Ergotron Cryptographic Module

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (62)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Ergotron Cryptographic Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>HTTPS</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Ergotron Cryptographic Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>HTTPS</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Ergotron, Inc. Ergotron Cryptographic Module Software Version: 1.0 FIPS Security Level: 1 Document Version: 0.2 Prepared for: Prepared by: Ergotron, Inc. Corsec Security, Inc.

1181 Trapp Road 12600 Fair Lakes Circle Suite 210

Eagan, MN 55121 Fairfax, VA 22033 United States of America United States of America Phone: +1 655 681 7600 Phone: +1 703 267 6050 www.ergotron.com/en-us/ www.corsec.com

Abstract This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Ergotron Cryptographic Module (software version: v1.0) from Ergotron, Inc. (Ergotron). This Security Policy describes how the Ergotron Cryptographic Module meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3, which details the U.S. and Canadian government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program is available on the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website, which is maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This document also describes how to run the module in a secure Approved mode of operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-3 validation of the module. The Ergotron Cryptographic Module is referred to in this document as “Ergotron Cryptographic Module” or “module”. References This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-3 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:

• The Ergotron website (www.ergotron.com/en-us/ ) contains information on the full line of products and solutions from Ergotron, Inc..
• The search page on the CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/Validated-Modules/Search) can be used to locate and obtain vendor contact information for technical or sales-related questions about the module. Document Organization ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B uses the same section naming convention as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7 - Security requirements. For example, Annex B section B.2.1 is named “General” and B.2.2 is named “Cryptographic module specification,” which is the same as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7.1 and section 7.2, respectively. Therefore, the format of this Security Policy is presented in the same order as indicated in Annex B, starting with “General” and ending with “Mitigation of other attacks.” If sections are not applicable, they have been marked as such in this document. Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

Ergotron, Inc. manufactures ergonomic solutions for the workplace, including workflow solutions for healthcare and asset control software. The Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 is a cryptographic library embedded in the following Ergotron products: • Ergotron Mobile Power • RhythmConnect • Mosaic Charging System • YES Charging System • ZIP Charging System • Mosaic • Encore 2.0 • Envoy 2.0 The Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 offers symmetric encryption/decryption, digital signature generation/verification, hashing, cryptographic key generation, random number generation, message authentication, and key establishment functions to secure data-at-rest/data-in-flight and to support secure communications protocols (including SSH1 and TLS2 1.2/1.3). The Ergotron Cryptographic Module is validated at the FIPS 140-3 section levels shown in Table

1. Table 1 – Security Levels The module has an overall security level of
2. SSH – Secure Shell

2 TLS – Transport Layer Security

2. Cryptographic Module Specification The Ergotron Cryptographic Module is a software module with a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The module is designed to operate within a modifiable operational environment. Additionally, the module is designed to utilize the AES-NI 3 extended instruction set when available by the host platform’s CPU for processor algorithm acceleration (PAA) of its AES implementation.

The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-3 requirements on the operational environments (OE) listed in Table 2. Table 2 – Tested Operational Environments There are no vendor-affirmed operational environments claimed. Module operators may perform post-validation porting of the module and affirm the module’s continued validation compliance. The cryptographic module will remain compliant with the FIPS 140-3 validation on any general-purpose platform/processor that supports the specified operating system listed on the validation entry, or another compatible operating system. The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.

Validation certificates for each Approved security function are listed in Table 3. Note that there are algorithms, modes, and key/moduli sizes that have been CAVP-tested but are not used by any Approved service of the module. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in Table 3 are used by an Approved service of the module.

3 AES-NI – Advanced Encryption Algorithm New Instructions

Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

4 This table includes vendor-affirmed algorithms that are approved but CAVP testing is not yet available.

5 PUB – Publication

6 CBC – Cipher Block Chaining

7 CFB – Cipher Feedback

8 CTR – Counter

ECB – Electronic Code Book

10 OFB – Output Feedback

11 CMAC – Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code

12 CCM – Counter with Cipher Block Chaining - Message Authentication Code

GCM – Galois Counter Mode

14 GMAC – Galois Message Authentication Code

15 XOR – Exclusive OR

16 XEX – XOR Encrypt XOR

XTS – XEX-Based Tweaked-Codebook Mode with Ciphertext Stealing

18 KW – Key Wrap

19 KWP – Key Wrap with Padding

21 CVL – Component Validation List

TLS – Transport Layer Security

23 RFC – Request for Comments

Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

24 DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator

26 ECDSA – Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

27 KAS-ECC-SSC – Key Agreement Scheme - Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Shared Secret Computation

KAS-FFC-SSC – Key Agreement Scheme - Finite Field Cryptography - Shared Secret Computation

30 KTS – Key Transport Scheme

31 Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES-CCM is an Approved key transport technique.

