Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (84)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback services<br/><i>Error State</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Symmetric Encryption with AES<br/>Symmetric Decryption with AES<br/>Show Status</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>HTTPS<br/>library named: gnutls</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Trusted code is reachable<br/>through update and<br/>recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery / rollback services<br/><i>Error State</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Symmetric Encryption with AES<br/>Symmetric Decryption with AES<br/>Show Status</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>HTTPS<br/>library named: gnutls</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3 clueHigh;
  class C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Amazon Web Services, Inc. Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Document Version 1.2 Last update: 2025-04-29 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table of Contents © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module List of Tables © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module List of Figures © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version 3.8.0-f3d7c0863662248d of the Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 1 module.

This Security Policy describes the features and design of the module named GnuTLS Cryptographic Module using the terminology contained in the FIPS 140-3 specification. The FIPS 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Module specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive but unclassified information. The NIST/CCCS Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) validates cryptographic module to FIPS 140-3. Validated products are accepted by the Federal agencies of both the USA and Canada for the protection of sensitive or designated information. including this notice. Other documentation is proprietary to their authors. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module consolidated into this document by atsec information security together with other vendor-supplied documentation. In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation for consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained. The further refining of the Security Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the conformance testing, wherein the Security Policy was submitted to the vendor, who would then edit, modify, and add technical contents. The vendor would also supply additional documentation, which the laboratory formatted into the existing Security Policy, and resubmitted to the vendor for their final editing. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

Purpose and Use: The Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a cryptographic module that provides cryptographic services to applications running in the user space of the underlying operating system through a C language Application Program Interface (API). Module Type: Software Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand Module Characteristics: Cryptographic Boundary: The block diagram in Figure 1 shows the cryptographic boundary of the module, its interfaces with the operational environment, and the flow of information within the module and between the module and operator (depicted through the arrows). The module components consist of the libgnutls.so.30, libnettle.so.8, libhogweed.so.6, and libgmp.so.10, which are verified by computing their HMAC values and comparing the computed value with the stored .libgnutls.so.30.hmac, .libnettle.so.8.hmac, .libhogweed.so.6.hmac, and .libgmp.so.10.hmac values. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): Figure 1: Block Diagram

Tested Module Identification

• Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Module Identification
• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): N/A N/A © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module N/A N/A N/A Table 2: Tested Module Identification

• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) Tested Module Identification
• Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: The module has been tested on the following platforms with the corresponding module variants and configuration options with and without PAA: N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module.

The module does not claim any excluded components.

Modes List and Description: © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module NonApproved Table 4: Modes List and Description only be transitioned into the non-approved mode by calling one of the non-approved services listed in the NonApproved Services table. Please see Section 4 or the details on service indicator provided by the module that identifies when an approved service is called. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Table 5: Approved Algorithms Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: curves 5.1, 5.2 Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Compliance:SP80090ARev1 © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 9: Security Function Implementations

The TLS protocol implementation provides both server and client sides. To operate in the approved mode, digital certificates used for server and client authentication shall comply with the restrictions of key size and message digest algorithms imposed by [SP800-131Ar2].

The AES algorithm in XTS mode can be only used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices, as specified in [SP800-38E]. The length of a single data unit encrypted with the XTS-AES shall not exceed 2²⁰ AES blocks, that is 16MB of data. To meet the requirement stated in IG C.I, the module implements a check that ensures, before performing any cryptographic operation, that the two AES keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical. Note: AES-XTS shall be used with 128 and 256-bit keys only. AES-XTS with 192-bit keys is not an approved algorithm.

The module implements AES GCM for being used in the TLS v1.2 and v1.3 protocols. AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with [FIPS140-3_IG] IG C.H for both protocols as follows:

• For TLS v1.2, IV generation is in compliance with scenario 1.a of IG C.H and [RFC5288]. The module supports acceptable AES-GCM ciphersuites from section 3.3.1 of [SP800-52r2]. For TLS v1.3, IV generation is in compliance with scenario 5 of IG C.H and [RFC8446]. The module supports acceptable AES-GCM ciphersuites from section 3.3.1 of [SP800-52r2]. The IV generated in both scenarios is only used within the context of the TLS protocol implementation. The nonce_explicit part of the IV does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key. The design of the TLS protocol in this module implicitly ensures that the nonce_explicit, or counter portion of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values. In the event the module’s power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption or decryption shall be established. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

The module provides password-based key derivation (PBKDF), compliant with [SP800-132]. The module supports option 1a from section 5.4 of [SP800-132], in which the Master Key (MK) or a segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK). In accordance with [SP800-132], the module ensures that the following requirements are met when running the PBKDF approved service.

