Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 4200 Series)

Certificate

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 4200 Series)
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Firmware Load</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>UnAuth</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 4200 Series)
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Firmware Load</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>UnAuth</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 4200 Series) Americas Headquarters: Cisco Systems, Inc., 170 West Tasman Drive, San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems logo is registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc.

table indicates the actual security levels for each area of the cryptographic module.

Purpose and Use: This module is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module deployed under the Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) with Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA). The module operates in a limited operational environment. ASA delivers enterprise-class firewall for businesses, improving security at the Internet edge, high performance and throughput for demanding enterprise data centers. The ASA solution offers the combination of the industry's most deployed stateful firewall with a comprehensive range of next-generation network security services, intrusion prevention system (IPS), content security and secure unified communications, HTTPS/TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2, SNMPv3 and Cryptographic Cipher Suite B using the ASA Cryptographic Module. Module Type: Hardware Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand Module Characteristics: Cryptographic Boundary: © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

The Tested Operational Environment Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) is defined as the entire chassis unit’s physical perimeter encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," “rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case as shown in the figures below and in the Physical Security section. The cryptographic boundary encompasses the entire TOEPP. The FPR 4215, FPR 4225, and FPR 4245 all have the same exterior appearance. Where they differ is in Firewall throughput, IPS throughput, IPsec VPN throughput and number of VPN peers allowed.

Tested Module Identification

• Hardware: Table 2: Tested Module Identification
• Hardware Tested Module Identification
• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): N/A for this module. Tested Module Identification
• Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

N/A for this module. Modes List and Description: Table 3: Modes List and Description operation after initial operations are performed (See Section 11). The module does not claim implementation of a degraded mode of operation. Section 4 provides details on the service

Approved Algorithms: CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 4: Approved Algorithms - CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation Nitrox-V GC Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Nitrox-V GC Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module.

Table 7: Security Function Implementations

The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation Guidance C.H scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. The keys for the client and server negotiated in the TLSv1.2 handshake process (client_write_key and server_write_key) are compared and the module aborts the session if the key values are identical. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. Two keys established by IKEv2 for one security association (one key for encryption in each direction between the parties) are not identical and abort the session if they are. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. The module was algorithm tested based on the FIPS 186-4 standard for Digital Signatures. According to IG C.K, this module is 186-5 compliant as all 186-4 CAVP tests performed are mathematically identical to the 186-5 CAVP tests. The Module does not support 186-4 DSA or RSA X9.31 for Signature Generation or Signature Verification. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 8: Entropy Certificates Table 9: Entropy Sources The module implements two approved DRBGs based on SP800-90Arev1, including CRT_DRBG with Algo Cert. #A4446, and HASH_DRBG with Algo Cert. #C1026. Those two DRBGs are used internally by the module (e.g. to generate symmetric keys, seeds for asymmetric key pairs, and random numbers for security functions). Each DRBG is seeded by the entropy source described in the table above. The CTR_DRBG (AES-128/192/256) enables Derivation Function capability, and the HASH_DRBG (SHA2-512) doesn’t support Prediction Resistance. Each DRBG is instantiated with a 384-bits long entropy input (corresponding to 384 bits of entropy) and provides at least 256 bits security strength for the cryptographic keys generation while in the approved mode. The Cisco JENT entropy source implementation generates an output that is considered to have full entropy. More information can be found in the public use document for ESV cert #E3.

The module generates RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DH asymmetric key pairs compliant with FIPS 186-4, using a NIST SP 800-90Arev1 CTR DRBG or NIST SP 800-90Arev1 Hash DRBG for random number generation. In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs CKG for asymmetric keys as per section 5.1 of NIST SP 800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) by obtaining a random bit string directly from an approved DRBG. The random bit string supports the required security strength requested by the calling application (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H.).

The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of operation: • KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation: - The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation.

The shared secret computation provides between 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength. - The module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 4419 (SSH), RFC

o SSH (RFC 4419): MODP-2048 (ID =

14. MODP-3072 (ID =
15. MODP-4096 (ID = 16) o TLS (RFC 7919): ffdhe2048 (ID = 256) ffdhe3072 (ID = 257) ffdhe4096 (ID = 258) o IKE (RFC 3526): MODP-2048 (ID =
16. MODP-3072 (ID =
17. MODP-4096 (ID = 16) • KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation: - The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.

The module supports SSHv2, TLS v1.2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 industrial protocols. Please refer to the Security Function Implementations Table for more information. No parts of IPSec/IKEv2, SNMPv3, SSH and TLS protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

The module’s physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in The module’s data output interface will be disabled when performing pre-operational self-tests, loading new firmware, zeroizing keys, or when in an error state.

Table 11: Authentication Methods © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

and the User role. The module also allows the concurrent operators.

