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CMVP Validated Module · FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider

Certificate#5032StandardFIPS 140-3Level1TypeSoftware-hybridEmbodimentMulti-Chip Stand AloneStatusActiveVendorIntel Corporation
Low review priority  ·  no TCB surface named  ·  last validated 13 months ago. How this is derived →

Certificate

StandardFIPS 140-3
Overall level1
Module typeSoftware-hybrid
EmbodimentMulti-Chip Stand Alone
StatusActive
Sunset date6/25/2030
CaveatNo assurance of minimum security of SSPs (e.g., keys, bit strings) that are externally loaded, or of SSPs established with externally loaded SSPs
VendorIntel Corporation

Approved Algorithms (27)

AlgorithmACVP Cert
AES-GCMA4390
AES-GCMA4391
DSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)A4390
DSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A4390
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)A4389
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)A4390
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A4389
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A4390
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3A4389
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3A4390
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3A4390
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)A4389
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)A4390
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A4389
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A4390
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)A4392
SHA2-224A4391
SHA2-256A4391
SHA2-256A4392
SHA2-384A4391
SHA2-512A4391
SHA3-224A4390
SHA3-256A4390
SHA3-384A4390
SHA3-512A4390
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627A4390
TLS v1.3 KDFA4390

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Recovery</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>status output<br/>Self-test<br/>Show Status</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>IPSEC<br/>HTTPS</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;
Underlying clues
flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Recovery</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>status output<br/>Self-test<br/>Show Status</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>IPSEC<br/>HTTPS</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

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Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy FIPS 140-3 Security Level: 1 Document version: 1.17 Date: May 9, 2025

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Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1 Table of Contents

Page 3

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

Page 4

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1 List of Tables List of Figures

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Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

0 Introduction
0.1 Purpose

This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider from Intel Corporation. This Security Policy describes how the Intel® QAT Provider meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3, which details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program. This document also describes how to run the Intel® QAT Provider in a secure Approved mode of operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-3 validation. The Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider is referred to in this document as the module.

0.2 References

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-3 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:

0.3 Document Organization

ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B uses the same section naming convention as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7 - Security requirements. For example, Annex B section B.2.1 is named “General” and B.2.2 is named “Cryptographic module specification,” which is the same as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7.1 and section 7.2, respectively. Therefore, the format of this Security Policy is presented in the same order as indicated in Annex B, starting with “General” and ending with “Mitigation of other attacks.” If sections are not applicable, they have been marked as such in this document.

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SectionFIPS 140-3 SectionSecurity Level
1General1
2Cryptographic module specification1
3Cryptographic module interfaces1
4Roles, services, and authentication1
5Software/Firmware security1
6Operational environment1
7Physical security1
8Non-invasive securityN/A
9Sensitive security parameter management1
10Self-tests1
11Life-cycle assurance1
12Mitigation of other attacksN/A

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

1 General Overview

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy of the Intel® QAT Provider cryptographic module. For the purpose of the FIPS 140-3 validation, the module is a software-hybrid, multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module validated at overall security level 1. The following table shows the claimed security level for each of the twelve sections that comprise the FIPS 140-3 standard. Table 1 – Security Levels

Page 7
ComponentDescription
qatprovider.soShared library for QAT_Provider implementation
libIPsec_MB.soShared library for AES-GCM SW acceleration.
libcrypto_mb.soShared library for asymmetric key-based algorithms SW acceleration
qat_4xxx.ko, usdm_drv.ko, intel_qat.ko, libusdm_drv_s.so, libqat_s.soIntel® QAT Driver for the hardware accelerator (not cryptographic implementation)
qat_4xxx.bin and qat_4xxx_mmp.binFirmware running over the dedicated hardware accelerator

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Module Specification

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider (hereafter referred to as “the module”) supports acceleration for both hardware as well as optimized software based on vectorised instructions. It is a software-hybrid module (compatible with OpenSSL 3.0.8) which supports the ability to accelerate the operations from the stand OpenSSL 3.0.8 to basic Intel instruction set, to either hardware acceleration path (via the qat_hw) or via the optimized software acceleration path (qat_sw). Both are packaged under OpenSSL 3.0.8 is a toolkit for TLS/SSL protocols and has developed a modular system to plugin devicespecific engines. As mentioned above, within the module are two separate internal entities by which acceleration can be performed. Depending on your particular use case, the module can be configured to meet specific acceleration needs. Software acceleration in the module is achieved by using the qat_sw in conjunction with the following supporting libraries: algorithm used in the TLS context. As to the hardware acceleration in the module is achieved by using the qat_hw in conjunction with a dedicated hardware accelerator as well as the Intel® QAT Driver which provides the API interface for the Based on that, the cryptographic boundary consists of the following shared libraries as well as the dedicated hardware acceleration device and the firmware running on it. The following table enumerates the elements that comprise the module (surrounded with red lines in Figure 1). Table 2 – Cryptographic Module Components

