Cambium Networks PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 820N, PTP 820A, PTP 850C, PTP 850E

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (35)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Cambium Networks PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 820N, PTP 820A, PTP 850C, PTP 850E
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Update<br/>firmware load</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>status output</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Cambium Networks PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 820N, PTP 820A, PTP 850C, PTP 850E
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Update<br/>firmware load</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>status output</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Cambium Networks PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 820N, PTP 820A, PTP 850C, PTP 850E Firmware: 12.0.1 Hardware: PTP 820N and PTP 820A, with TEL P/N: BS-0341-2 and with components:

• PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003
• PTP820 TCC-U: N000082H005
• PTP820 RMC-B: N000082H004 PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 850C and PTP 850E (Rev. 6) Prepared by: Acumen Security

Rockville, MD 20850 www.acumensecurity.net

Cambium Networks Ltd. assumes no liability resulting from any inaccuracies or omissions in this document, or from use of the information obtained herein. Cambium reserves the right to make changes to any products described herein to improve reliability, function, or design, and reserves the right to revise this document and to make changes from time to time in content hereof with no obligation to notify any person of revisions or changes. Cambium does not assume any liability arising out of the application or use of any product, software, or circuit described herein; neither does it convey license under its patent rights or the rights of others. It is possible that this publication may contain references to, or information about Cambium products (machines and programs), programming, or services that are not announced in your country. Such references or information must not be construed to mean that Cambium intends to announce such Cambium products, programming, or services in your country. This document, Cambium products, and 3rd Party software products described in this document may include or memories or other media. Laws in the United States and other countries preserve for Cambium, its licensors, and Cambium products described in this document may not be copied, reproduced, reverse engineered, distributed, merged or modified in any manner without the express written permission of Cambium. Furthermore, the purchase of Cambium products shall not be deemed to grant either directly or by implication, estoppel, or supplied software, except for the normal non-exclusive, royalty free license to use that arises by operation of law in the sale of a product. Restrictions of the software or documentation may be reproduced, transmitted, transcribed, stored in a retrieval system, or translated into any language or computer language, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission of Cambium. License Agreements The software described in this document is the property of Cambium and its licensors. It is furnished by express license agreement only and may be used only in accordance with the terms of such an agreement. High Risk Materials Cambium and its supplier(s) specifically disclaim any express or implied warranty of fitness for any high-risk activities or uses of its products including, but not limited to, the operation of nuclear facilities, aircraft navigation or aircraft communication systems, air traffic control, life support, or weapons systems (“High Risk Use”). Any High Risk is unauthorized, is made at your own risk and you shall be responsible for any and all losses, damage or claims arising out of any High-Risk Use. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

List of Figures Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Introduction This is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Cambium Networks Ltd. and the following Cambium Networks products: PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 820N, PTP 820A, PTP 850C, and PTP 850E. Below are the details of the certified products: Hardware Version #:

• PTP 820N and PTP 820A, with TEL P/N: BS-0341-2 and with components:
• PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003
• PTP820 TCC-U: N000082H005
• PTP820 RMC-B: N000082H004
• PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 850C, and PTP 850E (Rev. 6) Firmware Version #: 12.0.1 FIPS 140-3 Security Level: 2 Purpose This document was prepared as part of the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-3 validation process. The document describes how the Cambium Networks PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 820N, PTP 820A, PTP 850C and PTP 850E meet the security requirements of FIPS 1403. It also provides instructions to individuals and organizations on how to deploy the product in a secure Approved mode of operation. The target audience of this document is anyone who wishes to use or integrate any of these products into a solution that is meant to comply with FIPS 140-3 requirements. Document Organization The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-3 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains: Vendor Evidence document Finite State Machine Other supporting documentation as additional references This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Acumen Security, LLC. under contract to Cambium Networks. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-3 Submission Package is proprietary to Cambium Networks and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Cambium Networks PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 820N, PTP 820A, PTP 850C and PTP 850E (the module) are multi-chip standalone hardware modules validated at FIPS 140-3 Security Level 2. Specifically, the modules meet that following security levels for individual sections in FIPS 140-3 standard: Table 1 - Security Levels The PTP 820 and PTP 850 series radios provide a service-centric microwave platform for HetNet1 hauling. The platform includes a full complement of wireless products that provide backhaul and fronthaul solutions. Powered by a software-defined engine and sharing a common operating system, PTP 820 and PTP 850 Release 12.0.1, the PTP 820 and PTP 850 platforms deliver ultra-high capacities while supporting any radio transmission technology, any network topology, and any deployment configuration.