Table 12: Roles Unauthenticated Users can run the self-test service by power-cycling the module by removing the power and re-applying.

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access Input: Z - DRBG Seed: Z - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): Z - DRBG Internal State (V, C): Z - User Password: Z - Crypto Officer Password: Z - RADIUS Secret: Z - TACACS+ Secret: Z - Firmware Load Test Key: Z - SSH DH Private Key: Z - SSH DH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: Z - SSH RSA

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access Private Key: Z - SSH RSA Public Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: Z - SSH Session Encryption Key: Z - SSH Session Authenticatio n Key: Z - TLS DH Private Key: Z - TLS DH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: Z - TLS ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key:

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: Z - TLS RSA Private Key: Z - TLS RSA Public Key: Z - TLS Master Secret: Z - TLS Session Encryption Key: Z - TLS Session Authenticatio n Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): G,W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, C): G,W,E - RADIUS Secret: W,E - TACACS+ Secret: R,E User - SSH DH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH DH Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Peer DH Public Key: W,E - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - SSH RSA Private Key: E - SSH RSA Public Key: R

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access State (V, Key): G,W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, C): G,W,E User - TLS DH Private Key: G,W,E - TLS DH Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer DH Public Key: W,E - TLS DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - TLS ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - TLS ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - TLS ECDSA Private Key: E - TLS ECDSA Public Key: R - TLS RSA Private Key: E - TLS RSA Public Key: R - TLS Master

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access Internal State (V, C): G,W,E User - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: G,R,W - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: R - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: E - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: R

The module supports the firmware load test by using HMAC-SHA2-512 (HMAC Cert. #A4446) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test Key was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to load This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails. Any firmware loaded into the module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.

The module implements alternating Bypass service. Traffic output from the module’s data output interface can be cryptographically protected via IPSec/IKE VPN, or passed as plaintext (Bypass state), depending on the VPN tunnel establishment on the dedicated data output interface. The operator shall assume Crypto Officer role so as to configure IPSec/IKE VPN capability. If no IPSec/IKE VPN was configured, after running two independent internal actions, Module would enter the Bypass state. Before the module executes the Bypass service (sending out plaintext traffic via the data output interface), the module would conduct two independent internal actions to prevent the inadvertent bypass of plaintext data due to a single error. The Crypto Officer can use commands “show access-list” and “show crypto ipsec sa” to verify the module’s Bypass status. In Bypass tests fail, the module would enter an error state, and drop the traffic. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

The module implements Self-initiated cryptographic output capability without external operator request. The Crypto Officer shall configure self-initiated cryptographic output capability. Prior to executing the self-initiated cryptographic output capability, the module conducts two independent internal actions to activate the capability to prevent the inadvertent output due to a single error.

The module supports unauthenticated service. The unauthenticated User/Operators can trigger the self-test service by power-cycling the module, and is able to observe the module’s LEDs status.

The module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure firmware security, the module is protected by RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-512 (RSA Cert. #A4446) algorithm. A Firmware Integrity Test Key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware integrity test only at the pre-operational self-test. The module uses the RSA

2048 bits modulus public key to verify the digital signature. If the firmware integrity test fails, the

module would enter to an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited.

Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the firmware integrity test on-demand.

Type of Operational Environment: Limited

Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required The module utilizes a production-grade enclosure and removable cover along with tamper evidence labels as the physical security mechanisms. Step 1: Turn off and unplug the module. Step 2: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, oil or any other material other than the surface coating from manufacture before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. Step 3: Apply a label to cover the module as shown in the figures below. The tamper evident labels are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive backing. Any attempt to open the module will damage the tamper evident labels or the material of the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident labels have non-repeated serial numbers, they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to verify that the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident labels can also be inspected for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices. The word “FIPS” may appear if the label was peeled back.

Placement: Figure 2. FPR-4200 Front view TEL 1 TEL 2 TEL 3 TEL 4 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Figure

3. FPR-4200 Back view TEL 5 Figure
4. FPR-4200 Left view TEL 6 Figure
5. FPR-4200 Right view TEL 4 TEL 3 TEL 7 TEL 2 TEL 8 Figure
6. FPR-4200 Bottom view © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

TEL 1 TEL 6 TEL 9 TEL 10 TEL 5 Figure 7. FPR-4200 Top view Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Any unused TELs must be securely stored, accounted for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location. Part Numbers: AIR-AP-FIPSKIT=

