Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Cryptographic Module (FPR 1000 Series)

Certificate

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Cryptographic Module (FPR 1000 Series)
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Firmware Load<br/>Update</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>UnAuth</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Cryptographic Module (FPR 1000 Series)
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Firmware Load<br/>Update</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>UnAuth</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>SSH<br/>IKEV</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Cryptographic Module (FPR 1000 Series) Americas Headquarters: Cisco Systems, Inc., 170 West Tasman Drive, San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems logo is registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc.

Defense Cryptographic Module (FPR 1000 Series) (hereinafter referred to as FTD or Module), version 7.4. The following details how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-3, SP 800-140 and ISO/IEC 19790 for a Security Level 2 hardware cryptographic module. The security requirements cover areas related to the design and implementation of a cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic table indicates the actual security levels for each area of the cryptographic module.

Purpose and Use: This module is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module identified as Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) which houses ASA and Firepower solutions with underlying operating system identified as Linux 4 (also referred to as Firepower eXtensible Operating System or FXOS throughout this document). The Module’s operational environment is Limited. FTD delivers enterprise-class firewall for businesses, improving security at the Internet edge, high performance and throughput for demanding enterprise data centers. The FTD solution offers the combination of the industry's most deployed stateful firewall with a comprehensive © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

range of next-generation network security services, intrusion prevention system (IPS), content security and secure unified communications, HTTPS/TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2, SNMPv3 and Cryptographic Cipher Suite B using the ASA Cryptographic Module. Module Type: Hardware Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand Module Characteristics: Cryptographic Boundary: The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire chassis unit’s physical perimeter encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," “rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case, and shown in the figures below and in the Physical Security section. The FPR 1010 has a unique exterior appearance whereas the FPR 1120, FPR 1140 and FPR 1150 all have the same exterior appearance. Where they differ is in Firewall throughput, IPS throughput, IPsec VPN throughput and number of VPN peers allowed. Figure 2: FPR 1120, FPR 1140 and FPR 1150

Tested Module Identification – Hardware: © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 2: Tested Module Identification

• Hardware Tested Module Identification
• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): N/A for this module. Tested Module Identification
• Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module.

N/A for this module. Modes List and Description: Table 3: Modes List and Description operation after initial operations are performed (See Section 11). The module does not claim implementation of a degraded mode of operation. Section 4 provides details on the service

Approved Algorithms: © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 4: Approved Algorithms Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 6: Security Function Implementations

• The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation Guidance C.H scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. The keys for the client and server negotiated in the TLSv1.2 handshake process (client_write_key and server_write_key) are compared and the module aborts the session if the key values are identical. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.

• The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. Two keys established by IKEv2 for one security association (one key for encryption in each direction between the parties) are not identical and abort the session if they are. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
• The module was algorithm tested based on the FIPS 186-4 standard for Digital Signatures. According to IG C.K, this module is 186-5 compliant as all 186-4 CAVP tests performed are mathematically identical to the 186-5 CAVP tests. The Module does not support 186-4 DSA or RSA X9.31 for Signature Generation or Signature Verification.

Table 7: Entropy Certificates Table 8: Entropy Sources The module implements an approved DRBG based on SP800-90Ar1, including CTR_DRBG with Algo Cert. #A4446. The DRBG is used internally by the module (e.g. to generate symmetric keys, seeds for asymmetric key pairs, and random numbers for security functions). The DRBG is seeded by the entropy source described in the table above. The CTR_DRBG (AES-128/192/256) enables Derivation Function capability. Each DRBG is instantiated with a

384-bits long entropy input (corresponding to 384 bits of entropy) and provides at least 256 bits security strength for the cryptographic keys generation while in the approved mode. The Cisco JENT entropy source implementation generates an output that is considered to have full entropy. More information can be found in the public use document for ESV Cert. #E3.

The module generates RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DH asymmetric key pairs compliant with FIPS 186-4, using a NIST SP 800-90Arev1 DRBG for random number generation. In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs CKG for asymmetric keys as per section

5.1 of NIST SP 800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) by obtaining a random bit string directly from an

approved DRBG. The random bit string supports the required security strength requested by the calling application (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H.).

The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of operation: • KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation: - The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength. - The module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 4419 (SSH), RFC

SSH (RFC 4419): MODP-2048 (ID =

14. MODP-3072 (ID =
15. MODP-4096 (ID =
16. TLS (RFC 7919): ffdhe2048 (ID = 256) ffdhe3072 (ID = 257) ffdhe4096 (ID = 258) IKE (RFC 3526): MODP-2048 (ID =
17. MODP-3072 (ID =
18. MODP-4096 (ID = 16) • KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation: - The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

The module supports SSHv2, TLS v1.2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 industrial protocols. Please refer to the Security Function Implementations Table for more information. No parts of IPSec/IKEv2, SNMPv3, SSH and TLS protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

Table 9: Ports and Interfaces The module’s physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in Table 2. The module provides physical ports which are mapped to logical interfaces provided The module’s data output interface will be disabled when performing pre-operational self-tests, loading new firmware, zeroizing keys, or when in an error state.

