F5OS-A Cryptographic Module

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (53)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for F5OS-A Cryptographic Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback services<br/><i>Update own password<br/>Update others password<br/>Configure SSH user configuration</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>AES-CBC<br/>AES-CTR<br/>AES-ECB</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Trusted code is reachable<br/>through update and<br/>recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for F5OS-A Cryptographic Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery / rollback services<br/><i>Update own password<br/>Update others password<br/>Configure SSH user configuration</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>AES-CBC<br/>AES-CTR<br/>AES-ECB</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3 clueHigh;
  class C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

F5, Inc. F5, Inc. F5OS-A Cryptographic Module Module Version: 1.7.0 FIPS Security Level 2 Document Version 1.1 Last update: 05-06-2025 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module Table of Contents © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module 11.1.1 11.1.2 © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module List of Tables © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module List of Figures © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module F5®, BIG-IP® are registered trademarks of F5, Inc. Intel®, Atom® and Xeon® are registered trademarks of Intel Corporation. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the F5OS-A Cryptographic Module with firmware version 1.7.0. The document contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for a Security Level 2 module.

N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 1: Security Levels © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

Purpose and Use: The F5OS-A Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a microservices-based, proprietary platform layer that provides an interface between the BIG-IP ADC and the rSeries hardware. Module Type: Firmware Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand Cryptographic Boundary: The module cryptographic boundary is defined by the red dotted line in Figure

2. The TOEPP is defined by the tested platform listed in the Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid table and delineated by the black rectangle in Figure
3. Figure 2 also depicts the flow of status output (SO), control input (CI), data input (DI) and data output (DO) interfaces. Description of the ports and interfaces can be found in the Ports and Interfaces table. Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): The figure below shows the platform on which the module was tested. Figure 1: r12900 Platform Front View © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module Figure 2: Block Diagram

Tested Module Identification

• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): 1.7.0 N/A Table 2: Tested Module Identification
• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) The executable code is defined by the firmware version 1.7.0. All code belonging to this Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: 1.7.0 N/A 1.7.0 Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid

The module does not claim any excluded components.

Modes List and Description: 4.3 © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module NonApproved NonApproved 4.3 Table 4: Modes List and Description The module supports two modes of operation:

• In Approved mode of operation only approved or vendor affirmed security functions can be used. In non-Approved mode of operation only non-approved security functions can be used. The module enters the Approved Mode after the pre-operational self-tests and cryptographic algorithms self-tests (CASTs) have completed successfully. Mode Change Instructions and Status: The module automatically switches between the approved and non-approved modes depending on the services requested by the operator. The status indicator of the mode of operation is equivalent to the indicator of the service that was requested. SSPs used or stored in the Approved mode are not used in the non-Approved mode, and vice versa. Not applicable.

Approved Algorithms: © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module 5) 5) 5) 5) Table 5: Approved Algorithms Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module Table 6: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

DigSigSignature Generation © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module DigSigSigGen © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module Table 7: Security Function Implementations

The User shall consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module. AES-GCM IV is constructed in accordance with SP800-38D in compliance with IG C.H scenario 1a. The implementation of the nonce_explicit management logic inside the module ensures that when the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the module triggers a new handshake request to establish a new key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or decryption shall be re-distributed. The AES GCM IV generation follows [RFC 5288] and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with [FIPS140-3_IG] IG C.H scenario 1a; thus, the module is compliant with [SP800-52Rev2] section 3.3.1. Table 8: Entropy Certificates NonPhysical Table 9: Entropy Sources © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP80090ARev1] for the generation of random value used in asymmetric keys. The Approved DRBG provided by the module is the CTR_DRBG with AES-256. The module uses the SP800-90B compliant entropy source specified in the Entropy Sources table to seed the DRBG. The operator does not have the ability to modify the F5 entropy source (ES) configuration settings (see details in Public Use Document referenced in section 11.2). The F5 entropy source is tested in the OE listed in the Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid table.

