G&D Cryptographic Module

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (62)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for G&D Cryptographic Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>HTTPS</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for G&D Cryptographic Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>HTTPS</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Guntermann & Drunck GmbH G&D Cryptographic Module Software Version: 1.1.1s.006 FIPS Security Level: 1 Document Version: 0.4 Prepared for: Prepared by: Guntermann & Drunck GmbH Corsec Security, Inc. Obere Leimbach 9 12600 Fair Lakes Circle Suite 210 Siegen 57074 Fairfax, VA 22033 Germany United States of America Phone: +49 271 238720 Phone: +1 703 267 6050 www.gdsys.com www.corsec.com

Abstract This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the G&D Cryptographic Module (software version: 1.1.1s.006) from Guntermann & Drunck GmbH (G&D). This Security Policy describes how the G&D Cryptographic Module meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3, which details the U.S. and Canadian government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program is available on the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website, which is maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This document also describes how to run the module in a secure Approved mode of operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-3 validation of the module. The G&D Cryptographic Module is referred to in this document as “G&D Cryptographic Module” or “module”. References This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-3 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:

• The G&D website (www.gdsys.com) contains information on the full line of products and solutions from Guntermann & Drunck GmbH.
• The search page on the CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/Validated-Modules/Search) can be used to locate and obtain vendor contact information for technical or sales-related questions about the module. Document Organization ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B uses the same section naming convention as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7 - Security requirements. For example, Annex B section B.2.1 is named “General” and B.2.2 is named “Cryptographic module specification,” which is the same as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7.1 and section 7.2, respectively. Therefore, the format of this Security Policy is presented in the same order as indicated in Annex B, starting with “General” and ending with “Mitigation of other attacks.” If sections are not applicable, they have been marked as such in this document. G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

1. General Guntermann & Drunck GmbH is the leading KVM1 manufacturer for control room applications. G&D offers a broad range of KVM products that have been developed over their 35 years of experience with KVMs. G&D is headquartered in Germany with G&D North America headquartered in California. The G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 is a cryptographic library embedded in the G&D KVM-over-IP application software. The G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 offers symmetric encryption/decryption, digital signature generation/verification, hashing, cryptographic key generation, random number generation, message authentication, and key establishment functions to secure data-at-rest/data-in-flight and to support secure communications protocols (including SSH2 and TLS3 1.2/1.3). The G&D Cryptographic Module is validated at the FIPS 140-3 section levels shown in Table
2. Table 1 – Security Levels ISO/IEC 24579 Section
3. FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level [Number Below]

7 Physical Security N/A

8 Non-Invasive Security N/A

12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A

The module has an overall security level of 1.

G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

2. Cryptographic Module Specification The G&D Cryptographic Module is a software module with a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The module is designed to operate within a modifiable operational environment. Additionally, the module is designed to utilize the AES-NI 4 extended instruction set when available by the host platform’s CPU for processor algorithm acceleration (PAA) of its AES implementation.

The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-3 requirements on the operational environments (OE) listed in Table 2. Table 2

• Tested Operational Environments # Operating System Hardware Platform Processor PAA/Acceleration

1 Debian 9 Dell PowerEdge R440 Intel® Xeon Silver 4214R With (AES-NI)

2 Debian 9 Dell PowerEdge R440 Intel® Xeon Silver 4214R Without

The module is also vendor affirmed on the platforms listed in Table 3 for which testing was not performed: Table 3

• Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments # Series Name Operating System Hardware Platform Processor PAA/Acceleration

1 ControlCenter-IP (2.0) series ControlCenter-IP 2.0 Marvell Armada A8040 ARM A72 With (AES, SHA2)

2 ControlCenter-IP-XS series ControlCenter-IP-XS NXP i.MX8m mini ARM A53 With (AES, SHA2)

3 VisionXS-IP series VisionXS-IP firmware v1.4 NXP i.MX8m mini ARM A53 With (AES, SHA2)

4 Vision-IP series Vision-IP firmware v2.4 NXP Freescale MPC 8308 PPC e300 Without

5 RemoteAccess IP series RemoteAccess-IP firware NXP i.MX8m ARM A53 With (AES, SHA2)

v1.3 with SecureCert The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys on these operational environments. Module operators may perform post-validation porting of the module and affirm the module’s continued validation compliance. The cryptographic module will remain compliant with the FIPS 140-3 validation on any general-purpose platform/processor that supports the specified operating system listed on the validation entry,

G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

or another compatible operating system. The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.

Validation certificates for each Approved security function are listed in Table 4. Note that there are algorithms, modes, and key/moduli sizes that have been CAVP-tested but are not used by any Approved service of the module. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in Table 4 are used by an Approved service of the module. Table 4

• Approved Algorithms CAVP Algorithm and Mode / Method Description / Key Size(s) / Use / Function Certificate5 Standard Key Strengths A4978 AES CBC7, CFB18, CFB8, 128, 192, 256 Encryption/decryption FIPS PUB6 197 CFB128, CTR9, ECB10, NIST SP 800-38A OFB11 A4978 AES CMAC12 128, 192, 256 MAC generation/verification NIST SP 800-38B A4978 AES CCM13 128, 192, 256 Encryption/decryption NIST SP 800-38C A4978 AES GCM14 (internal IV) 128, 192, 256 Encryption/decryption NIST SP 800-38D A4978 AES GMAC15 128, 192, 256 MAC eneration/verification NIST SP 800-38D A4978 AES XTS16,17,18 128, 256 Encryption/decryption NIST SP 800-38E A4978 AES KW19, KWP20 128, 192, 256 Encryption/decryption NIST SP 800-38F Vendor CKG21 - - Cryptographic key generation Affirmed NIST SP 800-133rev2

5 This table includes vendor-affirmed algorithms that are approved but CAVP testing is not yet available.

CBC

• Cipher Block Chaining

GMAC

• Galois Message Authentication Code

KWP

• Key Wrap with Padding

G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

CAVP Algorithm and Mode / Method Description / Key Size(s) / Use / Function Certificate5 Standard Key Strengths A4978 CVL22 KDF (SSH, TLS v1.0/1.1, - Key derivation NIST SP 800-135rev1 v1.2) No parts of the SSH or TLS protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. A4978 CVL KDF (TLS v1.2) - Key derivation RFC23 7627 No part of the TLS v1.2 protocol, other than the KDF, has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. A4979 CVL KDF (TLS v1.3) - Key derivation RFC 8446 No part of the TLS v1.3 protocol, other than the KDF, has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. A4978 DRBG24 Counter-based 128, 192, 256-bit AES-CTR Deterministic random bit NIST SP 800-90Arev1 generation A4978 DSA25 KeyGen 2048/224, 2048/256, Key pair generation FIPS PUB 186-4 3072/256 PQGGen 2048/224, 2048/256, Domain parameter generation 3072/256 (SHA2-224, SHA2256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512) PQGVer 2048/224, 2048/256, Domain parameter verification 3072/256 (SHA2-224, SHA2256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512) SigGen 2048/224, 2048/256, Digital signature generation 3072/256 (SHA2-224, SHA2256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512) SigVer 2048/224, 2048/256, Digital signature verification 3072/256 (SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2512) A4978 ECDSA26 KeyGen B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, Key pair generation FIPS PUB 186-4 K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, Secret generation mode: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Testing candidates KeyVer B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, Public key validation B-571, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521