32 Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES-GCM is an Approved key transport technique.

Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES with CMAC is an Approved key transport technique.

34 Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.G, AES (in any Approved mode) with HMAC is an Approved key transport technique.

Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

The vendor affirms the following cryptographic security methods:

• Cryptographic key generation
• In compliance with section 6.1 of NIST SP 800-133rev2, the module uses its Approved DRBG to generate random bits and seeds used for asymmetric key generation. The generated

36 RSA – Rivest Shamir Adleman

37 PSS – Probabilistic Signature Scheme

SHAKE – Secure Hash Algorithm KECCAK

39 SHS – Secure Hash Standard

Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

seed is an unmodified output from the DRBG. The cryptographic module invokes a GET command to obtain entropy for random number generation (the module requests 256 bits of entropy from the calling application per request), and then passively receives entropy from the calling application while having no knowledge of the entropy source and exercising no control over the amount or the quality of the obtained entropy. The calling application and its entropy sources are located within the operational environment inside the module’s physical perimeter but outside the cryptographic boundary. Thus, there is no assurance of the minimum strength of the generated keys. The module implements the non-Approved but allowed algorithms shown in Table 4 below. Table 4

• Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation The module does not implement any non-Approved algorithms in the Approved mode of operation with no security claimed. The module employs the non-Approved algorithms shown in Table 5 below. These algorithms shall not be used in the module’s Approved mode of operation. Table 5
• Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation Per NIST SP 800-52, SHA-1 is allowed for generating digital signatures on ephemeral parameters within TLS v1.0/1.1.

41 OCB – Offset Codebook

Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

As a software cryptographic module, the module has no physical components. The physical perimeter of the cryptographic module is defined by each host platform on which the module is installed. Figure 1 below illustrates a block diagram of a typical GPC and the module’s physical perimeter. EdDSA – Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm

43 RC – Rivest Cipher

Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

Hardware                               Network                           DVD RAM Management                              Interface HDD Clock                                                         SCSI/SATA Generator                                                      Controller LEDs/LCD CPU                                                                              Serial I/O Hub Audio Cache                 PCI/PCIe Slots                                                       USB BIOS Power             Graphics                                               PCI/PCIe Interface           Controller                                              Slots External Power Supply KEY: BIOS – Basic Input/Output System               PCIe – PCI express Plaintext Data             CPU – Central Processing Unit                  HDD – Hard Disk Drive Encrypted Data             SATA – Serial Advanced Technology Attachment   DVD – Digital Video Disc Control Input              SCSI – Small Computer System Interface         USB – Universal Serial Bus Status Output              PCI – Peripheral Component Interconnect        RAM – Random Access Memory Physical Perimeter         LED – Light Emitting Diode                     LCD – Liquid Crystal Display Figure 1 – GPC Block Diagram The module’s cryptographic boundary consists of all functionalities contained within the module’s compiled source code and comprises the following components: •    libcrypto (cryptographic primitives library file) •    libssl (TLS protocol library file) •    libcrypto.hmac (an HMAC digest file for libcrypto integrity checks) •    libssl.hmac (an HMAC digest file for libssl integrity checks) The cryptographic boundary is the contiguous perimeter that surrounds all memory-mapped functionality provided by the module when loaded and stored in the host device’s memory. The module is entirely contained within the physical perimeter. Figure 2 shows the logical block diagram of the module executing in memory and its interactions with surrounding software components, as well as the module’s physical perimeter and cryptographic boundary. Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

libssl libssl.hmac Calling Application libcrypto libcrypto.hmac KEY: Cryptographic Boundary Physical Perimeter Operating System Data Input Data Output Control Input Control Output CPU Memory Storage Ports Status Output System Calls Host Device Figure 2 – Module Block Diagram (with Cryptographic Boundary)