The cryptographic boundary for the modules is defined as encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," and "bottom" surfaces of the case and all portions of the "backplane" of the case. The following figures provide a physical depiction of the cryptographic modules: Heterogenous Network Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 1

• PTP 820G Figure 2
• PTP 820C Figure 3
• PTP 820S Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 4

• PTP 820C-HP Figure 5
• PTP 820N and PTP 820A Figure 6
• PTP 850C Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 7

• PTP 850E (Rev. 6) The PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 850C and PTP 850E are fixed configuration. The PTP 820N and PTP 820A are modular configuration, and have slots to insert the following cards:
• Traffic and Control Card (TCC): The Traffic Control Card (TCC) provides the control functionality for the PTP 820N and PTP 820A units. It also provides Ethernet management and traffic interfaces. There are two variants of this card:
• PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003: Required for Multi-Carrier ABC configurations. Provides 2 x FE Ethernet management interfaces, 2 x GbE optical interfaces, 2 x GbE electrical interfaces, and 2 x dual mode electrical or cascading interfaces.
• PTP820 TCC-U: N000082H005: Provides 6 x 1/10GE optical interfaces and 2 x RFU or 1/2.5 GbE electrical PoE interfaces. Two of the optical interfaces (1 and 2) can be configured as cascading interfaces. Supports up to two Multi-Carrier ABC groups, with capacity of 2.5 Gbps (non-configurable). Supports multiple high-capacity configurations with Link Bonding.
• Radio Modem Card-B (PTP820 RMC-B: N000082H004): The Radio Modem Card (RMC) provides the modem interface between the Indoor Unit (IDU) and the Radio Frequency Unit (RFU). The models included in this validation have been tested in the following configurations: Indoor unit Outdoor unit Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration Additionally, the following cards can be configured on PTP 820N and PTP 820A modules. These cards provide port density, but do not contain any security-relevant functionality: •    Ethernet/Optical Line Interface Card (E/XLIC) •    STM-1/OC3 •    STM-1 RST •    TDM E1/T1 •    10Gb Ethernet/Optical Line Interface Card (LIC-X-E10) •    Radio Interface Card (RIC-D)

The module operates in the Approved mode of operation (when configured as per the instructions in Section 11 of this document). Any usage of the non-Approved services described in Table 17 would result in a non-Approved mode of operation. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The following table lists the Approved algorithms supported by the modules: d GCM IV generation tested in accordance with IG C.H, scenario 1 TLSv1.2 following RFCs 5516, 5246, 5288, and

5289 as well as SSH following RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254 and 5647. The IV is generated only for use with GCM

encryption within the protocol being used. The TLS cipher suites supported by the module are identified in section

11.4.2 of this document which are included in SP 800-52 Rev2 section 3.3.1. The module also internally generates

IVs for TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446) in accordance with scenario 5 in IG C.H. In the case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with AES-GCM encryption/decryption is established. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

d Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

CAVP Cert

Algorith m and Standar d

Mode/Me thod SigGen

Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) Primality Tests: Table C.2 Info Generated By Server Public Exponent Mode: Random Private Key Format: Standard Capabilities: Signature Type: PKCS 1.5 Properties: Modulo: 2048 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Properties: Modulo: 3072 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Properties: Modulo: 4096 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Capabilities: Signature Type: PKCSPSS Properties: Modulo: 2048 Salt Length: 28 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Salt Length: 32 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Salt Length: 48 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512

