Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

Certificate

Approved Algorithms (44)

Security Levels (Table 1)

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Recovery<br/>update</i>"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated /<br/>self-test / status service<br/>surface<br/><i>Symmetric Encryption and Decryption<br/>Self-test<br/>Show Status</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>IPSEC<br/>no library/version identified</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Some services may process<br/>input before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Recovery<br/>update</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[high] Unauthenticated / self-test / status service surface<br/><i>Symmetric Encryption and Decryption<br/>Self-test<br/>Show Status</i><br/>src: securityPolicy.services"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>TLS<br/>IPSEC<br/>no library/version identified</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C5,C6 clueLow;
  class C3 clueHigh;

Security Policy, page by page

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Apple Inc. Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Prepared for: Apple Inc. One Apple Park Way Cupertino, CA 95014 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

Austin, TX 78759 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Table of Contents This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] List of Tables List of Figures This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] cryptographic module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for

N/A N/A N/A Table 1: Security Levels This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

Purpose and Use: The Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] cryptographic module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) provides implementations of low-level cryptographic primitives to the Device OS’s (visionOS) Security Framework and Common Crypto. The module provides services intended to protect data in transit and at rest. The module is optimized for library use within the Device OS user space and does not contain any terminating assertions or exceptions. It is implemented as a Device OS dynamically loadable library. After the library is loaded, its cryptographic functions are made available to the Device OS application. Any internal error detected by the module is returned to the caller with an appropriate return code. The calling Device OS application must examine the return code and act accordingly. The module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented return codes, thus indicating the module’s status. Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers. Module Type: Software Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand Module Characteristics: Cryptographic Boundary: The module cryptographic boundary is delineated by the dotted green rectangle in the Figure

1. The module executes within the user space of the computing platforms and operating systems listed in the Tested Operational Environments Table section 2.2. Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): The physical perimeter is represented by the most exterior black line in the block diagram Figure
2. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Figure 1: Block Diagram

Tested Module Identification

• Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Module Identification
• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): corecrypto14.1 N/A Table 2: Tested Module Identification
• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) Tested Module Identification
• Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

None for this module Modes List and Description: NonApproved Operation is assumed automatically without any specific configuration. If the device starts up successfully then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Table 5: Approved Algorithms Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] N/A Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Table 8: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms

AESCFB128:Key This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] AsymKeyPairKeyGen This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] AsymKeyPairKeyVer This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Sp80056Ar3:Key SP80056Cr2:Shared This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] SHA2512/256:N/A This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Table 9: Security Function Implementations

GCM IV AES-GCM IV is constructed in compliance with IG C.H scenario 1 (TLS 1.2) and scenario 2 (IPsecv3). The GCM IV generation follows RFC 5288 shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2. This implementation is compatible with acceptable AES-GCM ciphersuites from SP800-52r2 Section 3.3.1. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. The module does not implement the TLS protocol. The module’s implementation of AES-GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module’s cryptographic boundary. The design of the TLS protocol implicitly ensures that the nonce_explicit, or counter portion of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values. The GCM IV generation follows RFC 4106 and shall only be used for the IPsec-v3 protocol version 3. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. The module does not implement the IPsec protocol. The module’s implementation of AES-GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module’s cryptographic boundary. The design of the IPsec protocol implicitly ensures that the nonce_explicit, or counter portion of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values. In compliance with IG C.H section 3, if the module's power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption/ decryption shall be re-distributed. AES-XTS AES-XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications. The length of the AES-XTS data unit does not exceed 220 blocks. The module checks explicitly that Key_1 ≠ Key_2 before using the keys in the XTS-Algorithm to process data with them compliant with IG C.I. Key Derivation using SP 800-132 PBKDF2 The module implements a CAVP tested key derivation function compliant to SP800-132 and IG D.N. The service returns the key derived from the provided password to the caller. The length of the password used as input to PBKDFv2 shall be at least 8 characters and the worst-case probability of guessing the value is 10^8 assuming all characters are digits only. The user shall choose the password length and the iteration count in such a way that the combination will This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] make the key derivation computationally intensive. PBKDFv2 is implemented to support the option 1a specified in section 5.4 of SP800-132. The derived keys may only be used in storage applications. KAS The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key agreement scheme (KAS). However, it does offer some or all of the underlying KAS cryptographic functionality to be used by an external operator/application as part of an approved KAS. Digital signature generation using SHA-1 is non-approved and not allowed in approved services. Digital signature verification using SHA-1 is considered approved (“Legacy”). HMAC using SHA-1 are approved. The SHA-1 algorithm, as implemented by the module, will be non-approved for all purposes except signature verification, starting January 1, 2031. Note: Algorithms designated as “Legacy” can only be used on data that was generated prior to the Legacy Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M.

