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CMVP Validated Module · FIPS 140-3 Security Policy

Nuvoton Cryptographic Library 3.0

Certificate#5098StandardFIPS 140-3Level1TypeHardwareEmbodimentSingle ChipStatusActiveVendorNuvoton Technology Corporation
Sources Certificate page Security Policy PDF
Low review priority  ·  no TCB surface named  ·  last validated 8 months ago. How this is derived →

Certificate

StandardFIPS 140-3
Overall level1
Module typeHardware
EmbodimentSingle Chip
StatusActive
Sunset date11/29/2030
CaveatNo assurance of minimum security of SSPs (e.g., keys, bit strings) that are externally loaded, or of SSPs established with externally loaded SSPs.
VendorNuvoton Technology Corporation

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Nuvoton Cryptographic Library 3.0
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update<br/>Firmware Load<br/>Recovery</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>UnAuth</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;
Underlying clues
flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Nuvoton Cryptographic Library 3.0
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update<br/>Firmware Load<br/>Recovery</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>UnAuth</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>HTTPS<br/>no library/version identified</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

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Nuvoton Technology Corporation Nuvoton Cryptographic Library 3.0 Document Version 1.2 Last update: 2025-11-19 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

4516 Seton Center Parkway, Suite 250

Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Table of Contents
#SectionPage
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© 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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List of Tables
ItemPage
Table 1: Security Levels5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware7
Table 3: Modes List and Description7
Table 4: Approved Algorithms11
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms11
Table 6: Security Function Implementations14
Table 7: Entropy Certificates15
Table 8: Entropy Sources15
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces16
Table 10: Roles17
Table 11: Approved Services22
Table 12: Mechanisms and Actions Required25
Table 13: Storage Areas27
Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods27
Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods28
Table 16: SSP Table 130
Table 17: SSP Table 233
Table 18: Conditional Self-Tests37
Table 19: Conditional Periodic Information41
Table 20: Error States41
Figure 1: Block Diagram6
Figure 2: Nuvoton NPCD324HA0DX (SIO)7
Figure 3: Nuvoton NPCX499HA0BX (EC)7
Figure 4: Nuvoton NPCX499HA1BX (EC)7
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1 General
1.1 Overview

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Hardware version 3.0.7 / 3.0.8 of the Nuvoton Cryptographic Library 3.0. It has a one-to-one mapping to the [SP 800-140Br1] starting with section B.2.1 named “General” that maps to section 1 in this document and ending with section B.2.12 named “Mitigation of other attacks” that maps to section 12 in this document. This document also contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for a Security Level 1 module.

1.2 Security Levels

Table 1 describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the Security Levels of those individual areas: Section Title Security Level

1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security N/A
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A

Overall Level 1 Table 1: Security Levels © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description

Purpose and Use: The Nuvoton Cryptographic Library 3.0 cryptographic module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a Hardware Single Chip cryptographic module. More specifically, the module is considered a sub-chip cryptographic subsystem as defined in IG 2.3.B. Module Type: Hardware Module Embodiment: SingleChip Module Characteristics: SubChip Cryptographic Boundary: The block diagram below shows the cryptographic boundary of the module (shown by the blue dotted outline), and its interfaces with the operational environment. Figure 1: Block Diagram Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): The red outline in Figure 1 above indicates the Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP). © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Figure 2: Nuvoton NPCD324HA0DX Figure 3: Nuvoton NPCX499HA0BX Figure 4: Nuvoton NPCX499HA1BX (SIO) (EC) (EC)

2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification

Tested Module Identification

2.3 Excluded Components

There are no components within the cryptographic boundary excluded from the FIPS 140-3 requirements.

2.4 Modes of Operation

Modes List and Description: The module supports approved services in the approved mode of operation. There are no non-approved services supported by the module. Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator Approved Mode Only approved algorithms are used Approved NCL_STATUS_OK Table 3: Modes List and Description

2.5 Algorithms

Approved Algorithms: The table below lists all security functions of the module, including specific key strengths employed for approved services, and implemented modes of operation. © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Algorithm CAVP Properties Reference Cert AES-CBC A4659 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38A Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-CBC A5276 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38A Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-CCM A4659 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38C AES-CCM A5276 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38C AES-CFB128 A4659 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38A Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-CFB128 A5276 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38A Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-CMAC A4659 Direction - Generation, Verification SP 800-38B Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-CMAC A5276 Direction - Generation, Verification SP 800-38B Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-CTR A4659 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38A Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-CTR A5276 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38A Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-ECB A4659 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38A Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-ECB A5276 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38A Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-GCM A4659 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38D IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-GCM A5276 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38D IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-GMAC A4659 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38D IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Algorithm CAVP Properties Reference Cert AES-GMAC A5276 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38D IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-OFB A4659 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38A Key Length - 128, 192, 256 AES-OFB A5276 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt SP 800-38A Key Length - 128, 192, 256 ECDSA KeyGen A4659 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5 (FIPS186-5) Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates ECDSA KeyGen A5276 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5 (FIPS186-5) Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates ECDSA KeyVer A4659 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5 (FIPS186-5) ECDSA KeyVer A5276 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5 (FIPS186-5) ECDSA SigGen A4659 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5 (FIPS186-5) Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Component - No, Yes ECDSA SigGen A5276 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5 (FIPS186-5) Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Component - No, Yes ECDSA SigVer A4659 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5 (FIPS186-5) Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 ECDSA SigVer A5276 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5 (FIPS186-5) Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Hash DRBG A4659 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes SP 800-90A Mode - SHA2-512 Rev. 1 Hash DRBG A5276 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes SP 800-90A Mode - SHA2-512 Rev. 1 HMAC-SHA2- A4659 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2- A5276 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Algorithm CAVP Properties Reference Cert HMAC-SHA2- A4659 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2- A5276 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2- A4659 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2- A5276 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 KAS-ECC-SSC A4659 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521 SP 800-56A Sp800-56Ar3 Scheme - Rev. 3 ephemeralUnified KAS Role - initiator, responder KAS-ECC-SSC A5276 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521 SP 800-56A Sp800-56Ar3 Scheme - Rev. 3 ephemeralUnified KAS Role - initiator, responder KDF SP800-108 A4659 KDF Mode - Counter, Double Pipeline Iteration, Feedback SP 800-108 Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 8-4096 Increment 8 Rev. 1 KDF SP800-108 A5276 KDF Mode - Counter, Double Pipeline Iteration, Feedback SP 800-108 Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 8-4096 Increment 8 Rev. 1 KTS-IFC A4659 Modulo - 2048, 3072 SP 800-56B Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg2-basic Rev. 2 Scheme KTS-OAEP-basic KAS Role - initiator, responder Key Transport Method Key Length - 1024 KTS-IFC A5276 Modulo - 2048, 3072 SP 800-56B Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg2-basic Rev. 2 Scheme KTS-OAEP-basic KAS Role - initiator, responder Key Transport Method Key Length - 1024 LMS SigVer A4659 LMS Modes - LMS_SHA256_M32_H10, LMS_SHA256_M32_H15, SP 800-208 LMS_SHA256_M32_H20, LMS_SHA256_M32_H25, LMS_SHA256_M32_H5 © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Algorithm CAVP Properties Reference Cert LMS SigVer A5276 LMS Modes - LMS_SHA256_M32_H10, LMS_SHA256_M32_H15, SP 800-208 LMS_SHA256_M32_H20, LMS_SHA256_M32_H25, LMS_SHA256_M32_H5 RSA SigGen A4659 Modulo - 2048, 3072 FIPS 186-5 (FIPS186-5) Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss RSA SigGen A5276 Modulo - 2048, 3072 FIPS 186-5 (FIPS186-5) Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss RSA SigVer A4659 Modulo - 2048, 3072 FIPS 186-5 (FIPS186-5) Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss RSA SigVer A5276 Modulo - 2048, 3072 FIPS 186-5 (FIPS186-5) Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss SHA2-256 A4659 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-256 A5276 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-384 A4659 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-384 A5276 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-512 A4659 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-512 A5276 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 Table 4: Approved Algorithms Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Name Properties Implementation Reference HSS SigVer Key Size:256 Nuvoton Cryptographic The LMS operations used by the HSS bits Library 3.0 (NCL) implementation were CAVP tested in accordance with IG C.O with Certs A4659 and A5276 CKG Type:Asymmetric N/A CKG for asymmetric keys as per SP 800-133Rev2 (ECDSA/ECDH) section 4 example 1 with no post processing on the U value Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module.

