HID Global ActivID Applet 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on Thales IDCore 3230 Platform

Certificate

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for HID Global ActivID Applet 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on Thales IDCore 3230 Platform
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>firmware load<br/>UPDATE</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>UnAuth<br/>unauthenticated</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for HID Global ActivID Applet 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on Thales IDCore 3230 Platform
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>firmware load<br/>UPDATE</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>UnAuth<br/>unauthenticated</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

HID Global HID Global ActivID Applet 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on Thales IDCore 3230 Platform HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

WORLD Combi RLT module (SLC37GDA512) for 3230

Oblong punching Top View – Combi Plate

Oblong punching

Bottom View – Black Epoxy with RLT

Top View – Combi Plate

technology

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the HID Global ActivID Applet 2.7.7 &

2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module. This document may freely be reproduced

and distributed in its entirety. This Security Policy describes the security services provided by the module and describes how the module meets the requirements of FIPS 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards 140-3) for an overall Security Level 2 implementation.

Purpose and Use: The Module is designed to be embedded into a plastic card body, USB key, secure element etc., with a contact plate connection and/or RF antenna. The physical form of the Module is depicted in following pictures (to scale). The cryptographic boundary is defined as the surfaces and edges of the packages. The Module relies on [ISO 7816] and/or [ISO 14443] card readers as input/output devices. Purpose and Use: HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

This document defines the Security Policy for the HID Global ActivID Applet 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore

3230 Platform cryptographic module, herein denoted the Module. The Module, validated to FIPS 140-3 overall

Level 2, is a single-chip “contact and contactless” module implementing the Global Platform operational environment, with Card Manager and the HID Global ActivID Applet. The term platform herein is used to describe the chip and operational environment, not inclusive of the ActivID Applet. The Module has a limited operational environment. The Module includes a firmware load function to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this Security Policy and certificate must be validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded onto this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The Module is designed to be embedded into a plastic card body, passport, USB key, secure element etc., with a contact plate connection and/or RF antenna. Module Type: Hardware Module Embodiment: SingleChip Module Characteristics: Cryptographic Boundary: Figure 1 below depicts the Module’s block diagram, with a red outline highlighting the cryptographic boundary. The cryptographic boundary encompasses all the components. included on the single chip. Figure 1: Block Diagram The Cryptographic Module (CM) is fully compliant with two major cards industry standards: Oracle Java Card

3.1.0 Classic Edition and GlobalPlatform (GP) Card Specification version 2.2.1.

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

The CM supports [ISO7816] T=0, T=1 and T=CL communication protocols. The CM provides an execution sandbox for Applets, performing the requested services as described in this security policy. Applets access module functionality via internal API entry points that are not exposed to external entities. External devices have access to CM services by sending APDU commands. The CM inhibits all data output via the data output interface while the module is in error state and during selftests. The JavaCard API (JCAPI) is an internal interface, available to applets. Only applet services are available at the card edge (the interfaces that cross the cryptographic boundary). The Javacard Runtime Environment (JCRE) implements the dispatcher, registry, loader, and logical channel functionalities. The Virtual Machine (VM) implements the byte code interpreter, firewall, exception management and byte code optimizer functionalities. The Card Manager is the card administration entity, allowing authorized users to manage the card content, keys, and life cycle states. The Card Manager behaves similarly to an applet, but is properly represented as a constituent of the platform. In case of delegated management (DM), the Supplementary Security Domain (SSD) behaves similarly to the Card Manager in term of card content, keys and life cycle states. The Memory Manager implements functions such as memory access, allocation, deletion and garbage collection. The Communication handler implements the ISO 7816 and ISO 14443 communications protocols in contactless mode and dual mode. The Cryptography Libraries implement the Approved services listed in Section 2.5. The HID Global ActivID Applet 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 comprises:

• ASC Library package
• This is the library package that implements functions required by other HID applets. The library functions are not directly accessible via the cryptographic Module command interface.
• Access Control Applet (ACA)
• This applet is responsible for Access Control Rules (ACR) definition, access control rules enforcement and secure-messaging processing for all card services. Three off-card entity authentication methods
• GP secure messaging, PIN, and External Authentication are included by default in the ACA applet.
• PKI / Generic Container (PKI/GC) Applet
• The PKI/GC Applet provides secure storage for PKI credentials, and other data that are required for implementation of card services including single sign-on applications, identity, and benefits information. This applet is responsible for RSA-based cryptographic operations using the RSA private key stored in the PKI buffers. This applet is compliant with GSC-IS 2.1.
• PIV EP Wrapper Applet
• This Applet aligns with [SP800-73-4] (both at card-edge and data model levels). This Applet is a wrapper on top of the ActivID Applet (ASCLIB, ACA, GC/PKI). Its purpose is to access the PIV card-edge and objects although objects are physically stored in the GC/PKI applet instance. This Applet cannot operate in standalone mode and must interface with the ACA and GC/PKI applets and library to operate properly.