Use / Function

d Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

CAVP Cert

Algorith m and Standar d

Mode/Me thod

Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) Salt Length: 64 Properties: Modulo: 3072 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Salt Length: 32 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Salt Length: 48 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Salt Length: 64 Properties: Modulo: 4096 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Salt Length: 32 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Salt Length: 48 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Salt Length: 64 Capabilities: Signature Type: ANSI X9.31 Properties: Modulo: 2048 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Properties: Modulo: 3072 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Properties: Modulo: 4096

Use / Function

d Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

CAVP Cert

Algorith m and Standar d

Mode/Me thod SigVer

Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Capabilities: Signature Type: PKCS 1.5 Properties: Modulo: 2048 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Properties: Modulo: 3072 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Properties: Modulo: 4096 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Capabilities: Signature Type: ANSI X9.31 Properties: Modulo: 2048 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Properties:

Use / Function

d Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

CAVP Cert

Algorith m and Standar d

Mode/Me thod

Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) Modulo: 3072 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Properties: Modulo: 4096 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Capabilities: Signature Type: PKCSPSS Properties: Modulo: 2048 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Salt Length: 32 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Salt Length: 48 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Salt Length: 64 Properties: Modulo: 3072 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 Salt Length: 32 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-384 Salt Length: 48 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-512 Salt Length: 64 Properties: Moduli: 4096 Hash Pair: Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256

Use / Function

d Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

d Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

d Note that no parts of the SSH, SNMPv3, IKEv1 and TLS protocols, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) as per SP 800-133r2 (vendor affirmed). The resulting generated symmetric keys and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the unmodified output from an NIST SP 800-90A DRBG. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

d Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

d Table 3

• Approved Algorithms *Note that there are algorithms, modes, and key/moduli sizes that have been CAVP-tested but are not used by any approved service of the module. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in this table are used by an approved service of the module. Table 4
• Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces The modules provide a number of physical ports/logical interfaces to the device, and the physical ports provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-3 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. The physical ports/logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following diagrams/tables: Figure 8

• PTP 820G Physical Ports Note that only one FE interface appears in the figure. With the addition of a Y-connector, the single port can be used to provide two FE interfaces. Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 5

• PTP 820G Ports and Interfaces Figure 9
• PTP 820C Physical Ports Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 6

• PTP 820C Ports and Interfaces Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 10

• PTP 820S Physical Ports Table 7
• PTP 820S Ports and Interfaces Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 11

• PTP 820C-HP Physical Ports Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 8

• PTP 820C-HP Ports and Interfaces Figure 12
• PTP820 TCC-U: N000082H005 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Physical Ports Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 9

• PTP820 TCC-U: N000082H005 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Ports and Interfaces Figure 13
• PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Physical Ports Note that only one FE interface appears in the figure. With the addition of a Y-connector, the single port can be used to provide two FE interfaces. Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 10 –PTP820 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Ports and Interfaces Figure 14

• PTP820 RMC-B: N000082H004 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Physical Ports Table 11
• PTP820 RMC-B: N000082H004 (PTP 820N and PTP 820A) Ports and Interfaces Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 15 - PTP 850C Physical Ports9 The WiFi port is disabled. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 12

• PTP 850C Ports and Interfaces Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 16 - PTP 850E Physical Ports Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 13 – PTP 850E Ports and Interfaces 4. Roles, services, and authentication The following sections provide details about roles supported by the module, how these roles are authenticated, and the services the roles are authorized to access.