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ComponentDescription
Intel® QuickAssist Technology SoCDedicated hardware acceleration device

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1 The image below illustrates the high-level boundary of the module. Applications such as NGINX and HAProxy are common applications which interfaces to OpenSSL. The block diagram below shows the module, its interfaces with the operational environment (EVP API coming from OpenSSL) and the delimitation of the cryptographic module boundary (dotted red line), which comprised the module and related files and the dedicated Intel® QAT hardware accelerator. Note that green zone represents the Operating System, which is split by the black dotted line in User Space and Kernel Space. Red, blue, yellow and green arrows represent the data input, data output, control input and status output flow data respectively. The TOEPP is the general-purpose computer (GPC) where the processor is installed together with the accelerator hardware device. Figure 1 – Cryptographic boundary The module is aimed to run on a general-purpose computer with compatible processor with QAT that supports hardware acceleration. The module has been tested and found compliant on the following platforms, being the platform the physical perimeter of the module:

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Operating systemHardware PlatformProcessorPAA/AccelerationOpenSSL VersionHardware acceleration device
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0Intel Eagle StreamIntel® Xeon® Platinum 8488CYesOpenSSL 3.0.8Intel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40)
CAVP CertificateImplementation Name and VersionUse
A4390Intel® QAT Provider Hardware Acceleration Device 4940 (rev40)Cryptographic primitives for those algorithms which support hardware acceleration.
A4391Intel® Multi-Buffer Crypto for IPsecMB Library v1.3 for Software AccelerationCryptographic library for AES GCM and SHA2 which support software acceleration.
A4389Crypto Multi-buffer library IPP Crypto v2021.7.1 for Software AccelerationCryptographic library for RSA, ECDSA and ECDH which support software acceleration.

Table 3

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A4392

Intel® Authentication Firmware V1.0.40

Cryptographic implementation for RSA SigVer and SHA256 for Hardware Integrity Test binaries

CAVP CertificateAlgorithmStandardMode/MethodKey Lengths Curves/Module (in bits)Use
A4390AESNIST SP 800-38DGCM128, 256Authenticated encryption/decryption
A4390CVLNIST SP 800-135rev1 RFC 8446TLS versions v1.2 (The extended master secret parameter is defined in Section 4 of RFC 7627) and v1.3SHA2-256, SHA2- 384Application-specific Key Derivation No parts of these protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
A4390DSAFIPS PUB 186-4SigGenL:2048 - N:224 L:2048 - N:256 L:3072 - N:256Digital Signature Generation
SigVerL:1024- N:160 L:2048 - N:224 L:2048 - N:256 L:3072 - N:256Digital Signature Verification
A4390ECDSAFIPS PUB 186-4SigGenP-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 B-233, B-283, B- 409, B-571 K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571Digital Signature Generation
SigVerDigital Signature Verification
A4390KAS-ECC- SSCNIST SP 800-56Arev3ephemeralUnified schemeP-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 B-233, B-283, B- 409, B-571 K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Shared Secret Computation Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength
A4390KAS-FFC- SSCNIST SP 800-56Arev3dhEphem schemeffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe8192Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Shared Secret Computation Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1 The module supports the following Approved Algorithms listed in Table 5 below: Table 5 – Approved Algorithms

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A4390RSAFIPS PUB 186-4SigGen (PKCS#1-v1.5) SigVer (PKCS#1-v1.5)2048, 3072, 4096 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096Digital Signature Generation Digital Signature Verification
A4390SHA-3FIPS PUB 202SHA3-224, SHA3- 256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512-Message Digest
A4391AESNIST SP 800-38DGCM128, 192, 256Authenticated encryption/decryption
A4389ECDSAFIPS PUB 186-4SigGenP-256, P-384Digital Signature Generation
SigVerDigital Signature Verification
A4389KAS-ECC- SSCNIST SP 800-56Arev3EphemeralUnified schemeP-256, P-384EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Shared Secret Computation Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 192 bits of encryption strength
A4389RSAFIPS PUB 186-4SigGen (PKCS#1-v1.5)2048, 3072, 4096Digital Signature Generation
SigVer (PKCS#1-v1.5)Digital Signature Verification
A4391SHSFIPS 180-4SHA2-224, SHA2- 256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512-Message Digest
A4392RSAFIPS PUB 186-4SigVer (PKCS#1-v1.5)3072Digital Signature Verification
A4392SHSFIPS 180-4SHA2-256-Message Digest

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1 The module does not implement either non-approved but allowed, non-approved allowed algorithms with no security claimed or non-approved and not allowed algorithms in the Approved mode of operation. The module does not implement any vendor affirmed algorithm or security method.

