Nuvoton NPCT7xx TPM 2.0 Cryptographic Engine

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (23)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Nuvoton NPCT7xx TPM 2.0 Cryptographic Engine
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback services<br/><i>TPM2_SequenceUpdate<br/>TPM2_PCR_Read<br/>TPM2_DictionaryAttackP arameters</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>ECDSA SigVer Component<br/>AES-CFB128<br/>AES-CTR</i>"]
    C4["[high] Physical/logical<br/>interfaces (some 'blocked<br/>in firmware')<br/><i>SPI Bus<br/>I2C Bus</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>bootloader<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Trusted code is reachable<br/>through update and<br/>recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I4["Interface reachability may<br/>vary by boot stage and<br/>lifecycle state."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R4["Are interfaces blocked<br/>before the bootloader<br/>runs, or only after<br/>approved mode starts?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E4["lifecycle reachability<br/>matrix · boot-stage<br/>interface timing ·<br/>factory/recovery/error-state<br/>access controls"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C4 --> I4 --> R4 --> E4
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C4,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I4,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R4,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E4,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Nuvoton NPCT7xx TPM 2.0 Cryptographic Engine
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery / rollback services<br/><i>TPM2_SequenceUpdate<br/>TPM2_PCR_Read<br/>TPM2_DictionaryAttackP arameters</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>ECDSA SigVer Component<br/>AES-CFB128<br/>AES-CTR</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C4["[high] Physical/logical interfaces (some 'blocked in firmware')<br/><i>SPI Bus<br/>I2C Bus</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.portsAndInterfaces"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>bootloader<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C4 clueHigh;
  class C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Nuvoton Technology Corporation Nuvoton NPCT7xx TPM 2.0 Cryptographic Engine Hardware Version 0x00FC Firmware Version 7.2.4.1 Document Version: 1.4 Last update: 2025-07-29 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module Table of Contents © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module List of Tables List of Figures © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Nuvoton NPCT7xx TPM 2.0 Cryptographic Engine (hereafter referred to as “the module”). It has a one-to-one mapping to the [SP 800-140Br1] starting with section B.2.1 named “General” that maps to section 1 in this document and ending with section B.2.12 named “Mitigation of other attacks” that maps to section 12 in this document.

The module meets the requirements of FIPS Pub 140-3 overall Security Level 1 with Physical Security N/A N/A N/A Table 1: Security Levels © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module

Purpose and Use: The Nuvoton NPCT7xx TPM 2.0 Cryptographic Engine is a hardware cryptographic module (hereafter simply referred to as “the module”) that implements advanced cryptographic algorithms, including symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, as well as key generation and random number generation. The module is a contained within a single-chip embodiment that provides cryptographic services utilized by external applications. The module meets commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, shock, and vibrations, and includes chip packaging to meet the physical security requirements at security level 3. Module Type: Hardware Module Embodiment: SingleChip Cryptographic Boundary: The block diagram below shows the cryptographic boundary of the module, and its interfaces with the operational environment. The components within TOEPP include an RNG block to provide entropy input for the module’s DRBG, Cryptographic Accelerators (SHA, AES, and PKA), ROM containing non-modifiable runtime execution code (CrypLib and Booter), Flash containing modifiable runtime execution code (Bootloader and TPM Library), CPU and RAM for runtime processing. Lastly the GPIO, Power Management and Host Interfaces provide the interfaces to/from the module. Figure 1: Block Diagram Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) The TOEPP and cryptographic boundary are one and the same, encompassing the entire physical chip (outlined in red).