Tested Module Identification – Hardware: The Module is designed to be embedded into a plastic card body, passport, USB key, secure element etc., with a contact plate connection and/or RF antenna. The Module’s single chip is the SLC37GDA512. It is presented on one form factor: WORLD Combi RLT module (contact and contactless) HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

Application Firmware: HID Global ActivID Applet 2.7.7 is comprised of

• ASCLIB: 2.7.7.3
• ACA: 2.7.7.3
• GC/PKI: 2.7.7.3
• PIV EP Wrapper: 2.7.7.5 HID Global ActivID Applet 2.7.8 is comprised of
• ASCLIB: 2.7.8.2
• ACA: 2.7.8.7
• GC/PKI: 2.7.8.7
• PIV EP Wrapper: 2.7.8.4 Table 2: Tested Module Identification
• Hardware Tested Module Identification
• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): N/A for this module. Tested Module Identification
• Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

Modes List and Description: Table 3: Modes List and Description The module is acting in an approved mode of operation when the module provides the services described in the Approved Services table. These services use the security functions listed in the Approved Algorithm table in an approved manner. The security service indicator provides confirmation that an approved service has been provided. Once the module has been delivered outside of the factory, the CM is always in Approved mode. The configuration cannot be changed outside the factory. The CM does not support a non-approved mode of To identify the CM, verify that a CM is in the approved mode of operation, select the Card Manager and send the GET DATA commands shown below: Figure 2 : Tags for Tracking Data (Approved Mode) The CM production life cycle data can be checked using GET DATA command with tag ‘9F7F’. The Module responds with 42 bytes composed of: Figure 3 : Card Production Life Cycle Data HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

The CM identification data can be checked using GET DATA command with tag ‘0103’. The Module responds with 29 bytes composed of: Figure 4 : Versions and Operations Indicators The status of the Approved mode of operation can be checked using GET DATA command with tag ‘012F’. The Module responds with 16 bytes composed of:

• 4 bytes for CAST status
• 2 bytes for Error log
• 4 bytes for Periodic Self-Test counter
• 4 bytes for Periodic Self-Test maximum counter value

Approved Algorithms: HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

Table 4: Approved Algorithms NOTE: Only the algorithms specified in the table above are supported by the module in approved mode of operation. Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module.

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

Table 6: Security Function Implementations The table lists the security functions provided by the HID Global ActivID Applet 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module.

SP 800-56Ar3 Assurances: The module is systematically checking the key in mode FULL VALIDATION at EC public key generation and key agreement, it implements assurances for SP800-56Ar3 section 5.6.2.3.3 for ECC full public key validation.

Table 7: Entropy Certificates Table 8: Entropy Sources ESV certificate (#E107) has been procured for this entropy source. The output of the entropy source is used to directly feed the DRBG. The DRBG uses CTR_DRBG from [SP800-90Ar1] with Derivation Function (DF) enabled. 1024-bits of entropy at 13.376 bits per 32-bits minentropy are fed to the DF which accounts for 428.032 -bits of entropy which exceed the 256-bits required by CTR_DRBG to claim full entropy output of the DRBG. A separate nonce is created for the DRBG based on output from entropy source.

The module uses unmodified output from its Counter DRBG to generate seeds used for asymmetric key generation. The module supports the following CKG methodologies: - FIPS 186-5 RSA Key generation per SP 800-133r2, sections 4 and 5.1 - FIPS 186-5 and SP 800-56Ar3 ECC Key generation per SP 800-133r2, sections 4, 5.1 and 5.2 HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

The module implements the following approved key agreement scheme as specified in FIPS 140-3 IG D.F, Scenario 2, path 2 which has been CAVP tested and validated: - SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC with SP 800-56Cr2 OneStep KDA.