DSA

• Digital Signature Algorithm

G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

CAVP Algorithm and Mode / Method Description / Key Size(s) / Use / Function Certificate5 Standard Key Strengths SigGen B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, Digital signature generation K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 (SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2384, SHA2-512) SigVer B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, Digital signature verification B-571, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 (SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2384, SHA2-512) A4978 HMAC SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2- 112 (minimum) Message authentication FIPS PUB 198-1 256, SHA2-384, SHA2512, SHA3-224, SHA3256, SHA3-384, SHA3A4978 KAS-ECC-SSC27 ephemeralUnified B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, Shared secret computation NIST SP 800-56Arev3 K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 A4978 KAS-FFC-SSC28 dhEphem 2048/224 (FB), 2048/256 NIST SP 800-56Arev3 (FC) A4978 KDA29 HKDF SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2- Key derivation NIST SP 800-56Crev2 384, SHA2-512, SHA2512/224, SHA2-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3384, SHA3-512) A4978 KTS30 AES-CCM 128, 192, 256 Key wrap/unwrap (authenticated NIST SP 800-38C encryption)31 Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength A4978 KTS AES-GCM 128, 192, 256 Key wrap/unwrap (authenticated NIST SP 800-38D encryption)32 Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength A4978 KTS AES-KW, AES-KWP 128, 192, 256 Key wrap/unwrap NIST SP 800-38F Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength

27 KAS-ECC-SSC

• Key Agreement Scheme - Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Shared Secret Computation

28 KAS-FFC-SSC

• Key Agreement Scheme - Finite Field Cryptography - Shared Secret Computation

Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES-CCM is an Approved key transport technique.

32 Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES-GCM is an Approved key transport technique.

G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

CAVP Algorithm and Mode / Method Description / Key Size(s) / Use / Function Certificate5 Standard Key Strengths A4978 KTS AES-CMAC 128, 192, 256 Key wrap/unwrap (encryption FIPS PUB 197 with message authentication)33 NIST SP 800-38B Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength A4978 KTS AES-ECB with HMAC 128, 192, 256 Key wrap/unwrap (encryption FIPS PUB 197 with message authentication)34 FIPS PUB 198-1 Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength A4978 PBKDF235 Section 5.4, option 1a SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, Password-based key derivation NIST SP 800-132 SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 A4978 RSA36 Key generation mode: 2048, 3072, 4096 Key pair generation FIPS PUB 186-4, B.3.3 Appendix B.3.3 A4978 RSA X9.31 2048, 3072, 4096 (SHA2-256, Digital signature generation FIPS PUB 186-4 SHA2-384, SHA2-512) 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096 Digital signature verification (SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2384, SHA2-512) PKCS#1 v1.5 2048, 3072, 4096 (SHA2-224, Digital signature generation SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2512) 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096 Digital signature verification (SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512) PSS37 2048, 3072, 4096 (SHA2-224, Digital signature generation SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2512) 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096 Digital signature verification (SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512) A4978 SHA-3 SHA3-224, SHA3-256, - Message digest FIPS PUB 202 SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE38-128, SHAKE-256 A4978 SHS39 SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2- - Message digest FIPS PUB 180-4 256, SHA2-384, SHA2Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES with CMAC is an Approved key transport technique.

34 Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES (in any Approved mode) with HMAC is an Approved key transport technique.

SHAKE

• Secure Hash Algorithm KECCAK

G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

CAVP Algorithm and Mode / Method Description / Key Size(s) / Use / Function Certificate5 Standard Key Strengths A4978 Triple-DES CBC, CFB1, CFB8, CFB64, 168 Decryption NIST SP 800-67 ECB, OFB NIST SP 800-38A A4978 Triple-DES CMAC 112, 168 MAC verification NIST SP 800-67 NIST SP 800-38B The vendor affirms the following cryptographic security methods:

• Cryptographic key generation
• In compliance with section 6.1 of NIST SP 800-133rev2, the module uses its Approved DRBG to generate random bits and seeds used for asymmetric key generation. The generated seed is an unmodified output from the DRBG. The cryptographic module invokes a GET command to obtain entropy for random number generation (the module requests 256 bits of entropy from the calling application per request), and then passively receives entropy from the calling application while having no knowledge of the entropy source and exercising no control over the amount or the quality of the obtained entropy. The calling application and its entropy sources are located within the operational environment inside the module’s physical perimeter but outside the cryptographic boundary. Thus, there is no assurance of the minimum strength of the generated keys. The module implements the non-Approved but allowed algorithms shown in Table 5 below. Table 5
• Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation Algorithm Caveat Use / Function AES Cert. A4978; key unwrapping; Per IG D.G. Symmetric key unwrapping RSA Cert. A4978; key unencapsulation: Per IG D.G. Asymmetric key unencapsulation G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

Algorithm Caveat Use / Function SHA-1 Cert. A4978; secure hashing Digital signature generation in TLS v1.0/1.140 Triple-DES Cert. A4978; key unwrapping; Per IG D.G. Symmetric key unwrapping The module does not implement any non-Approved algorithms in the Approved mode of operation with no security claimed. The module employs the non-Approved algorithms shown in Table 6 below. These algorithms shall not be used in the module’s Approved mode of operation. Table 6

• Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation Algorithm Use / Function AES-GCM (non-compliant when used with external IV) Authenticated encryption/decryption AES-OCB41 Authenticated encryption/decryption ANSI X9.31 RNG (with 128-bit AES core) Random number generation ARIA Encryption/decryption Blake2 Encryption/decryption Blowfish Encryption/decryption Camellia Encryption/decryption CAST, CAST5 Encryption/decryption ChaCha20 Encryption/decryption DES Encryption/decryption DH (non-compliant with key sizes below 2048 bits) Key agreement DSA (non-compliant) Digital signature generation ECDSA (non-compliant) Digital signature generation RSA (non-compliant when used with SHA-1 outside Digital signature generation the TLS protocol) DSA (non-compliant with key sizes below the Key pair generation, digital signature verification minimums Approved for Approved mode) ECDH (non-compliant with curves P-192, K-163, B- Key agreement 163, and non-NIST curves) ECDSA (non-compliant with curves P-192, K-163, B- Key pair generation, digital signature verification 163, and non-NIST curves) EdDSA42 Key pair generation, digital signature generation, digital signature verification IDEA Encryption/decryption MD2, MD4, MD5 Message digest