2.6 Security Function Implementations

Name Type Description Properties Algorithms AES-CBC BC-UnAuth AES Encryption Key Size:128, 192, 256 bits AES-CBC: and AES Key Strength:128, 192, 256 bits (A4659, A5276) Decryption AES-CCM BC-Auth Authenticated Key Size:128, 192, 256 bits AES-CCM: AES Encryption Key Strength:128, 192, 256 bits (A4659, A5276) and AES Decryption AES-CFB128 BC-UnAuth AES Encryption Key Size:128, 192, 256 bits AES-CFB128: and AES Key Strength:128, 192, 256 bits (A4659, A5276) Decryption AES-CMAC MAC CMAC Message Key Size:128, 192, 256 bits AES-CMAC: Authentication (A4659, A5276) Code Generation and CMAC Message Authentication Code Verification AES-CTR BC-UnAuth AES Encryption Key Size:128, 192, 256 bits AES-CTR: and AES Key Strength:128, 192, 256 bits (A4659, A5276) Decryption AES-ECB BC-UnAuth AES Encryption Key Size:128, 192, 256 bits AES-ECB: and AES Key Strength:128, 192, 256 bits (A4659, A5276) Decryption AES-GCM BC-Auth Authenticated Key Size:128, 192, 256 bits AES-GCM: AES Encryption Key Strength:128, 192, 256 bits (A4659, A5276) and AES Decryption AES-GMAC MAC GMAC Message Key Size:128, 192, 256 bits AES-GMAC: Authentication Key Strength:128, 192, 256 bits (A4659, A5276) Code Generation and GMAC Message Authentication Code Verification © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms AES-OFB BC-UnAuth AES Encryption Key Size:128, 192, 256 bits AES-OFB: and AES Key Strength:128, 192, 256 bits (A4659, A5276) Decryption HMAC MAC HMAC Message Key Size:256, 384, 512 bits HMAC-SHA2Authentication Key Strength:256, 384, 512 bits 256: (A4659, Code Generation A5276) HMAC-SHA2384: (A4659, A5276) HMAC-SHA2512: (A4659, A5276) RSA SigGen DigSig-SigGen RSA Signature Signature Types:PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA SigGen Generation RSA-PSS (FIPS186-5): Message Digest:SHA2-256, SHA2- (A4659, A5276) 384, SHA2-512 Modulus Size:2048, 3072 RSA SigVer DigSig-SigVer RSA Signature Signature Types:PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA SigVer Verification RSA-PSS (FIPS186-5): Message Digest:SHA2-256, SHA2- (A4659, A5276) 384, SHA2-512 Modulus Size:2048, 3072 RSA AsymKeyPair- RSA Scheme:OAEP-basic KTS-IFC: (A4659, encapsulation Encap encapsulation of Modulus Size:2048, 3072 A5276) arbitrary data Standard:SP800-56Brev2 RSA AsymKeyPair- RSA Scheme:OAEP-basic KTS-IFC: (A4659, decapsulation Decap decapsulation of Modulus Size:2048, 3072 A5276) arbitrary data Standard:SP800-56Brev2 ECDSA KeyGen AsymKeyPair- ECDSA Key Generation Method:B.4.2 Testing ECDSA KeyGen KeyGen Generation Candidates (FIPS186-5): CKG Curves:P-256, P-384, P-521 (A4659, A5276) CKG (ECDSA/ECDH): () ECDSA KeyVer AsymKeyPair- ECDSA Key Curves:P-256, P-384, P-521 ECDSA KeyVer KeyVer Verification (FIPS186-5): (A4659, A5276) ECDSA SigGen DigSig-SigGen ECDSA Signature Message Digest:SHA2-256, SHA2- ECDSA SigGen Generation 384, SHA2-512 (FIPS186-5): Curves:P-256, P-384, P-521 (A4659, A5276) © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms ECDSA SigVer DigSig-SigVer ECDSA Signature Message Digest:SHA2-256, SHA2- ECDSA SigVer Verification 384, SHA2-512 (FIPS186-5): Curves:P-256, P-384, P-521 (A4659, A5276) ECDSA SigGen DigSig-SigGen ECDSA Signature Curves:P-256, P-384, P-521 ECDSA SigGen Component Generation (FIPS186-5): Component (A4659, A5276) SHS SHA Message Digest SHA2-256: Generation (A4659, A5276) SHA2-384: (A4659, A5276) SHA2-512: (A4659, A5276) KAS-ECC-SSC KAS-SSC EC Diffie-Hellman Scheme:ephemeralUnified KAS-ECC-SSC Shared Secret Curves:P-256, P-384, P-521 Sp800-56Ar3: Computation (A4659, A5276) Hash_DRBG DRBG Random Number Mode:SHA2-512 Hash DRBG: Generation (A4659, A5276) HSS SigVer DigSig-SigVer HSS Signature Key Size:256 bits LMS SigVer: Verification LMS Modes (A4659, A5276) (CAVP):LMS_SHA256_M32_H10, LMS_SHA256_M32_H15, LMS_SHA256_M32_H20, LMS_SHA256_M32_H25, LMS_SHA256_M32_H5 LMOTS Modes (CAVP):LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W1, LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W2, LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W4, LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 KBKDF KBKDF Key Derivation KDF Modes:Counter, Feedback, KDF SP800-108: Function Double pipeline iteration (A4659, A5276) MAC Modes:HMAC-SHA2- 256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2Key Sizes:256, 384, 512 bits Table 6: Security Function Implementations