Tested Module Identification

• Hardware: © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module This module is available in three hardware configurations. 7.2.4.1 N/A 7.2.4.1 N/A 7.2.4.1 N/A Table 2: Tested Module Identification

• Hardware Figure 2
• Hardware Module Photographs

There are no components within the cryptographic boundary excluded from the FIPS 140-3 requirements. Modes List and Description: For some TPM host platforms, it might take too much time to execute all self-tests during power up. Therefore, the TPM supports the following two Approved modes. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module NonApproved NonApproved Table 3: Modes List and Description

Approved Algorithms: The table below lists all approved algorithms used by the module, including specific key strengths employed for approved services, and implemented modes of operation. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module Table 4: Approved Algorithms Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: The following table lists all vendor affirmed approved algorithms implemented by the module. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module N/A Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms N/A for this module. 2.4.A The following table list all non-approved algorithms not allowed in the approved mode of operation. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module AsymKeyPairKeyGen © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module AsymKeyPairKeyGen © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module Table 8: Security Function Implementations

Compliance to SP 800-56ARev3 assurances For KAS-ECC, the module satisfies IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2) (i.e., tested compliance with Full Unified and One Pass DH key agreement schemes followed by the derivation of the key as shown in Section 5.8 of SP 800-56Arev3). The key derivation function complies to SP 800-56C rev2 (i.e, OneStep KDF). Furthermore, the module obtained the appropriate assurances, as required in Sections

The key generation implemented by the module is CAVP validated. The entity using the module, must use the module's key generation service to generate the ECDH keys. The module will perform a pairwise consistency check upon generating ECDH keys.

5.6.2.2 Assurances Required by a Public Key Recipient Assurance of public-key validity: The module

makes used of approved EC curves listed in SP 800-140D and performs a successful public-key validation of the received public key.

5.6.2.2.3 Recipient’s assurance of owner’s possession of private key can be met via the use of a

Trusted Third party that requires the key confirmation procedure. Both of which are handled by the entity outside of the module that requested the ECDH Key Agreement service from the module. That is, such checks are out of the module's scope.

5.6.2.3 Public Key Validation Routines: The module performs the required public key validation before

initiating the handshake. Compliance to SP 800-56BRev3 assurances For KTS RSA, the tester verified the implementation satisfies IG D.G by employing an approved RSAbased key transport scheme as specified in SP 800-56Brev2. The following summary of assurances, as defined in Sections 5 and 6 of SP 800-56Brev2: Section 5.1

• The module uses an approved hash function (SHS, Cert. #A4792) for mask generation during RSA-OEAP encryption. Section 5.2 and Section 5.6
• N/A, The module does not implement key confirmation. Section 5.3 - The module uses an approved random bit generator (CTR_DRBG, Cert. #A4792) when generating random values. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 – N/A, The module does not implement a key agreement scheme (i.e., KAS1). For additional assurances found in its Section 6 (specifically SP 800-56Brev2 Section 6.4 Required Assurances):

1. The entity requesting the RSA key unwrapping (decapsulation) service from the module, shall only use an RSA private key that was generated by an active FIPS validated module that implements FIPS 186-4 compliant RSA key generation service and performs the key pair validity and the pairwise consistency as stated in section 6.4.1.1 of the SP 800-56Brev2. Additionally, the entity shall renew these assurances over time by using any method described in section 6.4.1.5 of the SP 800-56Brev2.
2. For use of an RSA key wrapping (encapsulation) service in the context of key transport per IG D.G, a) the entity using the module, shall verify the validity of the peer's public key using the public key validation service of the module. b) the entity using the module, shall confirm the peer's possession of private key by using any method specified in section 6.4.2.3 of the SP 800-56Brev2. Only after the above assurances are successfully met, shall the entity use the peer's public key to perform the RSA key wrapping (encapsulation) service of the module."