40 Per NIST SP 800-52, SHA-1 is allowed for generating digital signatures on ephemeral parameters within TLS v1.0/1.1.

G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

Algorithm Use / Function Poly1305 Message authentication code RC243, RC4, RC5 Encryption/decryption RIPEMD Message digest RMD160 Message digest RSA (non-compliant with non-approved/untested key Key pair generation; digital signature generation; digital sizes, and functions) signature verification; key transport SEED Encryption/decryption SM2, SM3 Message digest SM4 Encryption/decryption Triple-DES (non-compliant) Encryption; MAC generation; key wrap Whirlpool Message digest

As a software cryptographic module, the module has no physical components. The physical perimeter of the cryptographic module is defined by each host platform on which the module is installed. Figure 1 below illustrates a block diagram of a typical GPC and the module’s physical perimeter.

G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

Hardware Network DVD RAM Management Interface HDD Clock SCSI/SATA Generator Controller LEDs/LCD CPU Serial I/O Hub Audio Cache PCI/PCIe Slots USB BIOS Power Graphics PCI/PCIe Interface Controller Slots External Power Supply KEY: BIOS

• Basic Input/Output System PCIe
• PCI express Plaintext Data CPU
• Central Processing Unit HDD
• Hard Disk Drive Encrypted Data SATA
• Serial Advanced Technology Attachment DVD
• Digital Video Disc Control Input SCSI
• Small Computer System Interface USB
• Universal Serial Bus Status Output PCI
• Peripheral Component Interconnect RAM
• Random Access Memory Physical Perimeter LED
• Light Emitting Diode LCD
• Liquid Crystal Display Figure 1
• GPC Block Diagram The module’s cryptographic boundary consists of all functionalities contained within the module’s compiled source code and comprises the following components:
• libcrypto (cryptographic primitives library file)
• libssl (TLS protocol library file)
• libcrypto.hmac (an HMAC digest file for libcrypto integrity checks)
• libssl.hmac (an HMAC digest file for libssl integrity checks) The cryptographic boundary is the contiguous perimeter that surrounds all memory-mapped functionality provided by the module when loaded and stored in the host device’s memory. The module is entirely contained within the physical perimeter. Figure 2 shows the logical block diagram of the module executing in memory and its interactions with surrounding software components, as well as the module’s physical perimeter and cryptographic boundary. G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

libssl libssl.hmac Calling Application libcrypto libcrypto.hmac KEY: Cryptographic Boundary Physical Perimeter Operating System Data Input Data Output Control Input Control Output CPU Memory Storage Ports Status Output System Calls Host Device Figure 2

• Module Block Diagram (with Cryptographic Boundary)

The module supports two modes of operation: Approved and non-Approved. The module will be in Approved mode when all pre-operational self-tests have completed successfully, and only Approved services are invoked. Table 4 and Table 5 above list the Approved and allowed algorithms; Table 9 provides descriptions of the Approved services. The module can also alternate service-by-service between Approved and non-Approved modes of operation. The module will switch to the non-Approved mode upon execution of a non-Approved service. The module will switch back to the Approved mode upon execution of an Approved service. Table 6 lists the non-Approved algorithms implemented by the module; Table 10 below lists the services that constitute the non-Approved mode. When following the guidance in this document, CSPs are not shared between Approved and non-Approved services and modes of operation. G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces FIPS 140-3 defines the following logical interfaces for cryptographic modules: • Data Input • Data Output • Control Input • Control Output • Status Output As a software library, the cryptographic module has no direct access to any of the host platform’s physical ports, as it communicates only to the calling application via its well-defined API. A mapping of the FIPS-defined interfaces and the module’s ports and interfaces at the physical and logical boundaries can be found in Table
4. Note that the module does not output control information, and thus has no specified control output interface. Table 7 – Ports and Interfaces Physical Port Logical Interface Data That Passes Over Port/Interface Physical data input port(s) of Data Input • Data to be encrypted, decrypted, signed, the tested platforms • API input arguments that provide verified, or hashed input data for processing • Keys to be used in cryptographic services • Random seed material for the module’s DRBG • Keying material to be used as input to key establishment services Physical data output port(s) of Data Output • Data that has been encrypted, the tested platforms • API output arguments that return decrypted, or verified generated or processed data back • Digital signatures to the caller • Hashes • Random values generated by the module’s DRBG • Keys established using module’s key establishment methods Physical control input port(s) of Control Input • API commands invoking cryptographic the tested platforms • API input arguments that are services used to initialize and control the • Modes, key sizes, etc. used with operation of the module cryptographic services Physical status output port(s) Status Output • Status information regarding the module of the tested platforms • API call return values • Status information regarding the invoked service/operation G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

4. Roles, Services, and Authentication The sections below describe the module’s authorized roles, services, and operator authentication methods.

The module supports a Crypto Officer (CO) that authorized operators can assume. The CO role performs cryptographic initialization or management functions and general security services. The module also supports the following role(s):

• User
• The User role performs general security services, including cryptographic operations and other approved security functions. The module does not support multiple concurrent operators. The calling application that loaded the module is its only operator. Table 8 below lists the supported roles, along with the services (including input and output) available to each role. Table 8
• Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output Role Service Input Output CO Show Status API call parameters Current operational status CO Perform self-tests on-demand Re-instantiate module; API call Status parameters CO Zeroize Restart calling application; reboot None or power-cycle host platform CO Show versioning information API call parameters Module name, version User Perform symmetric encryption API call parameters, key, plaintext Status, ciphertext User Perform symmetric decryption API call parameters, key, Status, plaintext ciphertext User Generate symmetric digest API call parameters, key, plaintext Status, digest User Verify symmetric digest API call parameters, digest Status User Perform authenticated symmetric API call parameters, key, plaintext Status, ciphertext encryption User Perform authenticated symmetric API call parameters, key, Status, plaintext decryption ciphertext User Generate random number API call parameters Status, random bits User Perform keyed hash operations API call parameters, key, message Status, MAC44 User Perform hash operation API call parameters, message Status, hash User Generate DSA domain API call parameters Status, domain parameters parameters User Verify DSA domain parameters API call parameters Status, domain parameters User Generate asymmetric key pair API call parameters Status, key pair User Verify ECDSA public key API call parameters, key Status User Generate digital signature API call parameters, key, message Status, signature

G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

Role Service Input Output User Verify digital signature API call parameters, key, Status signature, message User Perform key wrap API call parameters, encryption Status, encrypted key key, key User Perform key unwrap API call parameters, decryption Status, decrypted key key, encrypted key User Compute shared secret API call parameters Status, shared secret User Derive SSH keys API call parameters, SSH master Status, SSH keys secret User Derive TLS keys API call parameters, TLS pre- Status, TLS keys master secret User Derive key via HKDF API call parameters Status, key User Derive key via PBKDF2 API call parameters, passphrase Status, key User Generate symmetric digest API call parameters, key, message Status, MAC (CMAC)

The module does not support authentication mechanisms; roles are implicitly selected based on the service invoked. Refer to Table 8 above for a listing of the services associated with each authorized role.