2.7 Algorithm Specific Information

The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG C.H scenario 2. The module uses the approved Hash_DRBG to generate the IV with a length of 96-bits. The entropy source producing the DRBG seed is located inside the module’s cryptographic boundary. Steps to comply with the SP800-56Brev2 assurances can be found in section 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance. © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key transport scheme (KTS). However, it does offer approved authenticated algorithms that can be used by an external operator/application as part of an approved KTS.

2.8 RBG and Entropy

The module employs a Hash_DRBG using a SHA-512 PRF. Per section 10.1.1.1 of [SP800-90A], the internal state of the Hash_DRBG is the V, C, and reseed counter. The module makes use of the GetEntropy() interface of the entropy source to make two independent calls that output 512-bit each of full entropy from the SP 800-90B entropy source then concatenating them together to form 1024-bits of entropy input for the DRBG. The Hash_DRBG can generate random numbers with up to 256-bits of security strength. The DRBG internal state is not accessible by non-DRBG functions. All random values used by approved security functions, SSP generation, or SSP establishment method are provided by the Hash_DRBG. Cert Vendor Number Name E161 Nuvoton Table 7: Entropy Certificates Name Type Operational Sample Entropy Conditioning Component Environment Size per Sample Nuvoton Physical NPCX499HA0BX, 512 bits 512 bits The entropy pool is filled with random bits NTCES03 NPCX499HA1BX, provided by an SP800-90B compliant entropy NPCD324HA0DX source whose noise source is from Ring Oscillators in hardware. SHA2-512 is used as the conditioning component with CAVP certs# A4659 and A5276. Table 8: Entropy Sources

2.9 Key Generation

The module generates Keys and SSPs in accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H. The cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per [SP800-133rev2] (vendor affirmed), compliant with [FIPS186-5] and using DRBG compliant with [SP800-90Arev1]. A seed (i.e., the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is obtained from [SP800-90Arev1] DRBG as described in Section 4 example 1 of [SP800-133rev2], where V is a string of binary zeroes, meaning B = U (i.e., the output of an approved RBG). The key generation service for ECDSA, as well as the [SP 800-90Arev1] DRBG have been ACVT tested with algorithm certificates found in Table 3. The module provides key derivation service using SP800-108 KBKDF.

2.10 Key Establishment

The module implements KAS-ECC-SSC EC Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Computation compliant to [SP800-56Arev3] and IG D.F Scenario (2) path (1).

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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces

The underlying logical interfaces of the module are the module’s C language Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). All data input and data output, status ports and control ports are directed through the interface of the module’s logical component, which are the APIs while the physical interface is considered the I/O ports of the sub-chip module through which the data input and data output, status output and control input traverse. Physical Logical Data That Passes Port Interface(s) I/O Ports Data Input Data inputs are provided in the variables passed in the API and callable service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers. I/O Ports Data Output Data outputs are provided in the variables passed in the API and callable service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers. I/O Ports Control Control inputs which control the operation of the module are provided through dedicated Input parameters. I/O Ports Status Status output is provided in return codes and through messages. Documentation for each Output API lists possible return codes. A complete list of all return codes returned by the C language APIs within the module is provided in the header files and the API documentation. Messages are documented also in the API documentation. Power Power Power interface is provided internally by TEOPP in which the cryptographic module is Port embedded. Table 9: Ports and Interfaces The module does not implement a Control Output Interface. © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods

FIPS 140-3 does not require authentication mechanism for level 1 modules. Therefore, the module does not implement an authentication mechanism. N/A for this module.

4.2 Roles

The module supports two authorized roles: A Crypto Officer Role and a User Role. No support is provided for a Maintenance operator. The module does not implement a bypass mode nor concurrent operators. Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods Crypto Officer Role CO None User Role User None Table 10: Roles When a device is delivered, the Crypto Officer is responsible for initializing the module i.e., configure the device by properly setting up key registers for storage of keys/CSPs. The Crypto Officer is implicitly assumed. The User can perform services from Table 11 only after the Crypto Officer takes possession by initializing the module, thus creating data to be protected is generated. The Users of the module are software applications that implicitly assume the User Role when requesting any cryptographic services provided by the module.