The module supports several different roles, including multiple Cryptographic Officer roles and a User Configuration of the module can occur over several interfaces and at different levels depending upon the role assigned. There are multiple levels of access for a Cryptographic Officer as follows:

• Security Officer, admin, SNMP User: Entities assigned this privilege level have complete access to configure and manage the module.
• Tech, Operator, Viewer: These entities have more limited access to manage the module. For example, they can only manage the configuration of the data traffic interface. The Users of the module are the remote peers to and from which backhaul traffic is transmitted. The Users are connected over a secure session protected using the Session keys. The Session keys are established from the remote peer using the Master Key to encrypt them. Successful decryption of the Session keys by the module, authenticates the User to the module. The CO is responsible for configuring the Master Key and the User role to pass encrypted data. Once the User is authenticated to the module, encrypted data can be transferred to and from the remote peer. If the CO does not configure the data-path for encryption, the User can still send un-encrypted data (bypass mode). The following table specifies roles, with corresponding service with input and output: Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

before being allowed access to services, which requires the assumption of an authorized role. The module employs the authentication methods described in the table below to authenticate Crypto-Officers and Unauthenticated users are only able to access the module LEDs and power cycle the module. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 15 – Roles and Authentication

The services (approved and non-approved) that require operators to assume an authorized role (CryptoOfficer or User) as well as unauthenticated services are listed in the tables below. The module supports when the module is in the non-Approved mode. Please note that the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) listed below use the following indicators to show the type of access required:

• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Only available on MIPS CPU based models Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

n, Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 16

• Approved Services Table 17
• Non-Approved Services 5. Software/Firmware Security The module performs a Firmware Integrity Test using a 160-bit error detection code (EDC) at power-on. If the EDC fails to compute properly, the module enters a hard error state where all cryptographic functions are disabled. Repeated failures of the integrity test will result in a reset to the factory default state. The integrity test may be performed on-demand by power-cycling the module. The module also performs a firmware load test (RSA 4096 with SHA2-256) covering the entire binary image, when a new FW is uploaded to the module. The signature is calculated and verified upon uploading of the new FW. If the test fails, the image will be discarded. Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

6. Operational Environment FIPS 140-3 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable since the module is a hardware module with a limited operational environment. The module runs Release 12.0.1 which includes Wind River Linux 4.1.0 or 4.14 depending on the CPU architecture. The appliances have a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The appliances are contained in a hard metal chassis, which is defined as the cryptographic boundary of the module. The appliances’ chassis is opaque within the visible spectrum. The enclosure of the appliances have been designed to satisfy Level 2 physical security requirements. Each of the appliances needs Tamper Evidence Labels (TELs) to meet Security Level 2 requirements. These labels are installed (as seen in the respective model images) at the factory before delivery to the customer, for the PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP, PTP 850C and PTP 850 E. For PTP 820N and PTP820A, the CO must place the twenty (20) TELs according to Figure 21-24 (below). The preparation instructions of the module prior to installation of the tamper seals are as follows:

• Use caution to avoid touching the adhesive in such a way as to leave fingerprints and damage
• The curing time (drying time) for the labels is at least sixty minutes.
• The labels must be replaced whenever cards are added to or removed from the unit. Replacement labels can be ordered from Cambium Networks, part number BS-0341-2.
• When replacing a label, gently cut the label, replace the module, and apply a new label in place The extra tamper seals shall be in possession of the CO at all times. The CO shall observe any changes to the module such as reconfigurations where the tamper evident seals are removed or installed to ensure the security of the module is maintained during such changes and the module is returned to an Approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer shall periodically (defined by organizational security policy, recommendation is once a month) monitor the state of all applied TELs for evidence of tampering. If tamper is detected, the CO must take the device out of commission, inspect it and if deemed safe, return it to the Approved state. Table 18
• Physical Security Inspection Guidelines Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 17

• PTP 820G TEL Application Locations Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 18

• PTP 820C TEL Application Locations Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 19

• PTP 820C-HP TEL Application Locations Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 20

• PTP820S TEL Application Locations Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 21 - PTP 820N and PTP 820A Bottom Figure 22

• PTP 820N and PTP 820A Front Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 23 - PTP 820N and PTP 820A Top Figure 24

• PTP 820N and PTP 820A Back Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 25

• PTP 850C/PTP 850E TEL Application Locations Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