Descriptions of the services available to the authorized roles are provided in Table 9 below. This module is a software library that provides cryptographic functionality to calling applications. As such, the security functions provided via the module’s APIs are considered security services, and the module provides indicators for Approved security services as required by FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.C. When invoking an API for an offered security service, the calling application provides inputs (keys, key sizes, modes, etc.) that the module combines into a single, internal structure, or “context”, that drives the execution of the cryptographic service. Each security service invocation will determine if the invoked service is an Approved security service. Upon completion of the service, that context is first updated with the results of the service as well as the Approved security service indicator, and then returned to the calling application. To access the indicator value from the context, the calling application must pass the resultant context to the indicator API associated with that security function (note the indicator check must be performed before any context cleanup is performed). The indicator API will return “1” to indicate the usage of an Approved service. Indicators for services providing non-Approved security functions (as well as for services not requiring an indicator) will have a value other than “1”, ensuring that the indicators for Approved services are unambiguous. Additional details on the APIs used for the Approved service indicators are provided in Appendix B below. Please note that the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the following notation:

• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP. Table 9
• Approved Services Service Description Approved Security Function(s) Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access Rights to Keys and/or Indicator SSPs Show Status Return mode None None CO N/A N/A status Perform self- Perform pre- None None CO N/A API return value tests on- operational selfdemand tests Zeroize Zeroize and de- None All SSPs CO All SSPs
• Z N/A allocate memory containing sensitive data Show Return module None None CO N/A N/A versioning versioning information information Perform Encrypt plaintext AES (CBC, CFB1, CFB8, CFB128, CTR, AES key User AES key
• WE API return value symmetric data ECB, OFB, KW, KWP) (Cert. A4978) XTS-AES key XTS-AES key
• WE encryption XTS-AES (Cert. A4978) Perform Decrypt AES (CBC, CFB1, CFB8, CFB128, CTR, AES key User AES key
• WE API return value symmetric ciphertext data ECB, OFB, KW, KWP) (Cert. A4978) XTS-AES key XTS-AES key
• WE decryption XTS-AES (Cert. A4978) Triple-DES key Triple-DES key
• WE Triple-DES (CBC, CFB1, CFB8, CFB64, ECB, OFB) (Cert. A4978) Generate Generate AES (CMAC )(Cert. A4978) AES CMAC key User AES CMAC key
• WE API return value symmetric symmetric digest AES (GMAC) (Cert. A4978) AES GMAC key AES GMAC key
• WE digest Verify Verify symmetric AES (CMAC) (Cert. A4978) AES CMAC key User AES CMAC key
• WE API return value symmetric digest AES (GMAC) (Cert. A4978) AES GMAC key AES GMAC key
• WE digest Triple-DES CMAC (Cert. A4978) Triple-DES CMAC key Triple-DES CMAC key
• WE Perform Encrypt plaintext AES (GCM) (Cert. A4978) AES GCM key User AES GCM key
• WE API return value authenticated using supplied AES GCM IV AES GCM IV
• WE symmetric AES GCM key and encryption IV Perform Decrypt AES (GCM) (Cert. A4978) AES GCM key User AES GCM key
• WE API return value authenticated ciphertext using AES GCM IV AES GCM IV
• WE symmetric supplied AES GCM decryption key and IV Generate Return random DRBG (Cert. A4978) DRBG entropy input User DRBG entropy input
• WE API return value random bits to the calling DRBG seed DRBG seed
• GE number application DRBG ‘V’ value DRBG ‘V’ value
• GE DRBG ‘Key’ value DRBG ‘Key’ value
• GE Perform keyed Compute a HMAC (Cert. A4978) HMAC key User HMAC key
• WE API return value hash message SHA (Cert. A4978) operations authentication code Perform hash Compute a SHA (Cert. A4978) None User N/A API return value operation message digest Generate DSA Generate DSA DSA (Cert. A4978) None User N/A API return value domain domain parameters parameters Verify DSA Verify DSA DSA (Cert. A4978) None User N/A API return value domain domain parameters parameters Generate Generate a DSA (Cert. A4978) DSA public key User DSA public key
• GR API return value asymmetric public/private key ECDSA (Cert. A4978) DSA private key DSA private key
• GR key pair pair RSA (Cert. A4978) ECDSA public key ECDSA public key
• GR ECDSA private key ECDSA private key
• GR RSA public key RSA public key
• GR RSA private key RSA private key
• GR G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

Service Description Approved Security Function(s) Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access Rights to Keys and/or Indicator SSPs Verify ECDSA Verify an ECDSA ECDSA (Cert. A4978) ECDSA public key User ECDSA public key