4.3 Approved Services

The module only implements Approved security functions in an Approved mode. The Table 5 below lists services available. The module provides an approved service indicator by receiving a return code of “NCL_STATUS_OK to indicate that the service executed an approved security function. NOTE: The module does not implement any non-Approved Algorithms in the Approved Mode of Operation (neither with nor without security claim). The module does not implement any non-approved security functions. The abbreviations of the access rights to keys and SSPs have the following interpretation: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security SSP Access Functions AES Data Encryption NCL AES key, cipher text AES-CBC User Encryption STATUS plain text AES-CCM - AES key: OK AES-CFB128 W,E AES-CTR © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security SSP Access Functions AES-ECB AES-GCM AES-OFB AES AES Decryption NCL AES key, plain text AES-CBC User Decryption STATUS cipher text AES-CCM - AES key: OK AES-CFB128 W,E AES-CTR AES-ECB AES-GCM AES-OFB CMAC Message NCL AES key, MAC AES-CMAC User Message Authentication STATUS message - AES key: Authentication Code Generation OK W,E Code Generation CMAC Message NCL MAC, "VALID" or AES-CMAC User Message Authentication STATUS Message "INVALID" - AES key: Authentication Code Verification OK W,E Code Verification GMAC Message NCL AES key, authentication tag AES-GMAC User Message Authentication STATUS AAD - AES key: Authentication Code Generation OK W,E Code Generation GMAC Message NCL AES key, "PASS" or "FAIL" AES-GMAC User Message Authentication STATUS AAD, IV, tag - AES key: Authentication Code Verification OK W,E Code Verification HMAC Message NCL HMAC key, MAC HMAC User Message Authentication STATUS message - HMAC Key: Authentication Code Generation OK W,E Code Generation Message SHS Message NCL message digest (hash SHS User Digest Digest STATUS value) Generation Generation OK RSA RSA NCL RSA public encapsulated RSA User Encapsulation Encapsulation STATUS key, data to data encapsulation - RSA OK © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security SSP Access Functions using KTS- be Encapsulation OAEP-basic encapsulated Key: W,E RSA RSA NCL RSA private decapsulated RSA User Decapsulation Decapsulation STATUS key, data decapsulation - RSA using KTS- OK encapsulated Decapsulation OAEP-basic data Key: W,E RSA Digital Digital Signature NCL RSA public signature RSA SigGen User Signature Generation STATUS key, Hash_DRBG - RSA Sig Generation OK message, private key: hash W,E algorithm RSA Digital Digital Signature NCL RSA public True or False RSA SigVer User Signature Verification STATUS key, - RSA Sig Verification OK signature, public key: message, W,E hash algorithm ECDSA Digital Digital Signature NCL ECDSA signature ECDSA User Signature Generation STATUS private key, SigGen - ECDSA Generation OK message, Hash_DRBG private key: hash W,E algorithm - DRBG internal state (i.e., Hash_DRBG V and C values): W ECDSA Digital Digital Signature NCL ECDSA signature ECDSA User Signature Generation STATUS private key, SigGen - ECDSA Generation Component OK message, Component private key: Component message Hash_DRBG W,E digest - DRBG internal state (i.e., Hash_DRBG V and C values): W ECDSA Digital Digital Signature NCL ECDSA public True or False ECDSA User Signature Verification STATUS key, SigVer - ECDSA Verification OK signature, public key: message, W,E hash algorithm © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security SSP Access Functions ECDSA Key Asymmetric Key NCL Curve size generated private ECDSA User Generation Pair Generation STATUS and public key KeyGen - ECDSA OK pair Hash_DRBG private key: G,R - ECDSA public key: G,R - ECDH private key: G,R - ECDH public key: G,R - DRBG internal state (i.e., Hash_DRBG V and C values): W - ECDSA intermediate key generation values: G,Z - ECDH intermediate key generation values: G,Z ECDSA Key Asymmetric NCL Public Key True or False ECDSA User Verification Public Key STATUS KeyVer - ECDSA Verification OK public key: W,E - ECDH public key: W,E EC Diffie- Shared Secret NCL received shared secret KAS-ECC- User Hellman Computation STATUS public key, SSC - ECDH public Shared Secret using Elliptic OK possessed key: W,E Computation Curve private key - ECDH private Cryptography key: W,E - ECC Shared Secret: G,R Random Deterministic NCL Seed random numbers Hash_DRBG User Number Random Number STATUS - Entropy Input Generation Generation OK String: G,E - DRBG Seed: G,E - DRBG internal state (i.e., Hash_DRBG V © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security SSP Access Functions and C values): W,E Show Module Outputs Module N/A None Module Name + None User Version Info Name + Version Module Version Number Number SSP Series of APIs N/A handle of zeroized and None User Zeroisation that can be crypto released memory - AES key: Z invoked by the function space - RSA operator to context Encapsulation zeroize crypto Key: Z function context - RSA and release Decapsulation memory space; Key: Z See the list of - RSA Sig APIs mentioned private key: Z in section 9.3 and - RSA Sig

11.4 public key: Z

- ECDSA private key: Z - ECDSA public key: Z - HMAC Key: Z - ECDH private key: Z - ECDH public key: Z - ECC Shared Secret: Z - Entropy Input String: Z - DRBG Seed: Z - DRBG internal state (i.e., Hash_DRBG V and C values): Z - HSS public key: Z - Derived key: Z - Key Derivation Key: Z © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security SSP Access Functions Show-Status Outputs N/A None Operational/Error None User Operational/ status Error status of the module Self-test Executes on- NCL None Pass/Fail status AES-CBC User demand self-test STATUS AES-CCM and outputs OK HMAC Pass/Fail status RSA SigGen RSA SigVer RSA encapsulation RSA decapsulation ECDSA SigGen ECDSA SigVer SHS KAS-ECCSSC Hash_DRBG HSS SigVer KBKDF HSS Signature Digital Signature NCL HSS Public True or False HSS SigVer User Verification Verification STATUS Key, Digital - HSS public OK Signature, key: W,E message Key derivation Perform key NCL Key Derived key KBKDF User derivation STATUS Derivation - Derived key: OK Key G,R - Key Derivation Key: W,E Table 11: Approved Services © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques

The memory technology is non reconfigurable memory as defined in IG 5.A, which will not have any change or degradation of data for a minimum of 10 years after manufactured date. As such, it is considered a hardware only module with a non-modifiable operational environment. The requirements of this area are not applicable to the module. © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements

The Nuvoton Cryptographic Library 3.0 operates in a non-modifiable operational environment. The module is programmed by the manufacturer during the silicon manufacturing (rather than by the user). It maintains its own memory region which can only be accessed by the module. There is no additional application present within the operating environment. The module does not spawn any cryptographic processes. Type of Operational Environment: Limited © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required

The Nuvoton Cryptographic Library 3.0 cryptographic module is a Hardware cryptographic module in a single chip embodiment. More specifically, the module is considered a sub-chip cryptographic subsystem. The module consists of production-grade components that include standard passivation techniques (e.g., a conformal coating applied over the module’s circuitry to protect against environmental or other physical damage). The module does not implement a maintenance role and has no maintenance access interface. Mechanism Inspection Frequency Inspection Guidance Hard tamper-evident Determined by the Observe the coating surrounding the chip for any signs of coating operator damage Table 12: Mechanisms and Actions Required © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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8 Non-Invasive Security

Currently, the non-invasive security is not required by FIPS 140-3 (see NIST SP 800-140F). The requirements of this area are not applicable to the module. © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas

The module does not provide persistent storage for keys/SSPs. Keys/SSPs are stored in memory only and are received for use by the module only at the request of the User firmware. Storage Description Persistence Area Type Name RAM Stored in volatile memory Dynamic Table 13: Storage Areas

9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods

Keys/SSPs entered or output the module are electronically entered in plaintext form from the invoking User firmware running on the same device. No Keys/SSPs are entered into or output from the module from outside of the TOEPP. According to IG 2.3.B, transferring SSPs including the entropy input between a sub-chip cryptographic subsystem and an intervening functional subsystem for Security Levels 1 and 2 on the same single chip is considered as not having Sensitive Security Parameter Establishment crossing the HMI of the sub-chip module per IG 9.5.A. Entropy input remains within the module's sub-chip boundary. Name From To Format Distribution Entry SFI or Type Type Type Algorithm API input Within the TOEPP RAM Plaintext Automated Electronic API output RAM Within the TOEPP Plaintext Automated Electronic Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods

9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods

Keys and SSPs are explicitly zeroized automatically prior to the structure associated with the cipher being deallocated or implicitly when the device is powered down thereby rendering the data irretrievable. Input and output interfaces are inhibited while zeroization is being performed. For Keys and SSPs explicitly zeroized automatically the successful completion of a requested service suffices as the implicit indicator that zeroisation has completed. Keys and SSPs may be zeroized explicitly by calling the respective NCL_<alg>_Clear API listed in the table below which immediately zeroizes all sensitive data. Zeroization Description Rationale Operator Method Initiation Module Reset Power cycles the All SSPs in memory are overwritten by zeros Initiated by module operator Automatic Automatic zeroization Overwrites the targeted SSP's contents in memory Automatically by zeroization when when no longer with zeros using memset/memset_s for any contents the module needed in RAM and REG_WRITE for any contents in hardware registers © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Zeroization Description Rationale Operator Method Initiation NCL_SHA_Clear Clears existing SHA, Overwrites the targeted SSP's contents in memory Initiated by HMAC, KBKDF with zeros using memset/memset_s for any contents operator contexts in RAM and REG_WRITE for any contents in hardware registers NCL_DRBG_Clear Clears existing Overwrites the targeted SSP's contents in memory Initiated by DRBG contexts with zeros using memset/memset_s for any contents operator in RAM and REG_WRITE for any contents in hardware registers NCL_AES_Clear Clears existing AES Overwrites the targeted SSP's contents in memory Initiated by contexts with zeros using memset/memset_s for any contents operator in RAM and REG_WRITE for any contents in hardware registers NCL_RSA_Clear Clears existing RSA Overwrites the targeted SSP's contents in memory Initiated by contexts with zeros using memset/memset_s for any contents operator in RAM and REG_WRITE for any contents in hardware registers NCL_ECC_Clear Clears existing Overwrites the targeted SSP's contents in memory Initiated by ECDSA and ECDH with zeros using memset/memset_s for any contents operator contexts in RAM and REG_WRITE for any contents in hardware registers NCL_HSS_Clear Clears existing HSS Overwrites the targeted SSP's contents in memory Initiated by contexts with zeros using memset/memset_s for any contents operator in RAM and REG_WRITE for any contents in hardware registers Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods

9.4 SSPs

The following summarizes the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module. Modification of PSPs by unauthorized operators is prohibited. Name Description Size - Type - Generated Established Used By Strength Category By By AES key AES Symmetric key 128, 192, Symmetric - AES-CBC used in Data 256 bits - CSP AES-CCM Encryption, Data 128, 192, AES-CFB128 Decryption and 256 bits AES-CMAC Message AES-CTR Authentication Code AES-ECB Generation and AES-GCM verification AES-GMAC © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Name Description Size - Type - Generated Established Used By Strength Category By By RSA RSA OAEP private 2048, 3072 Asymmetric - RSA Encapsulation key bits - 112, CSP encapsulation Key 128 bits RSA RSA OAEP public 2048, 3072 Asymmetric - RSA Decapsulation key bits - 112, PSP decapsulation Key 128 bits RSA Sig private Signature Generation 2048, 3072 Asymmetric - RSA SigGen key bits - 112, CSP

128 bits

RSA Sig public Signature Verification 2048, 3072 Asymmetric - RSA SigVer key bits - 112, PSP

128 bits

ECDSA private Signature Generation P-256, P- Asymmetric - ECDSA ECDSA key 384, P-521 CSP KeyGen SigGen curves - Hash_DRBG

112 to 256

bits ECDSA Intermediate values P-256, P- Asymmetric - ECDSA ECDSA intermediate key for ECDSA Signature 384, P-521 CSP KeyGen SigGen generation Generation curves - Hash_DRBG values 112 to 256 bits ECDSA public Key Verification, P-256, P- Asymmetric - ECDSA ECDSA key Signature Verification 384, P-521 PSP KeyGen KeyVer curves - Hash_DRBG ECDSA

112 to 256 SigVer

bits HMAC Key Hashed Message 112 bits or Symmetric - HMAC Authentication Code greater - CSP Generation 112 bits or greater ECDH private ECDH Shared Secret P-256, P- Asymmetric - ECDSA KAS-ECCkey Computation 384, P-521 CSP KeyGen SSC curves - Hash_DRBG

112 to 256-

bits ECDH Intermediate values P-256, P- Asymmetric - ECDSA intermediate key for ECDH Shared 384, P-521 CSP KeyGen Secret Computation curves - Hash_DRBG © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Name Description Size - Type - Generated Established Used By Strength Category By By generation 112 to 256values bits ECDH public key ECDH Shared Secret P-256, P- Asymmetric - ECDSA ECDSA Computation 384, P-521 PSP KeyGen KeyVer curves - Hash_DRBG KAS-ECC-

112 to 256- SSC

bits ECC Shared ECDH Shared Secret P-256, P- Asymmetric KAS-ECCSecret Computation 384, P-521 shared SSC curves - secret - CSP

112 to 256-

bits Entropy Input Seed DRBG 256-bits - DRBG - CSP Hash_DRBG String 256-bits DRBG Seed Maintaining DRBG 256-bits - DRBG - CSP Hash_DRBG internal state 256-bits DRBG internal Maintaining DRBG 256-bits - DRBG - CSP Hash_DRBG state (i.e., internal state 256-bits Hash_DRBG V and C values) HSS public key Used by HSS 256-bits - Asymmetric HSS SigVer signature verification 256-bits key - PSP Derived key Key derived by 256, 384, Symmetric - KBKDF KBKDF 512 bits - CSP 256, 384,