8. Non-invasive Security FIPS 140-3 Non-invasive Security requirements are not applicable. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

9.           Sensitive security parameter management The following table identifies each of the Keys/SSPs associated with the modules: Import/Export   Establishment Use & related Security Key/SSP Strength                    Generation                                     Storage       Zeroisation Function and Name/Type                                                                                                                        keys Cert. Number

Import/Export      Establishment Use & related Security Key/SSP Strength                    Generation                                             Storage           Zeroisation Function and Name/Type                                                                                                                                       keys Cert. Number Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025           Version Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Import/Export      Establishment Use & related Security Key/SSP Strength                    Generation                                             Storage           Zeroisation Function and Name/Type                                                                                                                                      keys Cert. Number Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025           Version Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Import/Export      Establishment Use & related Security Key/SSP Strength                    Generation                                             Storage           Zeroisation Function and Name/Type                                                                                                                                       keys Cert. Number Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025           Version Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Import/Export      Establishment Use & related Security Key/SSP Strength                    Generation                                             Storage           Zeroisation Function and Name/Type                                                                                                                                     keys Cert. Number Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025           Version Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Import/Export      Establishment Use & related Security Key/SSP Strength                     Generation                                             Storage           Zeroisation Function and Name/Type                                                                                                                                     keys Cert. Number Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025           Version Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Import/Export      Establishment Use & related Security Key/SSP Strength                    Generation                                             Storage           Zeroisation Function and Name/Type                                                                                                                                      keys Cert. Number Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025           Version Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Import/Export      Establishment Use & related Security Key/SSP Strength                     Generation                                             Storage           Zeroisation Function and Name/Type                                                                                                                                       keys Cert. Number Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025           Version Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Import/Export              Establishment Use & related Security Key/SSP Strength                    Generation                                                   Storage     Zeroisation Function and Name/Type                                                                                                                                keys Cert. Number Table 19 – SSPs Cambium Networks Ltd. © 2025           Version Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The module generates symmetric and asymmetric keys in compliance with the requirements of the FIPS 140-3 standard. Specifically, symmetric keys are generated using output of the Approved SP 800-90A DRBG and in compliance with IG D.H. Asymmetric keys are generated as part applicable key generation standards. See Table 19 for additional details.

All keys are entered into or output from the module in a secure manner. Specifically, the Session Keys are output from the module encrypted with an approved KTS using a Master Key with the AES-KW algorithm. Additionally, SSPs provisioned by an operator can be entered using an approved KTS employing AES-GCM or AES and HMAC within the SSH, TLS, or IPsec protocols. See Table 19 for additional details.

SSPs are stored in plaintext in non-volatile and volatile memory. See Table 19 for additional details.

SSPs stored in volatile memory are zeroized automatically when no longer needed. SSPs stored in nonvolatile memory are zeroized after repeated failure of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests or upon hardzeroization command issued. The zeroization will permanently erase SSPs stored in Flash by overwriting with zeroes. When zeroization occurs via power cycle or the zeroization command the module provides an indicator in the console log. When zeroization occurs via session termination the zeroization indicator is provided via session log. For CSPs that are zeroized after use, the indicator is that the service continues. If there is a zeroization error, the service in process will be terminated. See Table 19 for additional details. Table 20 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

10. Self-tests Self-tests are health checks that ensure that the cryptographic algorithms within the module are operating correctly. The self-tests identified in FIPS 140-3 broadly fall within two categories:
11. Pre-Operational Self-Tests
12. Conditional Self-Tests When the module is powered on, its power-up self-tests are executed without any operator intervention. CASTs are performed prior to first usage of an algorithm. The operator may run periodic self-tests by power-cycling the module. Conditional tests are performed when a specific condition is met, such as usage of the entropy source or generation of key-pair.