2.3 Modes of Operation

The module supports one mode of operation: Approved. The module will be in Approved mode when all pre-operational and conditional algorithms self-tests have completed successfully, and only Approved and non-approved but allowed security functions are invoked (see Table 5 and ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia. above). The module does not support degraded operation.

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Physical PortLogical InterfaceData that passes over port/interface
Keyboard interface, Mouse interface, Network interfaceControl inputCommand function Command control parameters
Keyboard interface, Mouse interface, Network interfaceData inputPlaintext data to be ciphered or signed Ciphertext data to be decrypted Signed data to be verified Cryptographic keys and other key management data
Display controller, Network interfaceData outputDecrypted plaintext data Encrypted ciphertext data Generated signature data Derived plaintext key material
Display controller, Network interfaceStatus outputCommand function result Command status parameters

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces

As a software-hybrid module, the module does not have physical ports. For the purpose of the FIPS 140-

3 validation, the module interfaces are defined as Hybrid Software (HSMI), and the physical ports are

interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which the module runs. The physical ports include the computer network ports, keyboard port, mouse port, power plug and display. The logical interfaces are a C language entry functions pointed by OpenSSL library interface through which calling application request services. The following table summarizes the FIPS 140-3 logical interfaces: Table 6 – Ports and Interfaces When the module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the logical data output interface is inhibited. As to the power interface, there is no separate power interface beyond the power interface provided by the module host platform itself. The module does not implement control output interface.

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RolesServiceInputOutput
Crypto OfficerInstallationNoneNone
Crypto OfficerInitializationAPI call parametersStatus
Crypto OfficerSelf-test on demandPower cycleStatus
Crypto OfficerShow StatusNoneStatus
Crypto OfficerShow version informationAPI call parametersStatus
Crypto OfficerZeroizationPower cycle or using provided free APIsStatus
Crypto OfficerSymmetric encryption/decryptionAPI call parameters, key, IV, plaintext/ciphertextStatus, ciphertext/plaintext
Crypto OfficerDSA digital signature generationAPI call parameters, DSA private key, messageStatus, signature
Crypto OfficerDSA digital signature verificationAPI call parameter, DSA public key, signatureStatus, message
Crypto OfficerECDSA digital signature generationAPI call parameters, ECDSA private key, messageStatus, signature
Crypto OfficerECDSA digital signature verificationAPI call parameter, ECDSA public key, signatureStatus, message
Crypto OfficerRSA digital signature generationAPI call parameters, RSA private key, messageStatus, signature
Crypto OfficerRSA digital signature verificationAPI call parameter, RSA public key, signatureStatus, message
Crypto OfficerEC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Shared Secret ComputationAPI call parameter, keyStatus, key components, key

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

4 Roles, Services and Authentication

The sections below describe the module's authorized role, services, and operator authentication method employed.

4.1 Authorized Roles and Authentication

The module only supports the following role: the Crypto Officer role. It performs all services as well as the module installation and configuration. The module does not support authentication mechanisms. The module does not support concurrent operators. The Crypto Officer role is implicitly assumed by using the module and invoking any of the available services. Table 7 – Roles, Services Commands, Input, and Output

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RolesServiceInputOutput
Crypto OfficerDiffie-Hellman Key Agreement Shared Secret ComputationAPI call parameters, keyStatus, domain parameters, key
Crypto OfficerMessage digestAPI call parameters, messageStatus, hash
Crypto OfficerTLS key derivationAPI call parameters, TLS pre- master secretStatus, session key, integrity key

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

4.2 Module Services

All services implemented by the module are listed in tables below. The approved and allowed services are shown in Table 8. Please note that the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) listed below indicate the type of access required using the following notation:

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ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionRolesSSP and Type of AccessIndicator
InstallationModule installation and configurationNoneCONone-
InitializationPerform initialization of the moduleNoneCONone-
Self-test on demandPerform pre- operational and conditional algorithms self-testsNoneCONone-
Show StatusImplicit service, since only one mode of operation is available, the status of the module can be determined with the indicator of a completion execution of the pre- operational and conditional self-tests.NoneCONone-
Show version informationDisplay the module name and versionNoneCONone-
ZeroizationZeroize and de- allocate memory that contains sensitive dataNoneCOAll SSP's - Z-
Symmetric encryption/decryptionEncrypt/Decrypt plaintext/ciphertext using supplied keyAES (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4391)COAES GCM Key - WX AES GCM IV -WXqat_fips_service_indicator=1
DSA digital signature generationGenerate a DSA digital signatureDSA sigGen (Cert. A4390)CODSA Private Key - WXqat_fips_service_indicator=1
DSA digital signature verificationVerify a DSA digital signatureDSA sigVer (Cert. A4390)CODSA Public Key - WXqat_fips_service_indicator=1
ECDSA digital signature generationGenerate an ECDSA digital signatureECDSA sigGen (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4389)COECDSA Private Key - WXqat_fips_service_indicator=1
ECDSA digital signature verificationVerify an ECDSA digital signatureECDSA sigVer (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4389)COECDSA Public Key - WXqat_fips_service_indicator=1
RSA digital signature generationGenerate an RSA digital signatureRSA sigGen (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4389)CORSA Private Key - WXqat_fips_service_indicator=1

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1 Table 8 – Approved Services

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ServiceDescriptionApproved Security FunctionRolesSSP and Type of AccessIndicator
RSA digital signature verificationVerify an RSA digital signatureRSA sigVer (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4389)CORSA Public Key - WXqat_fips_service_indicator=1
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Shared Secret ComputationShared secret computation using an ECDH schemeKAS-ECC-SSC (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4389)COECDH Public Key - RX ECDH Private – RX Shared Secret - Gqat_fips_service_indicator=1
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Shared Secret ComputationShared secret computation using a DH schemeKAS-FFC-SSC (Cert. A4390)CODH Public Key - RX DH Private – RX Shared Secret - Gqat_fips_service_indicator=1
Message digestCompute and return a message digest using SHS and SHA-3 algorithmsSHA (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4391);CONoneqat_fips_service_indicator=1
TLS key derivationKey derivation for TLS v1.2/1.3CVL (Cert. A4390)COTLS pre-master secret -WX TLS master secret - GRX TLS session key - G TLS integrity key - Gqat_fips_service_indicator=1

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

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Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

5 Software/Firmware Security

As it is described in section 2.1 the cryptographic module is composed of several software shared libraries as well as the firmware component running over the dedicated QAT hardware accelerator. The integrity of the software libraries is achieved by applying an ECDSA (with a P-256 curve) with SHA2-

256 algorithm over them at the build time. All the obtained signature values are stored in the headers of

the qatprovider.so file. After that, every time that a calling application uses the module, the execution flow passes first through the initialization part of the module, where the integrity is self-verified as follows:

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Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

6 Operational environment

The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The module runs on a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the hardware specified in Table 3. The operating system is restricted to a single operator. Concurrent operators are explicitly excluded. The application that requests cryptographic services is the single user of the module. All SSPs are under the control of the OS, which protects its CSPs against unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution as well as PSPs against modification and substitution. Additionally, the OS provides dedicated process space to each executing process, and the module operates entirely within the calling application’s process space. The module only allows access to SSPs through its well-defined interfaces. The module does not have the ability of spawning new processes.

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Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

7 Physical security

The module is a software-hybrid with a multiple-chip standalone embodiment. The hardware components of the module consist of production-grade components that include standard passivation techniques. Further, the module is entirely contained within a hard metal enclosure, which blocks physical access to the module. Since the module is evaluated at security level 1 and there is no maintenance interface, no more physical security mechanisms than the above described are implemented.

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Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

8 Non-invasive security

The module does not implement any non-invasive attack mitigation technique to protect itself and the module’s unprotected SSPs from non-invasive attacks.

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Key/SSP NameStrengthSecurity Function Cert NumberGenerationImport/ExportEstablishmentStorageZeroizationUse
AES GCM Key128, 192, 256AES GCM (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4391)ExternalPlaintext (MD/EE) / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callAuthenticated encryption and decryption
AES GCM IVDepends on the used AES GCM keyAES GCM (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4391)ExternalPlaintext (MD/EE) / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callInitialization vector for AES_GCM
DSA Public Key80, 112, 128DSA sigVer (Cert. A4390)ExternalPlaintext (MD/EE) / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callSignature verification
DSA Private Key112, 128DSA sigGen (Cert. A4390)ExternalPlaintext (MD/EE) / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callSignature generation
ECDSA Public Key112 - 256ECDSA sigVer (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4389)ExternalPlaintext (MD/EE) / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callSignature verification
ECDSA Private Key112 - 256ECDSA sigGen (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4389)ExternalPlaintext (MD/EE) / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callSignature generation

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management

The following section includes all the information related to the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) and its management. Table 9 below identifies all the SSPs handled by the cryptographic module as well as its purpose, generation method, input and output method, where they are stored and how they are zeroized. Table 9 – SSPs