Table 10: Entropy Certificates corecrypto nonphysical NonPhysical Table 11: Entropy Sources Entropy sources: The random bits used to seed and reseed the module’s approved DRBG comes from a physical entropy source residing within the TOEPP. The entropy source includes a vetted conditioning component in the form of a SHA-256. The min-entropy rate at the output of the entropy source (h_out for the output of the conditioning component per Section 3.1.5 of SP 800-90B) is 256 bits per 256-bit output. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] The entropy source follows IG 9.3.A scenario 1.(b) i.e., the module is a software module and the entropy sources reside outside of the cryptographic boundary but inside module's TOEPP. DRBG(s): The module implements an SP 800-90ARev1 approved deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) in the form of a CTR_DRBG using AES-256 with derivation function and without prediction resistance. The module performs DRBG health tests according to SP800-90ARev1 section 11.3. DRBG Output: The output of CTR_DRBG provides up to 256-bits of security strength.

The module implements asymmetric key generation compliant to SP800-133r2 Section 4 examples 1 and is listed as a vendor affirmed algorithm per FIPS 140_3 IG D.H. The seed material used to generate the asymmetric key pairs is provided directly output from the module’s CTR_DRBG.

The module implements KAS-FFC-SSC and KAS-ECC-SSC compliant to [SP800-56Ar3] and is listed as an approved algorithm per FIPS 140_3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (1). The module only implements shared secret computation. All required assurances from Section 5.6.2 of SP 80056Arev3 are met by the module.

No parts of the TLS or IPsec protocols, other than those mentioned above, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 12: Ports and Interfaces This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

N/A for this module. FIPS 140-3 does not require an authentication mechanism for level 1 modules. Therefore, the module does not support an authentication mechanism for Crypto Officer. The Crypto Officer role is authorized to access all services provided by the module (see Table - Approved Services and Table - Non-Approved Services).

The module implements a dedicated API function to indicate if a requested service utilizes an approved security function. The approved service indicator utilizes one of two functions (fips_allowed and fips_allowed_mode) depending on the service in question. Calling fips_allowed_mode with any approved AES mode will return a zero to indicate it is an approved algorithm. Similarly, calling fips_allowed with any other approved algorithm will return zero. Calling either of these with an algorithm not listed in the Approved Algorithms Table will return a non-zero value, and as such indicates a non-approved service. g / keywrapping This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] , , d n W,E d n W,E This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] d ): G,W,E : W,E W,E W,E G,R,E This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] r, n ): W,E G,R ): W,E G,R ): W,E - DiffieHellman G,R - DiffieHellman W,E - DiffieHellman This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] r, n N/A n G,R W,E DiffieHellman G,R This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] of DiffieHellman DiffieHellman N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A keywrapping Z Z This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] ): Z :Z - DiffieHellman Z Z - DiffieHellman DiffieHellman Table 14: Approved Services

This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Table 15: Non-Approved Services

The module does not load any external software. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the module. The HMAC-SHA256 implemented in the module is used as the approved algorithm for the integrity test. If the test fails, the module enters an error state where no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited i.e. the module is not operational.