The cryptographic module performs the following Pre-Operational Self-Tests on:

• Firmware Integrity Test: 160-bit Error detection code (EDC)
• Pre-operational Bypass Test

The HW-based entropy source is conditionally tested (when entropy is consumed by any of the FW components). Tests are APT and RCT (mentioned in the SP 800-90B document). The cryptographic module performs the following conditional self-tests:

• Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests:
• Management Security Algorithms Implementation (Firmware) (Cert. #A2758):
• HMAC-SHA2-256 CAST
• SHA-1 CAST
• SHA2-512 CAST
• AES-128 ECB Decrypt CAST
• AES KeyWrap Encrypt CAST
• AES KeyWrap Decrypt CAST
• AES-256 GCM Encrypt CAST
• RSA PKCS#1 Sign/Verify CASTs
• ECDSA Sign/Verify CASTs
• DH Shared Secret Computation CAST
• ECDH Shared Secret Computation CAST
• TLS 1.2 KDF CAST
• TLS 1.3 KDF CAST
• SSH KDF CAST
• DRBG CAST
• IKE KDF Implementation (Firmware) (Cert. #A2756):
• IKE KDF CAST
• SNMP KDF Implementation (Firmware) (Cert. #A2757): Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

• SNMP KDF CAST
• Linux Kernel Crypto Implementation (Firmware) (Cert. #A2755):
• AES-256 CBC Encrypt CAST
• AES-256 CBC Decrypt CAST
• HMAC-SHA2-256 CAST
• SHA2-256 CAST
• AES Core Implementation (Hardware):
• AES-256 OFB Encrypt CAST (Cert. #AES 4014)
• AES-256 OFB Decrypt CAST (Cert. #AES 4014)
• AES-256 CTR Encrypt CAST (Cert. #A680)
• AES-256 CTR Decrypt CAST (Cert. #A680)
• Entropy Self-tests
• SP 800-90B Repetition Count Test
• SP 800-90B Adaptive Proportion Test
• SP 800-90A Health Tests
• Conditional Pair-wise Consistency Self-Tests:
• Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) for RSA
• Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) for ECDSA
• Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) for DSA
• Conditional software/firmware load test
• Firmware Load Test (RSA 4096/SHA2-256 Signature Verification)
• Conditional Bypass Test

If any of the identified POSTs fail, the module will not enter an operational state and will instead provide an error message “Failed powerOnSelfTest”. If the failure persists after power-cycle, the module will then be placed in a Default State (where all keys/CSPs are zeroized) and the Approved mode enabled flag is reset to disabled. The module will enter the non-approved mode. Event logs will be updated accordingly. If either of the SP 800-90B self-tests fail, the repeated random numbers are discarded, and an error is reported. If the PWCT fails, the key pair is discarded, and an error is reported. If the Firmware Load Test fails, the new firmware is not loaded. If the conditional Bypass self-test fails, the error is reported, and the module does not transition into or out of bypass. During execution of the self-tests, firmware loading, zeroization, and while in an error state, data output is inhibited. 11. Life-cycle assurance This section describes the configuration and administration of the cryptographic module. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

When configured as per this section of the Security Policy, the module only runs in the Approved mode of operation, with the exception of the non-Approved Services identified in Table 17. The non-Approved services described may make use of non-compliant cryptographic algorithms or plaintext data transfers. Use of these services is prohibited in an Approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer is responsible for ensuring that any of the non-Approved Services (Table 17) in Section 4.3 are not used. Once the module is properly configured as outlined below, the non-Approved Services will not be available for use.

The module hardware is shipped in sealed boxes to indicate tamper. Upon delivery, the recipient should inspect the package to verify that there has been no tampering. PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820CHP, PTP 850C, and PTP 850E have a fixed configuration with TELs applied at factory. The Crypto Officer must verify at installation time that the TELs are affixed and intact. PTP 820N, and PTP 820A have variable configurations and the CO must verify that they are configured as per one of the approved configurations identified in Section 2.1, Table 2. Moreover, the Crypto Officer must verify at installation time that the TELs are affixed and intact. The tamper evident seals installed as indicated in Section 7 is required for the module to be operated in the Approved mode of operation. Please refer to the figures in Section 7 of this document for the proper placement of TELs.