FPR 4215, FPR 4225 and FPR 4245 Opacity Shield FPR4200-FIPS-KIT= Step 1: Attach the Slide Rail Locking Bracket, #2 in diagram to the Side of the Chassis using the countersink screws #3 in diagram. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Step 2: Attach the Cable Management Bracket (#1) to the Slide Rail Locking Bracket (#2) using the countersink screws (#3) Step 3: Route the Cables through the Cable Management Brackets Step 4: Attach the FIPS Opacity Shield (#1) to the Cable Management Brackets (#3) using the countersink screws (#2) © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Figure 8 Opacity Shield Brackets

m ) ) ) ) ) ) Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods default configuration is completed" status message upon completion. Please note that the Firmware Load Test Key is only used for Firmware Load Test Authentication and not subject to the zeroization requirement. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

s y y Table 18: SSP Table 1 © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

SHA-1 The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing and digital signature verification. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031. At this time, the user should move to SHA2, which is available in this module. 186-4/186-5 As of February 5, 2024, the CMVP does not accept module submissions that implement DSA or RSA X9.31 in the approved mode, other than for signature verification which is approved for legacy use. This module does not implement DSA or RSA X9.31 for signature generation and therefore is unaffected by the current transition from 186-4 to 186-5. As detailed in section 2.7, the CAVP testing performed on the 186-4 algorithms is mathematically similar to the testing performed on the 186-5 algorithms and therefore this module claims compliance with 186-5. This means that no timeline exists in which any of the implemented algorithms will transition from approved to non-approved.”

Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests The module performs the following self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and Conditional self-tests. Prior to the module providing any data output via the data output interface, the module performs and passes the pre-operational self-tests. Following the successful pre-operational self-tests, the module executes the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs). If anyone of the self-tests fails, the module transitions into an © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

error state and outputs the error message via the module’s status output interface. While the module is in the error state, all data through the data output interface and all cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the module transitions to the operational state.

Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information

Table 24: Error States If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the error and enters the Error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and perform the selftests, including the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs.

The validated module firmware was installed onto the respective test platforms listed in Table 2 above. The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps: Step 1: The Crypto Officer must install opacity shields as described in section 7 above. Step 2: The Crypto Officer must apply tamper evidence labels as described in section 7 above. Step 3: The Crypto Officer must securely store any unused tamper evidence labels. Note: Each module has a Type A USB 2.0 port, but it is considered to be disabled once the Crypto Officer has applied the TEL #7. Step 4: Crypto Officer performs the following configurations: ciscoasa# configure terminal Note, the Crypto Officer needs to connect the platform to cisco.com to obtain the license for ASA from Cisco. ciscoasa(config)# license smart register idtoken [token data] ciscoasa(config)#license smart © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

ciscoasa(config-smart-lic)# show license all Smart Licensing Status ====================== Smart Licensing is ENABLED -ORStep

5. Crypto officer shall perform zeroization operation if the module was previously used before the approved mode configuration. ciscoasa(config-smart-lic)# show license summary Smart Licensing is ENABLED Registration: Step 6: Enable “Approved Mode” to allow the module to startup the cryptographic module, such as run power-on self-tests and bypass test by using the following command: ciscoasa(config)# fips enable Note: Startup operational mode will not take effect until you save configuration and reboot the device Rebooting the device will force new self-test Step 7: Crypto Officer can verify the version installed and running ciscoasa(config)# show version Step 8: Crypto Officer will need to configure ASA ciscoasa> en ciscoasa# conf t ciscoasa(config)# Step 9: Assign users a Privilege Level of
6. Step 10: Configure IP address for unit and all distant endpoints. Step 11: Define RADIUS and TACACS+ shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long and secure traffic between the security module and the RADIUS/TACACS+ server via secure (IPSec, TLS) tunnel. Note: Perform this step only if RADIUS/TACAS+ is configured, otherwise skip over and proceed to next step. Step 12: Configure the security module so that any remote connections via Telnet are secured through IPSec connection by using the following commands crypto map interface access-list protocol esp encryption protocol esp integrity If IPSec secure connection is not configured, after running two internal independent actions defined in section 4.6 above, the module would enter the Bypass state. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Step 13: Configure the security module so that any remote connections via Telnet are secured through IPSec. Step 14: Configure the security module so that only approved algorithms are used for IPsec tunnels. Step 15: Configure the security module so that error messages can only be viewed by Crypto Officer. Step 16: Disable the TFTP server. Step 17: Disable HTTP for performing system management in approved mode of operation. HTTPS with TLS should always be used for Web-based management. Step 18: Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using approved algorithms. Step 19: Save the configuration. Step 20: Reboot the module.

Specific Administrator guidance can be found on various Cisco guidance documents: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/secure-firewall/threat-defense/use-case/multiinstance-sec-fw/multi-instance-sec-fw.html, https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/special/cluster-sec-fw/secure-firewallcluster.html, https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/asa923/asdm723/general/asdm-723general-config.html

Specific Non-Administrator guidance can be found in the Cisco Secure Firewall 4200 Datasheet: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/security/firewalls/secure-firewall-4200-ds.html

N/A for this module. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.