• W API return value public key public key Generate Generate a digital RSA (Cert. A4978) RSA private key User RSA private key
• WE API return value digital signature signature Verify digital Verify a digital ECDSA (Cert. A4978) ECDSA public key User ECDSA public key
• WE API return value signature signature RSA (Cert. A4978) RSA public key RSA public key
• WE Perform key Perform key wrap KTS (Cert. A4978) AES key User AES key
• WE API return value wrap AES CMAC key AES CMAC key
• WE AES GMAC key AES GMAC key
• WE AES GCM key AES GCM key
• WE AES GCM IV AES GCM IV
• WE HMAC key HMAC key
• WE Perform key Perform key KTS (Cert. A4978) AES key User AES key
• WE API return value unwrap unwrap AES CMAC key AES CMAC key
• WE AES GMAC key AES GMAC key
• WE AES GCM key AES GCM key
• WE AES GCM IV AES GCM IV
• WE HMAC key HMAC key
• WE Triple-DES key Triple-DES key
• WE Compute Compute KAS-ECC-SSC (Cert. A4978) DH public component User DH public component
• WE API return value shared secret DH/ECDH shared KAS-FFC-SSC (Cert. A4978) DH private component DH private component
• WE secret suitable for ECDH public component ECDH public component
• WE use as input to an ECDH private ECDH private component
• WE internal TLS KDF component TLS pre-master secret
• GE TLS pre-master secret Derive SSH Derive SSH KDF (SSH) (Cert. A4978) SSH master secret User SSH master secret
• WE API return value keys session and AES key AES key
• GR integrity keys HMAC key HMAC key
• GR Derive TLS Derive TLS session KDF (TLS 1.0/1.1) (Cert. A4978) TLS pre-master secret User TLS pre-master secret
• WE API return value keys and integrity keys KDF (TLS 1.2) (Cert. A4978) TLS master secret TLS master secret
• GE KDF (TLS 1.3) (Cert. A4979) AES key AES key
• GR AES GCM key AES GCM key
• GR AES GCM IV AES GCM IV
• GR HMAC key HMAC key
• GR Derive key via Derive key from HKDF (Cert. A4978) AES key User AES key
• GR API return value HKDF HKDF Derive key via Derive key from PBKDF (Cert. A4978) Passphrase User Passphrase
• WE API return value PBKDF2 PBKDF2 AES key AES key
• GR Triple-DES key Triple-DES key
• GR *Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance 2.4.C, the Show Status, Zeroize, and Show Versioning Information services do not require an Approved security service indicator. Table 10 below lists the non-approved services available to module operators. Table 10
• Non-Approved Services Service Description Algorithm(s) Accessed Role Indicator Perform data encryption Perform symmetric data ARIA, Blake2, Blowfish, User API return value (non-compliant) encryption Camellia, CAST, CAST5, ChaCha20, DES, IDEA, RC2, RC4, RC5, SEED, SM4, TripleDES (non-compliant) Perform data decryption Perform symmetric data ARIA, Blake2, Blowfish, User API return value (non-compliant) decryption Camellia, CAST, CAST5, ChaCha20, DES, IDEA, RC2, RC4, RC5, SEED, SM4 G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

Service Description Algorithm(s) Accessed Role Indicator Perform MAC operations Perform message Poly1305, Triple-DES/CMAC User API return value (non-compliant) authentication operations (non-compliant for MAC generation) Perform hash operation (non- Perform hash operation MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD, User API return value compliant) RMD160, SM2, SM3, Whirlpool Perform digital signature Perform digital signature DSA (non-compliant), ECDSA User API return value functions (non-compliant) functions (non-compliant), EdDSA, RSA (non-compliant) Perform key encapsulation Perform key encapsulation RSA (non-compliant) User API return value (non-compliant) functions Perform key un-encapsulation Perform key un-encapsulation RSA (non-compliant) User API return value (non-compliant) functions Perform key wrap (non- Perform key wrap functions Triple-DES/CMAC (non- User API return value compliant) compliant) Perform authenticated Perform authenticated AES-OCB User API return value encryption/decryption (non- encryption/decryption compliant) Perform random number Perform random number ANSI X9.31 RNG (with 128-bit User API return value generation (non-compliant) generation AES core) Perform key pair generation Perform key pair generation DSA (non-compliant), ECDSA User API return value (non-compliant) (non-compliant), EdDSA, RSA (non-compliant) G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

5. Software/Firmware Security All software components within the cryptographic boundary are verified using an Approved integrity technique implemented within the cryptographic module itself. The module implements independent HMAC SHA2-256 digest checks to test the integrity of each library file ; failure of the integrity check on either library file will cause the module to enter a critical error state. The module’s integrity check is performed automatically at module instantiation (i.e., when the module is loaded into memory for execution) without action from the module operator. The CO can initiate the pre-operational tests on demand by re-instantiating the module or issuing the FIPS_selftest() API command. The G&D Cryptographic Module is not delivered to end-users as a standalone offering. Rather, it is a pre-built integrated component of G&D’s KVM-over-IP devices. G&D does not provide end-users with any mechanisms to directly access the module, its source code, its APIs, or any information sent to/from the module. Thus, end-users have no ability to independently load the module onto target platforms. No configuration steps are required to be performed by end-users, and no end-user action is required to initialize the module for operation. G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

6. Operational Environment The G&D Cryptographic Module comprises a software cryptographic library that executes in a modifiable operational environment. The cryptographic module has control over its own SSPs. The process and memory management functionality of the host device’s OS prevents unauthorized access to plaintext private and secret keys, intermediate key generation values and other SSPs by external processes during module execution. The module only allows access to SSPs through its well-defined API. The operational environments provide the capability to separate individual application processes from each other by preventing uncontrolled access to CSPs and uncontrolled modifications of SSPs regardless of whether this data is in the process memory or stored on persistent storage within the operational environment. Processes that are spawned by the module are owned by the module and are not owned by external processes/operators. Please refer to section 2.1 of this document for a list/description of the applicable operational environments. G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

7. Physical Security The cryptographic module is a software module and does not include physical security mechanisms. Therefore, per ISO/IEC 19790:2012(E) section 7.7.1, requirements for physical security are not applicable. G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

8. Non-Invasive Security This section is not applicable. There are currently no approved non-invasive mitigation techniques referenced in ISO/IEC 19790:2021 Annex F. G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management

The module supports the keys and other SSPs listed in Table 11. Note that all SSP import and export is electronic and is performed within the Tested OE’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP). Table 11

• SSPs Key/SSP Strength Security Function Generation Import / Export Establishment Storage Zeroization Use & Related Name/Type and Cert. Number Keys Keys AES key Between 128 AES (CBC, CCM, - Imported in plaintext Established via Not persistently Unload module; Symmetric (CSP) and 256 bits CFB, CTR, ECB, via API parameter TLS or SSH KDF stored by the Remove power encryption, OFB, KW, KWP module decryption modes) Never exported (Cert. A4978) KTS (Cert. A4978) AES GCM key Between 128 AES (GCM mode) - Imported in plaintext Established via Not persistently Unload module; Authenticated (CSP) and 256 bits (Cert. A4978) via API parameter TLS or SSH KDF stored by the Remove power symmetric module encryption, KTS Never exported decryption (Cert. A4978) XTS-AES key 128 or 256 bits AES (XTS mode) - Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; Symmetric (CSP) (Cert. A4978) via API parameter stored by the Remove power encryption, module decryption Never exported AES CMAC key Between 128 AES (CMAC mode) - Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; MAC (CSP) and 256 bits (Cert. A4978) via API parameter stored by the Remove power generation, module verification KTS Never exported (Cert. A4978) AES GMAC key Between 128 AES (GMAC mode) - Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; MAC (CSP) and 256 bits (Cert. A4978) via API parameter stored by the Remove power generation, module verification KTS Never exported (Cert. A4978) Triple-DES key - Triple-DES (CBC, - Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; Symmetric (CSP) CFB1, CFB8, via API parameter stored by the Remove power decryption; key CFB64, ECB, OFB module unwrapping modes) Never exported (Cert. A4978) KTS (Cert. A4978) Triple-DES - Triple-DES (CMAC - Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; MAC verification CMAC key mode) via API parameter stored by the Remove power (CSP) (Cert. A4978) module Never exported HMAC key 112 bits HMAC - Imported in plaintext Established via Not persistently Unload module; Keyed hash (CSP) (minimum) (Cert. A4978) via API parameter TLS or SSH KDF stored by the Remove power module KTS Never exported (Cert. A4978) G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