Method Name

Description one-minute period, as the module at its highest can support at most 17,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one- minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^128), which is less than 1/100,000.

Security Mechanism

Strength Each Attempt

Strength per Minute

Table 10: Authentication Methods and the User role. The module also allows the concurrent operators.

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access - SSH ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: Z - SSH RSA Private Key: Z - SSH RSA Public Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: Z - SSH Session Encryption Key: Z - SSH Session Authenticatio n Key: Z - TLS DH Private Key: Z - TLS DH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: Z - TLS ECDH Public Key:

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: Z - TLS RSA Private Key: Z - TLS RSA Public Key: Z - TLS Master Secret: Z - TLS Session Encryption Key: Z - TLS Session Authenticatio n Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: Z

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: Z - SKEYSEED: Z - IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Authenticatio n Key: Z - SNMPv3 Shared Secret: Z - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: Z - SNMPv3 Authenticatio n Key: Z

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): G,W,E User - SSH DH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH DH Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Peer DH Public Key: W,E - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - SSH RSA Private Key: E - SSH RSA Public Key: R - SSH ECDSA Private Key: E - SSH ECDSA Public Key: R - SSH

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access Private Key: G,W,E - TLS ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - TLS ECDSA Private Key: E - TLS ECDSA Public Key: R - TLS RSA Private Key: E - TLS RSA Public Key: R - TLS Master Secret: G,W,E - TLS Session Encryption Key: G,W,E - TLS Session Authenticatio n Key: G,W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): G,W,E

Name

Descriptio n

Indicator

Inputs

Outputs

Security Functions

SSP Access Secret: G,W,E - SKEYSEED: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE Authenticatio n Key: G,W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State (V, Key): G,W,E User - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: G,R,W - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key:

The module supports the firmware load test by using HMAC-SHA2-512 (HMAC Cert. #A4446) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test Key was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to complete the firmware update service, the Crypto Officer must authenticate to the module before loading the firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails. Any firmware loaded into the module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

The module implements Self-initiated cryptographic output capability without external operator request. The Crypto Officer shall configure self-initiated cryptographic output capability. Prior to executing the self-initiated cryptographic output capability, the module conducts two independent internal actions to activate the capability to prevent the inadvertent output due to a single error.

The module supports Unauthenticated service, where the unauthenticated users can run the self-test service by power-cycling the module.

The module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure firmware security, the module is protected by RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-512 (RSA Cert. #A4446) algorithm. A Firmware Integrity Test Key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware integrity test only at the pre-operational self-test. The module uses the RSA

2048 bits modulus public key to verify the digital signature. If the firmware integrity test fails, the

module would enter to an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited.

Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the firmware integrity test on-demand.

Type of Operational Environment: Limited

Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required The module utilizes a production-grade enclosure and removable cover along with tamper evidence labels as the physical security mechanisms. Appling Tamper Evidence Labels Step 1: Turn off and unplug the module. Step 2: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, oil or any other material other than the surface coating from manufacture before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. Step 3: Apply a label to cover the module as shown in the figures below. The tamper evident labels are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive backing. Any attempt to open the module will damage the tamper evident labels or the material of the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident labels have non-repeated serial numbers, they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to verify that the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident labels can also be inspected for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices. The word “FIPS” may appear if the label was peeled back.

Number: FOUR (4) or Ten (10) FPR-1010 Placement: Figure 3: FPR-1010 Front view © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

TEL 1 Figure 4: FPR-1010 Back view Figure 5: FPR-1010 Left view Figure 6: FPR-1010 Right view © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Figure 7: FPR-1010 Top View TEL 3 TEL 2 TEL 4 Figure 8: FPR-1010 Bottom view © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

FPR-1120/1140/1150 Placement: Figure 9: FPR-1140 Front View TEL 1 TEL 2 Figure 10: FPR-1140 Rear View TEL 3 TEL 4 Figure 11: FPR-1140 Left View TEL 5 Figure 12: FPR-1140 Right View © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

TEL 6 TEL 7 TEL 5 TEL 4 TEL 1 TEL 3 TEL 2 Figure 13: FPR-1140 Top View © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

TEL 8 TEL 10 TEL 9 Figure 14: FPR-1140 Bottom View Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: It is recommended seals be stored in a secure location under controlled access Part Numbers: AIR-AP-FIPSKIT=

FPR1010 Opacity Shield 800-106088-01 Step 1: Slide the 1010 into the opacity case Step 2: Add three screws to bottom of opacity into the 1010 or 1010E. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