The module implements the following approved key transport methods as specified in FIPS 140-3 IG D.G, the underlying algorithms of which have been CAVP tested and validated: - SP 800-56Br2 KTS-IFC (Approved method #1 from IG D.G) - SP 800-38F Key Transport using AES ECB/CBC for encryption and AES-CMAC for authentication. (Approved method #2 from IG D.G)

The WORLD Combi RLT module has access to contact and contactless interfaces. VCC, RST, CLK, GND and IO are for contact interface. as specified into ISO7816 standard. When the contactless smart card is within the reader's electromagnetic field, the antenna receives the RF energy, which powers the IC chip via the LA and LB connections, enabling the chip to communicate with the reader in contactless. As specified into ISO14443 standard. HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

Table 9: Ports and Interfaces For contact interface operation, the Module conforms to [ISO 7816] part 1 and part

2. The electrical signals and transmission protocols follow the [ISO 7816] part
3. For contactless interface operation, the Module conforms to [ISO 14443] part 1 for physical connections, and to [ISO 14443] parts 2, 3 and 4 for radio frequencies and transmission protocols. Both contact and contactless interfaces share the same data storage, processing, SSPs, and services.

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

Table 10: Authentication Methods logical channel usage. Only one operator at a time is permitted on a channel. Applet deselection (including Card Manager), card reset or power down terminates the current authentication; re-authentication is required after any of these events for access to authenticated services. Applet reselection (except Card Manager that close systematically the GlobalPlatform secure channel) is leaving the secure channel unchanged and it is up to the applet policy to close it or not. The module clears previous authentications on each power cycle. It also supports Global Platform SCP logical channels, allowing concurrent operators in a limited fashion.

Table 11: Roles The Module does not support a maintenance role.

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

G,E G,E E HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

G,E G,E G,E G,E HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

G,E,Z R G,E,Z R R Table 12: Approved Services In the ‘Roles SSP Access’ column: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP In the ‘Indicator Column’: IND_1: The status conditions for successfully completed execution is 90 00

The module has a limited operational environment. In the Approved mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer (Crypto Officer) has access to the firmware load service. Only applets that are validated under FIPS 140-3 shall be loaded and installed. The firmware loading service relies on the DAP Verification specified in Global Platform Specification v2.3, whereby the DAP Verification (DAP-SYM) key uses AES-CMAC (Cert. #A2877) as the approved data authentication technique. The firmware load test verifies the validity of the firmware package to be loaded. HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

The CM’s firmware integrity is checked on startup and when periodic self-test period is over. Periodic Self-Tests (PST) are performed and run the firmware integrity tests. The integrity technique is based on EDC (CRC-16), which is approved for a hardware module. The firmware image size covered by the integrity technique is roughly 200 KB. Failure of firmware integrity self-tests during Periodic Self-Tests (PST) will trigger a module halt. Recovery from this state will require the module to be restarted and for the detected fault to have cleared. Otherwise the module will re-halt during POST following restart. The module’s FIPS error log is updated regarding the encountered issue and the card goes into an error state.

The integrity test can be triggered on demand by setting the specific flag with the proprietary command “Request for autotest”. Restarting the module will cause the integrity check to be rerun.

Type of Operational Environment: Limited How Requirements are Satisfied: The module includes a limited Operating Environment. Only authorized applets can be loaded at post-issuance under control of the Cryptographic Officer. Their execution is controlled by the CM operating system following its security policy rules.

Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required The module is a hardware module claiming level 3 physical security and of embodiment single-chip. The module meets commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, and shock/vibrations. The CM uses standard passivation techniques and is protected by passive shielding (metal layer coverings opaque HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

to the circuitry below) and active shielding (a grid of top metal layer wires with tamper response). A tamper event detected by the active shield places the Module permanently into the Card Is Killed error state. The Module is designed to be mounted in a plastic smartcard or similar package; physical inspection of the epoxy side of the Module is not practical after mounting. Table 14: EFP/EFT Information The module’s hardware is designed to sense and respond to out-of-range temperature conditions as well as outof-range voltage conditions. The temperature and voltage conditions are only monitored in the powered-on state. The module supports an EFP mechanism that will trigger module shutdown if low or high temperature extremes and out-of-range voltage conditions are detected whilst the module is active. In the event that the module senses an out-of-range temperature or over voltage the module will reset itself, clearing all working memory. The module can be reset and placed back into operation when in-bound operating conditions have been restored.

Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

Table 16: Storage Areas All SSPs used by the CM are described in this section. All usages of these SSPs by the CM are described in the services. In addition, all keys stored in RAM are zeroized upon power-cycle of the CM.

Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods ‘PutKey or Writing with Secure channel’ keys are encrypted by SD-KDEK; key identifier entity association during manufacturing. This command is only used only during manufacturing.

Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

All SSPs stored in RAM are zeroized upon power-cycle of the CM.

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

Table 19: SSP Table 1 HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

Name PIV-RDSK PIV-RCAK PIV-RKDK PIV-RPAK-PUB PIV-RDSK-PUB PIV-RCAK-PUB PIV-RKDK-PUB SMA-OPRI-PUB ACA-SPAK

Input - Output PUT Key (RSA) (contact) PUT Key (RSA) (contactless) PUT Certificate (contact) PUT Certificate (contactless) Read Certificates (contact) Read Certificates (contactless) PUT Certificate (contact) PUT Certificate (contactless) Read Certificates (contact) Read Certificates (contactless) PUT Certificate (contact) PUT Certificate (contactless) Read Certificates (contact) Read Certificates (contactless) PUT Certificate (contact) PUT Certificate (contactless) Read Certificates (contact) Read Certificates (contactless) OPACITY Secure Message output (contact) OPACITY Secure Message output (contactless) PUT AES 128 (contact)

Storage FLASH:Plaintext FLASH:Plaintext FLASH:Plaintext FLASH:Plaintext FLASH:Plaintext FLASH:Plaintext FLASH:Plaintext FLASH:Plaintext FLASH:Plaintext

Storage Duration

Zeroization Module entering TERMINATED state Uninstallation of applet Module entering TERMINATED state Uninstallation of applet Module entering TERMINATED state Uninstallation of applet Module entering TERMINATED state Uninstallation of applet Module entering TERMINATED state Uninstallation of applet Module entering TERMINATED state Uninstallation of applet Module entering TERMINATED state Uninstallation of applet Module entering TERMINATED state Uninstallation of applet Module entering TERMINATED

Related SSPs PIV-RDSK-PUB:Paired With PIV-RCAK:Paired With PIV-RKDK-PUB:Paired With PIV-RPAK:Paired With PIV-RDSK:Paired With PIV-RCAK:Paired With PIV-RKDK:Paired With SMA-OPRI:Paired With

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

Table 20: SSP Table 2 The following table lists Sensitive Security Parameters (SSP) used to perform approved security function supported by the cryptographic module. The following notes should be observed when reading the table:

Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests On power-on or reset, the Module performs integrity testing using an EDC (16-bit CRC) performed over all code located in FLASH and EEPROM memory (for OS and Applets).

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests The module maintains a flag in RAM memory that stores the state (self-test passed or not) for each Cryptographic algorithm that is approved. This flag indicates if an algorithm has been already self-tested. The Module performs self-test of an algorithm prior the first operational use (corresponding flag is not set) and if the self-test succeeds, the corresponding flag is set otherwise the card logs the self-test error and entered into a Card Is Mute error state or Card is Killed error state, depending on number of failures. On each reset, all flags for cryptographic algorithm self-tests are cleared. IND_2: In case of error detection, the module enters into specific error states such as "Card Is Mute" or "Card is Killed." IND_3: If the test fails, the error is logged in error log of “Approved mode parameters” IND_4: An unsuccessful execution returns the status word: Security Conditions not satisfied In the ‘Condition Column’: HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

COND_1: The self-test is executed before the first operational use of the algorithm if the indicator is not set COND_2: The test is executed at each Key pair generation requested by the module COND_3: The test is executed on each APDU Command

Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information strictly periodic but are triggered whenever the module calls on the services they depend on. The Module supports an internal counter and an associated maximum value. The counter is set to its maximum value on power on and it is decremented when receiving an APDU. When the counter reaches zero, the integrity test is executed (see 10.1), the counter is reset to its maximum value, and the flag for on-demand tests is reset so that at the next individual cryptographic algorithm usage, the CAST for that algorithm are executed again (see 10.2.1). No interruption to the module’s operation is expected while the CASTs are executed. The periodic counter is stored in RAM and defined during the init flow.

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

The cryptographic KATs are executed automatically, in a mode named “on demand”, when a cryptographic Self-tests can be run by any operator using the “autotests management” APDU command, corresponding to the “Request for autotest” service. The operator can choose from the list of self-test executions by providing the appropriate self-test flag.