Table 9: Entropy Certificates Table 10: Entropy Sources Entropy Information: The SP 800-90B entropy source consists of a noise source which feeds 1024bit samples to a block cipher vetted conditioning component. The final output from the conditioning component provides 384-bits of full entropy. DRBG Information: The module implements an approved SP 800-90Ar1 Deterministic Random Bit Generator in the form of CTR_DRBG. The CTR_DRBG is provided with 384-bits of entropy input from the SP 800-90B compliant entropy source. The DRBG is used internally by the module to generate symmetric keys, seeds for asymmetric key pairs and random numbers for security functions. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module

This module implements vendor affirmed Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for AES, HMAC, RSA, ECDSA and EC Diffie-Hellman keys, compliant to SP 800-133rev2 and IG D.H. When generating RSA and ECDSA and EC Diffie-Hellman asymmetric key pairs, the seed used for asymmetric key generation is obtained directly from the module's approved SP 800-90rev1 DRBG (CTR_DRBG) specified in SP 800-133 Rev2 Section 4, example 1. This is followed by an asymmetric key generation method compliant with FIPS 186-4 (and SP 800-56A Rev 3 for ECDH key pairs). Symmetric keys (AES and HMAC) are also generated directly from the module's approved CTR_DRBG as following Section 4, example 1 of SP 800-133rev2.

The module provides an approved [SP800-56Arev3] EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Scheme. The key agreement scheme is compliant with IG D.F scenario 2 path (2). The CAVP testing was performed end-to-end, using the Full Unified and One Pass DH Models with approved domain parameters (i.e., P-256 and P-384). Per FIPS 140-3 IG D.B, the curves provide 128 or 192 bits of security strength. The module provides key derivation services using SP 800-108 KBKDF and SP 800-56C One-Step KDF with key sizes 160, 256, 384 bits. Per FIPS 140-3 IG D.B, the key sizes provide 160-256 bits of security strength. The module provides SP 800-56B rev2 Key Transport using KTS-OAEP-basic. The implementation supports 2048-, 3072-, or 4096-bits modulus size, with both key encapsulation and un-encapsulation supported. The module does not implement key confirmation. Per FIPS 140-3 IG D.B, the key sizes provide 112, 128, or 150 bits of security strength. The module also implements AES-CFB128 combined with HMAC as approved key wrapping method compliant SP 800-38F. Per FIPS 140-3 IG D.B, the key sizes provide 128 or 256 bits of security strength.

The cryptographic module does not implement any relevant industry protocols. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module

Table 11: Ports and Interfaces The module does not implement any control output interface. The logical interfaces are the API through which applications request services. The ports and interfaces are shown in the following table. All data output via data output interface is inhibited when the module is performing pre-operational test or zeroization or when the module enters error state. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module

N/A for this module. The module does not support role authentication.

The table below lists the approved services. For each service, the table lists the associated cryptographic algorithm(s), the role to perform the service, the cryptographic keys or SSPs involved, and their access type(s). The following convention is used to specify access rights for SSPs: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroizes the SSP. N/A: The calling application does not access any SSP or key during its operation. Details on the approved cryptographic algorithms, can be found in the SFI table. The module implements a FIPS 140-3 service indicator function that outputs its value. This value corresponds to the three categories defined in IG 2.4.C. Non-security relevant services are set to '00', approved services are set to '01' and non-approved services are set to '10'. y N/A Z © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y y: Z Z :Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y Z Z Z Z Z Z N/A AESCFB128 AESCTR AESOFB E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y KASECC KASECCSSC e E E E E E E E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E N/A AESCFB128 AESCTR AESOFB KASECC KASECCSSC e E E E E E E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E E E E manufacturerspecific information N/A (manufacturerspecific KASECC E E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E G,E G,E N/A E E G G G G © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y g G G G G G G G © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y KASECCSSC W W W W W W W W © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y W W W KASECCSSC W W W W W © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y W W W W W W R © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y R R R R R R R R © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y R R KASECC E E E E R,E R,E E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E E R,E R,E KASECC g E E E E R,E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y R,E h g R,W,E R,W,E R,W R,W R,W R,W R,W R,W © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y R,W R,W R,W R,W R,W E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y g G,W,E G,W,E G,W G,W G,W G,W G,W G,W G,W © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y G,W G,W G,W G,W KASECC g R,E R,E R,E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y R R R R R R R R © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y KASECC g R R R R R R © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y R R R R R KASECC R,E R,E R,E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y y): E R R R R R R R © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y R E E E E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E KASECCSSC KASECCSSC AESCFB128 AESCTR AESOFB E E AESCFB128 AESCTR AESOFB E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E E E E G,E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E E E E N/A E E e E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E E E E E E E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E E E E E E E E E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E E E E E E E E E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E E E E E E E E E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E E E E E E E e E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E E E E E N/A N/A © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E y N/A E e N/A N/A E N/A © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A E N/A N/A © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y N/A N/A E E G,W,E G,W,E G,W G,W © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y G,W G,W G,W G,W G,W G,W G,W G,W © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y G,W N/A E E Z Z Z Z Z Z © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y Z Z Z Z Z . N/A E E E y: G N/A y: E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y Z Z Z N/A y: E Z Z Z Z Z © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y Z Z Z Z Z Z N/A E E,Z © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y Z Z :Z Z Z N/A E E N/A E E E N/A E N/A E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y N/A g N/A Z Z © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y N/A E E W W W W W W W © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y W W W W N/A N/A E E N/A E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y N/A E E G G e N/A E E Z Z N/A E E Z Z © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E E Z Z N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y N/A E E N/A N/A W W E E E © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module y E E E N/A N/A AESCTR Table 13: Approved Services

