Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 2100 Series)

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (29)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 2100 Series)
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback services<br/><i>Firmware Load Test<br/>Firmware Update</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Block Cipher (SSHv2)<br/>Block Cipher (TLSv1.2)<br/>Block Cipher (IPSec/IKE)</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Trusted code is reachable<br/>through update and<br/>recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 2100 Series)
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[high] Firmware update / recovery / rollback services<br/><i>Firmware Load Test<br/>Firmware Update</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Block Cipher (SSHv2)<br/>Block Cipher (TLSv1.2)<br/>Block Cipher (IPSec/IKE)</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3 clueHigh;
  class C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 2100 Series) Americas Headquarters: Cisco Systems, Inc., 170 West Tasman Drive, San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems logo is registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc.

Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 2100 Series) (hereinafter referred to as ASA or Module), version 9.20. The following details how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-3, SP 800-140 and ISO/IEC 19790 for a Security Level 2 Hardware cryptographic module. The security requirements cover areas related to the design and implementation of a cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic table indicates the actual security levels for each area of the cryptographic module.

Purpose and Use: This module is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module deployed under the Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) with Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA). The module’s operational environment is Limited. ASA delivers enterprise-class firewall for businesses, improving security at the Internet edge, high performance and throughput for demanding enterprise data centers. The ASA solution offers the combination of the industry's most deployed stateful firewall with a comprehensive range of next-generation network security services, intrusion prevention system (IPS), content © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

security and secure unified communications, HTTPS/TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2, SNMPv3 and Cryptographic Cipher Suite B using the ASA Cryptographic Module. Module Type: Hardware Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand Module Characteristics: Cryptographic Boundary: The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire chassis unit’s physical perimeter encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," “rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case, and shown in the figures below and in the Physical Security section. The FPR 2110 and FPR 2120 have the same exterior features while FPR 2130 and FPR 2140 have the same exterior features. Where they differ is in Firewall throughput, IPS throughput, IPsec VPN throughput and number of VPN peers allowed. Figure 2 FPR 2130 and FPR 2140

Tested Module Identification

• Hardware: © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 2: Tested Module Identification

• Hardware Tested Module Identification
• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): N/A for this module. Tested Module Identification
• Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module.

N/A for this module. Modes List and Description: Table 3: Modes List and Description operation after initial operations are performed (See Section 11). The module does not claim implementation of a degraded mode of operation. Section 4 provides details on the service

Approved Algorithms: CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 4: Approved Algorithms - CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation Octeon III Family Crypyto Engine HMAC-SHA2HMAC HMAC-SHA2HMAC HMAC-SHA2HMAC Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Octeon III Family Crypyto Engine © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module.

KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen KAS-ECCKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. Groups: modp2048, modp3072, modp4096

KAS-FFCKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. Groups: modp2048, modp3072, modp4096 Groups:: modp2048, modp3072, modp4096

© 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. Groups: modpstrength 2048, modp3072, modp4096

AsymKeyPairKeyGen AsymKeyPairKeyGen © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 7: Security Function Implementations © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

• The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation Guidance C.H scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. The keys for the client and server negotiated in the TLSv1.2 handshake process (client_write_key and server_write_key) are compared and the module aborts the session if the key values are identical. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
• The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. Two keys established by IKEv2 for one security association (one key for encryption in each direction between the parties) are not identical and abort the session if they are. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
• The module was algorithm tested based on the FIPS 186-4 standard Digital Signatures. According to IG C.K, this module is 186-5 compliant as all 186-4 CAVP tests performed are mathematically identical to the 186-5 CAVP tests. The Module does not support 1864 DSA or RSA X9.31 for Signature Generation or Signature Verification.

Table 8: Entropy Certificates NonPhysical Table 9: Entropy Sources A2810 (SHA3256) The module implements two approved DRBGs based on SP800-90Arev1, including CRT_DRBG with Algo Cert. #A4446, and HASH_DRBG with DRBG Algo Cert. #819.