The module supports two modes of operation: Approved and non-Approved. The module will be in Approved mode when all pre-operational self-tests have completed successfully, and only Approved services are invoked. Table 3 and Table 4 above list the Approved and allowed algorithms; Table 8 provides descriptions of the Approved services. The module can also alternate service-by-service between Approved and non-Approved modes of operation. The module will switch to the non-Approved mode upon execution of a non-Approved service. The module will switch back to the Approved mode upon execution of an Approved service. Table 5 lists the non-Approved algorithms implemented by the module; Table 9 below lists the services that constitute the non-Approved mode. When following the guidance in this document, CSPs are not shared between Approved and non-Approved services and modes of operation. Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

FIPS 140-3 defines the following logical interfaces for cryptographic modules: As a software library, the cryptographic module has no direct access to any of the host platform’s physical ports, as it communicates only to the calling application via its well-defined API. A mapping of the FIPS-defined interfaces and the module’s ports and interfaces at the physical and logical boundaries can be found in Table 6. Note that Table 6 – Ports and Interfaces ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

4. Roles, Services, and Authentication The sections below describe the module’s authorized roles, services, and operator authentication methods.

The module supports a Crypto Officer (CO) that authorized operators can assume. The CO role performs cryptographic initialization or management functions and general security services. The module also supports the following role(s):

• User
• The User role performs general security services, including cryptographic operations and other approved security functions. The module does not support multiple concurrent operators. The calling application that loaded the module is its only operator. Table 7 below lists the supported roles, along with the services (including input and output) available to each role. Table 7
• Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output

44 MAC – Message Authentication Code

Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

The module does not support authentication mechanisms; roles are implicitly selected based on the service invoked. Refer to Table 7 above for a listing of the services associated with each authorized role.

Descriptions of the services available to the authorized roles are provided in Table 8 below. This module is a software library that provides cryptographic functionality to calling applications. As such, the security functions provided via the module’s APIs are considered security services, and the module provides indicators for Approved security services as required by FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.C. When invoking an API for an offered security service, the calling application provides inputs (keys, key sizes, modes, etc.) that the module combines into a single, internal structure, or “context”, that drives the execution of the cryptographic service. Each security service invocation will determine if the invoked service is an Approved security service. Upon completion of the service, that context is first updated with the results of the service as well as the Approved security service indicator, and then returned to the calling application. To access the indicator value from the context, the calling application must pass the resultant context to the indicator API associated with that security function (note the indicator check must be performed before any context cleanup is performed). The indicator API will return “1” to indicate the usage of an Approved service. Indicators for services providing non-Approved security functions (as well as for services not requiring an indicator) will have a value other than “1”, ensuring that the indicators for Approved services are unambiguous. Additional details on the APIs used for the Approved service indicators are provided in Appendix B below. Please note that the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the following notation:

• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Table 8
• Approved Services Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

*Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance 2.4.C, the Show Status, Zeroize, and Show Versioning Information services do not require an Approved security Table 9 below lists the non-approved services available to module operators. Table 9 – Non-Approved Services Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

5. Software/Firmware Security All software components within the cryptographic boundary are verified using an Approved integrity technique implemented within the cryptographic module itself. The module implements independent HMAC SHA2-256 digest checks to test the integrity of each library file ; failure of the integrity check on either library file will cause the module to enter a critical error state. The module’s integrity check is performed automatically at module instantiation (i.e., when the module is loaded into memory for execution) without action from the module operator. The CO can initiate the pre-operational tests on demand by re-instantiating the module or issuing the FIPS_selftest() API command. The Ergotron Cryptographic Module is not delivered to end-users as a standalone offering. Rather, it is a pre-built integrated component of Ergotron’s products. Ergotron does not provide end-users with any mechanisms to directly access the module, its source code, its APIs, or any information sent to/from the module. Thus, end-users have no ability to independently load the module onto target platforms. No configuration steps are required to be performed by end-users, and no end-user action is required to initialize the module for operation. Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

6. Operational Environment The Ergotron Cryptographic Module comprises a software cryptographic library that executes in a modifiable operational environment. The cryptographic module has control over its own SSPs. The process and memory management functionality of the host device’s OS prevents unauthorized access to plaintext private and secret keys, intermediate key generation values and other SSPs by external processes during module execution. The module only allows access to SSPs through its well-defined API. The operational environments provide the capability to separate individual application processes from each other by preventing uncontrolled access to CSPs and uncontrolled modifications of SSPs regardless of whether this data is in the process memory or stored on persistent storage within the operational environment. Processes that are spawned by the module are owned by the module and are not owned by external processes/operators. Please refer to section 2.1 of this document for a list/description of the applicable operational environments. Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