© 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module Table 14: Non-Approved Services

The software/firmware load test is performed prior to loading external software or firmware on the security module. The firmware image is verified using an ECDSA signature verification algorithm, utilizing a 384-bit Firmware Update key. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module

The integrity of the module is verified by comparing an HMAC-SHA-256 value calculated at run time. The integrity test uses a fixed key size of 160 bits.

On demand integrity test may be performed by power cycling. The operator can call TPM2_Startup service from the Approved Services Table to perform on-demand integrity test. This service resets the module, resulting in the pre-operational self-tests to be re-performed. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module

The module operates in a non-modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-3 security level 1 specifications. The operator cannot modify the firmware components of the module. Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module

The TPM is implemented as a single integrated circuit (IC) device that attaches to standard system PCBs. It is manufactured using de-facto standard integrated circuit manufacturing technologies, producing a device that meets all commercial-grade power, temperature, reliability, shock and vibration specifications. The TPM IC physical package provides hardness, opacity and tamperevidence protection conforming to FIPS 140-3 Physical Security Level

3. The TPM achieves this level of protection by implementing an enclosure that is both hard and opaque, as shown in the figures in Section
4. This type of IC package ensures that any physical tampering will always result in scratches, chipping, or other visible damage on the enclosure. Before the TPM is integrated into a target application system, it must be checked visually for tampering. After it is integrated, typically through soldering onto a PCB, it can be inspected for tampering by opening the application system enclosure and examining the TPM.

Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required Table 16: EFP/EFT Information

Table 17: Hardness Testing Temperatures © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module

This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism defined in SP 800-140F, therefore this section is not applicable. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module

© 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods The module requires two independent internal actions to output SSP in plaintext. The TPM2_Duplicate command performs the following actions:

1. Verification of the encryptedDuplication attribute of the key to be duplicated: encryptedDuplication attribute needs to be set to 0
2. Verification of the handle of the new parent of the key to be duplicated: new handle needs to be set to the NULL handle

The table below identifies every zeroization method that is available within the module. Please refer to the “Zeroization” column in SSP Table 2 for the zeroization method used for each specific SSP. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods

The table below summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module h G G G G G G G © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module h G © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module h y © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module h ECC: P256, P384; G KAS-ECCSSC © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module h ECC: P256, P384; KAS-ECCSSC AESCFB128 © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module h AESCFB128 AESCFB128 © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module h G AESCFB128 AESCFB128 AESCFB128 © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module h G G KAS-ECCSSC n ECC: P256, P384; ECC: P256, P384; © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module h AESCFB128 G G G Table 21: SSP Table 1 © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module The following table continues to summarize the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module. e n N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A h N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n N/A N/A N/A © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n N/A N/A © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n N/A N/A N/A © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n N/A N/A © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n N/A N/A N/A © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n N/A N/A N/A © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module e n N/A N/A N/A Table 22: SSP Table 2 © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module

The Module implements the following tests during power-on: HMAC-SHA2256 Table 23: Pre-Operational Self-Tests The module does not provide any cryptographic services prior to this test.