Those two DRBGs are used internally by the module (e.g. to generate symmetric keys, seeds for asymmetric key pairs, and random numbers for security functions). Each DRBG is seeded by the entropy source described in the table above. The CTR_DRBG (AES-128/192/256) enables Derivation Function capability, and the HASH_DRBG (SHA2-512) doesn’t support Prediction Resistance. Each DRBG is instantiated with a 384-bits long entropy input (corresponding to 384 bits of entropy) and provides at least 256 bits security strength for the cryptographic keys generation while in the approved mode. The Cisco JENT entropy source implementation generates an output that is considered to have full entropy. More information can be found in the public use document for ESV cert #E3.

The module generates RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DH asymmetric key pairs compliant with FIPS 186-4, using a NIST SP 800-90Arev1 DRBG for random number generation. In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs CKG for asymmetric keys as per section

5.1 of NIST SP 800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) by obtaining a random bit string directly from an

approved DRBG. The random bit string supports the required security strength requested by the calling application (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H.).

The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of operation:

• KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation: - The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength. The module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 4419 (SSH), RFC

o SSH (RFC 4419): MODP-2048 (ID =

14. MODP-3072 (ID =
15. MODP-4096 (ID = 16) o TLS (RFC 7919): ffdhe2048 (ID = 256) ffdhe3072 (ID = 257) ffdhe4096 (ID = 258) o IKE (RFC 3526): MODP-2048 (ID =
16. MODP-3072 (ID =
17. MODP-4096 (ID = 16) © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

• KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation: - The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.

The module supports SSHv2, TLS v1.2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 industrial protocols. Please refer to SSPs Table for more information. No parts of IPSec/IKEv2, SNMPv3, SSH and TLS protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

N/A Table 10: Ports and Interfaces N/A The module’s physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in Table 2. The module provides physical ports which are mapped to logical interfaces provided © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

RSABased ECDSABased © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

and the User role. The module also allows the concurrent operators.

n (Preoperational the selftests Z © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

n N/A N/A © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. Z W,Z W,Z KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen W,E

n © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. with AESGCM) W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E

n © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen with AESGCM) W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E

n © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E

n © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen with AESGCM) W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E

n © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen with AESGCM) W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E

n © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. KAS-ECCKeyGen KAS-FFCKeyGen W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E W,E

The module supports the firmware load test by using HMAC-SHA2-512 (HMAC Cert. #A4446) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test Key was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to complete firmware update service, the Crypto Officer must authenticate to the module before loading the firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails.

The module implements alternating Bypass service. Traffic output from the module’s data output interface can be cryptographically protected via IPSec/IKE VPN, or passed as plaintext (Bypass state), depending on the VPN tunnel establishment on the dedicated data output interface. The operator shall assume Crypto Officer role so as to configure IPSec/IKE VPN capability. If no IPSec/IKE VPN was configured, after running two independent internal actions, Module would enter the Bypass state. Before the module executes the Bypass service (sending out plaintext traffic via the data output interface), the module would conduct two independent internal actions to prevent the inadvertent bypass of plaintext data due to a single error. The Crypto Officer can use commands “show access-list” and “show crypto ipsec sa” to verify the module’s Bypass status. In Bypass tests fail, the module would enter an error state, and drop the traffic.

The module implements Self-initiated cryptographic output capability without external operator request. The Crypto Officer shall configure self-initiated cryptographic output capability. Prior to executing the self-initiated cryptographic output capability, the module conducts two independent internal actions to activate the capability to prevent the inadvertent output due to a single error.

The module supports Unauthenticated service, where the unauthenticated users can run the self-test service by power-cycling the module.

The module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure firmware security, the module is protected by RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-512 (RSA Cert. #A4446) algorithm. A Firmware Integrity Test Key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware integrity test only at the pre-operational self-test. The module uses the RSA

2048 bits modulus public key to verify the digital signature. If the firmware integrity test fails, the

module would enter to an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited.

Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the firmware integrity test on-demand. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Type of Operational Environment: Limited

Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required Step 1: Turn off and unplug the module. Step 2: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, oil or any other material other than the surface coating from manufacture before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. Step 3: Apply a label to cover the module as shown in the figures below. The tamper evident labels are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive backing. Any attempt to open the module will damage the tamper evident labels or the material of the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident labels have non-repeated serial numbers, they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to verify that the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident labels can also be inspected for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices. The word “FIPS” may appear if the label was peeled back.

Number: Nine (9) Placement: Figure 3 Module front view with opacity shield © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Figure 4 FRP 2110/2120 back view TEL 1 Figure 5 FRP 2130/2140 back view TEL 1 TEL 6 TEL 2 TEL 4 TEL 1 TEL 5 TEL 6 TEL 3 Figure 6 FRP 2110/2120 top view with opacity shield © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

TEL 2 TEL 4 TEL 1 TEL 5 TEL 6 TEL 3 Figure 7 FRP 2130/2140 top view with opacity shield TEL 7 TEL 8 TEL 9 Figure 8 Module’s bottom view with opacity shield © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

TEL 6 TEL 2 Figure 9 Module’s left view with opacity shield TEL 3 Figure 10 Module’s right view with opacity shield Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: It is recommended seals be stored in a secure location under controlled access Part Numbers: AIR-AP-FIPSKIT=

2110, 2120, 2130 and 2140 Opacity Shield FPR-2100-FIPS-KIT= Step 1: Attach the Slide Rail Locking Bracket, #2 in diagram to the Side of the Chassis using the countersink screws #3 in diagram. Step 2: Attach the Cable Management Bracket (#1) to the Slide Rail Locking Bracket (#2) using the countersink screws (#3) © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Step 3: Route the Cables through the Cable Management Brackets Step 4: Attach the FIPS Opacity Shield (#1) to the Cable Management Brackets (#3) using the countersink screws (#2) © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Figure 11 Opacity Shield Brackets

) ) ) ) ) m ) c d c with AESGCM) d c d c with AESGCM) d c Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods

Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods Please note that the Firmware Load Test Key is only used for Firmware Load Test Authentication and not subject to the zeroization requirement. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

© 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. MODP2048, MODP3072, MODP2048, MODP3072, MODP2048, MODP3072, MODP2048, MODP3072, KASFFCKeyGen KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KASECCKeyGen KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3

© 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. - 112128 bits - 112128 bits KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 (FIPS1864) (A4446) (FIPS1864) (A4446) 8, 2,

8, KASFFCKeyGen ) KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-FFCSSC

P-256, P384, P521 128-256 p-256, P384, P521 128-256 Sp80056Ar3 KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KASECCKeyGen ) KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3

© 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. P-256, P384, P521 128-256 P-256, P384, P521 128-256 - 112128 bits - 112128 bits MODP2048, MODP3072, (FIPS1864) (A4446) (FIPS1864) (A4446) KASFFCKeyGen KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3

© 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. MODP2048, MODP3072, MODP2048, MODP3072, MODP2048, MODP3072, P-256, P384, P521 128-256 P-256, P384, P521 128-256 P-256, P384, P521 128-256 P-256, P384, P521 KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KASECCKeyGen KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3

y © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. P-256, P384, P521 128-256 P-256, P384, P521 128-256 s (FIPS1864) (A4446) (FIPS1864) (A4446)

s - N/A y 2) Table 18: SSP Table 1 n n n © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. n n

• SHA-1: The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing and digital signature verification. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031. At this time, the user should move to SHA2, which is available in this module.
• FIPS 186-4/186-5: As of February 5, 2024, the CMVP does not accept module submissions that implement DSA or RSA X9.31 in the approved mode, other than for signature verification which is approved for legacy use. This module does not implement DSA or RSA X9.31 for signature generation and therefore is unaffected by the current transition from 186-4 to 186-5. As detailed in section 2.7, the CAVP testing performed on the 186-4 algorithms is mathematically similar to the testing performed on the 186-5 algorithms and therefore this module claims compliance with 186-5. This means that no timeline exists in which any of the implemented algorithms will transition from approved to non-approved.