• The length of the MK or DPK is 112 bits or more. A portion of the salt, with a length of at least 128 bits (it shall be generated randomly using the [SP80090Ar1] DRBG). The minimum value of the iteration count is 1000 (the iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users). The length of the password or passphrase is of at least 20 characters (it shall consist of lower-case, upper-case and numeric characters). The probability of guessing the value is estimated to be 1/62 20 = 1036, which is less than 2 -112. If the password or passphrase only consists of numeric characters, the probability of guessing the value is estimated to be 10 -20. Passwords or passphrases, used as an input for the PBKDF, shall not be used as cryptographic keys. Derived keys shall only be used in storage applications. The Master Key (MK) shall not be used for other purposes. The calling application shall also observe the rest of the requirements and recommendations specified in [SP800132].

The module offers DH and ECDH shared secret computation services compliant to the [SP800-56Ar3] and meeting IG D.F scenario 2 path (1) and path (2). To meet the required assurances listed in section 5.6 of [SP80056Ar3], the module shall be used together with an application that implements the "TLS protocol" and the following steps shall be performed. 1. 2. 3. The entity using the module, must use the module's "Asymmetric Key Generation" service for generating DH/ECDH ephemeral keys. This meets the assurances required by key pair owner defined in the section 5.6.2.1 of [SP800-56Ar3]. As part of the module's shared secret computation (SSC) service, the module internally performs the public key validation on the peer's public key passed in as input to the SSC function. This meets the public key validity assurance required by the sections 5.6.2.2.1/5.6.2.2.2 of [SP800-56Ar3]. The module does not support static keys therefore the "assurance of peer's possession of private key" is not applicable.

Table 10: Entropy Certificates © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 11: Entropy Sources The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90Ar1] for the creation of seeds for symmetric keys, asymmetric keys, random numbers for security functions (e.g. ECDSA signature generation), and server and client random numbers for the TLS protocol. In addition, the module provides a Random Number Generation service to calling applications. The DRBG supports the CTR_DRBG with AES-256, without a derivation function and without prediction resistance. The module uses an [SP800-90B]-compliant entropy source specified in the Entropy Sources table. This entropy source is located within the physical perimeter, but outside of the cryptographic boundary of the module. The module obtains 384 bits to seed the DRBG, and 256 bits to reseed it, sufficient to provide a DRBG with 256 bits of security strength.

The module implements key generation methods according to SP 800-133r2 section 4 example 1, without the use of V. The key generation methods are specified in the Vendor Affirmed Algorithms table and the Security Function Implementations table. Additionally, the module implements key derivation methods according to section 6.2 of SP 800-133r2. The key derivation methods are specified in the Security Function Implementations table.

The module implements SSP agreement, compliant with IG D.F scenario 2(1) and scenario 2(2). Additionally, the module implements SSP transport, compliant with IG D.G. The Key Establishment methods are specified in the Security Function Implementations table.

The module implements KDF for the TLS protocol TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2. No parts of the TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2, other than the key derivation functions mentioned above, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. The module implements HKDF for the TLS protocol TLSv1.3. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 12: Ports and Interfaces © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

Table 13: Roles The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly and always assumed by the operator of the module. No support is provided for multiple concurrent operators.

- Modulegenerated G W,E W,E - Modulegenerated - Modulegenerated © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module - Modulegenerated G,R - Modulegenerated G,R - Modulegenerated EC DiffieHellman G,R - Modulegenerated EC DiffieHellman G,R - Modulegenerated DiffieHellman G - Modulegenerated DiffieHellman G W,E © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module W,E W,E G,E G,E W,E W,E - DiffieHellman © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module W,E EC DiffiePerform - EC DiffieHellman W,E - EC DiffieHellman W,E passwordbased key W,E,Z G,R W,E W,E - ModuleHMAC © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module G,E - Modulewith RSA DiffieSignature G,E - ModuleSignature Diffiewith RSA G,E N/A N/A - Modulegenerated - Modulegenerated Z - Modulegenerated - Modulegenerated © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module - Modulegenerated Z Z - Modulegenerated DiffieHellman - Modulegenerated DiffieHellman Z - DiffieHellman - DiffieHellman Z - Modulegenerated EC DiffieHellman - Modulegenerated EC DiffieHellman Z - EC DiffieHellman - EC DiffieHellman Z - (DiffieHellman) - (EC DiffieHellman) © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Z Z - TLS Premaster © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 14: Approved Services The following convention is used to specify access rights to a SSP:

• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. N/A: the calling application does not access any SSP or key during its operation. The details of the approved cryptographic algorithms including the CAVP certificate numbers can be found in the Approved Algorithms table. The “Indicator” column shows the service indicator API functions that must be used to verify the service indicator for each of the services. The function gnutls_fips140_get_operation_state() indicates GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_NOT_APPROVED or GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED depending on whether the API invoked corresponds to an approved or non-approved algorithm.

© 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

The module does not support loading software or firmware from an external source. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

The integrity of the module is verified by comparing an HMAC-SHA2-256 value calculated at run time with the HMAC value stored in the .hmac file that was computed at build time for each software component of the module listed in Section 2. If the HMAC values do not match, the test fails, and the module enters the Error state.

The module provides the Self-Test service to perform self-tests on demand which includes the pre-operational test (i.e., integrity test) and the cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs). The Self-Tests service can be called on demand by invoking the gnutls_fips140_run_self_tests() function which will perform integrity tests and the CASTs. Additionally, the Self-Test service can be invoked by powering-off and reloading the module. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are not available, and no data output is possible. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable How Requirements are Satisfied: the module executes on a general-purpose operating system (Amazon Linux 2023), which allows modification, loading, and execution of software that is not part of the validated module. The module should be compiled and installed as stated in Section 11.1.

Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace, userspace live patching, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-validated operational environment.

The operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

The module is comprised of software only, and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism, and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

Table 16: Storage Areas Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods form within the physical perimeter of the operational environment. This is allowed by [FIPS140-3_IG] IG 9.5.A, according to the “CM Software to/from App via TOEPP Path” entry in the Key Establishment Table. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module longer needed Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods All data output is inhibited during zeroization. Modulegenerated © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Modulegenerated Modulegenerated © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module EC DiffieHellman EC DiffieHellman (DiffieHellman) (EC DiffieHellman) © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 19: SSP Table 1 © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 20: SSP Table 2

The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes, starting January 1, 2031. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module The ECDSA, and RSA algorithms as implemented by the module conform to FIPS 186-4, which has been superseded by FIPS 186-5. The transition started on July 25, 2023, and ended on February 4, 2024. FIPS 186-4 was withdrawn on February 3, 2024. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests The module performs the pre-operational self-test and CASTs automatically when the module is loaded into memory. The pre-operational self-test ensure that the module is not corrupted, and the CASTs ensure that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. The module is not available for use by the calling application until the pre-operational test and CASTs are completed successfully. After the pre-operational test and the CASTs succeed, the module becomes operational. If the pre-operational test or any of the CASTs fail, an error message is returned, and the module transitions to the Error state.

© 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests

Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

Table 25: Error States In the Error state, the output interface is inhibited, and the module accepts no more inputs or requests (as the module is no longer running). The calling application can obtain the module state by calling the gnutls_fips140_get_operation_state() API function. A complete list of the error codes can be found in Appendix C “Error Codes and Descriptions” in the gnutls.pdf provided with the module's code.

The module provides the Self-Test service to perform self-tests on demand which includes the pre-operational test (i.e., integrity test) and CASTs. The Self-Tests service can be called on demand by invoking the gnutls_fips140_run_self_tests() function which will perform integrity tests and the cryptographic algorithms self-tests. Additionally, the Self-Test service can be invoked by powering-off and reloading the module. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are not available, and no data output is possible. The PCTs can be invoked on demand by requesting the Asymmetric Key Generation service. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

Before the RPM packages are installed, the Amazon Linux 2023 system must operate in the FIPS validated configuration. To achieve this, the Crypto Officer must ensure that the crypto-policies utilities are installed and up to date by executing sudo dnf -y install crypto-policies crypto-policies-scripts. Then, the Crypto Officer must execute the sudo fips-mode-setup --enable command, then, restart the system by executing sudo reboot. The Crypto Officer must verify the Amazon Linux 2023 system operates in the FIPS validated configuration by executing the sudo fips-mode-setup --check command, which should output “FIPS mode is enabled.” Once the operating environment is booted in FIPS validated configuration, the Crypto Officer can install the Amazon packages containing the module using the Yellowdog Updater Modified (yum) with the following commands: $ sudo yum install gnutls-3.8.0-376.amzn2023.0.2 $ sudo yum install gmp-6.2.1-2.amzn2023.0.2 $ sudo yum install nettle-3.8-1.amzn2023.0.2 Note: libhogweed is provided by nettle-3.8-1.amzn2023.0.2. All the Amazon packages are associated with hashes for integrity check. The integrity of the Amazon package is automatically verified by the packing tool during the installation of the module. The Crypto Officer shall not install the package if the integrity fails.