512 bits

Key Derivation Key used by KBKDF 256, 384, Symmetric - KBKDF Key 512 bits - CSP 256, 384,

512 bits

Table 16: SSP Table 1 Name Input - Storage Storage Zeroization Related SSPs Output Duration AES key API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset input deallocated or Automatic on module reset zeroization NCL_AES_Clear © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Name Input - Storage Storage Zeroization Related SSPs Output Duration RSA Encapsulation API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset RSA Decapsulation Key input deallocated or Automatic Key:Paired With on module reset zeroization NCL_RSA_Clear RSA Decapsulation API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset RSA Encapsulation Key input deallocated or Automatic Key:Paired With on module reset zeroization NCL_RSA_Clear RSA Sig private key API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset RSA Sig public key:Paired input deallocated or Automatic With on module reset zeroization NCL_RSA_Clear RSA Sig public key API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset RSA Sig private input deallocated or Automatic key:Paired With on module reset zeroization NCL_RSA_Clear ECDSA private key API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset DRBG internal state (i.e., input deallocated or Automatic Hash_DRBG V and C API on module reset zeroization values):Derived From output NCL_ECC_Clear ECDSA public key:Paired With ECDSA intermediate key generation values:Paired With ECDSA intermediate RAM:Plaintext Until no longer Automatic DRBG internal state (i.e., key generation values needed zeroization Hash_DRBG V and C values):Derived From ECDSA private key:Paired With ECDSA public key:Paired With ECDSA public key API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset DRBG internal state (i.e., input deallocated or Automatic Hash_DRBG V and C API on module reset zeroization values):Derived From output NCL_ECC_Clear ECDSA private key:Paired With ECDSA intermediate key generation values:Paired With HMAC Key API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset input deallocated or Automatic on module reset © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Name Input - Storage Storage Zeroization Related SSPs Output Duration zeroization NCL_SHA_Clear ECDH private key API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset DRBG internal state (i.e., input deallocated or Automatic Hash_DRBG V and C API on module reset zeroization values):Derived From output NCL_ECC_Clear ECDH public key:Paired With ECDH intermediate key generation values:Paired With ECDH intermediate RAM:Plaintext Until no longer Automatic DRBG internal state (i.e., key generation values needed zeroization Hash_DRBG V and C values):Derived From ECDH private key:Paired With ECDH public key:Paired With ECDH public key API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset DRBG internal state (i.e., input deallocated or Automatic Hash_DRBG V and C API on module reset zeroization values):Derived From output NCL_ECC_Clear ECDH private key:Paired With ECDH intermediate key generation values:Paired With ECC Shared Secret API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset ECDH private output deallocated or Automatic key:Established From on module reset zeroization ECDH public NCL_ECC_Clear key:Established From Entropy Input String RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset DRBG Seed:Derives deallocated or Automatic on module reset zeroization NCL_DRBG_Clear DRBG Seed RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset Entropy Input deallocated or Automatic String:Derived From on module reset zeroization DRBG internal state (i.e., NCL_DRBG_Clear Hash_DRBG V and C values):Derives DRBG internal state RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset DRBG Seed:Derived (i.e., Hash_DRBG V deallocated or Automatic From and C values) on module reset zeroization NCL_DRBG_Clear © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Name Input - Storage Storage Zeroization Related SSPs Output Duration HSS public key API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset input deallocated or Automatic on module reset zeroization NCL_HSS_Clear Derived key API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset Key Derivation output deallocated or Automatic Key:Derived From on module reset zeroization NCL_SHA_Clear Key Derivation Key API RAM:Plaintext Until Module Reset Derived key:Derives input deallocated or Automatic on module reset zeroization NCL_SHA_Clear Table 17: SSP Table 2 © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The module is solely implemented in hardware (i.e., only contains executable code that is stored in non- reconfigurable memory). As such, the module does not perform any pre-operational software/firmware integrity test, but instead performs a Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test on the SHA2-256, HMAC- SHA2-512 and KBKDF-HMAC-SHA2-256 algorithms when the module is powered on. Self-tests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. While the module is executing the above self-tests, no services are available and input and output are inhibited. The module will boot only after successfully passing the SHA2-256, HMAC- SHA2-512 and KBKDF-HMAC-SHA2-256 CASTs. If an error is detected in any self-test, the module will enter the Error State. N/A for this module. The module does not implement a pre-operational bypass test nor pre-operational critical functions test.

10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The module conducts conditional cryptographic algorithm self-test prior to the first operational use of each cryptographic algorithm. The table below describe the conditional tests supported by the module. Algorithm or Test Properties Test Test Indicator Details Conditions Test Method Type HMAC-SHA2- HMAC-SHA2-512 MAC KAT CAST NCL MAC Generation Performed

512 (A4659) Generation KAT STATUS when the

OK module is powered on HMAC-SHA2- HMAC-SHA2-512 MAC KAT CAST NCL MAC Generation Performed