7. Physical Security The cryptographic module is a software module and does not include physical security mechanisms. Therefore, per ISO/IEC 19790:2012(E) section 7.7.1, requirements for physical security are not applicable. Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

8. Non-Invasive Security This section is not applicable. There are currently no approved non-invasive mitigation techniques referenced in ISO/IEC 19790:2021 Annex F. Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

The module supports the keys and other SSPs listed in Table 10. Note that all SSP import and export is electronic and is performed within the Tested OE’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP). Table 10 – SSPs Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

The module implements the following Approved DRBG:

• Counter-based DRBG This DRBG is used to generate random values at the request of the calling application. Outputs from this DRBG are also used as seeds in the generation of asymmetric key pairs. The module implements the following non-Approved DRBGs (which are only available in the non-Approved mode of operation):
• Hash-based DRBG (non-compliant)
• HMAC-based DRBG (non-compliant)
• ANSI X9.31 RNG (non-Approved) The module relies on entropy input received from the calling application, which is outside of the logical cryptographic boundary. As such, there is no Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

There is no mechanism within the module’s cryptographic boundary for the persistent storage of SSPs. The module stores DRBG state values for the lifetime of the DRBG instance. The module uses SSPs passed in on the stack by the calling application and does not store these SSPs beyond the lifetime of the API call.

Maintenance, including protection and zeroization, of any keys and CSPs that exist outside the module’s cryptographic boundary are the responsibility of the end-user. For the zeroization of keys in volatile memory, module operators can unload the module from memory or reboot/power-cycle the host device. Table 11 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

10. Self-Tests Both pre-operational and conditional self-tests are performed by the module. Pre-operational tests are performed between the time the cryptographic module is instantiated and before the module transitions to the operational state. Conditional self-tests are performed by the module during module operation when certain conditions exist. The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status, and the error resolutions.

The module performs the following pre-operational self-test(s):

• Software integrity test for libcrypto (using an HMAC SHA2-256 digest)
• Software integrity test for libssl (using an HMAC SHA2-256 digest)

The module performs the following conditional self-tests:

• Conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs)
• AES GCM encrypt KAT46 (128-bit)
• AES GCM decrypt KAT (128-bit)
• XTS-AES encrypt KAT (128-bit)
• XTS-AES decrypt KAT (256-bit)
• Triple-DES ECB decrypt KAT (3-Key)
• Triple-DES CMAC verify KAT (3-key)
• CRNGT47 for the entropy input
• CTR_DRBG KAT (AES, 256-bit, with derivation function)
• CTR_DRBG generate/instantiate/reseed KAT (256-bit AES)
• DSA verify KAT (P-224 and K-233 curve, SHA2-256)
• ECDSA verify KAT (P-224 and K-233 curve, SHA2-256)
• HKDF KAT
• HMAC KAT (SHA2-256)
• RSA sign KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1.5 scheme)
• RSA verify KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1.5 scheme)
• SHA KATs (SHA-1, SHA2-512, SHA3-256)
• FFC DH Shared Secret “Z” Computation KAT (2048-bit)
• ECC CDH Shared Secret “Z” Computation KAT (P-224 curve)
• PBKDF2 KAT
• SSH KDF KAT
• TLS KDF KAT (1.0/1.1, 1.2)
• TLS KDF KAT (1.3) KAT
• Known Answer Test

47 CRNGT – Continuous Random Number Generator Test

Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

To ensure all CASTs are performed prior to the first operational use of the associated algorithm, all CASTs are performed during the module’s initial power-up sequence. The SHA and HMAC KATs are performed prior to the pre-operational software integrity test; all other CASTs are executed after the successful completion of the software integrity test.

• Conditional pair-wise consistency tests (PCTs)
• DSA sign/verify PCT48
• ECDSA sign/verify PCT
• RSA sign/verify PCT (SHA-256)
• DH key generation PCT
• ECDH key generation PCT

The module reaches the critical error state when any self-test fails. Upon test failure, the module will set an internal flag and enter a critical error state. In this state, the module will no longer perform cryptographic services or output data over the data output interfaces. For any subsequent request for cryptographic services, the module will return a failure indicator. To recover, the module must be re-instantiated by the calling application. If the pre-operational self-tests complete successfully, then the module can resume normal operations. If the module continues to experience self-test failures after reinitializing, then the module will not be able to resume normal operations, and the CO should contact Ergotron, Inc. for assistance.