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Key/SSP NameStrengthSecurity Function Cert NumberGenerationImport/ExportEstablishmentStorageZeroizationUse
RSA Public Key80, 112, 128, 152RSA sigVer (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4389)ExternalPlaintext (MD/EE) / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callSignature verification
RSA Private Key112, 128, 152RSA sigGen (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4389)ExternalPlaintext (MD/EE) / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callSignature generation
DH Public Key112, 128, 152, 200KAS-FFC-SSC (Cert. A4390)ExternalPlaintext (MD/EE) / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callShared secret generation
DH Private Key112, 128, 152, 200KAS-FFC-SSC (Cert. A4390)ExternalPlaintext (MD/EE) / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callShared secret generation
ECDH Public Key112 - 256KAS-ECC-SSC (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4389)ExternalPlaintext (MD/EE) / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callShared secret generation
ECDH Private Key112 - 256KAS-ECC-SSC (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4389)ExternalPlaintext (MD/EE) / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callShared secret generation
Shared Secret112 - 256KAS-FFC-SSC (Cert. A4390); KAS-ECC- SSC (Cert. A4390; Cert. A4389); CVL (Cert. A4390)Generated inside the moduleNA / Plaintext (MD/EE)N/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callDerivation of the TLS pre- master secret

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

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Key/SSP NameStrengthSecurity Function Cert NumberGenerationImport/ExportEstablishmentStorageZeroizationUse
TLS pre-master secret256, 384CVL (Cert. A4390)ExternalPlaintext (MD/EE) / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callDerivation of the TLS master secret
TLS master secret256, 384CVL (Cert. A4390)Derived internally using the TLS pre- master secret via TLS KDFNA / Never exits the moduleN/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callDerivation of the TLS session key and TLS integrity key
TLS session key128, 192, 256CVL (Cert. A4390)Derived internally using the TLS master secret via TLS KDFNA / Plaintext (MD/EE)N/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callEncryption and decryption of TLS session packets.
TLS integrity key112 or greaterCVL (Cert. A4390)Derived internally using the TLS master secret via TLS KDFNA / Plaintext (MD/EE)N/ANot persistently storedPower cycle or API callAuthentication of TLS session packets.

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

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Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

9.1 Random number generation

The module does not contain an entropy source. The module does not contain a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG).

9.2 SSP generation

For RSA, DSA, ECDSA and Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman keys, the module imports them using API calls. The module does not generate keys. Additionally, the module also imports symmetric keys in the same manner for symmetric algorithms.

9.3 SSP Agreement and SSP Derivation

The module provides Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation to obtain “shared secret” values. The security strength of the preceding algorithms is as follows:

  1. Diffie-Hellman key agreement provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength.
  2. EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength. The Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman are under scenario 2 of [IG] D.F. The module supports key derivation for the TLS protocol. The module implements the pseudo-random function (PRF) for TLSv1.2 using the extended master secret RFC 7627 and the HKDF for TLSv1.3.
9.4 SSP Entry/Output

The keys and SSPs to be entered or exited are provided to the module via API input/output parameters in plaintext form and output via API output parameters in plaintext form. This is allowed per section 7.9.5 of the ISO/IEC 19790:2012 since all CSPs or key components are maintained within the environment and the requirements from section 7.6.3 are met. The module does not support either manual key entry or intermediate key generation values. Additionally, the module implements two independent internal actions in order to prevent the inadvertent output of any plaintext SSP. The mechanism implemented by the module is described below: First of all, the module reserves the required memory where the CSP will be stored after being derived. Then the CSP is derived using the specific entry point of hardware or software implementation. Finally, the derived CSP is copy into a variable received in a parameter of the invoked function and this last function ends. Particular information for the input and output for each SSP, if applicable, is provided under column "Import/Export” of Table 9.

9.5 SSP Storage

Symmetric keys, and public and private keys are provided to the module by the calling application via API input parameters and are destroyed by the module when invoking the appropriate API function calls.

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NameDescriptionType
RAMSystem MemoryDynamic
ARAMIntel® QAT Hardware Device accelerator working memoryDynamic
Shared RAMIntel® QAT Hardware Device accelerator CryptoEngine memoryDynamic

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1 No physical storage is offered within the logical boundary, and therefore the module does not store any SSPs persistently beyond the lifetime of the API call. Any persistent key storage occurs outside the module’s logical boundary but within the physical perimeter and the management of these keys is responsibility of the calling application. Table 10 - Storage Areas Particular information for storage of each SSP, is provided under column "Storage" of Table 9.