Key/SSP Strength Security Function Generation Import / Export Establishment Storage Zeroization Use & Related Name/Type and Cert. Number Keys DSA private key 112 or 128 bits DSA Generated via Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; Digital signature (CSP) (Cert. A4978) Approved DRBG via API parameter stored by the Remove power generation module Exported in plaintext via API parameter DSA public key 112 or 128 bits DSA Generated via Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; Digital signature (PSP) (Cert. A4978) approved DRBG via API parameter stored by the Remove power verification module Exported in plaintext via API parameter ECDSA private Between 112 ECDSA Generated via Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; Digital signature key and 256 bits (Cert. A4978) approved DRBG via API parameter stored by the Remove power generation (CSP) module Exported in plaintext via API parameter ECDSA public Between 112 ECDSA Generated via Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; Digital signature key and 256 bits (Cert. A4978) approved DRBG via API parameter stored by the Remove power verification (PSP) module Exported in plaintext via API parameter RSA private key Between 112 RSA Generated via Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; Digital signature (CSP) and 150 bits (Cert. A4978) approved DRBG via API parameter stored by the Remove power generation module KTS Exported in plaintext (Cert. A4978) via API parameter RSA public key Between 80 and RSA Generated via Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; Digital signature (PSP) 150 bits (Cert. A4978) approved DRBG via API parameter stored by the Remove power verification module KTS Exported in plaintext (Cert. A4978) via API parameter DH private 112 bits KAS-SSC-FFC Generated via Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; DH shared component (Cert. A4978) approved DRBG via API parameter stored by the Remove power secret (CSP) module computation Exported in plaintext via API parameter DH public 112 bits KAS-SSC-FFC Generated via Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; DH shared component (Cert. A4978) approved DRBG via API parameter stored by the Remove power secret (PSP) module computation Exported in plaintext via API parameter ECDH private Between 112 KAS-SSC-ECC Generated via Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; ECDH shared component and 256 bits (Cert. A4978) approved DRBG via API parameter stored by the Remove power secret (CSP) module computation Exported in plaintext via API parameter ECDH public Between 112 KAS-SSC-ECC Generated via Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; ECDH shared component and 256 bits (Cert. A4978) approved DRBG via API parameter stored by the Remove power secret (PSP) module computation Exported in plaintext via API parameter Other SSPs Passphrase - PBKDF - Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; Input to PBKDF (PSP) (Cert. A4978) via API parameter stored by the Remove power for key module derivation Never exported AES GCM IV - AES (GCM mode) Generated in - - Not persistently Unload module; Initialization (CSP) (Cert. A4978) compliance with stored by the Remove power vector for AES the provisions of a module GCM peer-to-peer industry standard protocol G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

Key/SSP Strength Security Function Generation Import / Export Establishment Storage Zeroization Use & Related Name/Type and Cert. Number Keys SSH shared - KDF (SSH) - Imported in plaintext Established via Not persistently Unload module; Derivation of secret (Cert. A4978) via API parameter ECC/FFC shared stored by the Remove power the AES key and (CSP) secret module HMAC key used Exported in plaintext computation for securing SSH via API parameter connections TLS pre-master - KDF (TLS 1.0/1.1) - Imported in plaintext Established via Not persistently Unload module; Derivation of secret (Cert. A4978) via API parameter ECC/FFC shared stored by the Remove power the TLS master (CSP) secret module secret KDF (TLS 1.2) Exported in plaintext computation (Cert. A4978) via API parameter KDF (TLS 1.3) (Cert. A4979) TLS master - KDF (TLS 1.0/1.1) - - Established via Not persistently Unload module; Derivation of secret (Cert. A4978) TLS KDF (using stored by the Remove power the AES/AES(CSP) imported TLS module GCM key and KDF (TLS 1.2) pre-master HMAC key used (Cert. A4978) secret) for securing TLS connections KDF (TLS 1.3) (Cert. A4979) DRBG entropy - DRBG - Imported in plaintext - Not persistently Unload module; Entropy material input (Cert. A4978) via API parameter45; stored by the Remove power for DRBG (CSP) module Never exported DRBG seed - DRBG Generated using - - Not persistently Unload module; Seeding material (CSP) (Cert. A4978) nonce along with stored by the Remove power for DRBG DRBG entropy module input DRBG ‘V’ value - DRBG Generated - - Not persistently Unload module; State values for (CSP) (Cert. A4978) stored by the Remove power DRBG module DRBG ‘Key’ - DRBG Generated - - Not persistently Unload module; State values for value (Cert. A4978) stored by the Remove power DRBG (CSP) module

The module implements the following Approved DRBG:

• Counter-based DRBG This DRBG is used to generate random values at the request of the calling application. Outputs from this DRBG are also used as seeds in the generation of asymmetric key pairs. The module implements the following non-Approved DRBGs (which are only available in the non-Approved mode of operation):
• Hash-based DRBG (non-compliant)
• HMAC-based DRBG (non-compliant)
• ANSI X9.31 RNG (non-Approved) The module relies on entropy input received from the calling application, which is outside of the logical cryptographic boundary. As such, there is no assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys. G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

There is no mechanism within the module’s cryptographic boundary for the persistent storage of SSPs. The module stores DRBG state values for the lifetime of the DRBG instance. The module uses SSPs passed in on the stack by the calling application and does not store these SSPs beyond the lifetime of the API call.

Maintenance, including protection and zeroization, of any keys and CSPs that exist outside the module’s cryptographic boundary are the responsibility of the end-user. For the zeroization of keys in volatile memory, module operators can unload the module from memory or reboot/power-cycle the host device.