48 PCT – Pairwise Consistency Test

Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

11. Life-Cycle Assurance The sections below describe how to ensure the module is operating in its validated configuration, including the following:

• Procedures for secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module
• Maintenance requirements
• Administrator and non-Administrator guidance Operating the module without following the guidance herein (including the use of undocumented services) will result in non-compliant behavior and is outside the scope of this Security Policy.

As the module is an integrated component of the Ergotron’s products, module operators have no ability to independently load the module onto the target platform. The module and its calling application are to install on a platform specified in section 2.1 or one where portability is maintained. Ergotron does not provide any mechanisms to directly access the module, its source code, its APIs, or any information sent between it and the products.

This module is designed to support Ergotron applications, and these applications are the sole consumers of the cryptographic services provided by the module. No end-user action is required to initialize the module for operation; the calling application performs any actions required to initialize the module. The pre-operational integrity test and cryptographic algorithm self-tests are performed automatically via a default entry point (DEP) when the module is loaded for execution, without any specific action from the calling application or the end-user. End-users have no means to short-circuit or bypass these actions. Failure of any of the initialization actions will result in a failure of the module to load for execution.

No setup steps are required to be performed by end-users.

There are no specific management activities required of the CO role to ensure that the module runs securely. However, if any irregular activity is noticed or the module is consistently reporting errors, then Ergotron Customer Support should be contacted. The following list provides additional guidance for module administrators: Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

• The fips_post_status() API can be used to determine the module’s operational status. A non-zero return value indicates that the module has passed all pre-operational self-tests and is currently in its Approved mode.
• The OpenSSL_version() API can be used to obtain the module’s versioning information. The API call will return “ExtraHop Cryptographic Module 2.0”, which correlates to the “Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0” on the module’s FIPS 140-3 validation certificate.
• The CO can initiate the pre-operational self-tests and CASTs on demand for periodic testing of the module by re-instantiating the module or issuing the FIPS_selftest() API command.

The following list provides additional policies for non-Administrators:

• The module uses PBKDF2 option 1a from section 5.4 of NIST SP 800-132.
• The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the resultant key is acceptable for module operators. The minimum iteration count shall be 1000.
• The length of the passphrase used in the PBKDF shall be of at least 20 characters, and shall consist of lower-case, upper-case, and numeric characters. The upper bound for the probability of guessing the value is estimated to be 1/6220 = 10-36, which is less than 2-112.
• Passphrases (used as an input for the PBKDF) shall not be used as cryptographic keys.
• Keys derived from passphrases may only be used in storage applications.
• The length of a single data unit encrypted or decrypted with the AES-XTS shall not exceed 2²⁰ AES blocks; that is, 16 MB of data per AES-XTS instance. An XTS instance is defined in section 4 of NIST SP 800-38E. The AES-XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices. The AES-XTS shall not be used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in transit. The module implements the check to ensure that the two AES keys used in the XTS-AES algorithm are not identical.
• AES GCM encryption is used in the context of the TLS protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3. To meet the AES GCM (key/IV) pair uniqueness requirements from NIST SP 800-38D, the module generates the IV as follows:
• For TLS v1.2, the module supports acceptable AES GCM cipher suites from section 3.3.1 of NIST SP 800-52rev2. Per scenario 1 in FIPS 140-3 IG C.H, the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288. The counter portion of the IV is strictly increasing. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, a failure in encryption will occur and a handshake to establish a new encryption key will be required. It is the responsibility of the module operator (i.e., the first party, client, or server) to trigger this handshake in accordance with RFC 5246 when this condition is encountered. Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

The module also supports internal IV generation using the module’s Approved DRBG. The IV is at least 96 bits in length per section 8.2.2 of NIST SP 800-38D. Per NIST SP 800-38D and scenario 2 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H, the DRBG generates outputs such that the (key/IV) pair collision probability is less than 2-32. In the event that power to the module is lost and subsequently restored, the calling application must ensure that any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.