9.6 SSP Zeroization

The memory occupied by keys is allocated by regular memory allocation operating system calls. The application is responsible for calling the appropriate zeroization functions provided in the module's API listed in Table

  1. The zeroization functions overwrite the memory occupied by keys with "zeros" and deallocate the memory with the regular memory deallocation operating system call. In case of abnormal termination, or swap in/out of a physical memory page of a process, the keys in physical memory are overwritten by the Linux kernel before the physical memory is allocated to another process. Particular information for zeroization of each SSP, is provided under column "Zeroization" of Table
  2. The zeroization of the SSPs starts just after the invocation of the zeroization command. Once invoked, these techniques take effect immediately and do not allow sufficient time to compromise any plaintext secret, private keys and CSPs. During the zeroization process, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited.
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AlgorithmOETest PropertiesTypeDetails
ECDSARed Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0P-256 curves with SHA2-256KATSignature verification for each software library component.
RSAIntel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40)3072 bits key size with SHA2-256KATSignature verification for the firmware components of Intel® QAT Hardware Accelerator device as it is described in section 5.

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

10 Self-Tests

FIPS 140-3 requires that the module performs a set of self-test in order to provide the operator assurance that faults have not been introduced that would prevent the module's correct operation. The module includes two different set of self-test: pre-operational self-test (for software and hardware parts) which are executed prior to the module providing any data output via the data output interface; and conditional self-tests (for software and hardware parts) which are executed in the initialization phase The determination of pass or fail of each self-test is made by the module itself, without external controls, externally provided input test vectors, expected output results, or operator intervention. The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status and error resolutions.

10.1 Pre-operational Self-Tests

The module executes the following pre-operational software and firmware integrity tests. If some of them fail, the module flows to an error state: Table 11 – Pre-operational integrity Self-Tests As to the Intel Authentication Firmware running on Microengine and used to check the integrity of the firmware components (qat_4xxx.bin and qat_4xxx_mmp.bin), no integrity tested is performed because this Authentication Firmware is stored in a non-reconfigurable memory as allowed per FIPS IG 5.A. While the module is executing the pre-operational self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. The module is not available for use by the calling application until the pre-operational tests are completed successfully.

10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The module executes the following conditional algorithms self-tests at the module initialization phase prior to the pre-operational integrity tests just after an applicable security function is invoked via the available services:

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AlgorithmOETest PropertiesTypeDetailsCondition
RSARed Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 / Intel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40)2048 bits key size with SHA2-256KATSignature generation and Signature verificationPower-Up
ECDSARed Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 / Intel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40)P-256 and P-384 curves with SHA2-256KATSignature generation and Signature verificationPower-Up
DSARed Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 / Intel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40)2048,224 key size with SHA2-256KATSignature generation and Signature verificationPower-Up
ECDHRed Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 / Intel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40)P-256 and P-384 curvesKATShared Secret computationPower-Up
DHRed Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 / Intel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40)ffdhe2048 safe prime groupKATShared Secret computationPower-Up
AES GCMRed Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 / Intel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40)256 bits key sizeKATEncryption and DecryptionPower-Up
SHA3Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 / Intel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40)SHA3-256KATGenerationPower-Up
TLS 1.2 (PRF)Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 / Intel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40)Using SHA2-256 and SHA2-384KATKey Derivation. This self-test is implemented to cover the requirement of self- testing the underlying algorithms, based on the “10.3.B Self-test for Embedded Cryptographic Algorithms” of the IG documentPower-Up
TLS 1.3 (HKDF)Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 / Intel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40)Using SHA2-256 and SHA2-384KATKey Derivation This self-test is implemented to cover the requirement of self- testing the underlying algorithms, based on the “10.3.B Self-test for Embedded Cryptographic Algorithms” of the IG documentPower-Up

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1 Table 12 - Conditional Self-Tests of Hardware implementation

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AlgorithmOETest PropertiesTypeDetailsConditions
RSARed Hat Enterprise Linux 9.02048 bits key size with SHA2-256KATSignature generation and Signature verificationPower-Up
ECDSARed Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0P-256 and P-384 curves with SHA2- 256KATSignature generation and Signature verificationPower-Up
ECDHRed Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0P-256 and P-384 curvesKATShared Secret computationPower-Up
AES GCMRed Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0256 bits key sizeKATEncryption and DecryptionPower-Up
SHSRed Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0SHA2-256 and SJA2- 512KATGenerationPower-Up
AlgorithmOETest PropertiesTypeDetailsConditions
RSAIntel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40)3072 bits key size with SHA2-256KATSignature verification. Executed by checking the integrity test of a "dummy" firmware as allowed per FIPS IG 10.2.A, path 2.Power-Up
SHSIntel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40)SHA2-256KATGeneration. Used to check RSA public key embedded in authentication ROMPower-Up

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1 Table 13 - Conditional Self-Tests of Software implementation The module executes the following conditional algorithms self-tests at the module initialization phase prior to the pre-operational integrity tests of the hardware part. Table 14 - Conditional Self-Tests of Firmware implementation While the module is executing the conditional self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited.