512 (A5276) Generation KAT STATUS when the

OK module is powered on SHA2-256 SHA2-256 Message Digest KAT CAST NCL Message Digest Performed (A4659) KAT STATUS when the OK module is powered on SHA2-256 SHA2-256 Message Digest KAT CAST NCL Message Digest Performed (A5276) KAT STATUS when the OK module is powered on AES-CCM AES-CCM Encryption KAT KAT CAST NCL AES Encryption Prior to the first (A4659) using 128-bit key STATUS operational use OK of the algorithm AES-CCM AES-CCM Encryption KAT KAT CAST NCL AES Encryption Prior to the first (A5276) using 128-bit key STATUS operational use OK of the algorithm © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Algorithm or Test Properties Test Test Indicator Details Conditions Test Method Type AES-CBC AES-CBC Decryption KAT KAT CAST NCL AES Decryption Prior to the first (A4659) using 128-bit key STATUS operational use OK of the algorithm AES-CBC AES-CBC Decryption KAT KAT CAST NCL AES Decryption Prior to the first (A5276) using 128-bit key STATUS operational use OK of the algorithm KTS-IFC KTS-OAEP-basic KAT CAST NCL KTS-OAEP-basic Prior to the first (A4659) Encryption/Decryption KAT STATUS Encryption and operational use with 2048 -bit key and OK Decryption of the algorithm SHA2-256 KTS-IFC KTS-OAEP-basic KAT CAST NCL KTS-OAEP-basic Prior to the first (A5276) Encryption/Decryption KAT STATUS Encryption and operational use with 2048 -bit key and OK Decryption of the algorithm SHA2-256 RSA SigGen RSA Signature Generation KAT CAST NCL RSA Signature Prior to the first (FIPS186-5) KAT with 2048-bit key and STATUS Generation operational use (A4659) SHA2-256 OK of the algorithm RSA SigGen RSA Signature Generation KAT CAST NCL RSA Signature Prior to the first (FIPS186-5) KAT with 2048-bit key and STATUS Generation operational use (A5276) SHA2-256 OK of the algorithm RSA SigVer RSA Signature Verification KAT CAST NCL RSA Signature Prior to the first (FIPS186-5) KAT with 2048-bit key and STATUS Verification operational use (A4659) SHA2-256 OK of the algorithm RSA SigVer RSA Signature Verification KAT CAST NCL RSA Signature Prior to the first (FIPS186-5) KAT with 2048-bit key and STATUS Verification operational use (A5276) SHA2-256 OK of the algorithm ECDSA SigGen ECDSA Signature KAT CAST NCL ECDSA Signature Prior to the first (FIPS186-5) Generation KAT with P-256 STATUS Generation operational use (A4659) curve and SHA2-256 OK of the algorithm ECDSA SigGen ECDSA Signature KAT CAST NCL ECDSA Signature Prior to the first (FIPS186-5) Generation KAT with P-256 STATUS Generation operational use (A5276) curve and SHA2-256 OK of the algorithm ECDSA SigVer ECDSA Signature KAT CAST NCL ECDSA Signature Prior to the first (FIPS186-5) Verification KAT with P-256 STATUS Verification operational use (A4659) curve and SHA2-256 OK of the algorithm © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Algorithm or Test Properties Test Test Indicator Details Conditions Test Method Type ECDSA SigVer ECDSA Signature KAT CAST NCL ECDSA Signature Prior to the first (FIPS186-5) Verification KAT with P-256 STATUS Verification operational use (A5276) curve and SHA2-256 OK of the algorithm KAS-ECC-SSC ECDH shared secret KAT CAST NCL ECDH shared Prior to the first Sp800-56Ar3 computation KAT with P- STATUS secret operational use (A4659) 256 curve OK computation of the algorithm KAS-ECC-SSC ECDH shared secret KAT CAST NCL ECDH shared Prior to the first Sp800-56Ar3 computation KAT with P- STATUS secret operational use (A5276) 256 curve OK computation of the algorithm Hash DRBG Hash_DRBG random KAT CAST NCL SP 800-90Ar1 Prior to the first (A4659) number generation KAT STATUS section 11.3 operational use using predefined seed. OK (instantiate, of the algorithm reseed, generate) health test Hash DRBG Hash_DRBG random KAT CAST NCL SP 800-90Ar1 Prior to the first (A5276) number generation KAT STATUS section 11.3 operational use using predefined seed. OK (instantiate, of the algorithm reseed, generate) health test KDF SP800-108 Counter mode using HMAC- KAT CAST NCL KBKDF Performed (A4659) SHA2-256 using 160-bit key STATUS when the OK module is powered on KDF SP800-108 Counter mode using HMAC- KAT CAST NCL KBKDF Performed (A5276) SHA2-256 using 160-bit key STATUS when the OK module is powered on ECDSA KeyGen Pairwise consistency test PCT PCT NCL Pairwise Performed upon (FIPS186-5) STATUS consistency test generation of a (A4659) OK new ECDSA key pair ECDSA KeyGen Pairwise consistency test PCT PCT NCL Pairwise Performed upon (FIPS186-5) STATUS consistency test generation of a (A5276) OK new ECDSA key pair HSS SigVer HSS KAT SHA2-256 KAT CAST NCL HSS Digital Prior to the first STATUS Signature operational use OK Verification of the algorithm © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Algorithm or Test Properties Test Test Indicator Details Conditions Test Method Type ESV - Repetition Startup test with 1024 RCT CAST NCL Entropy Health Performed Count Test samples; Cutoff value = 35 STATUS Test before seeding (Startup) OK the DRBG ESV - Repetition Cutoff value = 35 RCT CAST NCL Entropy Health Performed Count Test STATUS Test before seeding (Continuous) OK the DRBG ESV - Adaptive Startup test with 1024 APT CAST NCL Entropy Health Performed Proportional samples; Cutoff value = 748 STATUS Test before seeding Test (Startup) OK the DRBG ESV - Adaptive Cutoff value = 748 APT CAST NCL Entropy Health Performed Proportional STATUS Test before seeding Test OK the DRBG (Continuous) Table 18: Conditional Self-Tests The module does not implement a Software/Firmware Load Test, Manual Entry Test, Conditional Bypass Test nor Conditional Critical Functions Test.