The Crypto Officer shall follow this Security Policy to configure the operational environment and install the module to be operated in the approved mode. The module cannot use the following environment variables:

• GNUTLS_NO_EXPLICIT_INIT GNUTLS_SKIP_FIPS_INTEGRITY_CHECKS The module can only be used with the cryptographic algorithms provided. Therefore, the following API functions are forbidden in the approved mode of operation:
• gnutls_crypto_register_cipher gnutls_crypto_register_aead_cipher gnutls_crypto_register_mac gnutls_crypto_register_digest gnutls_privkey_import_ext4 The “Show Module Name and Version” service returns the value “fips-module-name: Amazon Linux 2023 gnutls” “fips-module-version: 3.8.0-f3d7c0863662248d” © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

There is no non-administrator guidance.

As the module does not persistently store SSPs, secure sanitization of the module consists of unloading the module. This will zeroize all SSPs in volatile memory. Then, if desired, the gnutls-3.8.0-376.amzn2023.0.2, gmp-6.2.1-2.amzn2023.0.2, nettle-3.8-1.amzn2023.0.2 RPM packages can be uninstalled from the Amazon Linux 2023 systems. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

The module does not mitigate other attacks. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Appendix A. TLS Cipher Suites The module supports the following cipher suites for the TLS protocol version 1.0, 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, compliant with section 3.3.1 of [SP800-52rev2]. Each cipher suite defines the key exchange algorithm, the bulk encryption algorithm (including the symmetric key size) and the MAC algorithm. © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Appendix B. Glossary and Abbreviations AES Advanced Encryption Standard AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CBC Cipher Block Chaining CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code CFB Cipher Feedback CKG Cryptographic Key Generation CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CSP Critical Security Parameter CTR Counter Mode DES Data Encryption Standard DF Derivation Function DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB Electronic Code Book ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography FFC Finite Field Cryptography FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication GCM Galois Counter Mode GMAC Galois Counter Mode Message Authentication Code HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code KAS Key Agreement Scheme KAT Known Answer Test MAC Message Authentication Code NIST National Institute of Science and Technology OFB Output Feedback PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration PAI Processor Algorithm Implementation PBKDF2 Password-based Key Derivation Function v2 PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module PCT Pairwise Consistency Test PR Prediction Resistance RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SHS Secure Hash Standard © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module Appendix C. References FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program January 2024 https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) August 2015 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) July 2013 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf FIPS186-5 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) February 2023 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard November 2001 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 2008 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf FIPS202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions August 2015 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 February 2003 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques December 2001 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication May 2005 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38b.pdf SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality May 2004 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC November 2007 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38d.pdf SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices January 2010 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf SP800-52r2 NIST Special Publication 800-52 Revision 2 - Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations August 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-52r2.pdf SP800-56Ar3 NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3 - Recommendation for Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography April 2018 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3 SP800-56Cr2 Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion August 2020 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2 SP800-57r5 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5 - Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General May 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf SP800-90Ar1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators June 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1 © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Amazon Linux 2023 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module SP800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation January 2018 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90B SP800-131Ar2 NIST Special Publication 800-131 Revision 2 - Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132 - Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation - Part 1: Storage Applications December 2010 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-132/nist-sp800-132.pdf SP800-133r2 NIST Special Publication 800-133 - Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation June 2020 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-133r2 SP800-135r1 NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions December 2011 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-135r1.pdf SP800-140B NIST Special Publication 800-140B - CMVP Security Policy Requirements March 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140B.pdf © 2025 Amazon Web Services, Inc./atsec information security.

Referenced URLs

• www.atsec.com
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
• http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
• http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
• http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf
• http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38b.pdf
• http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38d.pdf
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-52r2.pdf
• https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3
• https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf
• http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1
• https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90B
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-132/nist-sp800-132.pdf
• https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-133r2
• http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-135r1.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140B.pdf