The module performs continuous health tests of the entropy using the repetition count test and the adaptative Proportion test. The cryptographic module performs a pair-wise consistency test for every generated public and private key pair. If this test fails, the error is logged into the error log. The module performs a validity check of the public static key and the ephemeral keys according to the SP 80056Ar3 specification. If this test fails, the error is logged into the error log. The module performs hardware fault detection tests (APT and RCT tests). If a fault is detected, the module will handle the error by entering entered into a “Card Is Mute” error state or “Card is Killed” error state. In case of failure, the module will handle the error by entering entered into a “Card Is Mute” error state or “Card is Killed” error state, depending on number of failures. If 8 consecutive failures occur, the module irreversibly In case of “Card Is Mute”, the crypto module provides an error log an error log that is accessible by an authorized operator of the module. Following are the details on specific ADPU return codes returned upon specific self-test failures:

• AT_LOG_INTEGRITY_ERROR [0xA1] - This error code is used when memory integrity fails
• AT_LOG_CAST_SHA2_256 [0xA3] - This error code is used when SHA2 256 bits CAST result is not matching with expecting pattern
• AT_LOG_CAST_SHA2_512 [0xA4] - This error code is used when SHA2 512 bits CAST result is not matching with expecting pattern
• AT_LOG_CAST_DRBG (Counter DRBG) [0xA9] - This error code is used when DRBG CAST result is not matching with expecting pattern
• AT_LOG_CAST_AES [0xAA] - This error code is used when AES CAST result is not matching with expecting pattern HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

• AT_LOG_CAST_KDF_SP800_56CREV2 (KDA OneStep SP800-56Cr2) [0xAC] - This error code is used when KDF (based on SP800-56CRev2) CAST result is not matching with expecting pattern
• AT_LOG_CAST_RSA_CRT (RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) CRT) [0xAF] - This error code is used when RSA CRT CAST result is not matching with expecting pattern
• AT_LOG_CAST_RSA_STD (RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) STD) [0xB0] - This error code is used when RSA STD CAST result is not matching with expecting pattern
• AT_LOG_CAST_RSA_PUB ( RSA primitive encryption, KTS_IFC) [0xB1] - This error code is used when RSA Pub CAST result is not matching with expecting pattern
• AT_LOG_CAST_RSA_CONSISTENCY (conditional test perform after RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)) [0xB2] - This error code is used when RSA consistency check fails
• AT_LOG_CAST_ECC_CONSISTENCY (conditional test perform after Generate Key Pair EC) [0xB3] This error code is used when ECC consistency check fails
• AT_LOG_CAST_CS2 (KAS-ECC OnePassDH algorithm relying on Crypto Suite 2) [0xB5] - CAST ONE PASS DH CS2 Error

Some additional documents (‘Delivery and Operation’, ‘Reference Manual’, ‘Card Initialization Specification’ documents) define and describe the steps necessary to deliver and operate the CM securely. Once the module has been delivered outside of the factory, the CM is always in Approved mode. The configuration cannot be changed outside the factory. Product documentation, technical notes are available on The Customer Support Portal https://supportportal.thalesgroup.com.

The Guidance document provided with CM is intended to be the ‘Reference Manual’. This document includes guidance for secure operation of the CM by its users as defined in the Roles, Services, and Authentication chapter.

Please refer to section 11.2.

When the module has reached end of life and is no longer deployed or intended for further use, it shall be placed in the TERMINATED state by the Crypto Officer. Following this, the module shall be taken to a suitable electronics recycling facility that assures physical destruction of electronic waste.

The Module implementation also enforces the following security rules:

• No additional interface or service is implemented by the Module which would provide access to SSPs.
• Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroisation, and error states.
• The zeroisation service is applied with no restrictions on all keys or SSPs of the CM. HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024

• The Module does not support manual key entry, output plaintext SSPs or output intermediate key values.
• Status information does not contain SSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the Module. In addition, the guidance below must be followed to operate the Module in accordance with the conditions of the FIPS 140-3 validation. The PIV applet always checks all 8 bytes and does not restrict character space in PIN values. However, an external system may impose rules which restrict character space or include padding schemes. PIV Applet administrators are required to procedurally enforce usage policy that ensures end user’s PIV PIN values meet the conditions as described in [SP800-73-4].

HID Global ActivID Applet Suite 2.7.7 & 2.7.8 on the Thales IDCore 3230 Platform Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy 002-000482-001, Rev F, Sep 27, 2024