The CO must follow these steps to place the module in an Approved mode of operation. For the exact CLI command syntax or GUI instructions, please refer to the below referenced sections of the FIPS Security Configuration Guide for precise details. 1. Enable Password Enforcement to enforce password strength.

- Select Quick Configuration > Security > Access Control. - In the Password change for first login field, select Yes. - In the Enforce password strength field, select Yes. 2. Configure failure login attempts for wrong passwords to 3 attempts (default value).

- In the Failure login attempts to block user field, select the number of failed login attempts (3) that will trigger blocking. 3. For radio encryption mode, configure Master Key and enable Payload Encryption.

Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

4. Enable SNMP v3 (default) and disable SNMPv1 and v2. Add SNMP users as appropriate following the password complexity requirements specified for CO operators in Section 4 above. Ensure that “AES” and “SHA” are selected for the privacy and authentication ciphers, respectively.

- Select Quick Configuration > Security > Protocols. The Quick Configuration Security Protocols page opens (Figure 41). - In the SNMP Admin field, select Enable to enable SNMP - In the V1V2 Blocked field, select Yes to block SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 access so that only SNMPv3 access will be enabled. 5. Disable Telnet

- Select Quick Configuration > Security > Protocols. - In the Telnet Admin field, select Disable. - Click Apply. 6. Disable HTTP and enable HTTPS

- Select Quick Configuration > Security > Protocols. - In the HTTP protocol field, select HTTPS 7. [Optional step] in case of External Protection configuration (relevant for PTP 820G, PTP 820C, PTP 820S, PTP 820C-HP), enable Protection Admin and supply a pre-shared key. - 8.1 Encrypting the Protection Link 8. [Optional step] In case of TCC Redundancy (relevant for PTP 820N, PTP 820A), enable Protection Admin, and make sure TCC Protection switch mode is set to Cold Switch Over Note: Hot Switch Over (HSO) shall not be used in the Approved Mode - Web GUI: Platform > Shelf Management > Main Card Redundancy (In the TCC Protection switch mode field, select Cold Switch Over)

9. Change the default CO password - 3.4 Changing Your Password
10. Enable Approved Admin configuration, i.e., set operation mode to ‘Approved mode’. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

- 7.1 Enabling ‘Approved Mode’ Once the final step is performed the module will prompt the CO to reboot. Upon successful reboot the module will enter the Approved mode of operation. Once the module has been configured, the Approved mode status can be verified by selecting the Security Summary from the Web EMS main menu. The field for “FIPS Mode Admin” shows “enabled”. - 6 Viewing the Security Parameters

Protocols such as Telnet, RADIUS, TACACS+, HTTP, SNMPv1, and SNMPv2, Syslog, Hot Standby, NTP are not approved for use in the Approved mode and shall remain disabled. When in FIPS 140-3 compliant mode, only the following algorithms are used for SSH and TLS communications.

When in the Approved mode, the module supports only the following symmetric encryption algorithm:

• aes128-ctr
• aes192-ctr
• aes256-ctr
• aes128-gcm@openssh.com
• aes256-gcm@openssh.com The following Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm is supported in the Approved mode:
• hmac-sha1 The following key exchange algorithms are supported in the Approved mode:
• ecdh-sha2-nistp256
• ecdh-sha2-nistp384
• ecdh-sha2-nistp521
• diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
• diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
• diffie-hellman-group18-sha512

When in the Approved mode, only the following cipher suites are available for TLSv1.2 communications: •    TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 •    TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 •    TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 •    TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 •    TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 •    TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 •    TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA •    TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA •    TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

When in the Approved mode, only the following cipher suites are available for TLSv1.3 communications:

• TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

There are no specific maintenance actions required. 12. Mitigation of other attacks The module does not claim to mitigate any other attacks beyond those specified in FIPS 140-3. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).