10.3 Error states

The module has two different error states: One error state at software level, “Critical Error (Software)” and one at hardware level, “Critical Error (Hardware)”. The module can flow to "Critical Error" state of the software part if the pre-operational integrity test or if the conditional algorithms self-tests fail. The only manner to recover from this error is by rebooting the module (only the software part). No CSPs output are available on this state. The module can flow to "Critical Error" state of the firmware of the hardware part if the pre-operational integrity test or if the conditional algorithms self-tests fail. The only manner to recover from this error is by rebooting the module (only the software part). No CSPs output are available on this state.

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NameDescriptionConditionsRecovery MethodIndicator
Critical Error (Hardware)The module reaches to this state if the firmware pre- operational integrity self-tests or conditional algorithms self-tests fail.Pre-operational integrity self- tests or conditional algorithms self-tests firmware failureRestart the hardware component of the module.Integrity check failure and algorithms self-tests failure: "FW integrity self-test failed!"
Critical Error (Software)The module reaches to this state if the pre-operational integrity self-tests or conditional algorithms self-tests fail.Pre-operational integrity self- tests or conditional algorithms self-tests failureRestart the application that exercise the software component of the module.Integrity check failure: “QAT FIPS Integrity test result: FAIL” Software algorithms self- test failure: “QAT FIPS self-tests(KAT) result: FAIL”

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1 In both Error states, the cryptographic functions are not available because they are inhibited as well as the logical interfaces. The only manner to recover cryptographic functionality is to reboot the module and pass the Pre-Operational Integrity self-tests as well as Conditional algorithm self-tests again. Table 15 - Error States

10.4 Operator Initiation Self-Tests

implementation) by powering-off and reloading the module which cause the module to run the prethe QAT accelerators are loaded and will be ready for providing cryptographic services. “adf_ctl up” command starts all the available QAT accelerators of the processor, and consequently, the preBy executing “adf_ctl restart” command, it is possible to execute the same pre-operational and During the execution of the operator initiation self-tests, services are not available, and no data output or input is possible.

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Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

11 Life-cycle Assurance
11.1 Delivery and Operation

The module has been tested in the following operational environments: - Hardware Platform: Intel Eagle Stream, Operating System: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 with OpenSSL 3.0.8 For installation, the operator shall follow the guidance below described. The RPM package can be downloaded from Intel GitHub repository.

11.2 Crypto Officer Guidance

The only role allowed in the module is the Crypto Officer who is in charge to perform all the operations and services of the module. The module only supports one mode of operation: Approved. The module will be in Approved mode when all pre-operational and conditional self-tests have been completed successfully, and only Approved and allowed security functions are invoked. There are no additional installation, configuration, or usage instructions for operators intending to use the module.

11.3 Installation

The operator shall first install the OpenSSL 3.0.8 in a customized path: - . /config -g --prefix=<customized path> - make -j; make install Since the module is already compiled and packed in a “rpm” package, the operator shall run the following command to install it: - rpm -ivh qatprovider-fips-1.3.1-1.el9.x86_64.rpm--target noarch The operator shall also execute the following commands in order to finalize the installation of the module: - export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/<customized path>/lib64 - cp -rf /usr/lib64/ossl-modules/qatprovider.so /<customized path>/lib64/ossl-modules/ - cp -rf /usr/lib64/ossl-modules/qatprovider.la /<customized path>/lib64/ossl-modules/

11.4 Component versioning identification

By executing the service 'Show version information', an operator can obtain information about the versioning identification for each component of the cryptographic module. The output return by the service execution is as follows (being relevant the information in bold text): Module Info Name: QAT Provider FIPS ID: qatprovider Version: QAT Engine v1.3.1

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Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1 QAT_HW Driver version: QAT20.l.1.0.40-00004 IPSec-mb version: v1.3 IPP-crypto version: ippcp_2021.7.1 Additionally, the operator can check the hardware device version embedded in the CPU using the “lspci” Linux command. The module has been tested and found compliant on the hardware acceleration device: Intel Corporation Device 4940 (rev 40). Using the information, a potential user of the cryptographic module can correlate the module version information with the one included in the FIPS 140-3 certificate.