10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information

During runtime, operators can initiate the conditional self-tests on demand by calling NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument. The module’s entropy source is powered on only momentarily to seed the module’s SP800-90B DRBG. The module performs entropy source health tests defined in Section 4 of SP800-90B on the generated output prior to seeding the SP800-90B DRBG. After completing its execution, the entropy source powers down. N/A for this module. Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT CAST On demand By calling (A4659) NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT CAST On demand By calling (A5276) NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument SHA2-256 (A4659) KAT CAST On demand By calling NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method algorithm as an argument SHA2-256 (A5276) KAT CAST On demand By calling NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument AES-CCM (A4659) KAT CAST On demand By calling NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument AES-CCM (A5276) KAT CAST On demand By calling NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument AES-CBC (A4659) KAT CAST On demand By calling NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument AES-CBC (A5276) KAT CAST On demand By calling NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument KTS-IFC (A4659) KAT CAST On demand By calling NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument KTS-IFC (A5276) KAT CAST On demand By calling NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument RSA SigGen KAT CAST On demand By calling (FIPS186-5) (A4659) NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method RSA SigGen KAT CAST On demand By calling (FIPS186-5) (A5276) NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument RSA SigVer KAT CAST On demand By calling (FIPS186-5) (A4659) NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument RSA SigVer KAT CAST On demand By calling (FIPS186-5) (A5276) NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument ECDSA SigGen KAT CAST On demand By calling (FIPS186-5) (A4659) NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument ECDSA SigGen KAT CAST On demand By calling (FIPS186-5) (A5276) NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument ECDSA SigVer KAT CAST On demand By calling (FIPS186-5) (A4659) NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument ECDSA SigVer KAT CAST On demand By calling (FIPS186-5) (A5276) NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument KAS-ECC-SSC KAT CAST On demand By calling Sp800-56Ar3 NCL_MISC_SelfTest (A4659) and passing the algorithm as an argument © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method KAS-ECC-SSC KAT CAST On demand By calling Sp800-56Ar3 NCL_MISC_SelfTest (A5276) and passing the algorithm as an argument Hash DRBG (A4659) KAT CAST On demand By calling NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument Hash DRBG (A5276) KAT CAST On demand By calling NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument KDF SP800-108 KAT CAST On demand By calling (A4659) NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument KDF SP800-108 KAT CAST On demand By calling (A5276) NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument ECDSA KeyGen PCT PCT N/A N/A (FIPS186-5) (A4659) ECDSA KeyGen PCT PCT N/A N/A (FIPS186-5) (A5276) HSS SigVer KAT CAST On demand By calling NCL_MISC_SelfTest and passing the algorithm as an argument ESV - Repetition RCT CAST On demand Powering the chip off Count Test (Startup) and on ESV - Repetition RCT CAST On demand Powering the chip off Count Test and on (Continuous) © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method ESV - Adaptive APT CAST On demand Powering the chip off Proportional Test and on (Startup) ESV - Adaptive APT CAST On demand Powering the chip off Proportional Test and on (Continuous) Table 19: Conditional Periodic Information

10.4 Error States

For any of the conditional self-tests, the module enters an error state upon failing the self-test. A failure in the conditional CAST or conditional PCT results in “NCL_STATUS_FAIL”. Likewise, a failure of the entropy source health tests will result in an “ENTROPY_SRC_ERROR” status returned to the user. When in the error state, no cryptographic services are provided, control and data output is prohibited. The only method to clear this error state is to power cycle the device and then successfully pass the conditional self-tests. Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator Error When in this error Failure in The only method to Failure in conditional self-test: State state, no cryptographic conditional self- clear this error state is to NCL_STATUS_FAIL; Failure of services are provided, test (conditional power cycle the device the ENT health test: control and data output CAST or and then successfully ENTROPY_SRC_ERROR is prohibited. conditional PCT) pass the conditional Failure of the self-tests. ENT health test Table 20: Error States © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures

The module is delivered as part of the Nuvoton NPCX499HA0BX (EC), Nuvoton NPCD324HA0DX (SIO) and Nuvoton NPCX499HA1BX (EC) platforms (listed in Table 2). During manufacturing

11.2 Administrator Guidance

The module is configured to be operational by default. If the device starts up successfully and has successfully passed the SHA2-256, HMAC- SHA2-512 and KBKDF-HMAC-SHA2-256 CASTs, it is operating correctly and can begin servicing User requests.

11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance

The module does not establish any SSPs for itself. Instead, the module provides this functionality as a service for other components within the TOEPP. The entity using the IUT must obtain required assurances listed in section 6.4 of SP 80056BRev2 by performing the following steps: 1. The entity requesting the RSA key unwrapping (un-encapsulation) service from the module, shall only use an RSA private key that was generated by an active FIPS validated module that implements FIPS 186-5 compliant RSA key generation service and performs the key pair validity and the pairwise consistency as stated in section

6.4.1.1 of the SP 800-56BRev2. Additionally, the entity shall renew these assurances over time by using any

method described in section 6.4.1.5 of the SP 800-56BRev2.

  1. For use of an RSA key wrapping (encapsulation) service in the context of key transport per IG D.G, the entity using the module, shall verify the validity of the peer's public key using any method specified in section 6.4.2.1 of the SP 800-56BRev2.
  2. The entity using the module, shall confirm the peer's possession of private key by using any method specified in section 6.4.2.3 of the SP 800-56BRev2. To comply with the assurances found in Section 5.6.2 of SP 800-56Ar3, the operator must use module’s approved key pair generation service to generate ephemeral EC Diffie-Hellman key pair, or the key pair must be obtained from another FIPS-validated module. As part of this service, the module will internally perform the full public key validation of the generated public key. The module’s shared secret computation service will internally perform the full public key validation of the peer public key, complying with Sections 5.6.2.2.1 and 5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56Ar3.
11.4 End of Life

Once the module reaches its end-of-life stage (End of Life (EOL) date for the Nuvoton device is 10 years from manufacturing date) or sanitation is initiated by the module’s Operator, it is the Operator’s responsibility to clear all existing SSPs from the module. This can be achieved by either performing a full device reset, or by explicitly invoking the following sequence of APIs to clear the data from all modules:

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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module does not implement security mechanisms to mitigate other attacks. © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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Glossary and Abbreviations AES Advanced Encryption Standard ACVP Algorithm Certification Validation Program CBC Cipher Block Chaining CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code CFB Cipher Feedback CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CSP Critical Security Parameter CTR Counter Mode DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB Electronic Code Book ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography EOL End Of Life FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication GCM Galois Counter Mode HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code HSS Hierarchical Signature System KAS Key Agreement Scheme KAT Known Answer Test LMS Leighton-Micali Signature MAC Message Authentication Code NIST National Institute of Science and Technology OFB Output Feedback PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SHS Secure Hash Standard SSC Shared Secret Computation TOEPP Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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References FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules March 2019 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3 FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program September 2024 https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/documents/fips 140-3/FIPS 140-3 IG.pdf FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) March 2012 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf FIPS186-5 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) February 2023 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard November 2001 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 2008 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 February 2003 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm September 2002 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt RFC5649 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm September 2009 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques December 2001 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication May 2005 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality May 2004 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC November 2007 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping December 2012 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf SP800-56Arev3 NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3 - Recommendation for Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography April 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf SP800-56Brev2 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Br2.pdf SP800-90Ar1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators June 2015 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf SP800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation January 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf SP800-208 NIST Special Publication 800-208 - Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes October 2022 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-208.pdf SP800-108rev1 NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions February 2024 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1.pdf SP800-133rev2 NIST Special Publication 800-133 - Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation December 2012 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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SP800-140Br1 NIST Special Publication 800-140Br1 - CMVP Security Policy Requirements November 2023 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140Br1.pdf © 2025 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.

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