N/A N/A N/A Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests The module performs the following self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and Conditional self-tests. Prior to the module providing any data output via the data output interface, the module performs and passes the pre-operational self-tests. Following the successful pre-operational self-tests, the module executes the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs). If anyone of the self-tests fails, the module transitions into an error state and outputs the error message via the module’s status output interface. While the module is in the error state, all data through the data output interface and all cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the module transitions to the

KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAT KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAT HMAC-SHA2256 HMAC-SHA2384 HMAC-SHA2512 MODP2048 with SHA2256 with SHA2256 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

N/A N/A N/A N/A HMAC-SHA2256 HMAC-SHA2384 HMAC-SHA2512 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 PCT N/A KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 PCT MODP2048 N/A HMACSHA2-512 N/A © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests.

N/A Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information

Table 24: Error States If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the error and enters the Error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and perform the selftests, including the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs.

The validated module firmware was installed onto the respective test platforms listed in Table 2 above. Any firmware/software loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps. Operating this module without maintaining the following settings will put the module into a non-compliant state. Step 1: The Crypto Officer must install opacity shields as described in section Physical Security above. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Step 2: The Crypto Officer must apply tamper evidence labels as described in section Physical Security above. Step 3: The Crypto Officer must securely store any unused tamper evidence labels. Note: Each module has a Type A USB 2.0 port, but it is considered to be disabled once the Crypto Officer has applied the TEL #9. Step 4: Crypto Officer performs the following configurations: ciscoasa# configure terminal Note, the Crypto Officer needs to connect the platform to cisco.com to obtain the license for ASA from Cisco. ciscoasa(config)# license smart register idtoken [token data] ciscoasa(config)#license smart ciscoasa(config-smart-lic)# show license all Smart Licensing Status ====================== Smart Licensing is ENABLED -ORciscoasa(config-smart-lic)# show license summary Smart Licensing is ENABLED Registration: Step

5. Crypto officer shall perform zeroization operation if the module was previously used before the approved mode configuration. Step 6: Enable approved mode of operation by using the following command. ciscoasa(config)# fips enable Note: Startup operational mode will not take effect until you save configuration and reboot the device Rebooting the device will force new self-test Step 7: Crypto Officer can verify the version installed and running the following command. ciscoasa(config)# show version Step 8: Crypto Officer will need to issue the following commands to configure module. ciscoasa> en ciscoasa# conf t ciscoasa(config)# Step 9: Assign users a Privilege Level of
6. Step 10: Configure IP address for unit and all distant endpoints. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Step 11: Define RADIUS and TACACS+ shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long and secure traffic between the security module and the RADIUS/TACACS+ server via secure (IPSec, TLS) tunnel. Note: Perform this step only if RADIUS/TACAS+ is configured, otherwise skip over and proceed to next step. Step 12: Configure the security module so that any remote connections via Telnet are secured through IPSec connection by using the following commands crypto map interface access-list protocol esp encryption protocol esp integrity If IPSec secure connection is not configured, after running two internal independent actions defined in section 4.6 above, the module would enter the Bypass state. Step 13: Configure the security module so that only approved algorithms are used for all security connections (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, SNMPv3 and IPSec/IKEv2). Step 14: Configure the security module so that error messages can only be viewed by Crypto Officer. Step 15: Disable the TFTP server. Step 16: Disable HTTP for performing system management in approved mode of operation. HTTPS with TLSv1.2 should always be used for Web-based management. Step 17: Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using approved algorithms. Step 18: Save the configuration. Step 19: Reboot the module.

No specific Administrator guidance.

No specific Non-Administrator guidance.

N/A for this module. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.