respective test platforms listed in Table 2 above. The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps: Step 1: The Crypto Officer must install opacity shields as described in section 7 above. Step 2: The Crypto Officer must apply tamper evidence labels as described in section 7 above. Step 3: The Crypto Officer must securely store any unused tamper evidence labels. Note: Each module has a Type A USB 2.0 port, but it is considered to be disabled once the Crypto Officer has applied the TEL #9. Step 4: The Crypto Officer shall configure the module to be managed by the Firepower Management Center (FMC), and follow the procedure below from the FMC: a) Choose Devices > Platform Settings and create or edit a Firepower policy. b) On the left click “UCAPL/CC Compliance”. c) Choose “CC” from the dropdown under “Enable UCAPL/CC Compliance”. d) Click “Save” to save the changes. e) Click “Deploy” and select “Deploy All”. Step 5: The module will automatically reboot, and will be placed in the approved mode once it is done rebooting. Step 6: Crypto Officer can verify the version installed and running > show version Step 7: Crypto Officer can verify the module is in approved mode: > show fips Step 8: Assign users a Privilege Level of basic. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Step 9: Configure IP address for unit and all distant endpoints from the FMC. Step 10: Define RADIUS shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long and secure traffic between the security module and the RADIUS server via secure (IPSec, TLS) tunnel. Note: Perform this step only if RADIUS is configured, otherwise proceed. Step 11: Configure the security module so that any remote connections via Telnet are secured through IPSec. Step 12: Configure the security module so that only approved algorithms are used for all security connections (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, SNMPv3 and IPSec/IKEv2). Step 13: Configure the security module so that error messages can only be viewed by Crypto Officer. Step 14: Enable HTTPS with TLS. HTTPS with TLS should always be used for Web-based management. Step 15: Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using approved algorithms. Step 16: Save and reboot the module.

Specific Administrator guidance can be found in the Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Administration Guide, 7.4: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/securefirewall/management-center/admin/740/management-center-admin-74.html

Specific Non-Administrator guidance can be found in the Cisco Secure Firewall 3100 Series Hardware Installation Guide: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/securefirewall/hardware/3100/fw-3100-install.html

N/A for this module. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Referenced URLs

• https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/secure-