• The cryptographic module’s services are designed to be provided to a calling application. Excluding the use of the NIST-defined elliptic curves as trusted third-party domain parameters, all other assurances from FIPS PUB 186-4 (including those required of the intended signatory and the signature verifier) are outside the scope of the module and are the responsibility of the calling application.
• The module performs assurances for its key agreement schemes as specified in the following sections of NIST SP 800-56Arev3:
• Section 5.5.2 (for assurances of domain parameter validity)
• Section 5.6.2.1 (for assurances required by the key pair owner) Note that several of the assurances required by the key pair owner are provided by the fact that the module itself, when acting as the key pair owner, generates the key pairs. The module includes the capability to provide the required recipient assurance of public key validity specified in section 5.6.2.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3. However, since public keys from other modules are not received directly by this module (those keys are received by the calling application), the module has no knowledge of when a public key is received. Validation of another module’s public key is the responsibility of the calling application.
• The calling application is responsible for ensuring that CSPs are not shared between approved and nonapproved services and modes of operation.
• The calling application is responsible for using entropy sources that meet the minimum security strength of 112 bits required for the CTR_DRBG as shown in NIST SP 800-90Arev1, Table 3. Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

12. Mitigation of Other Attacks This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 requirements for this validation. Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations Table 12 provides definitions for the acronyms and abbreviations used in this document. Table 12 – Acronyms and Abbreviations ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

Appendix B. Approved Service Indicators This appendix specifies the APIs that are externally accessible and return the Approved security service indicators. Synopsis #include <openssl/service_indicator.h> #include <openssl/ssl.h> int EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int DSA_get_service_indicator(DSA * ptr_dsa, DSA_MODES_t mode); int RSA_key_get_service_indicator(RSA * ptr_rsa); int PBKDF_get_service_indicator(); int EVP_Digest_get_service_indicator(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); int EC_key_get_service_indicator(EC_KEY *ec_key); int CMAC_get_service_indicator(CMAC_CTX *cmac_ctx, CMAC_MODE_t mode); int HMAC_get_service_indicator(HMAC_CTX *ctx); int TLSKDF_get_service_indicator(EVP_PKEY_CTX *tls_ctx); int TLS1_3_kdf_get_service_indicator(EVP_MD *md); int TLS1_3_get_service_indicator(SSL *s); int DRBG_get_service_indicator(RAND_DRBG *drbg); Description These APIs are high-level interfaces that return the Approved security service indicator value based on the parameter(s) passed to them.

• EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for block ciphers like AES and Triple DES.
• DSA_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for the DSA algorithm and its modes. You must include the mode you want the indicator for, which is to be specified in the DSA_MODES_t enum.
• RSA_key_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for RSA algorithm and its modes.
• PBKDF_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for PBKDF usage.
• EVP_Digest_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for SHS algorithms like SHA-1 and SHAKE.
• EC_key_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for elliptic curve algorithms like ECDSA and its modes. Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

• CMAC_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for CMAC requests that use AES or Triple DES. You must include the mode you want the indicator for, which is to be specified in the CMAC_MODE_t enum.
• HMAC_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for HMAC requests and the associated SHS algorithm.
• TLSKDF_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for TLS KDF usage excluding TLS 1.3.
• TLS1_3_kdf_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for TLS 1.3 KDF usage. This function requires the ssl.h file and is used to call the TLS1_3_get_service_indicator() function because of the SSL struct requirement. You cannot call TLS1_3_get_service_indicator() directly unless you have the SSL struct that was used.
• DRBG_get_service_indicator() is used to return the appropriate Approved security service indicator status for DRBG usage. Return Values Each function returns “1” when indicating the usage of approved services and “0” for non-approved security services. Notes When calling a I<get> function, always call it after the variables have been finalized but before they are freed or destroyed. Examples The code sample below provides examples of how to check the Approved security service indicators for TripleDES (3-key, in ECB mode) encryption and decryption: int 3des_indicator_test() { static EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; static EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; int outLen; unsigned char pltmp[8]; unsigned char citmp[8]; unsigned char key[] = { 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18, 19,20,21,22,23,24}; unsigned char plaintext[] = { 'e', 't', 'a', 'o', 'n', 'r', 'i', 's' }; cipher = EVP_des_ede3_ecb(); //Encrypt ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, 24); EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, citmp, &outLen, plaintext, 8); // Check the indicator Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

int NID = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx); fprintf(stdout,"EVP_des_ede3_ecb (NID %i) encrypt indicator = %i\n", NID, EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator(ctx)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); //Decrypt ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, 24); EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, pltmp, &outLen, citmp, 8); // Check the indicator fprintf(stdout,"EVP_des_ede3_ecb (NID %i) decrypt indicator = %i\n", NID, EVP_cipher_get_service_indicator(ctx)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); } Ergotron Cryptographic Module 1.0 ©2025 Ergotron, Inc.

Prepared by: Corsec Security, Inc.

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