The Module implements the following conditional tests: HMACSHA2-384 © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module Hash: SHA2256 Hash: SHA2256 © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module Table 24: Conditional Self-Tests No services are available, and input and output are inhibited while performing the self-test.

Table 25: Pre-Operational Periodic Information © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 26: Conditional Periodic Information

© 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module Table 27: Error States If a conditional or power-on self-test fails, the Module enters an error state where both data output and cryptographic services are disabled. The Module can recover from this error state once all self-tests pass after a platform reset or power cycle.

The module allows operators to initiate the pre-operational or conditional cryptographic algorithm selftests on demand for periodic testing, by power-cycling the module. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module

The module is not considered to be initialized until the following are completed:

• The module must be connected on the PCB as described in the Module technical specifications. The connection must ensure one-to-one binding with the platform. The platform on which the module is installed should include BIOS and OS that initialize and control TPM hierarchies and set hierarchy’s authorization value and policy. If the platform does not have such BIOS and OS, the crypto-officer shall install software to manage TPM hierarchies and set the hierarchy’s authorization and policy.

The administrator guidance can be found within the TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning Guidance.

The module may be operated as described in TCG TPM2.0 Revision 1.59. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module

The module does not claim any mitigation of other attacks. © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module References FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules March 2019 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3 FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program January 29, 2024 https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips 140-3/FIPS 140-3 IG.pdf TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning Guidance Version 1.0 Revision 1.0 TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning Guidance Version 1.0 Revision 1.0 March 15, 2017 https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/tcg-tpm-v2-0-provisioning-guidance TPM Library Specification TPM Library specification, Family “2.0”, Revision 1.59 November 2019 https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-specification/ Platform TPM Profile Specification TCG PC Client Platform TPM Profile Specification for TPM 2.0 September 4, 2020 https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-Client-Specific-Platform-TPM-Profilefor-TPM-2p0-v1p05p_r14_pub.pdf TCG TPM2.0 Revision 1.59 TCG TPM2.0 Revision 1.59, version 1.4 January 9, 2023 https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-2.0-Library-Spec-v1.59-Erratav1.4_pub.pdf FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) March 2012 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) February 2023 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard November 2001 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf FIPS 198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 2008 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 February 2003 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module SP 800-38Arev1 NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques December 2001 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf SP 800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication May 2005 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38b/final SP 800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality May 2004 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf SP 800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC November 2007 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf SP 800-56Arev3 NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2 - Recommendation for Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography April 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf SP 800-57rev5 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5 - Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General May 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf SP 800-90Arev1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators June 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf SP 800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation January 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf SP 800-131Arev2 NIST Special Publication 800-131A Revision 2 - Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf SP 800-133rev2 NIST Special Publication 800-133 Revision 2 - Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation June 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf SP 800-135rev1 NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Existing ApplicationSpecific Key Derivation Functions December 2011 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-135r1.pdf © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module Cryptographic Module SP 800-140Br1 NIST Special Publication 800-140Br1 - CMVP Security Policy Requirements November 2023 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140Br1.pdf © 2025 Nuvoton / atsec information security.

Referenced URLs

• www.atsec.com
• https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3
• https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
• https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/tcg-tpm-v2-0-provisioning-guidance
• https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-specification/
• https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-Client-Specific-Platform-TPM-Profile-
• https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-2.0-Library-Spec-v1.59-Errata-
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
• https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38b/final
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
• https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-135r1.pdf
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140Br1.pdf