11.5 Non-reconfigurable memory

The module boundary contains a non-reconfigurable memory where it is stored the “Authentication firmware” that implements the RSA Signature Verification with 3072 bits key size with SHA2-256 and SHA2-256 (both CAVP certified under #A4392 certificate number). Since this firmware is stored in a nonreconfigurable memory created by mechanical means, there is not performed an integrity test to check that it has not been modified. This is allowed per “5.A Non-Reconfigurable Memory Integrity Test” of the IG document. As included in the “5 Software/Firmware security” section of this document, this firmware is used to check the integrity of the “Production firmware” that runs in the Cryptoengines. This Non-reconfigurable memory does not store any sensitive information such as SSPs or keys, so there is no need to follow any procedure prior to be distributed to other operators or disposed to remove sensitive information.

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Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 requirements for this validation.

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Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

13 Secure Guidance
13.1 AES-GCM Usage

The module does not implement the TLS protocol itself, however, it provides the cryptographic functions required for implementing the protocol. AES GCM encryption is used in the context of the TLS protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3 (per Scenario 1 and Scenario 5 in FIPS 140-3 C.H respectively). For TLS v1.2, the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288. The counter portion of the IV is strictly increasing. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, this results in a failure in encryption and a handshake to establish a new encryption key will be required. It is the responsibility of the user of the module i.e., the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition, to trigger this handshake in accordance with RFC 5246. For TLS v1.3, the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 8446. The IV is at least 96-bits in length per NIST SP 800-38D, Section 8.2.1 so that the (key, IV) pair collision probability is less than 2-32. The module uses at least 32 bits of the IV field as a name and use 64 bits as a deterministic non-repetitive counter. When the counter part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key the encryptor aborts the session. In the event that the module power is lost and restored the user must ensure that the AES-GCM encryption/decryption keys are re-distributed. The module supports importing of GCM IVs when an IV is not generated within the module. In the Approved mode, an IV must not be imported for encryption from outside the cryptographic boundary of the module as this will result in a non-conformance.

13.2 Intel suggestion on use of cryptographic algorithms

Intel recommends following the latest NIST standards when considering the selection of cryptographic algorithms. Consider stronger alternatives for the following algorithms

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Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

14 Appendix A
Table, extracted as text (did not parse into structured rows)
The module implements TLS versions 1.2 and 1.3. The AES GCM supported ciphersuites for each version are listed below: Supported AES GCM ciphersuites for TLS v1.2: -   TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -   TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -   TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -   TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -   TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -   TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 Supported AES GCM ciphersuites for TLS v1.3: -   TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
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AbbreviationFull Specification Name
FIPS 140-3FIPS 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules
NIST SP 800-140FIPS 140-3 Derived Test Requirements (DTR): CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC 24759
ISO 19790ISO/IEC 19790:2012/Cor.1:2015(E), Information technology — Security techniques — Security requirements for cryptographic modules
ISO 24759ISO/IEC 24759:2017(E), Information technology — Security techniques — Test requirements for cryptographic modules
IGImplementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
FIPS PUB 197FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS PUB 180-4FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard
FIPS PUB 186-4FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS PUB 202FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
NIST SP 800-38ANIST SP 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques
NIST SP 800-38DNIST SP 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
NIST SP 800-56Arev3NIST SP 800-56Arev3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
NIST SP 800-131Arev2NIST SP 800-131Arev2, Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
NIST SP 800-135rev1NIST SP 800-135rev1, Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions
RFC 7627Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension
RFC 8846The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
AcronymDefinition
AESAdvanced Encryption Standard
APIApplication Program Interface

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1

15 References and Acronyms
15.1 References
15.2 Acronyms
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AcronymDefinition
CAVPCryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CMVPCryptographic Module Validation Program
CVLComponent Validation List
DHDiffie-Hellman
DSADigital Signature Algorithm
DRGBDeterministic Random Bit Generator
ECCElliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSAElliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FFCFinite Field Cryptographic
FIPSFederal Information Processing Standards Publication
GCMGalois Counter Mode
GPCGeneral Purpose Computer
KASKey Agreement Scheme
KATKnown Answer Test
KDFKey Derivation Function
MACMessage Authentication Code
NISTNational Institute of Science and Technology
QATQuickAssist Technology
RSARivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHASecure Hash Algorithm
SHSSecure Hash Standard
SSCShared Secret Computation
TLSTransport Layer Security

Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) Provider v1.3.1 Intel technologies may require enabled hardware, software or service activation. No product or component can be absolutely secure. Your costs and results may vary. No license (express or implied, by estoppel or otherwise) to any intellectual property rights is granted by this document. © Intel Corporation. Intel, the Intel logo, and other Intel marks are trademarks of Intel Corporation or its subsidiaries. Other names and brands may be claimed as the property of others.