Table 12 below specifies the module’s entropy sources. Table 12

• Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification Entropy Source(s) Minimum Number Details of Bits of Entropy Calling application 256 256 bits of seed material are provided to the module’s DRBG by the calling application. The calling application and its entropy sources are outside the module’s cryptographic boundary. The calling application shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the CTR_DRBG as shown in NIST SP 800-90Arev1, Table 3. This entropy shall be supplied by means of a callback function. The callback function must return an error if the minimum entropy strength cannot be met. G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

10. Self-Tests Both pre-operational and conditional self-tests are performed by the module. Pre-operational tests are performed between the time the cryptographic module is instantiated and before the module transitions to the operational state. Conditional self-tests are performed by the module during module operation when certain conditions exist. The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status, and the error resolutions.

The module performs the following pre-operational self-test(s):

• Software integrity test for libcrypto (using an HMAC SHA2-256 digest)
• Software integrity test for libssl (using an HMAC SHA2-256 digest)

The module performs the following conditional self-tests:

• Conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs)
• AES GCM encrypt KAT46 (128-bit)
• AES GCM decrypt KAT (128-bit)
• XTS-AES encrypt KAT (128-bit)
• XTS-AES decrypt KAT (256-bit)
• Triple-DES ECB decrypt KAT (3-Key)
• Triple-DES CMAC verify KAT (3-key)
• CRNGT47 for the entropy input
• CTR_DRBG KAT (AES, 256-bit, with derivation function)
• CTR_DRBG generate/instantiate/reseed KAT (256-bit AES)
• DSA verify KAT (P-224 and K-233 curve, SHA2-256)
• ECDSA verify KAT (P-224 and K-233 curve, SHA2-256)
• HKDF KAT
• HMAC KAT (SHA2-256)
• RSA sign KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1.5 scheme)
• RSA verify KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1.5 scheme)
• SHA KATs (SHA-1, SHA2-512, SHA3-256)
• FFC DH Shared Secret “Z” Computation KAT (2048-bit)
• ECC CDH Shared Secret “Z” Computation KAT (P-224 curve)
• PBKDF2 KAT
• SSH KDF KAT
• TLS KDF KAT (1.0/1.1, 1.2)
• TLS KDF KAT (1.3) KAT
• Known Answer Test

G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

To ensure all CASTs are performed prior to the first operational use of the associated algorithm, all CASTs are performed during the module’s initial power-up sequence. The SHA and HMAC KATs are performed prior to the pre-operational software integrity test; all other CASTs are executed after the successful completion of the software integrity test.

• Conditional pair-wise consistency tests (PCTs)
• DSA sign/verify PCT48
• ECDSA sign/verify PCT
• RSA sign/verify PCT (SHA-256)
• DH key generation PCT
• ECDH key generation PCT

The module reaches the critical error state when any self-test fails. Upon test failure, the module will set an internal flag and enter a critical error state. In this state, the module will no longer perform cryptographic services or output data over the data output interfaces. For any subsequent request for cryptographic services, the module will return a failure indicator. To recover, the module must be re-instantiated by the calling application. If the pre-operational self-tests complete successfully, then the module can resume normal operations. If the module continues to experience self-test failures after reinitializing, then the module will not be able to resume normal operations, and the CO should contact Guntermann & Drunck GmbH for assistance.

G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

11. Life-Cycle Assurance The sections below describe how to ensure the module is operating in its validated configuration, including the following:

• Procedures for secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module
• Maintenance requirements
• Administrator and non-Administrator guidance Operating the module without following the guidance herein (including the use of undocumented services) will result in non-compliant behavior and is outside the scope of this Security Policy.

As the module is an integrated component of the G&D’s KVM-over-IP devices, module operators have no ability to independently load the module onto the target platform. The module and its calling application are to install on a platform specified in section 2.1 or one where portability is maintained. G&D does not provide any mechanisms to directly access the module, its source code, its APIs, or any information sent between it and the KVM-over-IP firmware.

This module is designed to support G&D applications, and these applications are the sole consumers of the cryptographic services provided by the module. No end-user action is required to initialize the module for operation; the calling application performs any actions required to initialize the module. The pre-operational integrity test and cryptographic algorithm self-tests are performed automatically via a default entry point (DEP) when the module is loaded for execution, without any specific action from the calling application or the end-user. End-users have no means to short-circuit or bypass these actions. Failure of any of the initialization actions will result in a failure of the module to load for execution.

No setup steps are required to be performed by end-users.

There are no specific management activities required of the CO role to ensure that the module runs securely. However, if any irregular activity is noticed or the module is consistently reporting errors, then G&D Customer Support should be contacted. The following list provides additional guidance for module administrators: G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

• The fips_post_status() API can be used to determine the module’s operational status. A non-zero return value indicates that the module has passed all pre-operational self-tests and is currently in its Approved mode.
• The OpenSSL_version() API can be used to obtain the module’s versioning information. The API call will return “ExtraHop Cryptographic Module 2.0”, which correlates to the “G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006” on the module’s FIPS 140-3 validation certificate.
• The CO can initiate the pre-operational self-tests and CASTs on demand for periodic testing of the module by re-instantiating the module or issuing the FIPS_selftest() API command.

The following list provides additional policies for non-Administrators:

• The module uses PBKDF2 option 1a from section 5.4 of NIST SP 800-132.
• The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the resultant key is acceptable for module operators. The minimum iteration count shall be 1000.
• The length of the passphrase used in the PBKDF shall be of at least 20 characters, and shall consist of lower-case, upper-case, and numeric characters. The upper bound for the probability of guessing the value is estimated to be 1/6220 = 10-36, which is less than 2-112.
• Passphrases (used as an input for the PBKDF) shall not be used as cryptographic keys.
• Keys derived from passphrases may only be used in storage applications.
• The length of a single data unit encrypted or decrypted with the AES-XTS shall not exceed 2²⁰ AES blocks; that is, 16 MB of data per AES-XTS instance. An XTS instance is defined in section 4 of NIST SP 800-38E. The AES-XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices. The AES-XTS shall not be used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in transit. The module implements the check to ensure that the two AES keys used in the XTS-AES algorithm are not identical.
• AES GCM encryption is used in the context of the TLS protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3. To meet the AES GCM (key/IV) pair uniqueness requirements from NIST SP 800-38D, the module generates the IV as follows:
• For TLS v1.2, the module supports acceptable AES GCM cipher suites from section 3.3.1 of NIST SP 800-52rev2. Per scenario 1 in FIPS 140-3 IG C.H, the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288. The counter portion of the IV is strictly increasing. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, a failure in encryption will occur and a handshake to establish a new encryption key will be required. It is the responsibility of the module operator (i.e., the first party, client, or server) to trigger this handshake in accordance with RFC 5246 when this condition is encountered. G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

The module also supports internal IV generation using the module’s Approved DRBG. The IV is at least 96 bits in length per section 8.2.2 of NIST SP 800-38D. Per NIST SP 800-38D and scenario 2 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H, the DRBG generates outputs such that the (key/IV) pair collision probability is less than 2-32. In the event that power to the module is lost and subsequently restored, the calling application must ensure that any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.