FPR1120, 1140 and 1150 Opacity Shield FPR1K-RM-FIPS-KIT Step 1: Attach the Slide Rail Locking Bracket, #2 in diagram to the Side of the Chassis using the countersink screws #3 in diagram. Step 2: Attach the Cable Management Bracket (#1) to the Slide Rail Locking Bracket (#2) using the countersink screws (#3) © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Name Peer Public Key Input

From External (Outside of the

To Module

Format Type Plaintext

Distributio n Type Automated

Entry Type Electroni c

SFI or Algorith m

Step 3: Route the Cables through the Cable Management Brackets Step 4: Attach the FIPS Opacity Shield (#1) to the Cable Management Brackets (#3) using the countersink screws (#2)

m ) ) ) ) ) ) Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods

Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods Performing the zeroization command will explicitly zeroize the module returning the “Factorydefault configuration is completed" status message upon completion. Please note that the Firmware Load Test Key is only used for Firmware Load Test Authentication and not subject to the zeroization requirement. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

y y Table 17: SSP Table 1 n n n © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

• SHA-1: The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing and digital signature verification. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031. At this time, the user should move to SHA2, which is available in this
• FIPS 186-4 to 186-5: As of February 5, 2024, the CMVP does not accept module submissions that implement DSA or RSA X9.31 in the approved mode, other than for signature verification which is approved for legacy use. This module does not implement DSA or RSA X9.31 for signature generation and therefore is unaffected by the current transition from 186-4 to 186-5. As detailed in section 2.7, the CAVP testing performed on the 186-4 algorithms is mathematically similar to the testing performed on the 186-5 algorithms and therefore this module claims compliance with 186-5. This means that no timeline exists in which any of the implemented algorithms will transition from approved to non-approved.

Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests The module performs the following self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and Conditional self-tests. Prior to the module providing any data output via the data output interface, the module performs and passes the pre-operational self-tests. Following the successful pre-operational self-tests, the module executes the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs). If anyone of the self-tests fails, the module transitions into an error state and outputs the error message via the module’s status output interface. While the module is in the error state, all data through the data output interface and all cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the module transitions to the operational state. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests.

Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information

Table 23: Error States If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the error and enters the Error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and perform the selftests, including the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs.

The validated module firmware was installed onto the respective test platforms listed in Table 2 above. The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps: Step 1: The Crypto Officer must install opacity shields as described in section 7 above. Step 2: The Crypto Officer must apply tamper evidence labels as described in section 7 above. Step 3: The Crypto Officer must securely store any unused tamper evidence labels. Note: Each module has a Type A USB 2.0 port, but it is considered to be disabled once the Crypto Officer has applied the TEL #1 (FPR 1010) or TEL #8 (FPR 1120/1140/1150). Step 4. Crypto officer shall perform zeroization operation if the module was previously used before the approved mode configuration. Step 5: The Crypto Officer shall configure the module to be managed by the Firepower Management Center (FMC), and follow the procedure below from the FMC: © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

a) Choose Devices > Platform Settings and create or edit a Firepower policy. b) On the left click “UCAPL/CC Compliance”. c) Choose “CC” from the dropdown under “Enable UCAPL/CC Compliance”. d) Click “Save” to save the changes. e) Click “Deploy” and select “Deploy All”. Step 6: The module will automatically reboot, and will be placed in the approved mode once it is done rebooting. Step 7: Crypto Officer can verify the version installed and running > show version Step 8: Crypto Officer can verify the module is in approved mode: > show fips Step 9: Assign users a Privilege Level of basic. Step 10: Configure IP address for unit and all distant endpoints from the FMC. Step 11: Define RADIUS shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long and secure traffic between the security module and the RADIUS server via secure (IPSec, TLS) tunnel. Note: Perform this step only if RADIUS is configured, otherwise proceed. Step 12: Configure the security module so that any remote connections via Telnet are secured through IPSec. Step 13: Configure the security module so that only approved algorithms are used for all security connections (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, SNMPv3 and IPSec/IKEv2). Step 14: Configure the security module so that error messages can only be viewed by Crypto Officer. Step 15: Enable HTTPS with TLS. HTTPS with TLS should always be used for Web-based management. Step 16: Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using approved algorithms. Step 17: Save and reboot the module.

Specific Admin guidance can be found in the Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense compatibility guide: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/securefirewall/compatibility/threat-defense-compatibility.html

Specific Non-Admin guidance can be found in the Firepower 1000 Series Datasheet and the Firepower 1100 Series Hardware Installation Guide: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/security/firepower-1000-series/datasheet-c78742469.html and https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/1100/hw/guide/hwinstall-1100/overview.html © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.

N/A for this module. © 2021-2025 Cisco Systems, Inc.