The module implements the following key generation methods:

• RSA, ECDSA asymmetric key generation, for digital signature schemes, compliant with [FIPS186-5], using an [SP800-90ARev1] DRBG for the generation of random values. These key generation services are compliant with section 5.1 of [SP800133Rev2], according to IG D.H.
• EC Diffie-Hellman key generation using an [SP800-90ARev1] DRBG for the generation of random values. This key generation scheme is compliant with section

The module does not implement symmetric key generation as an explicit service. The HMAC and AES symmetric keys are derived from shared secrets by applying [SP 800-135] as part of the TLS/ SSH protocols. The scenario maps to the [SP 800-133Rev2] section 6.2.1.

The module provides the following key establishment services:

• EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme compliant with SP800-56ARev3 and FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 (path 2) is used as part of the TLS and SSH Protocols. The full EC Diffie-Hellman KAS implements a shared secret computation with the key derivation implemented by TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL) [SP 800-135] and KDF SSH (CVL) [SP 800-135]. EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement with P-256 and P-384 curves provides 128 and 192 bits of strength respectively. AES-GCM in the context of TLS protocol, with 128 and 256-bit keys, with 128 and

AES-CBC or AES-CTR with HMAC in the context of SSH protocol, with 128 and 256bit keys, with 128 and 256 bits of key strength; compliant with IG D.G. AES-CBC with HMAC in the context of TLS protocol, with 128 and 256-bit keys, with

The module implements the SSH key derivation function for use in the SSH protocol (RFC

GCM with internal IV generation in the approved mode is compliant with version 1.2 of the TLS protocol (RFC 5288) and shall only be used in conjunction with the TLS protocol. Additionally, the module implements the TLS 1.2 key derivation function for use in the TLS protocol. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module No parts of the SSH, TLS, other than those mentioned above, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 10: Ports and Interfaces The logical interfaces are the commands through which users of the module request services. There are no external input or output devices to the module that can be used for data input, data output, status output or control input. The module does not implement a For the purpose of the FIPS 140-3 validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which the module runs. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

Table 11: Authentication Methods The module supports role-based authentication. The module supports concurrent operators belonging to different roles (one CO role and one User role) which create different authenticated sessions, while achieving the separation between the concurrent operators. Two interfaces are used to access the module:

• CLI: The module offers a CLI which is accessed remotely using the SSHv2 secured session over the Ethernet connection. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module

• Web Utility Interface (WebUI): The Web interface consists of HTTPS over TLSenabled web browser which provides a graphical interface for system management tools. The CO role and User role can access the module through Command Line Interface (CLI) or Web Interface. However, the CO can restrict User role access to have the User accessing through Web Interface only. At initialization, the CO is the only available role and only the The module does not maintain authenticated sessions upon power cycling. Power-cycling the system requires the authentication credentials to be re-entered. When entering password authentication data through the WebUI, any character entered will be obfuscated (i.e., replace the character entered with a dot on the entry box). When entering password authentication data through the CLI, the module does not display any character entered by the operator in stdin (e.g. keyboard).

Table 12: Roles The CO and User roles are selected via the authentication credentials that are entered.

r W © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module r W W W W W,E W,E W,E W,E G © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module r n tenantover SSH G G G W,E W,E Tenantconsole © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

r n Tenantconsole W W DiffieHellman Z DiffieHellman Z - TLS preprimary :Z DiffieHellman Z DiffieHellman Z © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module r :Z :Z Z Z Z Z Z DiffieHellman Z DiffieHellman Z - TLS preprimary :Z © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module r n l Z Z DiffieHellman Z DiffieHellman Z :Z Z :Z Z DiffieHellman G,R,W,E DiffieHellman G,R,W,E © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module r E E DiffieHellman G,R,W,E DiffieHellman G,R,W,E E E W,E DiffieHellman G,R,W,E DiffieHellman G,R,W,E © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module r n l n l n l E E W,E :E :E :E :E :E :E :E © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module r :E :E DiffieHellman Z DiffieHellman Z :Z DiffieHellman Z DiffieHellman Z :Z DiffieHellman Z DiffieHellman © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module r DiffieGeneration Z :Z DiffieHellman E DiffieHellman E - TLS preprimary :G E E E E DiffieHellman E DiffieHellman E © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module r :G E E - TLS preprimary :G E E E E n) :E :E :E © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module r n) :E :E :E n) :E :E :E DiffieHellman Z DiffieHellman Z - TLS preprimary :Z © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module r DiffieHellman Z DiffieHellman Z - TLS preprimary :Z DiffieHellman Z DiffieHellman Z - TLS preprimary :Z © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module r n) g) Table 13: Approved Services The environment variable SECURITY_FIPS140_CIPHER_STRICT is exported with the cipher restriction status. If the cipher_restricted status is enabled, the status output from the service indicator is returned in the /var/log/audit.log file. Using an approved service will provide an indicator which shows which approved algorithms were used. If the cipher_restricted status is disabled, there is no service indicator output. For the SSH services, the service indicator is implicit: when the SSH connection is established the service with the selected cipher is approved. The following variables are used in the Access rights to keys or SSPs column:

• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module

• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.

© 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module Table 14: Non-Approved Services

Not applicable. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

The integrity of the module is verified using the approved integrity technique HMAC-SHA384, as listed in the section 10.1, by comparing the HMAC-SHA-384 checksum values of the installed binaries calculated at run time with the stored values computed at build time. If the values do not match, the module enters the Error state.

The on demand pre-operational self-tests, including the integrity test on demand, are performed by rebooting the module. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable How Requirements are Satisfied: Once the module is operational, it does not allow the loading of any additional firmware. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required The module tested on the platform listed in the Tested Operational Environments Software, Firmware, Hybrid table is enclosed in a hard-metallic production grade enclosure that provides opacity and prevents visual inspection of internal components. Each test platform is fitted with tamper evident labels to provide physical evidence of attempts to gain operate in approved mode of operation.

Number: 5 Placement: Shown in Figure 3 Surface Preparation: The following steps should be taken when installing or replacing the tamper evident labels on the test platform on which the module runs. The instructions are also included in F5 Platforms: FIPS Kit Installation provided with the hardware platform.

• Use the provided alcohol wipes to clean the chassis cover and components of dirt, grease, or oil before you apply the tamper evidence seals. After applying the seal, run your finger over the seal multiple times using extra high pressure. The seals completely cure within 48 hours. The pictures below show the location of all tamper-evident labels for the platform. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module Figure 3 - Tamper labels on r12900 © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

Per IG 12.A: Until requirements of SP 800-140F are defined, non-invasive mechanisms fall under ISO / IEC 19790:2012 Section 7.12 Mitigation of other attacks. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods network includes RSA/ECDSA public keys. For TLS with EC Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the TLS pre-primary secret is established during key agreement and is not output from the module. Once the TLS session is established, any key or data transfer performed thereafter is protected by authenticated encryption mode using AES-GCM or by AES encryption and HMAC authentication through a mutually agreed AES and HMAC session keys derived by applying TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL) [SP800-135]. For SSH with EC Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the SSH shared secret is established during key agreement and is not output from the module. SSH ECDSA public keys can be imported into the module by the CO using the "Configure SSH user configuration" service. Once the SSH session is established, any key or data transfer performed thereafter is protected by AES encryption and HMAC authentication through a mutually agreed AES and HMAC session keys derived by applying KDF SSH (CVL) [SP800-135]. There are no encrypted SSPs that are directly entered.

© 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods The zeroization methods listed in the SSP Zeroization Methods table, overwrite the memory occupied by keys with “zeros” or pre-defined values.

© 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module DiffieHellman public Table 19: SSP Table 1 © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module N/A © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module Table 20: SSP Table 2

The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes, starting January 1, 2030. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

1.7.0 1.7.0 Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests The pre-operational self-test is performed automatically when the module is powered on. At initialization, the module performs pre-operational self-test (integrity test) and the CASTs. Services are not available, and the data output is inhibited during the pre-operational selftest. Upon successful completion of the pre-operational self-tests and CASTs, the module any of the self-tests, the module returns an error code, and transitions to the Error state. Both, the pre-operational tests, and conditional tests are performed without operator intervention, without any external controls, externally provided test vectors, output results and the determination of pass of fail is done by the module.

© 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module SSC Sp80056Ar3 SSC Sp80056Ar3 HMACSHA2-256 HMACSHA2-256 HMACSHA2-384 HMACSHA2-384 © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests During the conditional self-tests, services are not available and the data output interface is inhibited.

Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information

Table 25: Error States All data output and cryptographic operations are inhibited when the module is in the Error

The software integrity tests, and cryptographic algorithm self-tests can be invoked on demand by rebooting the module. During the execution of the periodic and on-demand selftests, crypto services are not available, and no data output or input is possible. The PCTs are executed on demand during the key generation functions invocation. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

• The hardware devices are shipped directly from the hardware manufacturer/authorized subcontractor via trusted carrier and tracked by that carrier.
• The hardware is shipped in a sealed box that includes a packing slip with a list of components inside, and with labels outside printed with the product nomenclature, sales order number, and product serial number. Upon receipt of the hardware, the customer is required to perform the following verifications:
• Ensure that the shipping label exactly identifies the correct customer’s name and address as well as the hardware model.
• Ensure that the external labels match the expected delivery and the shipped product.
• Ensure that the components in the box match those on the documentation shipped with the product.
• Verify the hardware model with the model number given on the shipping label and marked on the hardware platform itself. The Crypto Officer must verify that the following specific configuration rules are followed in order to operate the module in the approved mode validated configuration. The ESV Public Use Document (PUD) reference for non-physical entropy source is as follows: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/entropyvalidations/certificate/85. The information regarding installing tamper evident labels is specified in section 7 of this document.

Follow the instructions in the "Initial Configuration" guide for the initial setup and configuration of the hardware module.

• Install the FIPS validated F5OS iso onto the device. Guidance on installing or upgrading the ISO can be found here: https://techdocs.f5.com/en-us/f5os-a-1-00/f5-rseries-systems-installation-upgrade/title-install-upgrade-software.html#installupgrade-options). Run the Setup wizard "appliance-setup-wizard" using the CLI with the CO account and default credentials. The system will prompt you to change the password. License the system from the WebUI. Guidance on Licensing the F5OS system can be found in https://techdocs.f5.com/en-us/hardware/f5-rseries-systems-gettingstarted/gs-system-initial-config.html#run-setup-wizard) and summarized as followed: Before you can activate the license for the F5OS system, you must obtain a base registration key. The base registration key is pre-installed on new F5OS systems. When you power up the product and connect through the WebUI, you can open the SYSTEM SETTINGS > Licensing page to display the registration key. Select © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

F5OS-A Cryptographic Module

• "Automatic" for the license Activation Method to communicate with the F5 License Server. The F5 product generates a dossier which is an encrypted list of key characteristics used to identify the platform and activates the license. After rebooting the F5OS system, it will then be in the approved mode and is now ready for additional system configuration. Once the module is installed, licensed and configured, the Crypto Officer should confirm that the system is installed and licensed correctly.

The Crypto Officer should call the show version service (with command "show system image"), then confirm that the provided version matches the validated version shown in the Tested Module Identification

• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) table. Any firmware loaded into the module other than version 1.7.0 is out of the scope of this validation and will mean that the module is not operating as a FIPS validated module.

The FIPS validated module activation requires installation of the license referred as ‘FIPS license’. The Crypto Officer should call the show license service (with command "show system licensing"), then verify that the list of license flags includes "FIPS 140 License”.

The Crypto Officer should verify that the following specific configuration rules are followed to operate the module in the FIPS validated configuration.

• The integrity check must not be disabled. The CO can verify whether this is enabled by using the command "show system security integrity-check". Management of the module via the platform's LCD display is not allowed. Serial port console and USB port should be disabled after the initial power on and communications setup of the hardware. The Approved and non-Approved modes of operation are specified in section 2.4. The administrative functions are specified in the Approved Services table. All the physical ports and logical interfaces are specified in section 3.1.

The approved and non-approved security functions available to users are listed in section 2, the physical ports, and logical interfaces available to users are specified in section 3.1. The Approved and non-Approved modes of operation are specified in section 2.4. The algorithmspecific information is listed in section 2.7. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

The module does not implement security mechanisms to mitigate other attacks. © 2024 F5, Inc. / atsec information security.

Referenced URLs

• www.atsec.com
• https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/entropy-
• https://techdocs.f5.com/en-us/f5os-a-1-0-
• https://techdocs.f5.com/en-us/hardware/f5-rseries-systems-getting-