• The cryptographic module’s services are designed to be provided to a calling application. Excluding the use of the NIST-defined elliptic curves as trusted third-party domain parameters, all other assurances from FIPS PUB 186-4 (including those required of the intended signatory and the signature verifier) are outside the scope of the module and are the responsibility of the calling application.
• The module performs assurances for its key agreement schemes as specified in the following sections of NIST SP 800-56Arev3:
• Section 5.5.2 (for assurances of domain parameter validity)
• Section 5.6.2.1 (for assurances required by the key pair owner) Note that several of the assurances required by the key pair owner are provided by the fact that the module itself, when acting as the key pair owner, generates the key pairs. The module includes the capability to provide the required recipient assurance of public key validity specified in section 5.6.2.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3. However, since public keys from other modules are not received directly by this module (those keys are received by the calling application), the module has no knowledge of when a public key is received. Validation of another module’s public key is the responsibility of the calling application.
• The calling application is responsible for ensuring that CSPs are not shared between approved and nonapproved services and modes of operation.
• The calling application is responsible for using entropy sources that meet the minimum security strength of 112 bits required for the CTR_DRBG as shown in NIST SP 800-90Arev1, Table 3. G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

12. Mitigation of Other Attacks This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 requirements for this validation. G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations Table 13 provides definitions for the acronyms and abbreviations used in this document. Table 13

• Acronyms and Abbreviations Term Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard ANSI American National Standards Institute API Application Programming Interface CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test CBC Cipher Block Chaining CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining - Message Authentication Code CFB Cipher Feedback CKG Cryptographic Key Generation CMAC Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CO Cryptographic Officer CPU Central Processing Unit CSP Critical Security Parameter CTR Counter CVL Component Validation List DEP Default Entry Point DES Data Encryption Standard DH Diffie-Hellman DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator DSA Digital Signature Algorithm ECB Electronic Code Book ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography ECC CDH Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cofactor Diffie-Hellman ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm FFC Finite Field Cryptography FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard GCM Galois/Counter Mode GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

Term Definition GPC General-Purpose Computer HMAC (keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code KAS Key Agreement Scheme KAT Known Answer Test KDF Key Derivation Function KTS Key Transport Scheme KW Key Wrap KWP Key Wrap with Padding MD Message Digest NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology OCB Offset Codebook OE Operational Environment OFB Output Feedback OS Operating System PBKDF Password-Based Key Derivation Function PCT Pairwise Consistency Test PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standard PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme PUB Publication RC Rivest Cipher RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SHAKE Secure Hash Algorithm KECCAK SHS Secure Hash Standard SP Special Publication SSC Shared Secret Computation SSP Sensitive Security Parameter TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard TLS Transport Layer Security TOEPP Tested OE’s Physical Perimeter XEX XOR Encrypt XOR XTS XEX-Based Tweaked-Codebook Mode with Ciphertext Stealing G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

Appendix B. Approved Service Indicators This appendix specifies the APIs that are externally accessible and return the Approved security service indicators. Synopsis #include <openssl/service_indicator.h> #include <openssl/ssl.h> int EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int DSA_get_service_indicator(DSA * ptr_dsa, DSA_MODES_t mode); int RSA_key_get_service_indicator(RSA * ptr_rsa); int PBKDF_get_service_indicator(); int EVP_Digest_get_service_indicator(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int EC_key_get_service_indicator(EC_KEY *ec_key); int CMAC_get_service_indicator(CMAC_CTX *cmac_ctx, CMAC_MODE_t mode); int HMAC_get_service_indicator(HMAC_CTX *ctx); int TLSKDF_get_service_indicator(EVP_PKEY_CTX *tls_ctx); int TLS1_3_kdf_get_service_indicator(EVP_MD *md); int TLS1_3_get_service_indicator(SSL *s); int DRBG_get_service_indicator(RAND_DRBG *drbg); Description These APIs are high-level interfaces that return the Approved security service indicator value based on the parameter(s) passed to them.

• EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for block ciphers like AES and Triple DES.
• DSA_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for the DSA algorithm and its modes. You must include the mode you want the indicator for, which is to be specified in the DSA_MODES_t enum.
• RSA_key_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for RSA algorithm and its modes.
• PBKDF_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for PBKDF usage.
• EVP_Digest_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for SHS algorithms like SHA-1 and SHAKE.
• EC_key_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for elliptic curve algorithms like ECDSA and its modes. G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

• CMAC_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for CMAC requests that use AES or Triple DES. You must include the mode you want the indicator for, which is to be specified in the CMAC_MODE_t enum.
• HMAC_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for HMAC requests and the associated SHS algorithm.
• TLSKDF_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for TLS KDF usage excluding TLS 1.3.
• TLS1_3_kdf_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for TLS 1.3 KDF usage. This function requires the ssl.h file and is used to call the TLS1_3_get_service_indicator() function because of the SSL struct requirement. You cannot call TLS1_3_get_service_indicator() directly unless you have the SSL struct that was used.
• DRBG_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for DRBG usage. Return Values Each function returns “1” when indicating the usage of approved services and “0” for non-approved security services. Notes When calling a I<get> function, always call it after the variables have been finalized but before they are freed or destroyed. Examples The code sample below provides examples of how to check the Approved security service indicators for TripleDES (3-key, in ECB mode) encryption and decryption: int 3des_indicator_test() { static EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; static EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; int outLen; unsigned char pltmp[8]; unsigned char citmp[8]; unsigned char key[] = { 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18, 19,20,21,22,23,24}; unsigned char plaintext[] = { 'e', 't', 'a', 'o', 'n', 'r', 'i', 's' }; cipher = EVP_des_ede3_ecb(); //Encrypt ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, 24); EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, citmp, &outLen, plaintext, 8); // Check the indicator G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

int NID = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx); fprintf(stdout,"EVP_des_ede3_ecb (NID %i) encrypt indicator = %i\n", NID, EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator(ctx)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); //Decrypt ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, 24); EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, pltmp, &outLen, citmp, 8); // Check the indicator fprintf(stdout,"EVP_des_ede3_ecb (NID %i) decrypt indicator = %i\n", NID, EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator(ctx)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); } G&D Cryptographic Module 1.1.1s.006 ©2025 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH

Prepared by: Corsec Security, Inc.

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