The module’s integrity test can be performed on demand by power-cycling the computing platform. Integrity tests on demand is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable

The module is supplied as part of Device OS, a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the computing platforms specified in section 2.2. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

The FIPS 140-3 physical security requirements do not apply to the Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] since it is a software module. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

Per IG 12.A, until the requirements of NIST SP 800-140F are defined, non-invasive mechanisms fall under ISO/IEC 19790:2012 Section 7.12 Mitigation of other attacks. The requirements of this area are not applicable to the module. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

s t c t c s m Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods

N/A Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods Data output interfaces are inhibited while zeroisation is performed. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

n AES keywrapping ) h 8262144 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] n h DiffieHellman DiffieHellman DiffieHellman DiffieHellman MODP2048, MODP3072, MODP4096, MODP6144, MODP2048, MODP3072, MODP4096, n This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] n EC DiffieHellman EC DiffieHellman EC DiffieHellman h MODP6144, n Table 19: SSP Table 1 AES keywrapping This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] D.L This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] DiffieHellman DiffieHellman EC DiffieHellman Table 20: SSP Table 2 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited.

The module performs a pre-operational software integrity automatically when the module is loaded into memory (i.e., at power on) before the module transitions to the operational state. A used to perform the approved integrity technique. Prior to using HMAC-SHA-256, a Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CAST) is performed. HMACSHA2-256 Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] HMACSHA2-256 HMACSHA2-256 HMACSHA2-256 HMACSHA-1 HMACSHA-1 HMACSHA2-512 HMACSHA2-512 HMACSHA2512/256 HMACSHA2512/256 HMACSHA3-224 SHA2512/256 SHA2512/256 HMACSHA3-224 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] HMACSHA3-256 HMACSHA3-256 HMACSHA3-384 HMACSHA3-384 HMACSHA3-512 HMACSHA3-512 and SHA2256 and SHA2256 and SHA2256 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] and SHA2256 KAS-ECCSSC Sp80056Ar3 KAS-FFCSSC Sp80056Ar3 SP80056Cr2 ECDH: SP80056Arev3 5.6.2.1.4 ECDH: SP80056Arev3 5.6.2.1.4 key, SHA2256 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Passwordbased key Passwordbased key SP 80056Arev3 5.6.2.1.4 This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests

Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

e s preConditiona 3) g the preoperational This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] e s Table 25: Error States

The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational or conditional self-tests on demand for periodic testing of the module by rebooting the system (i.e., power-cycling). This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

Startup Procedures: The module is built into Device OS defined in section 2 and delivered/ installed with the respective Device OS. There is no standalone delivery of the module as a software library. Installation Process and Authentication Mechanisms: The vendor’s internal development process guarantees that the correct version of module goes with its intended Device OS version. For additional assurance, the module is digitally signed by vendor, and it is verified during the integration into Host Device OS. This digital signature-based integrity protection during the delivery/integration process is not to be confused with the HMAC-256 based integrity check performed by the module itself as part of its pre-operational self- tests.

The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table - Non-Approved Services. If the device starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode. Apple Platform Certifications guide (platform certifications) and Apple Platform Security guide (SEC) are provided by Apple which offers IT System Administrators with the necessary technical information to ensure FIPS 140-3 Compliance of the deployed systems. This guide walks the reader through the system’s assertion of cryptographic module integrity and the steps necessary if module integrity requires remediation.

The Crypto Officer shall consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module.

• AES-GCM see section 2.7. AES-XTS see section 2.7. PBKDF see section 2.7.

All of the RSA modulus sizes used by the cryptographic module have been CAVP tested and the certificates are listed in the Approved Algorithms Table of this security policy. There are no untested RSA modulus sizes used by the cryptographic module. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

The module secure sanitization is accomplished by first powering the module down, which will zeroize all SSPs within volatile memory. Following the power-down, an uninstall by way of system wipe or system update will zeroize the corecrypto-1638.100.62 binary file listed in Table 2. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.

Apple corecrypto Module v14.1 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]

The module does not claim mitigation of other attacks. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.